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PREFACE 
This dissertation is a study for a single state, Oklahoma, and 
is designed to test the prevailing Mowry-Chandler-Hofstadter thesis 
concerning progressivism. The "progressive profile" as developed in 
the Mowry-Chandler-Hofstadter thesis characterizes the progressive 
as one who possessed distinctive social, economic, and political 
qualities that distinguished him from the non-progressive. In 1965 
in a political history seminar at Central Missouri State College, 
Warrensburg, Missouri, I tested the above model by using a single 
United States House representative from the state of Missouri. When 
I came to the Oklahoma State University in 1967, I decided to expand 
my test of this model by examining the thirteen representatives from 
Oklahoma during the years 1901 through 1917. In testing the thesis 
for Oklahoma, I investigated the social, economic, and political 
characteristics of the members whom Oklahoma sent to the United States 
House of Representatives during those years, and scrutinized the role 
they played in the formulation of domestic policy. In addition, a 
geographical analysis of the various Congressional districts suggested 
the effects the characteristics of the constituents might have on the 
representatives. Since progressivism was largely manifested in 
Congressional enactments, I selected forty-four national political, 
economic, and social issues which could illuminate the part played by 
Oklahoma's delegation in the development and revision of national 
legislation. The analysis included national, state, and local news-
iii 
paper and periodical files as well as the speeches and roll call votes 
found in the Congressional Record. The comprehensive record of the 
thirteen Oklahoma House members who served from 1901 through 1917 was 
thus analyzed so as to assess the progressive or non-progressive nature 
of their representation. 
I would like to thank the members of my graduate conunittee for 
their aid throughout my entire graduate program and for their careful 
reading of this dissertation: Dr. John F. Rooney, of the Geography 
Department; Dr. LeRoy H. Fischer, Dr. John A. Sylvester, Dr. Douglas 
D. Hale, and Dr. Theodore L. Agnew, of the History Department. I owe 
special thanks to Dr. Homer L. Knight, who, as head of the History 
Department, made it possible for me to pursue this academic degree, 
and to Dr. Agnew, the chairman of my graduate conunittee, whose long, 
hard, and able editorship of my dissertation is appreciated. Dr. Agnew 
will be remembered for his patience and promptness in seeing me through 
this academic effort. 
I would also like to thank Dr. Perry McCandless, Professor of 
History at Central Missouri State College, Warrensburg, Missouri, for 
planting ideas in my mind about the nature of progressivism; many 
friends who tolerated me during this effort; and the people who helped 
with the research of this manuscript, especially Mrs. Heather Lloyd, 
the reference librarian of the Oklahoma State University Library, and 
Mrs. Louise Cook, newspaper librarian at the Oklahoma Historical 
Society, Oklahoma City. 
But most of all, I want to thank my wife, Janie, whose encourage-
ment, patience, and proofreading assistance was of inestimable value. 
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CHAPTER I 
PROGRESSIVISM: DEFINITIONS AND HISTORIOGRAPHY 
Before assessing the nature and extent of progressivism in 
Oklahoma, a definit;ion of term:;,, as they are meant to be understood 
in this study, is necessary. An analysis of the following questions 
will be attempted: Who was a progressive? What was progressivism? 
What was the progressive movement? What is the progressive school of 
historiography? Perhaps a discussion of the differences of these 
terms will lead to a clearer understanding of the vernacular that has 
been used to describe this epoch in American history. With the 
terminology in greater perspective, an examination of the various 
schools of interpretation of the period will follow. 
~ progressive has been defined by an older source as one who 
favors the gradual introduction of ~olitical and social reforms by 
government action. 1 A more recent source defined progressive as a 
term applied, rather vaguely, to persons or theories that claim to 
favor progress. It stated that the term has often been a convenient 
2 label for the omnibus category of views which are "left of center.it 
For the historian, there appears to be general agreement; that the 
1Edward c. Smith and Arnold J. Zurcher, Dictionary of American 
Politics (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1944), 299a 
2Maurice Cranston and Sanford A. Lakoff, eds.,! Glossary of 
Political Ideas (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 131. 
2 
goals of the progressive included tariff, tax, and banking reform; 
regulation of railroads, of trusts, and the employment of child labor; 
improvement of the conditions of the laborer and the farmer; and 
political innovations conceived in the interest of perfecting democra-
cy ~nd representative government. These goals, for the purposes of 
this study, constitute a working definition of the progressive pro-
gram and thus form the basis for a working definition of a progres-
sive. The terms progressive and progressivism, as used in the present 
study, do not necessarily reflect any commitment on the part of the 
writer to the view that there was at any time during the period from 
1901 to 1917 any large group of men who were in agreement on all of 
the goals included in the reform program. Rather these terms and 
the definition refer to a trend that historians have apparently ob-
served in the politics of the United States during the period from 
1901 to L917, and to the issues that historians suggest became upper-
most in the politics of that period. Further insight as to the 
definition of a progressive and progressivism can be obtained by 
looking at the writings of the avowed progressives and how they 
viewed themselves and their beliefs. 
J~gl~g by the autobiographies of many of the progressives, Henry 
George was a kind of Martin Luther to progressivism, a critic whose 
challenge to orthodoxy in his 1879 book entitled Progress~ Poverty 
opened the gateway to numerous conversions to the reform movement. 
Writing in the midst of the depress;i.oh of the 1870' s, George saw 
progress as a social process, rather than a mere advance of science 
or a fulfillment of individual fortunes. He believed that the "gar-
ments of laws, customs, and political institutions which each society 
weaves for itself, are constantly tending to become too tight as the 
3 
society develops•" In a fine metaphor that struck the keynote of 
progressive thought• George suggested that men in a community, like 
sailors adrift in a lifeboat, must pull together to conserve their 
energies and together chart their course. George's work became some-
thing of a catechism for .progre.s.sives, especially those who became 
active.at the outset of the twentieth century. 
The rhetoric of the progressives seemed to satisfy their need 
3 
for a sense of forward motion, and their phraseology held deep signiH-
capce in· their· beliefs. , Therefore, additional understanding of 
progressivism can be gained by evaluating the words of three of the 
leading progressives of the periodt Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow 
Wilson, and Robert M. LaFollette, who convey the sentiments o:f: the 
progressive spirit~ 
Roosevelt, as he battled at Armageddon in 1912, said that 
"progressives stand for the rights of the people." His approach to 
national problems was one of "understanding and good faith." The 
main purpose of progressivism• according 'to this leading progressive, 
was 1.1to place the American people in possession of their birthright, 
to secure for all the American people unobstructed access to the 
4 fountains of measureless prosperity which their creator offers them~" 
In an article entitled ''Who is a Progressive," written earlier in 
3 Henry George, Progress and rov~r,ty (New York: Doubleday, Page 
and Company, 1929), 514. 
4 Theodore Roosevelt, "A Confession of Faith," address before the 
national convention of the Progressive Party, Chicago\ August 6, 1912, 
in Herman Hagedorn, ed., The Works of Theodore Roosevelt (New York: 
c, Scribner, 1926), xvn,256, 260,287. · 
4 
1912, Roosevelt gives an excellent peroration regarding his definition 
of a progressive and a non-progressive: 
The essential difference, as old as civilized history, is 
between the men who, with fervor and broad sympathy and 
imagination, stand for the forward movement; the men who 
stand for the uplift and betterment of mankind, and who 
h~ve faith in the people, on the one hand; and, on the 
other hand, the men of narrow vision and small sympathy, 
who are not stirred by the wrongs of others. With these 
latter stand also those other men who distrust the people, 
and many of whom not merely distrust the people, but wish 
to keep them helpless so as to exploit them for their own 
benefit.5 
Wilson, a second spokesman of the progressives, eloquently expressed 
the progressive mood as he campaigned for the presidency in 1912: 
There has come over the land that un-American set of 
conditions which enables a small number of men who control 
the government to get favors from the government; by those 
favors to exclude their fellows from equal business 
opportunity; by those favors to extend a network of control 
that will presently dominate every industry in the country, 
and so make men forget the ancient time when America lay 
in every hamlet, when America was to be seen in every fair 
valley, when America displayed her great forces on the 
broad prairies, ran her fine fires of enterprise up over the 
mountainsides,, and down into the bowels of the earth, and 
eager men were everywhere captains of industry, not 
employees; not looking to the distant city to find 7otit what 
they'might do, but looking about among their neighbors, 
finding credit according to their character, not according 
to their connections, finding credit in proportion to what 
was known to be in them and behind them, not in proportion 
to the securities they held that were approved where they 
were not known.6 
And looking back in 1913 upon his hard battles for the people as 
Governor of Wisconsin, LaFollette penned a fitting epilogue, not only 
for progressivism in Wisconsin, but for progressivism in many other 
5 Theodore Roosevelt, 11Who is a Progressive," The Outlook, C 
(April 13, 1912), 809. 
6woodrow Wilson, "The New Freedom, A Call for the Emancipation of 
The Generous Energies of a People: The Old Order Changeth," World's 
~, XXV (January, 1913), 259. 
states as well: 
This closes the account of my services in Wisconsin--a time 
full of struggles, and yet a time that I like to look back 
upon. It has been a fight supremely worth making, and I 
want it to be judged, as it will be ultimately, by results 
actually attained. If it can be shown that Wisconsin is 
a happier and better state to live in, that its institutions 
are more democratic, that the opportunities of all its 
people are more equal, that social justice more nearly 
prevails, that human life is safer and sweeter--then I 
shall rest content in the feeling that the Progressive 
movement has been successful.7 
These were progressives as individuals. What can now be said of the 
so-called progressive movement? 
The historian has generally attempted to place historical move-
5 
ments within definite time brackets, and such is the case with progres-
sivism. It is difficult to delimit the progressive period because of 
its complexity and far-reaching effects. This is evidenced by those 
historians who believe it started as early as the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century and those historians who see it manifested as late 
as the third and fourth decades of the twentieth century. However, 
for the purpose of this study and in agreement with many historians, 
the progressive era wiU roughly coincide with the beginning of the 
twentieth century and will end with the American entry into the Great 
War in 1917. 
To begin a definition of the progressive movement, it should be 
pointed out that there was no such thing as~ progressive movement. 
That is, there was no organized campaign united all diverse efforts 
at political, social, and economic reform. It manifested itself in no 
single political party, geographical section, or social class. On the 
7Robert M. LaFollette, LaFollette 1 s Autobiography (Madison, 
Wisconsin: The Robert M. LaFollette Company, 1913), 368-369. 
c.ontrary, there were numerous progres·sive movements operating in 
different regions at different levels of government simultaneously. 
The progressive movement meant different things to different people 
in different regions of the country. As Thomas H. Greer has written, 
11H;ere was a social reform movement with no set leadership, no i;,ingle 
platform, no disciplined organization, and no planned means of 
action. 118 Another view of the mov~ent is expressed by George E. 
Mowry, one of the leading students of American progressivism, who 
states that it was nothing:.less than 11 a social quest which, in its 
broadest aspects, attempted to find solutions for the amazing number 
of domestic and foreign problems spawned by the great industrial, 
9 
urban, and population changes of the late nineteenth century." De-
fining the movement becomes even more perplexing when one analyzes 
the more recent interpretation presented by Peter G. Filene• a North 
Carolina University historian, who argues that "the progressive move-
10 
ment11 never existed as such. 
Yet, to some degree, progressivism rested on definable, widely 
sqared, unifying principles. A contemporary historian of that age of 
reform, Benjamin P. DeWitt, summed them up this way some fifty-six 
years ago: 
In this widespread political agitation that at first sight 
seems so incoherent and chaotic, there may be distinguished 
upon examination and analysis three tendencies. The first of 
8Thomas H. Greer, American Social Reform Movements: Their 
Pattern Since ~ (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1949), 93. 
9 George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of 
Modern America, 1900~19Tf'"(~ ~rk: Harper and Row,"'"1958), xiii. 
lOPeter G. Filene, "An Obituary for 'The Progressive Movement,'" 
American Quarterly, XXII (Sp;ring, 1970), 20-34. 
6 
these tendencies is found in the insistence by the best men in 
all political parties that special, minority, and corrupt 
influence in government--nati,onal, state, and city--be re-
moved; the second tendency is found in the demand that 'the 
structure or machinery of government, which has hitherto 
been admirably adapted to control by the few, be so changed 
and modified that it will be more difficult for the few, 
and easier for the many, to control; and, finally, the 
third tendency is found in the rapidly growing conviction that 
the functions of government at present are too restricted and 
that they must be increased and extended to relieve social 
and economic distress. These three tendencies with varying 
emphasis are seen to-day in the platform and program of 
every political party; they are manifested in the political 
changes and reforms that are advocated and made in the 
nation, the states, and the cities; and, because of their 
universality and definitenesi·,. they may be said to consti-
tute the real progressive movement.11 
Ideologically speaking, progressivism culminated and diverged in 
the philosophies and programs set forth by Wilson and Roosevelt in 
the 1912 campaign for the presidency. Roosevelt termed his program 
.7 
the "New Nationalism," while Wilson's became known as the "New Freedom." 
This divergence among progressives signaled a full-dress debate over 
the two conflicting progressive theories of government. Roosevelt's 
"New Nationalism" was the consummation of a steady progression of this 
political thought and that of a significant group of progre.ssive 
thinkers. By 1909 Roosevelt had adopted a program demanding broad 
federal e~onomic and social regulation, but he had not yet formulated 
a cohe~ent political philosophy to justify his program. Herbert Croly 
provided this philosophy when, in 1909, he published the political 
treatise, The Promise£!. American~· This could be correctly termed 
the philosophical underpinning of progressivism since it became the 
rationale for the "New Nationalism" as well as for the "New Freedom" 
11Benjamin P. DeWitt, The Progressive Movement: ! Non-Partisan, 
Comprehensive Discussion of Current Tendencies in American Politics 
(New York: Macmillan, 1915), 4-5. 
8 
after 1915. Croly contended that the Hamiltonian belief in direct 
intervention of government in the economic realm had come to be associ-
ated with aristocracy and special privilege, while the Jeffersonian be-
lief :i,n weak government had come to be identified with a democracy of 
equal rights and opportunities. What he demanded in his political 
treatise was that the progressiv.es abandon their Jeffersonian .prejudices 
against strong government and adopt Hamiltonian means to achieve 
Jeffersonian ends. Roosevelt translated these ideas into living 
political principles and proposed his "New Nationalism," a dynamic 
democracy that would recognize the inevitability of concentration in 
industry and bring the great corporations under federal control, and 
that would press for legislation usually associated with the modern 
12 
concept of the welfare state. 
Wilson had no well defined program when his campaign began; 
fundamentally he was still a states-rights Democrat who believed that 
federal power should be used only to sweep away special privilege to 
help restore competition in business. He wanted no part of an idea 
that would have the :l;ederal government move directly into the economic 
:t;"ealm. Louis D. Brandeis, one of the leading progressive lawyers in 
the country, helped Wilson clarify his thought and formulate the 
notion that the most vital question confronting the American people 
was preservation of economic freedom. The government was to provide 
the means by which business could be set free from the shackles of 
monopoly and special privilege. Wilson attacked Roosevelt's proposals 
for social welfare legislation and his "paternalistic" attitude toward 
12Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1954), 18-19.--
labor. He campaigned under the strong conviction that he was battling 
13 for the old American way of life. Due to pressure from Brandeis 
and other individuals and factions from within the Democratic Party, 
perhaps as much because of the upcoming presidential contest of 1916, 
Wilson began to implement the "New Nationalism" program after 1915. 
Regardless of the differences in philosophical methods, the first 
years of the twentieth century witnessed a flurry of reform legisla-
tion unparalleled in American history up to that point. 
Since that era of social, economic, and political ferment, 
historians have attempted to create an interpretation of progressivism 
because, as Richard Hofstadter has explained, "it is the historian's 
business ••• to assess the general direction of social movements 
14 in the past." As yet, however, no one has been able to construct an 
unchallenged interpretation, one which will account for the variety 
as well as the unity of the period. The latter part of this segment 
of the study will analyze the various interpretations that have been 
applied to progressivism. 
Until the post-World War II period, there was little controversy 
among historians about the nature and character of the progressive 
years. Most American historians were writing within the tradition 
of the progressive school of historiography. The progressive school 
took their cues from the intellectual ferment of the period from 1901 
to 1917, from the demands for reform raised by the progressives, and 
from the new burst of political and intellectual activity that came 
13Ibid., 20-22. 
14Richard Hofstadter, The Progressive Movement, 1900-1915 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963), 4. 
9 
10 
with these demands. The progressive historians contributed to progres-
sivism by giving reform politics a historical rationale, It was these 
men who explained the American liberal mind to itself in historical 
terms, If pragmatism, as Hofstadter has said, provided American 
liberalism with its philosophical nerve, progressive historiography 
gave it memory and myth, and naturalized it within the whole framework 
f Am . h' . 1 . 15 o erican 1stor1ca experience, 
To the progressive historian, the reformer's goals were clear and 
simple: to restore government to the people; to abolish special 
privilege and ensure equal opportunity for all; and to wipe out all 
social injustices, This group of historians did not envision the 
reformers as being anti-capitalist, or as wild-eyed radicals seeking 
the establishment of a socialist society. On the contrary, they por-
trayed the reformers as searching for a more democratic and humane 
society based on egalitarian ideals. The real enemies of society, 
according to the progressive historians, were the dishonest politicians 
and the so-called "special interests" who were posing a serious threat 
to the success of the democratic process. 
Vernon L. Parrington, one of the best known of the progressive 
historians, saw progressivism as a "democratic renaissance"--a movement 
of the masses against a "plutocracy" that had been corrupting the very 
fabric of American society since the Civil War, To Parrington the 
movement was linked to the liberal periods of earlier days, and he 
likened the progressives to the reformers of the 1840 1 s, According to 
Parrington, progressivism was a broad-based movement that included 
15Richard Hofstadter, The Progressive Historians: Turner, Beard, 
Parrington (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), xii, 
11 
members of the middle class, journalists and scholars, who feared being 
swallowed by the trend of economic centralization. These were men 
whose consciences had been aroused by the "cesspools that were poison-
ing the national household," and who had set for themselves the task of 
16 
reawakening the American people. 
The pivotal idea of the progressive historians was economic and 
political conflict. They were convinced that American history could be 
characterized by a cpntinuous struggle between liberalism and conserva-
tism. Many of the earliest interpretations of the progressive period 
stressed the strain of liberalism that was carried over from the 
agrarian reform movement of a generation earlier. They saw in it a 
fulfillment of the programs of the Grangers, Greenbackers, and Populists. 
Such was the position of John D. Hicks, who linked the agrarian reform-
ers to progressivism as cause and effect. 
Hicks in 1931 published The Populist Revolt, the first major 
account of Populism based on wide research in the primary sources. 
He viewed the Populists as representing the first organized protest of 
the masses against the encroachments of a monopolistic plutocracy. 
Although the Populist Party did not survive politically, nor did many 
of its leaders, the movement was victorious in the long run, as Hicks 
points out, because much of its program was taken over by the re-
formers of the progressive era and enacted into law during the first 
seventeen years of the twentieth century. 
In his classical argument, Hicks cites examples of Populist de-
16vernon L. Parrington, The Beginnings of Critical Realism in 
America, 1860-1920, Vol. III of Main Currents in American Thought (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1927-1930)-,-406. 
12 
mands that became progressive legislation. The farmer group observed 
that the currency of the United States was both inadequate and inelas-
tic; in 1913 Congress adopted the Federal Reserve system. Populists 
demanded direct government loans on farm lands; Farm Loan Banks were 
created by an act of 1916. Perhaps most important to the early protest 
group was the railway monopoly and the long-and-short haul issue; the 
Hepburn Act of 1906 and the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910 gave power to the 
Interstate Commerce Commission in railway regulation. Hicks makes a 
good case for his contention that the progressives were direct line 
d d f h P 1 . 17 escen ants o t e opu ists. 
During the depression years of the 1930's, many historians con-
demned the progressive reforms as being piecemeal and superficial in 
nature. They were critical of progressivism because of its failure 
to adopt more radical solutions to meet the problems of the early 
twentieth century. But even these historians, some of whom flirted 
with Marxism, were strongly associated with the progressive school due 
to their acceptance of the idea that class conflict had been a major 
factor in determining progress and social change in America. One of 
the most vocal of the critics during the 1930 1 s was John Chamberlain, 
then a young Marxist, who in 1932 attacked the progressive movement 
as being an abysmal failure. Its advocates, Chamberlain claimed, were 
motivated by an escapist desire to return to a golden past where 
honesty and virtue had dominated over egoism and evil. 18 These 
17John D. Hicks, "The Persistence of Populism," Minnesota History, 
XII (March, 1931), 3-20. See also Hicks, "The Legacy of Populism in 
the Middle West," Agricultural History, XXIII (October, 1949), 235-236. 
18 John Chamberlain, Farewell to Reform:: The Rise, Life and Decay 
of the Progressive Mind in Americ;-(New York:-----rhe John Day Company, 
T9"3'Z"}'7 
13 
critics emphasized that the progressive generation had not gone far 
enough and, therefore, this had resulted in the disastrous depression 
of the 1930 1 s. Nevertheless, disillusionment with the progressive era 
expressed by the critics of the 1930's did not necessarily imply that 
they were disillusioned with the ideals of reform or the aspirations of 
the liberal tradition in America. Hence, it was not until later that 
the mood of American historians began to change. 
Beginning in the 1950's and continuing in the 1960's~ there was a 
shift in the evaluation of the American past. To these newer scholars, 
the progressive ideology appeared much too simplified and appeared to 
rest on an unrealistic analysis of human nature. They believed that 
the progressive school of historiography had too long played on the 
morality theme where good always triumphed over evil. Hence, America 
was unp~epared for the challenges of the depression of the 1930's and 
the world-wide conflict of the 1940 1 s. 
This new group of scholars who criticized the progressive school 
have stressed the consensus that has characterized the American past 
and have insisted that American history should not be written in terms 
of conflict. Many of these historians have been categorized into what 
has been labeled the consensus school of historiography due to their 
tendency to emphasize the unity of the American past, the stability of 
basic institutions, and the existence of a homogeneous national charac-
ter. The result of this changed outlook concerning the American past 
was a sharp shift in the manner in which historians interpreted the 
progressive movement. 
The attack on the progressive school interpretation of the pro-
gl;'e.$,,S..ive m,9vemen,twas led by the late Richard Hofstadter, the well-known 
Columbia University historian. In criticizing the entire liberal 
tradition in America, he saw it as a failure and attempted in two of 
his most brilliant works to show its inadequacies. 19 His thesis was 
14 
that liberalism had not succeeded because it was based upon the idea of 
---
a return to an ideology that emphasized individualistic values. 
Because progressivism had been placed within the liberal spectrum, 
it was severely castigated by Hofstadter. Instead of viewing the move-
ment as a liberal attempt to readjust American institutions and values 
to a new industrial age, he maintained that progressivism was different. 
Placing progressivism in more of a behavioral context, he argued 
that it was related to status anxiety. The conflict that arose in 
the first two decades of the twentieth century, according to Hofstadter, 
reflected the drive of different social groups for a secure status in 
society. By the time of the inauguration of the new century, several of 
the older groups that had once held prestige and power--lawyers, 
professors, clergymen, older Anglo-Saxon Protestants--were finding their 
positions threatened by the new leadership emerging from the industrial 
and technological changes. The response to this displacement was a 
moral crusade to restore older Protestant and individualistic values. 
Hofstadter's provocative thes;i.s about the "status revolution" por-
trays the progressive as being blinded by moral absolutism and there-
fore his ideology as being extremely narrow. This thinking, he wrote, 
was to lead to later reaction regarding the 1920's. The interpreta-
tion of Professor Hofstadter led to the conclusion that progressivism 
19Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men 
Who Made It (New York: Vintage Books, 1948) and The Age of~f~:~-
F+om13rya;--to F.D.R. (New York: Vintage Books, 1955). 
was not a liberal movement, but a movement by well-to-do middle class 
groups who had been alienated from their society because of the rapid 
transformation occurring in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
20 
century. 
15 
Hofstadter's analysis draws heavily upon two significant surveys of 
progressive leadership, one by Al~red D. Chandler, Jr. for 260 Progres-
sive Party leaders throughout the United States and another by George 
E. Mowry for California. 21 Although there are some regional variations, 
the conclusions of both surveys are similar. Progressive leaders did 
not represent the population at large; rather they had some distinct 
and special characteristics. It was from this groundwork that the 
"status revolution" concept was derived. 
According to Chandler and Mowry, the progressives were vigorous 
young men who belonged to the generation that came of age in the 
nineties. Gone were the white-haired men with Civil War memories who 
were part of the Populist revolt. The elder statesmen could never have 
come forth with such dynamism as did these young men filled with the 
spirit of youth. The analyses by Mowry and Chandler show that the 
progressives drew their leaders mainly from the middle class rather 
than from the financially downtrodden. The very wealthy were repre-
sented, and the movement wore the cloak of respectability. It was 
nationwide in scope, but primarily urban and northern in setting. 
20 Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R., 131-172. 
21Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., "The Origins of Progressive Leadership" 
in Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1954), VIII, 1462-1465 and 
George E. Mowry, The California Progressives (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1951), 86-104. 
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At a time when a college education was a rarity to possess, many 
of the reform leaders had received higher education. Most of them were 
either professional men, particularly lawyers, doctors, teachers, and 
member of the clergy, or businessmen who represented neither the very 
largest nor the very smallest businesses. Mowry depicted these ener-
getic reformers as self-appointed guides for the masses, who could have 
been dangerous had they not been molded by the far-reaching religious 
influence of New England. If the names convey anything, it is that 
they came from old American stock with British origins. The middle 
class reformer acted, Mowry believed, because he felt himself hemmed 
in, and his place in society threatened by the monopolistic corporation 
on the one side, and by organized labor and socialism on the other. 
Instead of the belly reforms demanded by the Populists during an acute 
depression, the progressive reforms, in contrast, were more the results 
of the heart and head due to origin of the demands in a period of rela-
tive prosperity. In summary, Mowry saw progressivism as an expression 
of an older America objecting to the ideological and social drifts of 
22 the twentieth century. 
There can be little doubt that the Hofstadter-Mowry•Chandler 
interpretation has made a highly valuable contribution to our under-
standing of the progressive era, but it is equally certain that this 
thesis alone cannot account for the vast outpouring of legislation 
which occurred from 1901 to 1917. So that the "status revolution" 
thesis does not serve to distract attention from other possible evalua-
tions, a considerable number of scholars have undertaken to look at 
22 Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of Modern 
America, 1900:T91~8S.:-105. 
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other segments of society and their attitudes toward reform. 
Perhaps the most noteworthy challenge to the Hofstadter-Mowry-
Chandler approach has been offered by J. Joseph Huthmacher, who criti-
cizes their thesis for ignoring the creative role of the non-Anglo-
Saxon urban masses in the progressive movement. Willing to concede 
that middle class reformers contributed much to progressivism, Huth-
macher insists that in the legislatures of the highly industrial 
states of New York and Massachusetts reform bills received more uni-
form and consistent support from representatives of the urban lower 
class than they received from the urban middle class. He writes that 
the working class liberal and his political representative, the machine 
politician, provided an active and politically necessary force for 
reform. These individuals experienced the ills of society which made 
them more practical and less idealistic. In summary, Huthmacher 
emphasizes that although the urban working class did not all become 
reform-oriented, they did produce leaders such as Al Smith and Robert 
Wagner, and they also produced their share of progressive legisla-
. 23 t:i,on. 
In a more recent interpretation, Richard Abrams has examined urban 
working class liberalism in a different fashion. In his study of 
Massachusetts, he sees the Boston Irish and other ethnic minorities 
as the major force for change. The insurgent groups in the Bay State 
did not derive from the middle class businessmen and professionals, 
Abrams states, but came instead primarily from the large Irish-American 
segment of the population, who represented the newer Americans general~ 
23J. Joseph Huthmacher, "Urban Liberalism and the Age of Reform," 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLIX (September, 1962), 231-241. 
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ly, especially the growing class of labor unionists. 24 In a similar 
vein, Irwin Yellowitz has produced a study of the activities of New 
York state labor organizations during the progressive years which pre-
sents considerable evidence that labor's influence on reform legisla-
tion had an impact that the "status revolution" thesis does not recog-
nize.25 In a recent article on organized labor and progressivism in 
Oklahoma, Keith L. Bryant has presented an enlightening defense of 
his thesis that labor's impact on progressivism was significant and 
that labor's influence need not be restricted to progressivism in the 
26 
northeastern industrial areas. 
A number of historians have not only criticized the conceptual 
framework of the Hofstadter-Mowry-Chandler thesis, but have also 
pointed to what is regarded as a flaw in the methodology of the thesis. 
In arguing that the progressives were a cohesive unit that could be 
easily categorized, the thesis requires that the anti-progressives 
represented a different social and economic group. Recent state 
studies of the anti-progressives have shown that their social, economic, 
and ideological characteristics were almost identical with those of the 
. 27 progressives. 
24Richard Abrams, Qonservatism in.§!. Progressive Era (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1964), 132. 
25Irwin Yellowitz, Labor and the Progressive Movement in New York 
State: 1897-1916 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Pre~,--r9°6's):-
26Keith L. Bryant, "Kate Barnard, Organized Labor, and Social Jus-
tice in Oklahoma During the Progressive Era," Journal of Southern 
History, XXXV (May, 1969), 145-164. 
27Richard B. Sherman, "The Status Revolution and Massachusetts Pro-
gressive Leadership," Political Science Quarterly, LXXVIII (March, 
1963), 59-65; William T. Kerr, Jr., "The Progressives of Washington, 
1910-1912," Pacific Northwest Quarterlr, LV (January, 1964), 16-27; 
E. Daniel Potts, "The Progressive Profi e in Iowa," Mid-America, XLVII 
(October, 1965), 257-268. ~ 
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Some of the earlier challenges to the p'rogressive school have been 
reinforced by a group of historians of the 1960 1 s. A number of these 
scholars have advanced the thesis that progressivism represented 
largely an attempt to govern society in accordance with the newer 
ideals of scientific management and efficiency. Hence, they propose 
that the business community was not monolithically opposed to all 
reforms. Robert Wiebe, for example, has produced a comprehensive 
study of the question, and has discovered evidence of substantial 
business support for even such supposedly anti-business measures as 
the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Anti-Trust Act. 28 In 
addition, Samuel P. Hays and James Weinstein have documented the sup-
port of many business leaders for such municipal reforms as the city 
29 
manager and commission forms of government. 
In his research on the conservation movement of the progressive 
era, Hays has pointed to what he feels is another misconception held 
by the progressive school, i.e., the American people were engaged in 
a struggle with established interests attempting to deprive the nation 
of its natural resources. Frequently, Hays has found, large corpora-
tions influenced by scientific management were ardent supporters of 
conservationist policies because of their interest in long-range re-
source planning. On the contrary, many of those groups equated with 
the democratic masses, such as small farmers and cattlemen, were often 
28 Robert H. Wiebe, Businessmen~ Reform: ~ Study of the Progres-
sive Movement (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1963), 129-141, 147-149. 
29 Samuel P. Hays, "Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in 
the Progressive Era," Pacific Northwest Quarterly, LV (October, 1964), 
55; James Weinstein, "Organized Business and the City Commissioner 
and Manager Movements," Journal of Southern History, XXVIII (May, 1962), 
166-182. ~ 
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opposed to conservation because it deprived them of their hopes of be-
coming rich quickly. Therefore, Hays concludes that conservation could 
not be neatly placed in the liberal-conservative categories of the 
. h 1 f h" . h 30 progressive sc oo o 1stor1ograp y. 
With the advent of the 1970's, still another group of historians 
called the New Left had begun to subject many of the older interpre-
tations to criticism. The progressive period has not escaped scrutiny 
by the New Leftists, and perhaps Gabriel Kolko's reinterpretation of 
the era is the best offering. He contends that the r~forms of 
progressivism were not directed at making the government more respon-
sive to the desires of the American people, but to making it and the 
economy more efficient. The movement for federal regulation of busi-
ness was not, as the progressive school of historians had argued, 
motivated by fear of large corporate enterprises. Its goal, according 
to Kolko, was the elimination of senseless and destructive competition 
in the economic system. The establishment of regulatory agencies 
was actually promoted by large industrial concerns because each such 
agency was usually staffed by individuals sympathetic to the industry 
that it regulated. Therefore, these agencies often acted in the 
interests of the industry instead of the public, which meant that the 
movement toward regulation, rather than being anti-business, was 
11 b b . 1· . . . 31 actua ya movement y us1ness toe 1m1nate competition. As 
30samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The 
Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1959), 1-4, 265-266. 
31Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: ! Reinterpretation 
of American History, 1900-1916 (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963) 
and Railroads and Regulations: 1877-1916 (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1965). 
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evidenced by Kolko's work, the relationship of government and business 
has become a chief concern to historians of the period. Additional 
interest has centered around the effects of the Rooseveltian "New 
Nationalism" platform on the Wilsonian "New Freedom" program. 
As previously mentioned, Roosevelt regarded bigness in business 
as both historically inevitable and economically beneficial. He was 
prepared to regulate monopoly and also to expand the welfare functions 
of the state in order to aid the laboring poor. Wilson, on the other 
hand, saw the large corporations as inefficient and a threat to social 
mobility. He also envisioned using the federal government, but as a 
tool to break up the trusts and return to the older, more individual-
istic and competitive spirit of free enterprise. Most historians who 
have written about the progressive era from the progressive school 
viewpoint favor the "New Nationalism" philosophy of Roosevelt over the 
"New Freedom" philosophy of Wilson. In this they reflect the intel-
lectual spirit of the period as espoused by such journalists as Croly 
and Walter Lippmann, who argued that the twentieth century needed more 
central planning by the state. The current consensus among most of 
the progressive school scholars is that Wilson actually implemented 
the "New Nationalism" program in the latter portion of his first 
administration and early part of his second as well as carrying out his 
"New Freedom" platform in the early stages of his White House tenure. 
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., New Deal historian, portrays progressivism 
as the precursor to the New Deal program of the 1930 1 s. He believes 
that the New Deal pragmatic philosophy and the emphasis on the positive 
role that government should play in the economy had its roots in the 
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progressive programs of Roosevelt and Wilson. 32 
Arthur S. Link accounts for the differences between the two pro-
grams largely in terms of strong agrarian and Southern influence in 
the Democratic Party. These two elements within the party pressured 
Wilson into accepting some of the long awaited demands of the progres-
sives, e.g., rural credits and good roads. Link believes that Wilson 
gradually assented to this pressure of using the federal government 
in a more positive role in these various programs. In doing so, Link 
concludes, Wilson had extended the basic tenet of Rooseveltian "New 
Nationalism. 1133 
Hofstadter, mentioned earlier in relation to the group composition 
of progressivism, challenges both Schlesinger and Link on the philoso-
phical aspects of "New Nationalism".and "New Freedom." In a scathing 
indictment of both Roosevelt and Wilson, he writes that neither went 
far enough toward the principle of central state planning. The pro-
gressives, epitomized by Roosevelt and Wilson, were backward in 
wanting to restore the avarice of economic individualism and in 
looking for solutions of contemporary problems in an unreturnable 
34 past. 
Two regional studies since World War II have made significant 
contributions to the enlightenment of scholars in interpreting the 
progressive era. Arthur Mann, long time scholar of progressivism, has 
32Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of the Old Order (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1951). 
33Arthur S. Link, "The South and the 'New Freedom': An Interpre-
tation," American Scholar, XX (Sununer, 1951), 314-324. 
34 Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men Who 
Made It, 206-282. 
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made a study of Boston and its intellectual hinterland. In this volume 
he has indicated for the first time the contributions made to twentieth 
century reforms by Jews and Irish Catholics. This study of the impact 
of ethnic groups on the progressive era has added an important dimen- ·. 
sion to scholarship in the field. Moreover, he has examined another 
neglected group found within reform elements, the women. In his 
chapter on "The New and the Newer Women as Reformers," Mann has supplied 
an important service in the study of feminist influences that colored 
the progressive element. Perhaps Mann's most valuable addition in the 
understanding of the progressive years has been to prove once again 
that modern liberalism owes its beginnings to the city as well as to 
35 the farm. 
The Midwest has long been considered by many historians as the 
place of origin of twentieth century reform. No examination of pro-
gressive historiography could be complete without mentioning Russel B. 
Nye's study of progressivism in the heartland of America. In an excel-
lent volume, Nye accepts the older agrarian interpretation that 
twentieth century progressivism was a descendant of nineteenth century 
farmer protest. In many ways he has offset Mann's urban interpretation 
by defending the thesis that progressivism was a result of the agrarian 
influence and not of the urban influence. 36 A recent article that 
certainly complements Nye's neo-agrarian thought is "The Rural Roots 
of the Progressive Leaders" by Wayne E. Fuller. The author suggests 
that the urban character of progressivism has been overemphasized, 
35 . - .... __ ; ;· .... 
• ·Arthur Mann, Yankee Reformers in the Urban Age (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1954). 
36Russel B. Nye, Midwestern Progressive Politics: 
Study of ItsU07igins and Develo~ment, 1870-1950 (East 
gan: 'State niversit'y""l'"ress, I 59). 
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especially when the historian discovers that many of the lead.ing 
progressives, e.g., Jane Addams and Robert M. LaFollette, spent their 
37 youth being nurtured in the values of rural America. 
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The diverse nature of the reform impulse of the progressive years, 
however, has not obscured the fact that there were certain measures 
of unity among groups and regions. The mixture of legislation that 
was enacted indicates strongly that the ideals and interests of a 
variety of groups and regions must have coalesced on a number of issues. 
Huthmacher, for one, insists that forward-looking legislation, at least 
in such industrial states as New York and Massachusetts, depended upon 
collaboration between reformers from both urban lower and urban middle 
classes. At times, this coalition was further supplemented by the 
efforts of organized labor. 38 The almost legendary achievements of 
the governorship of LaFollette in Wisconsin, according to Robert 
Maxwell, scholar of Wisconsin's progressivism, were owed to the efforts 
of farm groups, labor leaders, and intellectuals, a union of "soil, 
shop and seminar. 1139 Indeed, even as far back as 1913, Walter Weyl, 
a contemporary observer, recognized that certain issues might make 
common cause for a variety of people. "The Polish slag worker," he 
said, "the Boston salesgirl and the Oshkosh lawyer have a similar 
interest as consumers of national wealth. 1140 
37wayne E. Fuller, "The Rural Roots of the Progressive Leaders," 
Agricultural History, XLII (January, 1968), 1-13. 
38 Huthmacher, "Urban Liberalism and the Age of Reform," 29-31. 
39Robert Maxwell, LaFollette and the Rise of Progressivism in 
Wisconsin (Madison: State Historical~ciety of Wisconsin, 1956). 
40 Walter Weyl, The New Democracy (New York: Macmillan, 1913), 
249-254. 
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As the historiography of progressivism indicates, it is difficult 
to evaluate the specific achievements of the period without dealing 
with certain moral values that inevitably influence the historical 
judgments of scholars studying the subject. The progressive school of 
historians saw progressivism as a valiant effort to aid Americans in 
their adjustment to a society where values were business oriented. 
They tended to agree with goals of the reformers and thus pictured 
the concentration of economic power as undermining the moral fabric of 
our society. The reforms and reformers were described in sympathetic 
language by these scholars. 
With the advent of a highly technological civilization, many 
historians have tended to emphasize the constructive aspects of the 
business community throughout American history. Within this framework, 
they have either stressed the more conservative aspects of the era 
or have pointed to its lack of realism in order to show the failures 
of progressivism. 
The problem of surveying the historiography of the progressive 
era, therefore, is by no means easy or simple. The divisions among 
historians are not disappearing despite considerable research on this 
important epoch in American history. On the contrary, the division 
between the old and the new generations appear to be widening, and 
with the introduction of recent hypotheses the problem is compounded. 
However, in the final analysis, when one examines the varying inter-
pretations of progressivism, the assessment will perhaps make it 
easier to understand the ability of Americans to adapt themselves to 
new problems in any given era. 
CHAPTER II 
OKLAHOMA AND ITS CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS: A GEOGRAPHIC-
BIOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS FROM 1901 TO 1917 
The purpose of this portion of the study will be to concentrate 
on the geography of Oklahoma from 1901 to 1917 and the individuals who 
served as the representatives from the state. Various census data are 
used to present the economic and demographic characteristics of the 
d h · 1 d" · l state an t e congressiona istricts. Oklahoma Territory, eighteen 
years old and predominantly white, and Indian Territory, with her 
civilization established seventy-five years earlier, were combined 
into one state and admitted to the union under the name of Oklahoma on 
November 16, 1907. The last of the thirteen states formed wholly or 
in part of the Louisiana Purchase, Oklahoma entered the union larger 
in land area than any state east of the Mississippi River and smaller 
than any west of that river excepting Iowa, Missouri, Arkansas, 
1united States, Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census of the 
United States, 1910: Population (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1913), III, 433-484; Thirteenth Census of the United States, 
1910: Agriculture (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1913), 
VII, 350-393; Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910: Manu-
factures (Washington: Governmen~Printing Office, 19l~IX, 1001-
1017; Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920: Population 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1923), III, 811-831; Four-
teenth Census of the United States, 1920: Agriculture (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1923), VI, 617-652; Fourteenth Census of 
the United States, 1920: Manufactures (Washington: Government Print-
ing Office, 1923), IX, 1213-1233; and Religious Bodies, 1916 (Wash-
ington: Government Printing Office, 1919), I, 301. 
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Washington, and Louisiana. The connnonwealth had an area of 70,057 
square miles, of which 643 represented water surface. Its population 
was 1,657,155. The density of population was doubling, from 11.4 per 
square mile in 1900 to 23. 9 in 1910. Racially, the population in 
27 
1910 was approximately eighty-seven per cent white, eight per cent 
Negro, four and one-half per cent Indian, and the remaining one-half 
per cent Oriental and other groups. There was a fifty-three to forty-
seven percentage ratio of males to females in the state. According 
to the religious census of 1916, the state was eighty-eight and one-half 
per cent Protestant, eleven per cent Roman Catholic, and the remainder 
Jewish. 
As the forty-sixth state to be admitted, Oklahoma ranked twenty-
third among the states according to population in 1910, a rise from 
thirtieth in 1900, when its total population was divided between the 
Twin Territories. The percentage of increase during the decade 1900-
1910 was greater than for any other state except Washington. Rela-
tively speaking, the combined population of the Twin Territories was 
more than eight times the number of persons who lived in California 
in the year it became a state, and more than eighteen times the popula-
tion of Nevada in 1900, a third of a century after admission. 
According to the 1910 census the population of the state was 
primarily rural, with only 19.3 per cent of the people residing in 
incorporated units having a population of 2,500 or over (see Figure 
1). Eight cities in 1910 had more than 10,000 residents--Oklahoma 
City, Muskogee, Tulsa, Enid, McAlester, Shawnee, Guthrie, and 
Chickasha. These most populous cities contained 10.2 per cent of the 
state's inhabitants, and in the manufacturing census of 1909 they were 
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credited with 37.3 per cent of the total value of manufactures. 
From an economic point of view, the state's leading industries in 
1909 directly depended on the products of agriculture, e.g., railroad 
and flour milling. ~owever, a marked increase in independent indus-
trial activities began in 1907 with the development of oil fields and 
the discovery of natural gas. An abundance of coal and lumber and 
the presence of such minerals as gypsum, asphalt, granite, limestone, 
lead, and zinc further stimulated manufacturing. By 1910 the state 
had 2,310 manufacturing establishments which provided employment to 
18,034 persons. The value added by manufacture had reached 
$19,529,000 by 1910, representing a four-fold increase from the 1899 
figure. 
Variety was the most striking feature of the Oklahoma landscape 
(see Figure 2). Elevations in Oklahoma ra~ge from about 300 feet on 
the Coastal Plain in the southeastern corner of the state to almost 
5,000 feet on Black Mesa in the extreme northwestern part. Local 
relief varies greatly in different sections of the state, being as 
great as 2,000 feet in the Ouachita Mountains and as little as 10 feet 
in extensive areas of the Great Plains. 
While most of Oklahoma receives between 26 and 40 inches of rain-
fall annually, it is not evenly distributed through the year. Spring 
is the wettest season and winter the driest. The natural vegetation 
of Oklahoma reflects the rainfall pattern. Dense forests of oak, 
hickory, and pine are found in the Ouachitas, but toward the west, as 
the rainfall decreases, the forests are replaced by park lands, tall 
grass, short grass, and finally bunch grass and cacti. The chief 
agricultural crops likewise reflect the distribution of rainfall. 
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Wheat is important in the drier western part of the state, corn and 
vegetables in the wetter eastern section. Ranching is common in all 
parts of the state, for there is usually sufficient moisture for 
pastures. 
All of northern Oklahoma and much of the central part of the 
state is in the drainage basin of the Arkansas River, with the re-
maining streams flowing into the Red River located along the southern 
border. These two large rivers and their tributaries flow in a 
general eastward direction and have played a primary role in the 
development of the state. 
These environmental factors have likewise shaped the state's 
governmental development. Oklahoma's political history may be said 
to date from 1889, the year in which six million acres of central 
Oklahoma was opened to settlement by whites, or from 1890, the year 
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in which Oklahoma Territory was officially organized. From 1890 until 
1907, Oklahoma Territory was predominantly Republican in political 
sentiment, partly because of the large initial influx of settlers 
coming from Republican states north of the territory. In addition, the 
homesteaders developed a Republican bias out of gratitude to the 
national administration for the law opening the territory to white 
settlement. Only the residents of Oklahoma Territory elected dele-
gates to Congress from 1890 until 1907, and they elected a majority 
of Republican delegates. 
Indian Territory, on the other hand, was predominantly Democratic 
because Indians of the Five Civilized Tribes had come from Florida, 
Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, and Mississippi. Since many were slave-
holders, a majority had been Confederate sympathizers during the 
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Civil War. They therefore lost much of their original land holdings 
after Lee's surrender. ln addition, the white settlers in the Indian 
Nations were mostly from Arkansas and Texas. Thus the assumption was 
that the region would probably vote Democratic upon achievement of 
statehood. Before 1907 the Indian Territory was not eligible to send 
delegates to Congress. 
The Enabling Act for Oklahoma statehood, signed by President 
Theodore Roosevelt on June 16, 1906, provided that the new state 
should elect five representatives until the next regular apportion-
ment act. The first legislature of Oklahoma therefore divided the 
state into five Congressional districts (see Figure 3). 
After the federal census of 1910, the new apportionment gave 
the state eight representatives. After careful thought, Governor 
Lee Cruce directed that the voters elect three members-at-large, thus 
avoiding the unnecessary expense of a special legislative session to 
reapportion districts. Therefore in 1912 three representatives were 
selected at large by the voters of Oklahoma, in addition to the five 
elected from the previously created districts. By 1914 the state's 
congressional boundaries had been redrawn so as to include eight 
districts, a plan that remained in effect until 1951 (see Figure 4). 
A regional analysis of the 1907 and 1914 districts follows. 
Congressional district number one was composed of ten counties 
covering some 9,850 square miles in the north central part of the 
state. The population of the district was approximately 240,000 in 
1910, which gave it a density of more than 24 people per square mile. 
The counties of the district included Garfield, Grant, Kay, King-
fisher, Lincoln, Logan, Noble, Osage, Pawnee, and Payne. The district 
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contained the largest county in the state, Osage, which had a total 
area of 2,293 square miles. Some of the important cities located 
within the district were Guthrie, one of the most populous centers 
during the territorial era and state capital until 1910; Kingfisher, 
another city with more than 1,000 inhabitants during territorial days 
and a leading contender for location of the state capital before 
Guthrie was selected; and Stillwater, the site of the Oklahoma Agri-
cultural and Mechanical College, established by statute in 1890 and 
holding its first classes in 1891. 
The second congressional district occupied the major portion of 
northwestern Oklahoma. It consisted of fifteen counties plus four 
townships of northern Grady County and nine townships of northern 
Roger Mills County. The total of 17,273 square miles made it the 
largest of the five districts. Within the second district lived 
approximately 324,000 people, giving it a density of nearly 19 people 
per square mile. The counties making up the district were Alfalfa, 
Beaver, Blaine, Caddo, Canadian, Cimarron (the only county in the 
United States bordering three states), Custer, Dewey, Ellis, Harper, 
Major, Oklahoma, Texas, Woods, and Woodward. The Grady County town-
ships were Verdon, Washington Valley, Hillsborough, and Kochi. The 
nine townships of Roger Mills County included Hamburg, Preston, 
Fairview, Churchill, Rail, Lone Star, Texmo, Shirley, and Crawford. 
The district can be described as the most urban in demographic compo-
sition, i.e., possessing the most cities with more than 2,500 popula-
tion. Over 26 per cent of the second district's population lived in 
these urban areas, with three quarters of the 84,600 urban population 
in Oklahoma County; Oklahoma City, the state capital after 1910, 
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predominated. 
Congressional district three incorporated a major portion of the 
northeastern counties of Oklahoma. Nearly 285,000 people lived in the 
more than 10,000 square miles, giving the district 28 people per square 
mile, the highest density of the five. Eighteen counties plus nine. 
townships of Mcintosh County made up the district. The district 
possessed the second highest number of urban centers and was by far 
the leader in manufacturing. Almost 24 per cent of the district's 
population lived in cities of over 2,500. The district contained 
over 41 per cent of the total value added by manufacture and more than 
33 per cent of the total labor force in the state. Of the five dis-
tricts, number three had the largest percentage of black population, 
nearly 12 per cent, a significant concentration of Negroes in 1910 
(see Figure 5). Both Muskogee and Tulsa, which ranked second and 
third in state population, were located in district three. Muskogee, 
a city of 25,278 in 1910, was the terminus for the first railroad 
running into Indian Territory and had the agency for the Five Civilized 
Tribes. Tulsa, a city of 18, 182 ,was soon to become known as the "oil 
capital" of the United States. Okmulgee and Tahlequah, capital of 
the Creek and Cherokee Nations, respectively, were also important. 
The eighteen counties comprising the district were Adair, Cherokee, 
Craig, Creek, Delaware, Hughes, Mayes, Muskogee, Nowata, Okfuskee, 
Okmulgee, Ottawa, Rogers, Seminole, Sequoyah, Tulsa, Wagoner, and 
Washington. The townships of Shady Grove, Rentiesville, south part 
of Minton, West Checotah, south part of Elm, Hitchita, Huffman, Guyson, 
and east Checotah in northern Mcintosh County were also included. 
Twenty counties, the largest number of counties in any district, 
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made up district four, located in the southeastern section of the 
state. Close to 272,000 people living on over 12,700 square miles 
gave the district a population density of nearly 22. In comparison 
with the other four districts, number four had the largest percentage 
of non-Protestants, even though the figure of 14.07 per cent does not 
significantly deviate from the norm which showed all the districts 
being more than 85 per cent Protestant. Important cities included 
McAlester, center of early coal mining activities and home of the 
state prison, Ardmore, Durant, and Hugo. 
The fifth district, situated in the southwestern area of the 
state, contained sixteen counties and the southern townships of 
Grady and Roger Mills Counties. This district was the most striking 
example in Oklahoma of the White-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant political 
unit. Proportionately fewer blacks, foreign born, and non-Protestants 
lived in this district than in any of the other four. It was likewise 
least urbanized, with only about 16.5 per cent living in cities of 
2,500 or over. Yet the density of the district ranked second at 26.5. 
Most of the incorporated communities were small. Lawton was adjacent 
to Fort Sill, one of the principal artillery posts in the nation. 
Norman was designated by the first legislature in 1890 as the site 
for the territorial and later state university. Other urban areas 
deserving mention were Chickasha, one of eight cities in the state 
having a population of over 10,000 in 1910, Duncan, and Altus. The 
counties were Beckham, Carter, Cleveland, Comanche, Garvin, Greer, 
Jackson, Jefferson, Kiowa, Love, McClain, Murray, Pottawatomie, 
Stephens, Tillman, Washita, and those townships of Grady and Roger 
Mills Counties that were not included in district two. 
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In reviewing the demographic and economic composition of the five 
districts that existed from 1907 to 1914, several observations can be 
presented. Districts two and three can be classified as being the 
most urban and industrial, and district three was the most densely 
populated. The remaining three districts can be categorized as more 
rural and agricultural in nature (see Table I). 
In 1914 Oklahoma's congressional district boundaries were re-
drawn, increasing the number to eight from five. Most districts 
were smaller than before, except for district eight. District one, 
which covered the extreme northeastern part of the state, was composed 
of ten counties. Its area was 7,871 square miles, with 316,156 people 
and a density of approximately 40. District one contained the highest 
percentage of non-Protestants, with over 19 per cent (see Figure 6). 
It likewise had the highest percentages, 33.4 and 23.9, in the cate-
gories of value added by manufacture and average number of wage 
earners, respectively. However, over 75 per cent of the total in 
each category was found in one county, Tulsa. The most populous 
cities in the district, primarily due to their connection with the 
development of the oil industry, were Tulsa and Bartlesville. Tulsa, 
which had 18,182 people in 1910, numbered 72,075 in 1920, a growth 
rate of nearly 400 per cent. Bartlesville had increased its popula-
tion by 1920 to 14,417 to become Oklahoma's seventh largest city. 
Counties other than Tulsa were Craig, Delaware, Mayes, Nowata, Osage, 
Ottawa, Pawnee, Rogers, and Washington. 
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TABLE I 
CENSUS CHARACTERISTICS OF OKLAHOMA'S 1907-1914 CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS 
District Area Density 
Number (square miles) Population (per square mile) 
1 9,850 239,942 24 
2 17,273 323,283 19 
3 10,185 284,326 28 
4 12,706 271, 797 22 
5 14,084 371,406 26.5 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
District Per Cent 
Number Urban Rural Urban 
1 43,131 328,275 17.97 
2 84,681 186, 116 26.19 
3 67,258 217, 068 23.65 
4 47,317 276,966 17.04 
5 61,188 178,754 16. 47 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
District Per Cent Per Cent Foreign Per Cent 
Number White White Black Black Born Foreign Born 
1 217,452 90.62 18,733 7.82 8,931 3. 72 
2 306, 292 94. 74 13,133 4.06 13, 424 4.15 
3 215,334 75.73 33,593 11. 81 2,912 1.02 
4 231,633 85.22 24, 773 9.11 6,945 2.55 
5 354,414 95.42 10,094 2. 71 6, 811 1. 83 
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TABLE I (Continued) 
District 
Number Protestant Per Cent Catholic Per Cent Jewish Per Cent 
1 70,802 88.30 9,373 11.69 0 0 
2 74,464 86.59 10,939 12.67 630 • 72 
3 68,700 87.16 9,907 12.56 210 .26 
4 53,524 85.92 8,703 13.97 65 .10 
5 79,618 92.54 6,347 7.37 71 .08 
---------------~--------------- ,--------------------------------------
District 
Number 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
District 
Number 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Value Added By Manufacture 
$12,315,759 
18,137,843 
36,288,037 
7,944,598 
6,885,128 
Average Number of Wage Earners 
3,649 
7,032 
10,986 
3,664 
2,625 
Per Cent of Total 
15.01 
22.43 
43.88 
9.95 
8.73 
Per Cent of Total 
14.36 
23. 83 
34.18 
14.41 
8.89 
Source: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910: Population 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1913), III, 433-484; 
Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910: Manufactures 
(Washington: Gove~ent Printing Office-;-i:913), IX, 1001-
1017; Religious Bodies, 1916 (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1919), I, 301. 
PER CENT OF NON-PROTESTANTS IN TOTAL POPULATION 
BY COUNTIES 
GROUPED INTO CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS: 1916 
3.53% 3.20% 
D LESS THAN 5% 
Em 5 TO 15 % 
IIIID 15 TO 25% 
FFJil 25 TO 50% 
- OVER 50% 
1.50% 
SOURCE: U. s . Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census, 
Religious~: 1916 
(Washington: u. s. Government Printing Office), 
Part II, p. 301, 
Figure 6 
+:-
N 
The second congressional district of 1914, composed of eight 
counties, was located in the east central part of the state. Its 
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area of 5,308 square miles and 244,315 people gave it the second 
highest density of 46. It had the highest percentage of Negroes 
(17.23) and the lowest percentage of foreign born whites (1.12). The 
greatest concentration of blacks was found in the western counties of 
the district, namely Wagoner, a county whose population was more than 
25 per cent black, Okmulgee, Muskogee, and Mcintosh (see Figure 7). 
Muskogee and Okmulgee by 1920 were the centers of urban growth in 
district two. Muskogee, which in 1910 was the second most populous 
city in the state with 25,278, had dropped to third, but still showed 
a growth to 30,277. Okmulgee, still a city of less than 10,000 in the 
census of 1910, had increased its population ten years later to 17,430 
to become Oklahoma's fourth most populous city. There were eight 
counties in district two: Adair, Cherokee, Haskell, Mcintosh, 
Muskogee, Okmulgee, Sequoyah, and Wagoner. 
The eleven southeastern counties of the state made up the third 
congressional district. Second largest in area with 11,407 square 
miles, it contained 325,680 people for a density of 28.7, somewhat 
below the average district's 33.7. The third district's most populous 
city was McAlester, which in 1910 had ranked fifth with 12,954, but 
declined in population by 859, which dropped it to the ninth largest 
city in the state by 1920. 
The fourth district of 1914 embraced nine counties in the central 
portion of the state. 286,218 people living on 6,705 square miles 
gave the district a density of 42.7. This district, as well as 
district two, showed a significant percentage of Negroes, with 
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nearly 30,000 blacks, or more than 10 per cent of the population, 
living in the district. Sapulpa by 1920 had grown to be the most 
populous city in the district with 11,634, ranking it eleventh in the 
state. The nine counties of the district were Coal, Creek, Hughes, 
Johnston, Lincoln, Okfuskee, Pontotoc, Pottawatomie, and Seminole. 
District five was a tier of seven centrally located counties 
running from Payne in the north to Murray in the south. It was the 
smallest of the districts in area, but with Oklahoma County and Okla-
homa City, was heavily populated, showing the highest density of all 
the districts with 57.4. Again because of Oklahoma County, the dis-
trict was the_ second leading industrial area, with over 21 per cent of 
the state's total value added by manufacture. As further proof of its 
industrial nature, over 23 per cent of the inhabitants were laborers. 
The foremost urban center, Oklahoma City, grew from 64,205 in 1910 to 
91,295 by 1920. This district was unique in that it was the home of 
the two major institutions of higher learning: Oklahoma Agricultural 
and Mechanical at Stillwater in Payne County and the University of 
Oklahoma at Norman in Cleveland County. The seven counties were 
Cleveland, Garvin, Logan, McClain, Murray, Oklahoma, and Payne. 
To the west of the fifth district lay a two-row tier of counties 
making up the sixth district. 207,648 people occupying 9,132 square 
miles indicated a density of 22.8. The leading city in 1910 was 
Chickasha, whose 10,320 residents ranked it seventh in the state; 
although it had declined in population by 1920, it still ranked 
twelfth with 10,189. In each of the counties of the sixth district 
2 
more than 60 per cent of the land area was devoted to farms. In 
2It should be pointed out that as one moves westward in Oklahoma 
the per cent of land area in farms increases (see Figure 8). 
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Caddo, Canadian, and Kingfisher Counties, more than 90 per cent was 
in farm land. The average value of land in the sixth district was 
high, running from $25 to $50 per acre in six of the nine counties. 
Only Oklahoma County in the fifth district had land that was more 
valuable per acre (see Figure 9). The counties other than those pre-
viously mentioned were Blaine, Comanche, Cotton, Grady, Jefferson, 
and Stephens. 
The seventh congressional district covered the far western 
central area, with eleven counties, 10,149 square miles, and 189,472 
people. This low density district was the most heavily Protestant, 
nearly 96 per cent, and least indu&trial, with only 2.1 per cent of 
the state's total value added by manufacture. Correspondingly, fewer 
than 2 per cent of the state's wage earners were located in district 
seven. In contrast, a high degree of agricultural activity was carried 
on, ranging from 60 to 80 per cent of the land area in farms in Ellis, 
Roger Mills, and Beckham Counties to over 95 per cent in Washita 
County. The value of farm land per acre was highest in Washita, 
Kiowa, Jackson, and Tillman Counties, all of which fell in the cate-
gory of $25 to $50 per acre. In addition to those counties listed 
above, Custer, Dewey, Greer, and Harmon were included in this district. 
The eighth and last congressional district of 1914 was the north-
western portion of Oklahoma including the Panhandle. A dozen counties 
made up this sparsely settled but largest district of 14,775 square 
miles. Its 200,402 inhabitants gave it the lowest density, 13.5. 
Ten of the twelve counties were less than 1 per cent Negro, with two 
counties reporting no blacks at all. District eight was also rural. 
In the eastern part of the district, the four counties of Grant, Gar-
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field, Kay, and Noble were heavily farmed, with more than 90 per cent 
of the land set aside for agricultural purposes. Both the percentage 
in farm land and value of farm land decrease as one proceeds westward 
into the Panhandle. In the eastern sector of the district the value 
of farm land ranged from $25 to $50 per acre, but this figure dropped 
to approximately $8 per acre in Cimarron County. The remaining seven 
counties making up the district were Alfalfa, Beaver, Harper, Major, 
Texas, Woods, and Woodward. 
Several general observations can be made in regard to the eight 
districts of 1914. Demographically, the density of population is 
significantly less in the three western districts, primarily due to 
their rural nature. These same three districts, six, seven, and 
eight, show the greatest percentage of whites and Protestants. In 
contrast, districts one, two, and five emerge as the more urban 
oriented and industrial centered, due primarily to the Loc<:!-t:Lon of 
Tulsa County in district one, Okmulgee and Muskogee Counties in two, 
and Oklahoma County in five (see Table II). 
The study will now focus on the individuals sent to Washington 
from 1901 to 1917 from the Territory of Oklahoma and the congressional 
districts that were subsequently established. The thirteen men who 
represented Oklahoma in the United States House of Representatives 
during the progressive era will be presented in chronological order 
as they were elected. The biographical information concerning the 
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TABLE II 
CENSUS CHARACTERISTICS OF OKLAUOMA 1 S 1914-1951 CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS 
District Area Density 
Number (square miles) Population (per square mile) 
1 7 ,871 316,156 40 
2 5,308 244,315 46 
3 11, 407 325,680 28.7 
4 6,705 286,218 42.7 
5 4,495 258,312 57.4 
6 9,132 207,648 22.8 
7 10,149 189, 472 18.6 
8 14,775 200,402 13.5 
~---------------------------------------------------------------------
District .Per Cent Per Cent Foreign Per Cent 
Number White White Black Black Born Foreign Born 
1 283, 969 89.81 16,550 5.23 5,453 1. 72 
2 186, 934 76.51 42, 119 17.23 2,756 1.12 
3 283, 77 5 87.13 27,390 8.41 5,187 1. 59 
4 246, 7 52 86. 21 29,903 10.44 3,629 1. 26 
5 233,121 90.24 22,611 8.75 6,365 2. 46 
6 193,706 93.28 6,726 3.23 5,408 2.60 
7 182,000 96.05 2,758 1.45 4,096 2.16 
8 197,639 98.62 1,351 .67 7,074 3.52 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
District 
Number Protestant Per Cent Catholic Per Cent Jewish Per Cent 
1 42,185 80.49 10, 013 19.10 210 • 40 
2 47,503 92.33 3,791 7.36 150 .29 
3 52, 511 87.27 7,554 12.55 105 .17 
4 43,091 89.28 5, 169 10.70 0 0 
5 49,948 86.18 7,376 12.72 630 1. 08 
6 44,885 87.03 6,613 12.82 71 .13 
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TABLE II (Continued) 
District 
Number 
7 
8 
District 
Number 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
District 
Number 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Protestant Per Cent 
46,758 95.97 
68,351 92. 37 
Value 
Average 
Catholic Per Cent 
1, 962 4,02 
5,638 7.62 
Added By Manufacture 
$29,659,818 
8, 711,459 
8,768,553 
7, 961, 568 
18,867,637 
5,373,073 
1, 868,386 
7,546,546 
Number of Wage Earners 
7,055 
3,706 
3,576 
3,376 
6,849 
1,694 
506 
2,147 
Jewish Per Cent 
0 0 
0 0 
Per Cent of Total 
33.41 
9~81 
9.87 
8. 97 ,' 
21.25 
6.05 
2.10 
8.50 
Per Cent of Total 
23.91 
12.56 
12.12 
11.44 
23.21 
5.74 
1. 71 
7.27 
Source: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Fourteenth 
Census of the United States, 1920: Population (Washington: 
Goverrunent Printing Office, 1923), III, 811-831; Fourteenth 
Census of the United States, 1920: Manufactures (Washington: 
Goverrunent Printing Office, 1923), IX, 1213-1233; Religious 
Bodies, 1916 (Washington: Goverrunent Printing Office, 1919), 
I, 301. 
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3 
representatives was taken from several different sources. Two terri-
torial delegates, Dennis T. Flynn and Bird S. McGuire, belong in the 
time period of this study; both were Republicans. Flynn, serving 
from 1901 to 1903, terminated his congressional career in 1903; but 
McGuire, who succeeded him, was re-elected with statehood, serving 
in five consecutive Congresses from 1903 to 1913. 
Flynn, born in 1861 in Pennsylvania, moved to Guthrie in 1889 and 
was postmaster of that city until 1892. Previously he had been raised 
in a Catholic orphanage, attended the connnon schools and Canisius 
College, edited the Riverside, Iowa, Leader, and practiced law in 
Kiowa, Kansas, as well as publishing the Kiowa Herald. Defeated in 
1890 for Oklahoma territorial delegate, he was successful in 1892 and 
served in the Fifty-third and Fifty-fourth Congresses. Failing to be 
re-elected in 1896, he won two more consecutive terms and served from 
1899 to 1903. Although nominated again in 1902, he declined the 
offer. He resumed his law practice in Oklahoma City, in 1908 being an 
unsuccessful Republi~an candidate for the United States Senate. He 
was a delegate to the Republican National Convention in 1912. Flynn 
died in 1939. 
3Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1961 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961); Lyle H. and Dale 
Boren, Who Is Who in Oklahoma (Guthrie: The Co-operative Publishing 
Company~935); Marian L. Brockway, "A Study of the Geographical, 
Occupational, and Political Characteristics of Congressmen, 1800-1919," 
(Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Kansas, 1938); Rex Harlow, 
Oklahoma Leaders: Biographical Sketches of~ Foremost Living Men of 
Oklahoma (Oklahoma City: Harlow Publishing Company, 1928); A. N. 
Marquis, Who's Who in America (Chicago: A. N. Marquis and Company); 
H.F. O'Beirne, Leaders and Leading Men of the Indian Territory 
(Chicago: American Publishers' Association, 1891); Portrait and Bio-
graphical Record of Oklahoma (Chicago: Chapman Publishing Compan~ 
1901). 
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McGuire, the other territorial delegate included in this study, 
was born on an Illinois farm in 1865. After living in Missouri, he 
moved with his family to Kansas, where McGuire taught school and at-' 
tended the State Normal School at Emporia; later he studied law at the 
University of Kansas, and served as a county attorney and mayor. 
McGuire moved to Pawnee, Oklahoma Territory, in 1894. President William 
McKinley appointed him assistant United States Attorney in 1897, and 
McGuire served in that capacity until his election to the Fifty-eighth 
Congress in 1902. Elected as a Republican from the first district, 
McGuire was a member of the Oklahoma delegation until 1915, when he 
declined a renomination. In his final years he practiced law in 
Tulsa and operated a large ranch near Bartlesville, dying in 1930. 
Along with McGuire the five original United States House members 
to be elected on September 17, 1907 were Elmer Fulton, district two, 
James S. Davenport, district three, Charles D. Carter, district four, 
and Scott Ferris, district five. 
Elected in the special election of 1907 was Fulton, an Oklahoma 
City Democrat, who failed in his bid for the second district seat in 
1908. A native of Iowa, Fulton attended the public schools of 
Nebraska and received his higher education at Tabor College in Iowa. 
He was admitted to the bar in 1895 and, after practicing in Nebraska 
for six years, moved to Stillwater in Oklahoma Territory. After his 
short stint in Congress, Fulton resumed law practice in Oklahoma City 
and remained active in Democratic party affairs. He was assistant 
attorney general of Oklahoma from 1919 to 1922. Fulton died in 1939. 
Davenport, born in Alabama in 1864, moved to Muskogee in Indian 
Territory after being educated in Arkansas. He made law his occupation, 
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but had also taught in Arkansas. He settled in Vinita in 1893, where 
he acted as speaker of the Indian Territorial Council from 1899 to 
1901, and then was one of the attorneys for the Cherokee Nation from 
1901 to 1907~ During that time he was elected mayor of Vinita in 1903. 
A Democrat, Davenport was elected to the Sixtieth Congress, but was 
returned to the Sixty-second, Sixty-third, and Sixty-fourth Congresses, 
serving from 1911 to 1917. In the reapportionment of 1914 Davenport's 
district became number one. His congressional career ended with his 
defeat for re-election to the Sixty-fifth Congress in 1916. His re-
maining years, until his death in 1940, were spent practicing law and 
serving as judge of the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals. 
An Ardmore Democrat, Carter was born of Choctaw blood in Indian 
Territory in 1868. He was educated in the Indian day schools and 
Chickasaw Manual Training Academy at Tishomingo. From 1887 to 1900 
Carter was employed on a ranch and in a mercantile store near Ardmore, 
served as auditor of public accounts of the Chickasaw Nation, and headed 
the schools of the Chickasaws. In November, 1900, President McKinley 
appointed him mining trustee for Indian Territory, a position he held 
for four years. Carter was elected to Congress on September 17, 1907 
and was re-elected nine times, serving twenty years in the United States 
House from district four and district three after the reapportionment 
of 1914. After failing to regain the nomination in 1926, he was 
appointed to the state highway commission and served in that capacity 
until his death in 1929. 
Another Democrat who served a lengthy term in the United States 
House was Ferris. Born and educated in Missouri, he moved to Lawton 
to practice law after graduating from the Kansas City School of Law in 
1901. Ferris began his political career in the state House of Repre-
sentatives, serving there in 1904-1905. Elected to the Sixtieth 
Congress in 1907, he successively represented districts five and six 
until 1921. He was an unsuccessful candidate for a United States 
Senate seat in 1920. Ferris was active in political party affairs, 
serving as delegate to the Democratic National Convention in 1912 and 
1916 and as vice-chairman of the national committee. He was Demo-
cratic national committeeman from Oklahoma from 1924 to 1940, dying 
in 1945. 
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Replacing Fulton from the second district in the 1908 election 
was Dick T. Morgan, a Republican ·from Woodward. He was educated in 
Indiana, his state of birth, and received both a B.S. and M.S. in 
mathematics from Union Christian College. He was a professor at his 
alma mater for one year while also acting as superintendent of the 
high school in Hagerstown, Indiana. From college professor to lawyer, 
Morgan earned a bachelor of laws from the Central Law School of 
Indianapolis. His initial practice was at Terre Haute, where he .also 
edited the Terre Haute Courier for two years. He served in the 
Indiana legislature in 1880 and 1881. After moving via Kansas to 
Guthrie in 1889, Morgan settled at Woodward. President Theodore 
Roosevelt appointed him registrar of the United States land office, 
a position he held from 1904 until his election to the United States 
House in 1908. He served in the five succeeding Congresses until his 
death in 1920. After the reapportionment in 1914, Morgan's district 
was eight instead of two. 
A Muskogee Republican, Creager was elected from the third dis-
trict, replacing Davenport for 'the Sixty-first Congress. Primarily a 
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newspaperman, he had edited two papers in his native Ohio, the Columbus 
Press-Post and the Marietta Daily Leader. He moved to Muskogee, Indian 
Territory in 1904 and was engaged in the newspaper business until his 
election to Congress in 1908. After his unsuccessful attempt for re-
election in 1910, he was employed by the United States Indian Service 
and was later involved in oil production. His death came in 1965. 
In the 1912 election three representatives were elected at large 
due to the failure of Governor Cruce to carry out a plan for reappor-
tionment following the results of the 1910 census. Those elected 
in this capacity to the Sixty-third Congress were William H. Murray 
from Tishomingo, Joseph B. Thompson from Pauls Valley, and Claude Weaver 
from Oklahoma City, all Democrats. Murray and Thompson were later 
elected in 1914 from districts four and five, respectively. Weaver, 
elected only as a representative-at-large, never attempted to seek a 
House seat after the congressional redistricting took place in 1914. 
A man of varied interests, Murray came to Indian Territory in 
1898 from his native Texas. Teacher, newspaperman, rancher, and 
lawyer, he played an important role in the formation of the state of 
Oklahoma, having been president of the constitutional convention in 
1906. After statehood, "Alfalfa Bill," as he was known by his friends, 
served as speaker of the first state legislative session. A hard 
working and outspoken Democrat, he was a delegate to the national 
conventions in 1908, 1912, 1916, and 1932. After serving two terms 
in the United States House from 1913 to 1917, he failed in his attempt 
for renomination. During most of the 1920 1s, he lived and colonized 
in Bolivia, but returned to Oklahoma and was elected governor in 1930, 
serving from 1931 to 1935. He later unsuccessfully sought the gover-
nor's chair in 1938 and a United States Senate seat in 1942. He 
died at the age of 87 in 1956. 
Another native Texan, Thompson, graduated from Savoy College in 
1890. After being admitted to the bar in 1892, he moved to Ardmore, 
Indian Territory, where he was appointed conunissioner for a United 
States Court in 1893. Active in party politics, he was a delegate 
to the Democratic national conventions of 1900, 1904, and 1908, was 
chairman of the Democratic state conunittee in 1906 and 1908, and was 
elected to the state senate in 1910, serving to 1914. Elected as a 
representative-at-large to the Sixty-third Congress, he served Okla-
homa in three succeeding Congresses until his untimely death in 1919 
at the age of 48. 
William W. Hastings and James v. McClintic, district three Demo-
crat and district seven Democrat, were elected freshman members of 
the Sixty-fourth Congress in 1914. A native of Arkansas, Hastings 
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was a Cherokee and was educated at the Cherokee Male Seminary at 
Tahlequah. After graduating from the law department of Vanderbilt 
University, he was attorney general for the Cherokee Nation from 1891 
to 1895 and then national attorney for the Cherokees from 1907 to 1914. 
In 1912 he was a delegate to the Democratic national convention and 
was also a presidential elector for the Wilson-Marshall ticket nomin-
ated at the Baltimore convention. Although this study includes only 
Hastings' first term, he was returned to Washington for a total of 
eighteen years. After:.rejecting the opportunity for renomination in 
1934, he died four years later at the age of 71. 
McClintic was a Texas lawyer who migrated to Snyder in Kiowa 
County inunediately after the turn of the century. He had attended 
Add-Ran University (now Texas Christian University) in Fort Worth 
and later studied law at Georgetown University, Washington, D. C. 
Prior to his election to Congress, he served in both houses of the 
Oklahoma legislature from 1911 to 1915. Elected to the Sixty-fourth 
and nine succeeding Congresses, he equaled Hastings' long time career 
of public service. After his failure to secure the nomination in 
1934, he held various positions in Washington. He died in 1948 at 
the age of 70. 
In a biographical sununation, several conclusions can be made in 
regard to the thirteen congressmen as to their age, place of birth, 
occupation, length of public service, and political affiliation. Of 
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the thirteen individuals covered by this study, only one was born in 
Indian Territory, Carter. Four of the remaining eleven, Murray, 
Thompson, Weaver, and McClintic, were from a contiguous state, Texas. 
The other delegates to come from adjoining states were Ferris from 
Missouri and Hastings from Arkansas. Other than Davenport, who came 
from Alabama, the rest of the delegates originated in the Old Northwest-
Ohio Valley region. Flynn was from Pennsylvania, Creager, Ohio, Morgan, 
Indiana, McGuire, Illinois, and Fulton, Iowa. 
As to occupation, all were practicing attorneys except Creager, 
who was a newspaperman, Carter, a farmer-rancher, and McClintic, a 
merchant. However, many of them had at one time or another been 
teachers or connected with some phase of newspaper work. Those who 
had been in the classroom were McGuire, Davenport, Murray, and Morgan. 
Flynn, Morgan, and Murray had been associated with newspapers. 
All thirteen men were relatively young when they took the oath of 
office to serve as United States representatives. The youngest was 
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Ferris, who was elected in 1907 as one of the original representatives 
at the age of thirty, whereas the oldest was Morgan, who was sworn into 
office at the age of fifty-five. The average age of the thirteen upon 
taking oath was just over forty-one, with five in their thirties and 
six in their forties. 
In terms of public service as representatives from Oklahoma, two 
of them, Carter and McClintic, spent twenty years each in the United 
States House. Others with long records of service included Hastings, 
eighteen years, Ferris, fourteen years, and Morgan, eleven years. 
Of the twelve not born in Indian Territory, six, McGuire, Davenport, 
Murray, Thompson, Weaver, and Flynn, came to Oklahoma or Indian 
Territory before the turn of the century; three, Ferris, Morgan, and 
McClintic, waited until the century had turned; and two, Fulton and 
Creager, came in 1901 and 1904, respectively. Only Flynn, McGuire, 
Morgan, and Creager were affiliated with the Republican Party. The 
remaining nine were Democrats (see Tables III and IV). 
This section of the study sets the stage for further examination 
of the nature of progressivism in the Oklahoma House delegation. 
This will begin with territorial representation in 1901 and conclude 
with the termination of the second session of the Sixty-fourth Congress 
in 1917. 
Poli-
Name tics 
1. Bird S. McGuire R 
2. Elmer L. Fulton D 
Dick T. Morgan R 
3. James S. Davenport D 
Charles E. Creager R 
4. Charles D. Carter D 
5. Scott Ferris D 
Dennis T. Flynn R 
TABLE III 
REPRESENTATIVES IN CONGRESS FROM OKLAHOMA 
(ORIGINAL DISTRICTS) (PLUS DELEGATE FLYNN) 
State of Age on 
Term Occupation Birth Taking Oath 
1907-15 Attorney Illinois 43 
1907-09 Attorney Iowa 44 
1909-15 Attorney Indiana 55 
1907-09 Attorney Alabama 43 
1911-15 
1909-11 Newspaper Ohio 35 
1907-15 Rancher I. T. 38 
1907-15 Attorney Missouri 30 
1901-03 Attorney Pennsyl- 31 
vania 
Home Town 
Pawnee 
Okla.City 
Woodward 
Vinita 
Muskogee 
Ardmore 
Lawton 
Guthrie 
1served as Oklahoma Territorial Delegate prior to statehood--1903 to 1907 
2Including five years from eighth district after reapportionment 
3rncluding two years from first district after reapportionment 
4Including twelve years from third district after reapportionment 
5rncluding six years from sixth district after reapportionment 
Years Service 
in Congress 
81 
2 
112 
83 
2 
204 
145 
86 
6served as Oklahoma Territorial Delegate prior to Statehood--1892 to 1896 and 1899 to 1903 
0\ 
0 
Dis- Poli-
trict Name tics 
1. James S, Davenport D 
2, William W. Hastings D 
3, Charles D, Carter D 
4. William H, Murray D 
5, Joseph B, Thompson D 
6. Scott Ferris D 
7. James V, McClintic D 
8. Dick T. Morgan R 
At Large Representatives 
William H. Murray D 
Joseph B, Thompson D 
Claude Weaver D 
TABLE IV 
REPRESENTATIVES IN CONGRESS FROM OKLAHOMA 
(REVISED DISTRICTS) 
State of Age on 
Term Occupation Birth Taking Oath 
1915-17 Attorney Alabama 43 
1915~21 
19~~5 Attorney Arkansas 50 
1915-27 Rancher I. T. 38 
1915-17 Attorney Texas 43 
1915-19 Attorney Texas 41 
1915-21 Attorney Missouri 30 
1915-35 Merchant Texas 36 
1915-20 Attorney Indiana 55 
1913-15 Attorney Texas 43 
1913-15 Attorney Texas 41 
1913-15 Attorney Texas 45 
Home Town 
Vinitia 
Tahlequah 
Ardmore 
Tishomingo 
Pauls Valley 
Lawton 
Snyder 
Woodward 
Tishomingo 
Pauls Valley 
Okla. City 
Years Service 
8 
18 
20 
4 
6 
14 
20 
11 
4 
7 
2 
0\ 
t-' 
CHAPTER III 
THE TERRITORIAL DELEGATES: DENNIS T. FLYNN AND BIRDS. McGUIRE 
(FIFTY-SEVENTH THROUGH FIFTY-NINTH CONGRESSES, 1901-1907) 
With the assassination of President William McKinley on September 
6, 1901 and his death on September 14, Vice-President Theodore Roose-
velt, the former reform minded governor of New York, became president. 
After he entered the White House, Congress, following his reconnnenda-
tions, began to expand the social, economic, and political responsibili-
ties of the federal government and laid the groundwork for a whole 
series of subsequent developments. The role of Oklahoma's United States 
House of Representatives members in this development was an important 
I 
one, though it has received little attention. This chapter will examine 
the stand taken by the territorial delegates, Dennis T. Flynn and Bird 
S. McGuire, on the reform issues that came before the United States 
House from the Fifty-seventh through the Fifty-ninth Congresses. 
The standard employed to determine the bills that constituted 
progressive legislation is derived from the judgment expressed by eight 
leading American historians of the period, primarily from the consensus 
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h 1 "h' · h l sc oo o+ istoriograp y. These historians cited several measures and 
actions which they c~nsidered reform issues of the progressive period 
(Appendix A). It should be noted that the standard to be used expresses 
the interpretation of one school of historiography; it does not take 
into account the more recent studies which have suggested a re-evalua-
tion of the progressive period indicating that it was not a reform era, 
b h ' d f ' 2 ut rat er a perio o conservatism. 
Dennis T. Flynn, a Guthrie Republican, had previously served as 
the non-voting delegate from Oklahoma Territory from 1892 to 1896 and 
again from 1898 to 1900. He was re-elected in the campaign of 1900 to 
serve in the Fifty-seventh Congress and therefore falls within the 
1Benjamin P. DeWitt, The Progressive Movement,! Non-Partisan, 
Comprehensive Discussion of Current Tendencies in American Politics 
(New York: Macmillan, 1915); Harold U. Faulkner, The Quest for Social 
Justice, 1898-1914 (New York: Macmillan, 1931); Henry F. Pringle, The 
Life and Times of William Howard Taft (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 
~,-'f939); George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt and the 
Birth of Modern America, 1900-l912°"<Ne;-York: Harper and Ro;:-1958); 
Russel'B. Nye, Midwestern Progressive Politics: ! Historical Study of 
Its Origins and Developments, 1870-1958 (New York: Harper and Row, 
1959); Eric F. Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny: ! History of Modern 
American Reform (New York: Vintage Books, 1952); Arthur S. Link, 
Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917 (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1954); and Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan 
to F.D.R. (New York: Vintage Books, 1955). 
2The most outspoken proponent of the New Left re-evaluation of the 
progressive period is Gabriel Kolko, who states that the combination of 
glittering promise and empty performance in progressivism in the end 
headed off "the radical potential of mass grievances and aspirations of 
genuine progressivism," or, in other words, of true social reconstruc-
tion. See Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: ! Reinterpretation of 
American History, 1900-1916 (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963). 
The same theme in a narrower compass may be found in Kolko's volume on 
railroad legislation during the progressive period. See Kolko, Rail-
roads and Regulation, 1877-1916 (Princeton: Princeton Universit-y~-
Press, 1965). For a brief discussion of how the New Left historians 
have treated the progressive period see Irwin Unger, "The 'New Left' and 
American History," American Historical Review, LXXII (July, 1967), 1237-
1263. 
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scope of this study. Throughout his service prior to 1900, Flynn had 
solicited support for his constituents largely on the issue of "free 
homes." While the provisions of the Homestead Act applied chiefly to 
Oklahoma Territory, much of the land was not free as was the case for 
most of the public land in the West. To open Indian Territory land to 
homeseekers the federal govermnent had first to extinguish Indian title 
by purchasing each tribe's surplus land. This cost was passed on to 
settlers, generally running about $1.25 an acre, and Flynn's "free 
homes" plan proposed to repeal these charges. When Congress finally 
passed the "free homes" bill in 1900 it saved Oklahoma settlers an 
estimated $15,000,000. 3 
As "free homes" had been the rallying cry of all Oklahoma politi-
cians and political parties since the campaign of 1894, it was natural 
that Flynn should be the hero of the hour. In the issue of May 19, 
1900, the Weekly State Capital of Guthrie printed some twenty special 
dispatches from towns over the territory expressing gratitude at the 
passage of the bill and praising Flynn. "Free Homes Day" was cele-
b t d . . . 4 ra e in a score or more cities. In part these celebrations were 
engineered by Republican politicans, but the greater number repre-
sented spontaneous acclamation. When Flynn returned from Washington, 
a "welcome home" celebration drew approximately 5,000 people at Guthrie, 
and a similar rally at Oklahoma City, July 2, 1900, was attended by 
3victor Murdock, "Dennis T. Flynn," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XVIII 
(June, 1940), 107-113; Dennis T. Flynn, "Strenuous Political Legisla-
tive Battle Fought to Obtain Free Homes Bill," Oklahoma City Times, 
November 10, 1932. -------
4Guthrie Weekly State Capital, May 26, 1900 and June 2, 1900. 
5 
about 6,000. 
Flynn had become so popular as a result of his parliamentary 
success that he was easily renominated by the Republican state conven-
tion, which assembled at Guthrie in August of 1900. He was opposed in 
the general election by Robert A. Neff, the coalition candidate of the 
Democrats and Populists, a combination that had been victorious over 
Flynn in 1896. But Flynn's candidacy was so closely tied with the 
"free homes" success that it was inevitable that wherever he spoke .the 
meeting turned into a celebration. The Democrat-Populist coalition 
pointed in vain to the fact that "free homes" was a non-partisan or 
perhaps a multi-partisan issue and that all parties had assisted in 
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securing adoption of the bill in Congress. Regardless, Flynn was given 
all the credit for this gift to the settlers, credit which could only 
assist his campaign. 
On the other hand, the lack of a unifying issue was apparent in the 
ranks of the Democrat-Populist coalition. The problem was that in 1896 
the great national issue of free silver had served to unite all reform 
forces. This issue had declined in importance by 1900, and its absence 
left the coalition with no campaign message to match Flynn's "free 
homes" issue. The schism was deepened when the Republican press called 
Populists' attention to the fact that Neff was a straight-out Democrat 
and not a Populist. 6 The campaign of 1900 turned out to be a very one-
sided affair as Flynn,:the veteran Republican campaigner, won a deci-
sive victory over Neff. The election returns were as follows: 
5Guthrie Weekly State Capital, July 7, 1900. 
6Guthrie Weekly State Capital, September 15, 1900 and September 22, 
1900. 
Flynn 
Neff 
Others 
Republican 
Democrat-Populist 
38, 253 
33,529 
1,585 
52% 
46% 
2%7 
Evidence clearly shows that Flynn associated with the men who 
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formed the nucleus of what came to be called the "Old Guard" or "stand-
patters." This was the wing of the Republican Party which favored 
the status quo or conservative philosophy, and whom the progressives 
viewed as conferring favors on special interest groups such as the 
railroads and manufacturers. Flynn became well acquainted with_ Thomas 
B. Reed, House member from Maine, and supported Reed for the 1896 Re-
publican presidential nomination over McKinley. 8 Reed, Speaker of the 
House during the 1890's, became known as "the Czar" due to his arbi-
trary leadership and his interpretation of existing rules which cur-
tailed any power the Democratic minority might have possessed. Flynn's 
support of "Czar" Reed did not place him in a favorable position with 
certain progressive politicians. Territorial newspapers also told of 
Flynn's intimate association with the powerful Speaker Reed. In the 
Blackwell Times-Record of March 12, 1903, an article ent;i_,t,led· "Passed 
98 Bills" told of the "fancy" that Reed had taken for the delegate from 
Oklahoma Territory and the assistance provided by Reed to Flynn in 
passage of the "free homes" bill. 9 
Due to his association with Reed and others of like political 
nature, Flynn ran into trouble when Roosevelt took the oath of office. 
His relationship with the new president is vividly described in the 
7 The Oklahoma Red Book (Oklahoma City: Office of the Secretary 
of State, 1912), II-;--10~ 
8 Murdock, "Dennis T. Flynn," 111. 
9Blackwell Times-Record, March 12, 1903. 
Mangum Star, a Democratic publication. The December 19, 1901 article 
was entitled "Flynn's Hot Wire Grounded." Flynn had gone to Roosevelt 
seeking action on some Indian Territorial matters and was met by an 
irate president. ''You should confine your business to your own con-
stituency Flynn. And right here I want to say that there is to be a 
general change in conditions in Oklahoma. 1110 The article stated that 
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much more was said and that Flynn became so angry that he forgot to state 
the business that he had come on. According to the story, Flynn was 
no longer an admirer of Roosevelt. 
In the first session of the Fifty-seventh Congress, Flynn delivered 
some lengthy remarks concerning statehood for the territories of Okla-
homa, Arizona, and New Mexico. In a May 8, 1902 speech before the 
House Flynn favored H. R. 12543, which provided for the people of 
Oklahoma, Arizona, and New Mexico to form constitutions and state 
governments and be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with 
the original states. Arguing for statehood, Flynn said: 
It has now come to this, that in the consideration of this bill, 
in the language of old, 'Just and due consideration of the rights 
of the people should be the paramount question considered.' 
There are more people in every one of these Territories now 
applying for admission than were in many of the States now 
represented upon this floor.11 
Flynn was asked why Oklahoma was not reported alone for statehood, 
and he promptly replied that all members of the Committee on Terri-
tories, both Democrats and Republicans, had unanimously approved the 
bill as it now stood; he thought it was right that all three of the 
10 Mangum Star, December 19, 1901. 
11 U.S., Congressional Record, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., 1902, XXXV, 
Part 5, 227. 
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territories should be admitted. 12 
From the above evidence it would seem that Flynn's posture on the 
statehood for territories issue would have endeared him to the progres-
sives. This issue became more relevant to progressivism somewhat 
later when the Arizona and New Mexico state constitutions were being 
debated prior to the 1912 elections. It appears that the issue of 
Oklahoma statehood was Flynn's major concern. 
Flynn introduced one significant bill (H. R. 8327) in the first 
session .of the Fifty-seventh Congress, a resolution which would provide 
for the protection of miners in the territories. It was a revision of 
a previously passed law of 1890 governing the protection of miners in 
the Indian Territory. The old bill had required 3,300 cubic feet of 
air per minute for every 50 men at work in the mines, whereas Flynn's 
bill would increase the cubic feet per minute to 5,000. Flynn stated 
on January 30, 1902, on the House Floor, that the old bill had been 
most beneficial for miners, but he felt that the additional protection 
. l 13 was essentia. Since the social justice element of progressivism 
had campaigned {or the improvement of working conditions and more 
stringent safety requirements, it would appear that Flynn might have 
been connnended by progressives for this legislative action, even 
though somewhat minor in its extent of coverage. 
Another measure of Flynn's work in Congress was the reaction of 
the territorial press, although it is limited to some degree by the 
political polemics and partisanship of many of the papers. Among the 
territorial papers, one of the leading critics of Flynn was the Shawnee 
13u. s., Congressional Record, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., 1902, XXXV, 
Part 2, 1130. 
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Herald, known for its Democratic leanings. In a scathing editorial 
written near the close of Flynn's last term, the Herald published a list 
of bills under the heading "Flynn's Great (?) Work." The editorial 
mentioned that even the Republican controlled Newkirk News-Journal 
was able to find only three bills for which Flynn was responsible that 
directly or indirectly benefited all the citizens of Oklahoma: a bill 
creating two additional judges for the territory, a bill prohibiting 
the legislature from locating the capital or any of the public build-
ings, and a bill providing for the redistricting of the territory by a 
commission which it expected would gerrymander the territory so that 
the Republicans might control both houses of the territorial legisla-
ture. Every other bill, the editorial proclaimed, was either a private 
graft for someone who had been able to enlist the stalwart offices 
of the self-serving delegate, or it was a measure of purely local 
interest, such as allowing the new counties to spend their own money, 
or appropriating $100,000 for Guthrie and Oklahoma City public build-
ings. In a damning summation of what the paper called Flynn's great 
(?) work, the article said: 
The facts are that Oklahoma would generally have been better 
off if Dennis Flynn had gone to Honolulu before Congress met 
instead of after. His private grafts and personal ends are 
his chief aim and even a Republican Congress would do more 
for the territory if we had no delegate at all--unless we 
had an honest one. The territory has had enough tommy-rot 
about Flynn's 'great work. 1 14 
On the other hand, Flynn's work was praised by a Kansas City 
Journal article which was reprinted in several Oklahoma newspapers. 
The story, entitled "Passed 98 Bills," told of Flynn's pride in the 
14 Shawnee Herald, July 26, 1902. 
fact that he had left Congress with more bills to his credit than 
15 
any other previous member of Congress. However, only the "free 
homes" bill of the 98 in which Flynn was involved was of enough sig-
nificance to mention in the article. The article reported that ac-
cording to "Mr. Cannon and the late Speaker Reed, Flynn was the most 
16 
successful delegate that ever entered Congress." The "Mr. Cannon" 
referred to was the new Speaker of the House, Joseph G. Cannon, Re-
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publican of Illinois, who replaced Reed in the Fifty-seventh Congress. 
This statement was of interest to progressives since Cannon's name 
became virtually synonymous with dictatorial power in the House. 17 
Company of this type did not leave Flynn in a satisfactory position 
with the early progressives. 
Did Flynn speak in behalf of any of the early progressive legis-
lation that was of national concern? The best indication of Flynn's 
attitude toward national issues is reflected by his statement upon 
retirement that the reason he had enacted.so many measures affecting 
Oklahoma was the fact that he "never tried to meddle in general 
legislation. 1118 Asked about general legislation, Flynn remarked that 
he had introduced but one bill that was of general concern, and that 
was in regard to the authorization of fourth class postmasters to 
administer oaths in pension vouchers and the use of postmarking stamps 
15 Blackwell Times-Record, March 12, 1903. 
16Ibid. 
17 For an interpretation of Cannon's dictatorial power see Blair 
Bolles, Tyrant~ Illinois: Uncle Joe Cannon's Experiment with 
Personal Power (New York: W. w. Norton, 1951). 
18Blackwell Times-Record, March 12, 1903. 
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19 instead of a notary public seal. The nature of this piece of legis-
lation leaves something to be desired in comparison with the burning 
reform issues of the day. 
Even after his retirement from Congress, Flynn remained active in 
Republican Party circles. In 1908 there was considerable talk of Flynn 
being appointed to the newly elected President William Howard Taft's 
cabinet. In an Oklahoma City Times editorial, there was a call for 
Taft to appoint Flynn as Secretary of the Interior. Flynn, having just 
been defeated for the United States Senate, appeared as a likely candi-
date to many Republicans, at least in Oklahoma, since he represented 
a western state and, according to the Times, should be rewarded in some 
fashion for the faithful service he had rendered for the Republican 
20 Party. Apparently there was not a serious national effort for Flynn's 
appointment. 
The first territorial delegate of the progressive period retired 
from Washington in March of 1903, after making the following announce-
ment: "I originally entered politics for the purpose of passing the 
'Free Homes' bill. That has been accomplished and that statehood must 
come shortly, there are others who can as well represent the people 
21 
and the party in congress as myself." This announcement by Flynn 
gave hope to all aspirants for the office, both Democrats and Republi-
cans. The Democrats believed that Flynn had been stronger than his 
19Ibid. 
20 Oklahoma City Times, November 7, 1908. 
21Guthrie Daily~ Capital, March 8, 1902. See also the 
Oklahoma City Times, May 14, 1925. 
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party in the territory and for this reason it might be possible to 
wrest control of the territory from the Republicans. Meanwhile, the 
Republicans began a campaign to convince the territory that congres-
sional action on the statehood question would depend upon the election. 
Flynn was quoted as saying: "If Oklahoma goes Republican, and thus 
gives an evidence of the ability of the Republican Party in the terri-
tory to continue in control, there will be little doubt of her ad-
. . ,,22 
mission. 
In the Republican preliminaries, Dick T. Morgan of Woodward, 
Bird S. McGuire of Pawnee, and Joseph W. McNeal of Guthrie entered the 
23 
race. On the other hand, some nine Democrats sought the nomination 
of their party, with William M. Cross of Oklahoma City the leading 
contender. At the Enid Republican convention, McGuire was selected 
on the third ballot. In contrast, the Democrats took thirty-nine 
b 11 t bf C . d 24 a o s e ore ross was nominate. 
In their platform, the Republicans endorsed the Flynn statehood 
bill, which provided for the admission of Oklahoma Territory as a 
'h d Id' T ' 25 state wit out regar to n ian erritory. The Democrats, in their 
platform, urged the admission of Oklahoma and Indian Territory as one 
state. In the campaign the Republicans took the point of view that 
immediate statehood for Oklahoma with an eventual addition of Indian 
22Guthrie Leader, April 19, 1902. 
23Guthrie Leader, April 18, 1902; Guthrie Daily State Capital, 
April 20, 1902. 
24Guthrie Leader, April 23, 1902. 
25Luther B. Hill, History of the State of Oklahoma (Chicago: 
The Lewis Publishing Company, 1910), I, 343-.-
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Territory would secure quick admission and that the Democratic plan 
26 
could mean only prolonged delay. The Democrats charged that the 
Republican members of the Senate Conunittee on Territories were the ones 
27 that were delaying statehood. The election was extremely close, with 
McGuire winning by a plurality of 484 votes. Cross carried eight 
counties: Cleveland, Day, Greer, Kiowa, Oklahoma, Pottawatomie, Roger 
Mills, and Washita, while McGuire won the remaining eighteen. 28 The 
results were as follows: 
McGuire 
Cross 
Others 
45,896 
45,409 
2,998 
48. 7% 
48.1% 
3.2% 29 
McGuire, taking his Congressional seat on March 5, 1903 in the 
Fifty-eighth Congress, held his position until March 3, 1915, the 
termination of the Sixty-third Congress. This portion of the study 
will cover only his legislative career as a territorial delegate from 
1903 to the special election of September 17, 1907 which selected five 
Congressmen from the new state of Oklahoma. McGuire was re-elected 
in 1904 by a 1,586 vote plurality over Frank Mathews, the Democratic 
candidate. The results were: 
McGuire 
Mathews 
Others 
51,454 
49, 868 
7,823 
47.2% 
45.7% 30 
7.1% 
The legislative battles in the Fifty-eighth and Fifty-ninth 
Congresses, of which McGuire served a delegate, fall into two groups. 
26 .. 
. Guthrie Weekly~ Capital, August 23, 1902 and September 27, 
1902. 
27Guthrie Weekly State Capital, June 14, 1902. 
28 The Oklahoma Red Book, II, 306. 
29Ibid. 
30rbid. 
74 
One encompasses three bills to regulate the railroads. Of these, the 
most important was the Hepburn bill, providing for the regulation of 
freight and passenger rates by the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
Another bill increased the railroads' liability for injury to employees, 
and a third limited the hours of railroad employees engaged in inter-
state commerce. The second group includes two bills intended to pro-
tect health and welfare, the Pure Food and Drug Act and the Meat 
Inspection amendment to the Agricultural Appropriation bill. 
Among the pro-McGuire newspapers, the most outstanding tributes 
were paid by the Blackwell Times-Record and the Chandler News-Publicist. 
Both of these papers published full page articles in 1910 covering 
McGuire's work in Congress. Under the sub-heading entitled "Wonderful 
Legislative Record" they proclaimed that he participated in the efforts 
of Congress that had brought forth more constructive and progressive 
legislation in the interests of the whole people than any similar era 
31 in the history of the country. Both papers stated that he had stood 
shoulder to shoulder with the Republican organization in Congress in 
32 permanently placing these reforms on the statute books. The 
specifi~ legislation, mentioned by both papers, that McGuire had 
supported were the Pure Food and Drug Act, the Meat Inspection Act, 
the Employer's Liability Act, and the Hepburn Railroad Act, all passed 
in 1906. They also pointed out that Delegate McGuire was deeply 
interested in reclamation of lands and in good roads. Yet the pages 
of the Congressional Record reveal nothing. McGuire's activity in the 
31 Blackwell Times-Record, June 16, 1910; Chandler News-Publicist, 
June 3, 1910. 
32Ibid. 
Fifty-eighth and Fifty-ninth Congre~ses was confined to the introduc-
tion of a statehood bill for Oklahoma (H. R. 4078) and two bills con-
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cerning the granting of additional land for the Agricultural and 
Mechanical College of Oklahoma Territory (H. R. 17212 and H. R. 17769). 
All of his remarks on the House floor were limited to discussion of his 
statehood bill. There is no evidence to indicate how McGuire felt 
concerning the issues which were of interest to progressives. 
There were denunciations of McGuire's record as territorial dele-
gate supplied mostly by the Democratic newspapers of the territory. In 
an editorial that appeared in both the Shawnee Herald and the Muskogee 
Times-Democrat, McGuire was verbally assaulted for his laziness: 
"· •• he has done nothing more strenuous than draw his salary and 
throw bouquets at his Republican press agents. 1133 The article con-
tinued to assail McGuire and the "guff now being handed out to the 
Republican newspapers of Oklaho~a by a worshipping press agent in 
Washington, proclaiming McGuire as the Modern Moses. 1134 Nothing was 
mentioned as to the progressive stance of McGuire in these strongly 
Democratic newspapers. 
Likewise unfavorable to McGuire's legislative record was the 
nationally known mouthpiece of progressivism, LaFollette's Weekly 
Magazine, edited by the former governor and then United States Senator 
from Wisconsin, Robert M. LaFollette. The magazine stories on McGuire, 
which were written in 1910 and 1912, are the best analyses of his 
service as a territorial delegate from a point of view outside Oklahoma. 
33 Shawnee Herald, May 29, 1908. 
34Ibid. 
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In the LaFollette magazine's permanent column headed "The Roll Call on 
Men and Measures," McGuire was the featured legislator on June 18, 
1910. The first part of the column defines a demagogue as one who 
attempts to control the multitude by specious and deceitful arts. 
The definition, said LaFollette, was applicable to McGuire since he 
seuured his election to Congress by false promises of public service, 
and when in office, betrayed the trust of the people who elected him.35 
The next segment of the article discussed McGuire's record in 
the two Congresses prior to statehood for Oklahoma. LaFollette thus 
described McGuire's tenure as territorial delegate: 
Oklahoma and Indian Territory comprised the last general 
reserve which the Federal Government had set aside as a 
home for the Red Man in exchange for his native land. 
It was a reserve rich in fertility and mineral resources. 
The disposition of Indian lands, the distribution funds, 
and the extension privileges in coal and oil in Indian 
reserves have ever been sought and cherished as 'oppor-
tunities' by the .Interests which have 'stood in.' As 
spokesman for the territory before it became a State, and as 
a member of Congress sipce, BIRD MCGUIRE has taken a 
conspicuous part in the behalf of the various System 
schemes to promote the game of getting the Indians' patri-
mony into the hands of those who would use it to 'develop 
the country.' MCGUIRE has served the System and in turn 
the System supports MCGUIRE.36 
The progressive magazine went on to describe McGuire as schizophrenic 
due to the fact that he posed as "a champion of reform, a devotee of 
the Roosevelt policies," but "in spite of his campaign professions, a 
careful study of the record fails to disclose a single issue upon which 
McGuire failed to line up with the reactionaries for special interests 
35 LaFollette's Weekly Magazine, II (June 18, 1910), 4. 
36Ibid. 
. bl" . ..37 against pu ic interests. 
Two years later, McGuire was again spotlighted in the Lafollette 
publication. This time he received attention in an article entitled 
"A 'Progressive' at Home; A Standpatter in Congress." The article 
included a photograph of McGuire with the caption under it reading 
"a political Dr. Jekyll and :Mr. Hyde who professes to be progressive 
at home but is a stand-patterc_in Washington. 1138 The periodical de-
clared that McGuire "lost no time after reaching the Capitol to roll 
up his sleeves in the service of special privilege. 1139 McGuire's 
contribution to legislation, asserted Editor Lafollette, consisted 
mainly in the introduction of endless pension bills. Furthermore, 
he contributed nothing to the debates upon important measures of 
40 
statecraft. The magazine suJI}IIlarized his career as territorial 
delegate by picturing McGuire as the "representative in Congress for 
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the System, and was the representative of the same System in the 
41 
state of Oklahoma," Realizing that LaFollette's political viewpoints 
may have changed by 1912, we should nevertheless carefully weigh his 
assessment of ~cGuire's record as territorial delegate from 1903 to 
1907. 
In evaluating the territorial delegates who served Oklahoma from 
1901 to 1907 and their relation to progressivism, it is difficult to 
37Ibid., 5, 
38 LaFollette's Weekly Magazine, IV (October 12, 1912), 4. 
39Ibid. 
40Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
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establish a definitive conclusion due to the non-voting status of 
their position. However, it is important for the purpose of this 
study to attempt to draw some conclusions based on the delegate's 
remarks in the Congressional Record and the response to his speeches 
and record from a variety of sources, including territorial newspapers 
and observations made by the press outside the territory. 
Flynn, though serving only a limited time in what this study 
has delimited as the progressive period, must be classified as react-
ing negatively on most progressive issues, but he did take a positive 
stand on two local issues that were of concern to progressives, i.e., 
statehood for territories and regulation of working conditions for 
miners in the territories. The first reason for placing Flynn in a 
more negative role concerning progressivism is the notable lack of 
statements supporting the early reform efforts of President Roosevelt 
and the schism that apparently developed between the two. Even though 
progressivism had not fully developed at the national level, there 
were important reform issues to which Flynn might have addressed him-
self. There is no evidence to indicate that he spoke for Roosevelt's 
early attempts at trust regulation, e.g., the Northern Securities 
case. Flynn made no supporting statements for such legislative pro-
posals as the Elkins Act of 1903, aimed at eliminating the rebate 
evil; the Newlands Reclamation Act of 1902, a step toward conserva-
tion reform; or the act of 1903 establishing the Department of Com-
merce and Labor which was to include a Bureau of Corporations empowered 
to investigate and report upon the operations of corporations engaged 
in interstate cormnerce. 
A second argument for placing Flynn in the more negative mold is 
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the fact that he was recognized as holding close ties to the Republi-
can "Old Guard," the conservative wing of the party which frowned upon 
reform. His association with such "Old Guard" members as "Czar" Reed 
and Cannon, both of whom later became symbols of anti-progressivism, 
lend credence to this argument. And finally, the last point to show 
Flynn's lack of progressive qualities is his own admission of not 
meddling in general legislation. He took no active role unless the 
issues debated affected Oklahoma. It is apparent from the preceding 
evidence that Flynn envisioned the good of the nation as less pressing 
than the good of his immediate area. 
In analyzing McGuire's legislative career as territorial delegate, 
we find him appearing as negative as Flynn. The evidence indicates 
that McGuire paid verbal tribute through Republican newspapers in the 
territory to many of the progressive reforms enacted in the Fifty-
eighth and Fifty-ninth Congresses. But there is nothing to indicate 
that he was vitally concerned about these reforms since he spoke not 
once on the House floor in their behalf. Yet, he could have debated 
for such progressive legislation as the Pure Food and Drug Act, Meat 
Inspection Act, Hepburn Act, and Employer's Liability Act, all passed 
in 1906. 
It is likely that Flynn, as well as McGuire, represented the 
"Old Guard" and "stand-pat" conservative wing of the Republican Party, 
which took a limited stand on progressive issues. Therefore, it is 
apparent that Oklahoma Territory was represented by delegates who 
could not be considered in the forefront of progressivism. Additional 
investigation of McGuire's record in the later Congresses is needed 
to determine if he shifted as progressivism developed. 
CHAPTER IV 
OKLAHOMA'S FIRST TWO CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS FOLLOWING STATEHOOD 
(SIXTIETH AND SIXTY-FIRST CONGRESSES, 1907-1911) 
President Theodore Roosevelt shifted more to the left in his last 
two years in office, as he requested increased reform legislation from 
Congress in 1907 and 1908. In D~cember of 1907, he sent his annual 
message to Congress. In its 35,000 words were recommendations for the 
adoption of an inheritance and income tax, the national incorporation 
and regulation of interstate business, the regulation of railroad 
securities, and the fixing of railroad rates based upon a scheme of 
physical evaluation. The President also called for the establishment 
of a postal savings bank, the limitation of labor injunctions, and 
the extension of the eight-hour day and workmen's compensation 
. . 1 1 pr1.nc1.p es. 
Then at the end of January, 1908, as Congress seemed disinclined 
to consider his proposals, Roosevelt sent it the most radical message 
of his entire eight years in office. Included in it were all of the 
proposals he had recommended the previous December together with a new 
one demanding the federal regulations of stock market gambling. But 
the real blow was delivered at the federal courts. The courts had just 
declared unconstitutional the railway workingmen's compensation law of 
1 George Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of Mod-
~ America, 1900-19Tz'""(New York: Harper and Row,--r§°58), 220. 
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1906. The decision had evoked bitter criticism from the progressives. 
In these two messages, as Professor Elting E. Morison observes, 
Roosevelt had proposed practically every reform that was to be made 
during the Taft and Wilson administrations, and even a few that were 
2 to lie dormant until the New Deal days. But as most Presidents be-
fore him had found, Congress becomes more and more indifferent to 
their desires during their last months in office. Part of the reason 
for Roosevelt's problems with Congress lay in the traditional decline 
of power which all Presidents seem to experience. Deprived of 
patronage power, and no longer an important factor in future elections, 
Roosevelt's leverage with Congress diminished as his term neared its 
end. Another reason for the President's lack of success was the ad-
verse economic conditions that jarred the nation in 1907. The Panic 
of 1907 revealed the flaws in the economy's currency and credit struc-
ture, but the business community attributed the recession to Roosevelt's 
radical program. 
The Sixtieth Congress apparently felt much the same way, as the 
President received only two bills that interested progressives: a 
bill authorizing the temporary expansion of the currency and the 
establishment of a National Monetary Commission, and a workingmen's 
compensation measure that applied only to the railroads. Roosevelt's 
major proposals of a progressive nature were ignored. In addition 
to the bills signed by the President, two other bills concerned 
progressives but did not reach the President's desk: a child labor 
bill for the District of Columbia, which died on the House calendar; 
2Elting E. Morison (ed.), The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951:-f954), VI, 922. 
and a bill to create a Bureau of Mines within the Interior Depart-
ment, which passed the House but died in the Senate Mines and Mining 
Committee. The major consideration of the first segment of this 
chapter will be to evaluate the response to these bills by the new 
voting delegation from Oklahoma to the United States House. 
The Oklahoma Enabling Act, which allocated Oklahoma five con-
gressmen, was signed into law on June 16, 1906. The boundary scheme 
of the act had encouraged Republicans in the hope of capturing all 
three of the districts touching the Kansas border (see Figure 3). 
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But the Democratic landslide in the special election of September 17, 
1907, carried into all but the first district, where Delegate McGuire 
of Pawnee, for whom it was especially designed, won by a narrow margin 
over William L. Eagleton, 22,362 to 21,003. Elmer L. Fulton of 
Oklahoma City took the measure of former Governor Thompson Ferguson 
of Watonga, 26,006 to 25,028 in the second, and James S. Davenport of 
Vinita, former speaker of the Cherokee House, defeated Frank C. 
Hubb~rd of Muskogee in the third, 26,370 to 23,623. Under this dis-
trict system, which lasted until 1914, the two southern districts were 
conceded to the Democrats from the beginning. Charles D. Carter of 
Ardmore in the southeastern fourth won a decided majority of 29,782 
to 15,752 over Loren G. Disney, the Republican candidate. In the 
southwestern fifth district, Scott Ferris of Lawton defeated Henry 
D. McKnight by the wide margin of 32,935 to 14,883. Both of these 
latter Congressmen won four successive elections by widening majori-
ties to retain their seats for the duration of the 1907 district 
boundaries. After 1914, representing new and smaller districts, they 
continued their long careers in the lower house to complete ten and 
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. 1 3 seven terms, respective y. 
To cope with the Panic of 1907, the Sixtieth Congress passed the 
Aldrich-Vreeland Bill, an emergency currency measure. It authorized 
national banks for a period of six years to issue circulating notes 
based on commercial paper and state, county, and municipal bonds. In 
order to limit bank note emission based on securities other than 
Federal bonds, a graduated tax up to 10% was levied on such notes. 
While the bill introduced some elasticity into the national currency, 
it provided no safeguards for the credit supply. The most important 
provision was the establishment of a National Monetary Commission 
authorized to investigate and report upon the banking and currency 
systems of the United States and European countries. Its report, 
submitted to Congress in 1912, contained legislative proposals that 
were incorporated in modified form in the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. 
The bill is important in the study of progressivism because 
LaFollette's Weekly, a leading progressive journal, described it as 
"the most important legislation of the 60th Congress." The magazine 
opposed the bill by picturing it as being "designed to enable the 
Standard Oil-Morgan financial system to perfect its strangle hold 
4 
upon the money supply of the country." How the Oklahoma delegation 
responded to this measure pertains to the essential questions of this 
Stt,Jdy. 
Former territorial delegate McGuire is recorded as making no 
3samuel A. Kirkpatrick, David R.Morgan, and Larry G. Edwards, 
Oklahoma Voting Patterns: Congressional Elections (Norman, Oklahoma: 
Bureau of Government Research, 1970), 28-30. 
4LaFollette's Weekly Magazine, II (June 18, 1910), 5. 
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speeches for or against the Vreeland Bill when it was introduced into 
the House. However, the Blackwell Times-Record of June 16, 1910, 
stated that Congressman McGuire had supported the emergency currency 
1 . h . 5 act to re 1eve t e panic. Moreover, LaFollette's Weekly reported 
that he had voted for the Vreeland Bill when it passed the House, 
and paired in favor of the Aldrich-Vreeland Conference Bill on final 
6 passage. In examining the Congressional Record, the evidence indi-
cates that McGuire did vote in the affirmative on both, the original 
H. R. 21871 introduced by Representative Edward B. Vreeland of New 
York, and the Aldrich-Vreeland Conference Bill which passed the House 
on May 14, 1908, by a vote of 185 to 145. McGuire, the lone Republi-
can in the Oklahoma delegation, was the only "yea" vote found among 
Oklahoma's new Congressmen. "Insurgent" Republicans, such as Victor 
Murdock of ~ansas, C. A. Lindbergh of Minnesota, and E. A. Morse of 
Wisconsin, voted against the bill; therefore, it was not a party 
measure. All Oklahoma Democrats, Ferris, Carter, Davenport, and 
Fulton, voted "nay" on the Aldrich-Vreeland Bill, which became law 
on May 30, 1908. There is no evidence, other than their vote, to show 
7 their opposition to the measure. 
The only other bill enacted by the Sixtieth Congress that inter-
ested progressives was the Second Employer's Liability Act, which 
covered only railroads. The bill (H. R. 20194), introduced by Illinois 
Congressman John A. Sterling, experienced no opposition among the 
5Blackwell Times-Record, June 17, 1910. 
6LaFollette' s Weekly Magazine, II (June l~t,¥~910), 5. 
7u. S., Congressional Record, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., 1908, XLII, 
Part 7, 6294-6295. 
Oklahoma delegation. Representative Davenport was recorded as not 
voting, but the remaining four, including McGuire, voted yes on this 
proposition. 8 However, there is no evidence to demonstrate that any 
of the delegates spoke on the House floor or anywhere in the state 
on behalf of this issue which deeply interested progressives, es-
pecially the social justiee wing. 
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Two additional bills of the Sixtieth Congress that did not reach 
the White House, but which received attention among progressive 
circles, were H. R. 16063, written to regulate the employment of 
child labor in the District of Columbia, and H. R. 20883, which was a 
bill to create a Bureau of Mines in the Department of the Interior. 
The child labor bill, pffered by Congressman Samuel Smith of Michigan, 
was designed to set an example in the District for the rest of the 
nation. It was reported out of the Committee on the District of 
Columbia, but died on the House calendar. Scanty evidence discloses 
that none of the Oklahoma Congressmen spoke for this bill. The only 
information discovered concerning this legislation was a Chandler 
News-Publicist article which stated that Bird McGuire supported an 
act prohibiting child labor in the District of Columbia. 9 
The Bureau of Mines bill, important to progressives because of 
its provisions for miner safety, did come before the House for a vote 
on May 21, 1908, and passed 222 to 29. Among the Oklahoma legislators, 
McGuire and Davenport did not show enough interest to record a vote, 
8u. S., Congressional Record, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., 1908, XLII, 
Part 5, 4438-4439. 
9chandler News-Publicist, June 3, 1910 .• 
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but Carter, Ferris,, and Fulton supported the resolution. lO The bill 
died in the Senate but later reappeared for legislative action during 
the Wilson administration. 
Besides the enacted legislation, this study is also interested 
in the numerous bills introduced by the fledgling Congressmen from 
Oklahoma. None of these was ever brought to the House floor for 
approval, dying in connnittee or on the House calendar. Nevertheless, 
the type of resolutions put forward by the delegates during the 
Sixtieth Congress will serve as some measure of their progressivism. 
The most active Oklahoma Congressman in the Sixtieth Congress, as 
far as legislation presented is concerned, was Elmer L. Fulton of dis-
trict two. It is also important to look at Fulton's record more care-
fully since he was replaced by Dick T. Morgan in the election of 1908 
and was never re-elected to Congress. Since Fulton was from Okla-
homa City, he received considerable publicity in the Daily Oklahoman, 
most of which was favorable due to its Democratic leanings. In two 
separate editorial statements concerning Fulton's election to Congress 
in 1907, the paper was full of praise. One article reviewed Fulton's 
personal characteristics but said little regarding national issues. 
However, the second article pointed out that Fulton's platform 
breathed the "spirit of genuine democracy." 
It opposes graft in all forms, whether it be in the form of 
tariff rates, ship subsidies, railroad rates, asset currency 
or something else, and stands for those things which will 
conserve the best interests of every citizen of Oklahoma.11 
10u. s., Congressional Record, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., 1908, XLII, 
Part 7, 6723-6724. 
11oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, March 8, 1907. 
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Fulton was again praised by the Oklahoman as he faced re-election 
in 1908. In an article headlined "What the Oklahoma Delegation Did 
and Expects to Do in Congress," he was commended for introducing in 
the Sixtieth Congress the initiative, referendum, and recall in national 
affairs (H. J. Res. 43 and H. J. Res. 44); the election of United 
States Senators by direct vote (H. J. Res. 70); an income and inheri-
tance tax amendment (H. J. Res. 71); publicity of' all campaign ex-
penditures at stated intervals before elections (H. R. 9193); the 
repeal of import duties on lumber, printing paper, hides, leather, and 
all farm and agricultural implements and machinery (H. R. 9190); and 
an amendment to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 making restraint 
of trade a felony instead of a misdemeanor (H. R. 9191). 12 While none 
was reported out of committee, they were of vital concern to progres-
sives. 
During Fulton's unsuccessful campaign for re-election in 1908, he 
condemned the Republican Party's continued support of high tariff 
schedules. Speaking before approximately 1,000 people in Oklahoma 
City, the second district representative declared that tariffs were 
responsible for the miserable plight of the American farmer. The 
price of the farmer's products have decreased 15 per cent, proclaimed 
Fulton, while his cost of living has increased 17 per cent. 13 
Although Fulton enjoyed limited service, many of the bills he 
introduced were to become reality as progressivism developed. It 
would thus appear that Representative Fulton was ahead of his times 
12oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, August 9, 1908. 
13oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, July 21, 1908. 
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in achieving political and economic reform. His defeat in the election 
of 1908 may also indicate that he was ahead of his constituents in de-. 
manding these progressive changes. 
Like Fulton, Scott Ferris was busy during December of 1907, 
introducing a Constitutional amendment providing for direct election 
of United States Senators (H. J. Res. 61). Ferris also proposed two 
bills pertaining to the regulation of railroads. One was to regulate 
and establish a uniform passenger rate on railroads engaged in inter-
state commerce (H. R. 9113). The other would require payment by the 
railroads of attorney's fees in personal injury and loss claims to 
employees (H. R. 9114). The other three delegates, Carter, Davenport, 
and McGuire, were relatively inactive on issues of progressive nature, 
as they presented only numerous pension bills. 
The unsatisfied legislative demands of Theodore Roosevelt in 
1907 and 1908 had provided the progressives with a program. By the 
time Roosevelt left office and Taft became President in 1909, a 
distinct cleavage had appeared in both parties. The Republican Party 
was clearly dividing into two groups: the conservative or "stand-pat" 
element, which were still in the majority, and the progressive or 
"insurgentflwing,·which was .beginning to merit attention. The Demo-
cratic Party was also divided, with the Bryan Democrats, the progres-
sive wing of the party, in the majority, and the conservative group 
in the minority. The potential coalition of progressive Republicans 
and Democrats in the House spelled trouble for the "stand-pat" Republi-
cans, led by Speaker Joseph Cannon. 
Even though William Jennings Bryan carried Oklahoma over Taft in 
the presidential contest of 1908, the Republicans won three of the 
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five congressional races. Dick T. Morgan, former mathematics pro-
fessor and Woodward lawyer, replaced Elmer L. Fulton in the second 
district by a margin of 26,273 to 25,349; and Charles E. Creager, 
Muskogee postmaster and former newspaperman, ousted James S. Davenport 
in the third by a vote of 24,952 to 23,881. Bird S. McGuire defeated 
Henry S. Johnston of Perry, 23,312 to 20,501, to hold the first dis-
trict for the Republicans. Charles Carter easily won the fourth dis-
trict by a margin of over 6,000 votes, and the Republicans failed to 
field a candidate to oppose Scott Ferris in the fifth. 14 
When the first session of the Sixty-first Congress convened on 
March 15, 1909, the Republicans still controlled the House. The 
first order of business was to elect the Speaker. The Oklahoma dele-
gation voted along party lines,' with McGuire, Morgan, and Creager 
supporting Joseph Cannon of Illinois, who had held the post since 
1903, and Ferris and Carter supporting Champ Clark of Missouri. With 
this issue settled, the Sixty-first Congress turned to what became 
its five major accomplishments: the Payne-Aldrich tariff, the reso-
lution initiating an income tax amendment to the Constitution, a 
significant change in the rules of the House drastically curtailing 
the power of the Speaker, the Mann-Elkins railroad act, and the law 
authorizing the establishment of postal savings banks. 
The Sixty-first Congress was called into special session by 
President Taft to deal with the tariff. Popularly blamed for the 
high cost of living, tied up in the public mind with "the trusts" and 
"the interests," the tariff was one of the chief issues on which 
14K· k · k 1 Okl h V . P ir patric, et a., a oma oting atterns: Congressional 
Elections, 31-33. 
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progresi;;ives and "stand-patters" of both parties appeared to be divid-
ing. In the House, the Payne bill made some reductions in the existing 
tariff schedule, and a number of raw materials were put on the free 
1 . 15 1st. In the Senate, however, Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island was 
still powerful enough to defend the protectionist position, and 
duties which had been lowered by the House were raised again. 16 The 
final outcome was the Payne-Aldrich tariff, destined to play an impor-
tant role in progressivism. All the Congressmen from Oklahoma took 
advantage of their opportunities to be heard from the floor of the 
House of Representatives and delivered speeches in behalf of their 
convictions regarding the tariff of 1909. 
Dick T. Morgan, the new Republican member from the second dis-
trict, was the first to be heard. On March 31, 1909, his "maiden 
speech" concerned the gypsum clause in the 1909 tariff. 17 The Dingley 
tariff of 1897 had placed a duty of fifty cents per ton on gypsum 
and $2.25 per ton upon calcined or ground gypsum. The Payne bill 
proposed a duty of forty cents on crude gypsum and $1.75 upon ground 
gypsum. Morgan opposed this reduction because western Oklahoma was 
in the center of a gypsum deposit stretching across four states. A 
substantial protective tariff should be retained for such an infant 
industry, he declared, for under the existing tariff protection, 
seven gypsum mills had been located in his district. 
Continuing, Representative Morgan declared that the Republican 
15 F. W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States (New 
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1914), 372-373. 
16Ibid., 375-377. 
17 · 
The Oklahoma State Capital, April 6, 1909. 
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Party had always maintained that a protective tariff does not raise 
the price of commodities as the Democrats believed, but "that home 
competition, the development of manufacturing plants, improvement 
in machinery, the acquirement of greater skill among our mechanics 
and artisans will cause a great reduction in the price of the 
article so protected." He proved his point by stating that the price 
of gypstm1 had fallen by more than 33% after the duty had been placed 
on it. Morgan concluded his argument by saying that the Republican 
Party had insisted that a protective tariff is not class legislation, 
but that it has a dual purpose, for it furnishes revenue and it 
"scatters its blessings to every section of the country and to the 
people in every occupation and calling. 1118 Thus the representative 
from district two had supported the protection of home industries. 
On April 2, Scott Ferri~one of the two Democrats in the new 
delegation, made a vehement speech on the floor of the House against 
the tariff in general. He began his speech by saying: 
Mr. Chairman an_d gentlemen of the committee, the Payne bill 
(H. R~ 1438) bears the following title: 'To provide revenue, 
equalize duties and encourage the industries of the United 
States, and for other purposes.' I submit a more appropriate 
title would be: 'To raise revenue moderately, to encourage 
industries hugely, to issue bonds lavishly, to invade state 
rights perceptibly, to equalize duties terribly, and for 
other purposes too numerous to mention, of which the American 
people can never hope to know or understand. 1 19 
He then asked Congress to remove the duty on iron and agricultural 
implements, as "any rate you fix is prohibitive." The iron and steel 
18u. S., Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 1st Sess., 1909, XLIV, 
Part 1, 709-711. 
19 U. s., Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 1st Sess., 1909, XLIV, 
Part 1, 907. 
92 
industries, said Ferris, have admitted that they no longer need pro-
tection, with even Andrew Carnegie so testifying before the House Ways 
and Means Committee. Ferris demanded that barbed wire be placed on 
the free list. 
Then Ferris brought up the tariff subject that was nearest to the 
interests of the majority of his constituents, free lumber. With his 
state just emerging from the sod house era, Ferris pleaded, "Free the 
home builders of the Nation from the clutches of the lumber trust." 
He also advocated eliminating the tariff on wood pulp ,and print paper 
because it was "but a premium on education, a premium on the press 
••• and I might say even on intelligence." His idea of conserva-
~ 
tion of the forests was to place lumber on the free list, thus allow-
20 ing foreign lumber to come in and thereby saving our own supply. 
Ferris then attacked the theory of protection for which the 
Payne bill stood. As he saw it, the manufacturers wanted the govern-
ment to pay them for running businesses which without government aid 
would run at a loss. And it appeared to Ferris that the greatest 
of the trusts always were running at a loss whenever it came time 
for Congress to meet. Then employing a bit of irony, Ferris said: 
If it be advisable to pay men to manufacture ••• why 
could we not with the same logic pay the merchant, the 
artisan, the farmer, or the laborer for his daily toils 
when they were insufficient to maintain him in luxury 
and splendor? We may all feel thankful ••• that there 
is one industry in the land today that needs no subsidies, 
that needs no tariff, that needs nothing but brains and 
brawn to maintain itself. It is the industry arising 
from our fertile soil, the business of agriculture. 
Continuing, he proclaimed that the protective tariff does not fall 
20ibid., 908. 
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upon all like spring showers but rather it comes "from the thread-
. 21 bare pockets of the needy who toil and slave." 
Ferris concluded his speech by contrasting the philosophies of 
the two political parties in regard to prosperity. He believed that 
the Republicans would have prosperity if they had to borrow money, or 
"even if they have to take it." The Democratic theory of prosperity 
was ''"an abundance of commodities fairly distributed among those who 
produce them." "This is a tariff without profit to the goverrunent, 
tariff without advantage to the producer, tariff that ravishes the 
consumer," proclaimed Fe:i;ris. As a final statement to his lengthy 
speech, which was interrupted over thirty times by applause and 
laughter, he emphatically declared: 
You of the Republican faith believe it is right to tax the 
masses for protection, enrichment, and benefit of the few, 
to the end that they may distribute prosperity among us as 
to them of right appear •••• The Democratic theory often 
stated ••• that equal rights to all and special privilege 
to none should be and is the watchword of all free govern-
m~nt.22 
It is interesting to note that although Ferris vigorously opposed 
protective provisions in the Payne bill, he was as deeply opposed to 
placing hides on the free list. A protective tariff on hides would 
benefit one of the larger industries of the state of that period. 
Nevertheless, he insisted that all products closely connected with 
hides should be placed on the free list, such as finished leather. 
Taking the opposite view from that of Ferris, Charles E. Creager, 
the other new Republican Congressman from Oklahoma, spoke on April 3 
21 b"d I 1. • ' 909. 
22Ibid., 910. 
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on "The Indian and Protection." The theme of his argument was "for 
American protection to the original citizen--the Indian." He began 
by tracing the plight of the Creek and Cherokee Nations to statehood. 
They hold land now that they call home, said Creager, not of their 
own choice, but because they were driven there at the point of the 
bayonet by a Democratic administration. That same party left them 
there to starve and freeze until theywere finally "clothed and fed 
by the party of protection--the party which now offers protection to 
their industries and their crops." Creager went on to say that des-
pite the suffering experienced by the Indian, they had worked together 
with whites from surrounding states to form the forty-sixth state of 
the union, and "Oklahoma today is an apt pupil in the school of pro-
. ,,23 tection. 
Creager then reviewed the protectionist policies on oil being 
utilized by both neighbors of the United States, Canada and Mexico. 
In view of these facts, Creager encouraged the United States to· be true 
to her duty to the Indian citizen and "to guarantee to his production 
privileges and benefits and encouragement equal at least to that 
afforded by our nearest neighbors. 1124 
According to Representative Creager, the Indians and whites of 
Oklahoma were also interested in the protection of other industries. 
Coal, lead, and zinc producers were anxious, stated Creager, for 
continued profits "guaranteed to them by the Republican doctrine of 
protection." In conclusion, he pointed out that "the sword of the 
23 U. S., Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 1st Sess., 1909, XLIV, 
Part 5, 13. 
24Ibid. 
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Cherokee has never been drawn against the white man or his Government," 
but rather the Indian has always aided in every time of peril. He now 
believed that the Indian should be" ••• permitted to enjoy the 
blessings of real American protection in their every industry. 1125 
On April 6, Congressman McGuire from Pawnee delivered a speech 
against pla.cing hides on the free list. He introduced his speech by 
stating this was the first time ·that he had ever spoken against any 
part of a committee bill. He then announced his stand on protection: 
I am a protectionist and in advocating protection upon hides 
I am absolutely and unqualifiedly doing it, I believe, in the 
interests of the principles of the great Republican party of 
this country.26 
The Daily Oklahoman on March 7, 1909 carried an article that 
showed there was not only disaffection among the ranks of the national 
Republicans, but also a split beginning to evolve in the Oklahoma 
Republicans. The row that developed was between Joe Norris, chairman 
of the Republican State Committee, and Cash Cade, a member of the 
Republican National Committee, and the topic was patronage. Bird 
McGuire lined up behind Norris while Creager backed Cade. Morgan rode 
the fence, but later seemed to favor Cade. This split with McGuire 
had to be considered a major factor in Morgan's frequently voting with 
the Democrats from Oklahoma. 27 
Much of April 6, 1909 was spent discussing lumber and hides 
schedules. The backers of free lumber in the House were defeated by 
a margin of six votes after the striking out of the countervailing duty 
25Ibid., 14. 
26u. s., Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 1st Sess., 1909, XLIV, 
Part 2, 1144. 
27oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, March 7, 1909. 
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on lumber. The people of Oklahoma, many living in sod houses, were 
interested in the vote of the Oklahoma House members on the. free 
lumber amendment. McGuire, Morgan, and Creager voted against it; 
Ferris and Carter voted for it. David DeArmond of Missouri introduced 
a similar amendment, and again the Oklahoma vote was the same. An 
amendment reducing the tariff on lumber two dollars per thousand feet 
d d 1 G . d . . 28 was intro uce. On y Mc uire vote against it. 
After a month of debate, the Payne bill (H. R. 1438) was voted 
on April 9, 1909. The first three amendments were related to lumber. 
The first would admit lumber free of duty, being defeated 244 to 133, 
with Carter, Ferris, and Morgan favoring it, and Creager and McGuire 
opposing it. The second amendment revised downward the tariff on 
finished lumber. It too was defeated 200 to 180, with the Oklahoma 
vote identical to that on the previous amendment. A vote was then 
taken on an amendment to paragraph 708 which would have placed certain 
rough lumber on the free list. This was also defeated 200 to 181, 
with the Oklahoma Congressmen voting as they had on the first two 
. 29 
amendments. 
The second amendment topic to be considered was the tariff 
raising the duty on barley from fifteen to twenty-four cents per 
bushel and on barley malt from twenty-five to forty cents per bushel. 
It passed by a count of 194 to 186, as McGuire, Creager, and Morgan 
voted for it, and Carter and Ferris voted against it. 30 An amendment 
28oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, April 7, 1909. 
29u. s., Congressional Record, 6lst Cong., 1st Sess., 1909, XLIV, 
Part 2, 1294-1296. 
30ibid., 1296-1297. 
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was then presented which read, "Hides of cattle, raw or uncured, 
whether dried, salted, or pickled, ten per cent ad valorem." This 
was defeated by a vote of 274 to 103. The Oklahoma Republicans voted 
for the duty, while Ferris and Carter opposed it. Ferris voted 
against the duty although, as previously shown, he opposed the placing 
of hides on the free list in his speech of April 2. Another topic of 
interest to Oklahomans was oil, which was on the free list at that 
31 . time, but a countervailing duty prevailed. An amendment had been 
proposed which provided that the countervailing proviso be deleted. 
The amendment was ordered by a vote of 322 to 47. Carter, Ferris, 
and Morgan voted in favor of striking out the proviso, Creager voted 
32 for retaining it, and McGuire did not vote. 
After the disposal of these amendments, Champ Clark of Missouri 
made a motion to recommit the whole bill to the Committee of Ways 
and Means. This resolution also contained several amendments which 
would have lowered the proposed tariff rates and provided for a 
graduated income tax. The vote on recommittal was 162 for and 218 
against. Carter and Ferris favored the Clark resolution; Creager, 
M G . d M d . 33 c uire, an organ oppose it. The Payne bill was then considered 
as a whole. The result was "yeas" 217, "nays" 161, answered "present" 
1, "not voting" 9. Creager, McGuire, and Morgan favored the bill; 
Carter and Ferris opposed it. 34 
31A · 1 · d ' . 1 d ' d . countervai ing uty is a specia surtax esigne to insure 
that American producers remain competitive with foreign producers. 
32Ibid., 1299-1300. 
33Ibid., 1300-1301. 
34Ibid., 1300-1301. 
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Immediately the Daily Oklahoman began a withering attack upon the 
Congressman from its district, Dick T. Morgan. One article accused 
him of voting sod houses for the farmers, that is, he supported the 
then existing duties on lumber. It went on to say that "the prevailing 
high prices on lumber were largely artificial the American for-
ests are practically exhausted. We depend in large measure for our 
lumber supply upon the Canadian forests. In importing the same, we 
pay import duties averaging about fifty per cent of the total cost 
II In spite of this, the article concluded, Morgan voted for 
the tariff on lumber. "He evidently likes to see the farmers living 
35 in sod houses." 
36 An editorial entitled "Oklahoma's Tariff Dromios" appeared the 
next day in the same newspaper. The three Oklahoma Republicans, 
according to the article, had voted to continue the high protective 
schedules on lumber while the two Democrats had voted "in the interests 
of the people of Oklahoma and for tariff reduction on lumber." The 
editorial continued, "It will be remembered also. that the same 
three Republican Congressmen voted for the re-election of Mr. Cannon 
37 
as speaker ••• and a continuance of the tyrannous house rules." 
On April 13, Scott Ferris arrived at Lawton for a few days while 
the tariff bill was being considered in the.Senate. The Daily Okla-
homan interviewed Ferris and the result was a story the following 
day on "Morgan Votes for Lumber Tariff." This article stated that 
35oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, April 10, 1909. 
36 These were two characters in Shakespeare's "The Comedy of 
Errors." They were twin brothers of close resemblance. 
37oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, April 11, 1909. 
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Ferris "expresses great dissatisfaction with the tariff law, especially 
because of its neglect of western interests." The story further stated 
that Morgan voted, along with the other two Republicans, against the 
proposition putting lumber on the free list. And later, when Champ 
Clark put forth another amendment placing lumber on the free list, 
Morgan voted against it. Ferris stated: 
I went to Morgan ••• and said to him, 'The people in 
your district will get you for that.' 'Oh, I can't vote 
with you Democrats all the time,' was the reply. 
The article concluded by pointing out that in addition to lumber, 
Morgan had voted against reducing the duty on barbed wire, as did the 
other two Republicans from Oklahoma. 38 
In yet another editorial on April 16, the Oklahoman wrote on 
"Morgan and Free Lumber." The editor stated that on April 13, Morgan 
sent a telegram to the Oklahoman which read, "In the conunittee of the 
whole and in the House I voted to put lumber on the free list. Your 
Washington dispatch untrue. Please publish telegram and make editorial 
correction. The people entitled to the truth." The paper's investi-
gation of the affair proved that Morgan had voted against free lumber 
in the conunittee and then to save face had changed his vote when it 
was to be recorded. The editor sununarized by denouncing Morgan as a 
dodger, and that if he and the other dodgers had voted for free lumber 
in the conunittee, the free lumber resolution would have carried. 39 
On April 19, the Guthrie Leader carried an editorial which said, 
"First thing you know Congressman Morgan will be denying that he repre-
38 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, April 14, 1909. 
39 Oklaho~a City Daily Oklahoman, April 16, 1909. 
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sents that northwest district. 1140 On the same day, Morgan delivered 
a speech in the House on the tariff. In this speech he attempted to 
explain how the policy of protection would be beneficial to the 
farmer. 
Morgan believed there was no possible way the farmer could be 
benefited by removing tariff walls and placing agricultural products 
on the free list. He reasoned that the reduction of the tariff would 
not increase the capacity of the American people to consume, and, 
therefore, the result would be less manufacturing at home. With a 
decrease in manufacturing, he continued, there would be an increase 
in unemployment. With a high rate of unemployment, Morgan observed 
that these people would have only one place to go and that was to the 
farms. There they would become competitors of the farmer, whereas 
before they had been customers. 
The old question of why people left the farms and went to the 
cities was easy for Morgan to answer. It was due to the policy of 
protection, he avowed, because no person would go to the cities unless 
employment was offered. According to Congressman Morgan, the motivat-
ing force behind this employment was the protective tariff to 
industries and labor. The second district delegate viewed the pro-
tective tariff as giving the farmer better customers, as well as more 
customers, because they have more purchasing power. He then submitted 
a table comparing wages in 1903 in the United States, Great Britain, 
Germany, and France. It showed that wages were from 100 to 200 per 
cent higher in the United States. Thus, Morgan._ said, the protective 
40Guthrie Daily Leader, April 19, 1909. 
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tariff had given a protected market to the farmers o He pointed out 
that within five hundred miles of the Canadian boundary are located 
the large cities of the United States; and that if the duty were taken 
off farm products, the two million farmers of Canada would find a 
enormous market for their commodities. 
The results of the Dingley tariff of 1897 were used by Morgan to 
provide additional proof for his argument for a protective tariff. He 
cited facts to show that in eight years, the national wealth had 
increased twenty per cent, and that in ten years the increase in money 
circulation had been over one hundred per cent. Deposits in savings 
banks, according to Morgan, had increased more than sixty per cent 
during the period from 1896 to 19080 Then he concluded his lengthy 
defense of protection by saying, "Does this support the charge that 
the Republican party, by its protective tariff policy, legislates for 
41 the benefit of the few and not for all?" Thus Morgan failed to 
realize that America had exportable surpluses of farm products, there-
by needing no protection. 
On July 8, the tariff of 1909 passed the Senate with several 
amendments, most of which raised the duties upwardo Following passage, 
Senator Aldrich made a motion "that the Senate insist upon its amend-
ments to the bill and ask for a conference with the House of Repre-
sentatives upon the bill and amendments." 42 The motion was agreed to. 
The next day, the House of Representatives voted on the question of 
41u. s., Congressional Record, 6lst Cong., 1st Sess., 1909, XLIV; 
Part 5, 56-58. 
42u. s., Congressional Record, 6lst Cong., 1st Sess., 1909, XLIV, 
Part 4, 4316. 
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a committee of conference to join the Senate committee, with the re-
sult being 178 for and 152 against. Creager and Morgan voted for the 
committee, Carter and Ferris voted against it, and McGuire did not 
vote. Proponents of the Payne-Aldrich bill voted for the committee 
so that a compromise might be reached, whereas opponents voted against 
it, hoping that legislation might be stalled. So the resolution was 
43 
accepted and the speaker appointed the conferees. The joint committee 
acted upon the bill and returned it to the House for its consideration. 
In the proceedings of the House following the return of the 
tariff bill, Congressman Charles D. Carter, the Ardmore Democrat, 
spoke on July 31. Clark of Missouri, the Democratic floor leader 
of the debate against the tariff, yielded four minutes of his time to 
Carter. In his remarks, Carter passionately attacked the tariff bill 
as it then stood. He predicted that the Payne-Aldrich tariff bill 
would "doubtless prove a doleful, death-like procession to many of the 
liberal Republican members from west of the Allegheny Mountains" who 
had promised their constituents a downward revision of the tariff. 
He added: 
The burden of explanation is on you, my friends of the 
majority, and not upon us, for we of the Middle West on 
this side of the Chamber have zealously kept the faith 
by voting for every reduction which your special cloture 
rules would permit.44 
Carter continued by stating that representatives had been sent to 
Congress for the specific purpose of revising the tariff downward, 
but "the height of inconsistency was reached" when a tariff commission 
43Ibid., 4384-4385. 
44 U. s., Congressional Record, 6lst Cong., 1st Sess., 1909, XLIV, 
Part 5, 4750. 
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was appointed from the Republican Party "whose political success de-
pends largely on campaign funds contributed by the tariff barons." 
He concluded his speech by saying that some day there would be an 
equitable adjustment of the tariff, but it would not come from the 
Republican Party, "a subsidized auxiliary of predatory wealth, but by 
a just, sensible and united Democracy backed and fortified by public 
opinion at last aroused to the abuses connni.tted in the name of Republi-
. ,,45 
can1.sm. 
On the same date as Representative Carter's speech, the House 
voted on the conference report. They first voted on reconnnitting the 
bill to the conference connnittee, which was rejected by a margin of 
191 to 186. Ferris and Carter voted for reconnnittal, while the three 
Republicans voted negatively. Then the vote was taken on agreeing to 
the conference report, with the count being 195 in favor and 183 
. Th Ok 1 h d d . h · ff .. 1 · · 46 against. e a omans vote accor 1.ng tot e1.r party a 1. 1.at1.ons. 
The bill then went back to the Senate, was voted on, August 5, and 
passed 47 to 31. 47 The President signed the bill on the same day. 
The next day the Daily Oklahoman severely criticized President 
Taft for signing the Payne-Aldrich tariff bill. The editorial de-
clared: 
If President Taft is sincere in his utterance relative to 
the measure just passed by Congress and which has received 
his signature, a genuine surprise awaits him when the 
returns from the Congressional elections are received next 
year, for it may confidently be expected that an indignant 
45rbid., 47510 
46rb"d l. • ; 4754-4755. 
47Ibid,, 4949. 
people will reverse the present Republican majority, in 
the lower house, of seventy-seven members and it is likely 
that the upper branch will also undergo material altera-
tion.48 
The elections of 1910 would prove just how accurate the Oklahoman's 
104 
prediction was. The tariff of 1909 made little change in the existing 
tariff scheduies. It ieft a high system of rates and showed an un-
friendly attitude towards foreign trade. The worst feature of the 
special session was the fact that industrial magnates still unquestion-
49 
ably held an upper hand in Congress. This fact gave more support 
for the progressive belief that the tariff was "the mother of the 
trusts." The protest from the progressive wings of both parties was 
vigorous and undoubtedly would play a significant role in the composi-
tion of the next Congress. 
In the course of the tariff debate, another issue arose that con-
cerned progressives. The reform minded of both parties saw the income 
tax as a more equitable means of financing the government than the 
protective tariff, which bore heavily on the consumer. On April 15, 
1909, Senator Joseph W. Bailey of Texas introduced an income tax 
amendment to the tariff bill. According to Cordell Hull, the "Old 
Guard" crowd in charge of the Senc;tte under the leadership of Aldrich 
saw there was a real chance of the provision being approved. There-
fore, they proposed, instead of the rider on the tariff bill, a Con-
stitutional amendment which they felt would never be ratified. By 
48 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, August 6, 1909. 
49Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States, 407-408~ 
50 
this plan, they could have it both ways. 
105 
The original Bailey amendment called for a flat 3 percent on all 
individual and corporate incomes over $5,000. On April 21, Senator 
Albert B. Cunnnins, a leading ·11 insurgent, 11 introduced an income tax 
amendment calling for a graduated income tax. On June 11, Cunnnins 
and Bailey compromised and agreed to unite their followers behind a 
51 2 per cent income tax on all incomes over $5,000. It passed the 
House by a vote of 318 to 14. Carter, Ferris, Morgan, and Creager 
all voted in favor of the resolution while McGuire dodged the issue 
b . 52 y not voting. But strong White House pressure forced the Senate 
to postpone consideration until after the completion of the tariff 
schedule. Apparently none of the Oklahoma delegates felt strongly 
enough about the proposal to speak in support of it, nor did other 
evidence indicate their attitudes on the issue. 
Three months after the second session of the Sixty-first Congress 
convened, Republicans in the House split again along progressive-
"stand-pat" lines over the issue popularly called 11Cannonism. 11 As 
previously mentioned, the Speaker of the House had been given increas-
ing power over the years. He appointed members to House connnittees, 
and through his membership on the Rules Connnittee and the power of 
appointing its members, he could decide what legislation should come 
50cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell ~ (New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1948)-;--i°, 60. 
51u. s., Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 1st Sess., 1909, XLIV, 
Part 3, 3136-3137; Kenneth W. Hechler, Insurgency: Personalities 
and Politics in the Taft Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1940), 148. - - - -
52u. s., Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 1st Sess., 1909, XLIV, 
Part 4, 4440. 
before the House. Through the power of recognition he decided who 
would arid would not"beheard. Complaints had multiplied against the 
undemocratic nature of this system. In addition, it was widely felt 
that Speaker Cannon had wielded his power for the benefit of large 
business interests, so the question became not only one of democracy 
versus oligarchy, but also the familiar one of "the people'' versus 
"the interests•" 53 11Cannonism11 had become a symbolic term. 
The very nature of the system made change extremely difficult. 
A bill to revise the rules would have to clear the Rules Committee 
before it could come to the floor of the House, an unlikely event at 
best. Once in each Congress when the House adopted rules, an oppor-
tunity existed, but at this point the Speaker's power of recognition 
was the hurdle. Undismayed by these apparently insurmountable ob-
stacles, George Norris, an "insurgent" Republican from Nebraska, had 
composed a motion which he kept in his pocket in the hopes that an 
opportunity to put it before the House might occur. On March 17, 
1910, the opportunity came. The day before, Speaker Cannon had held 
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a motion dealing with the census to be privileged on the grounds that 
the Constitution required a census to be taken. Congressman Norris 
thereupon offered his motion to change the composition of the Rules 
Committee and its method of selection, arguing that his motion should 
also be privileged because the Constitution permitted the House to 
make its own rules. One of Cannon's lieutenants immediately raised a 
point of order against Norris' motion, which the Speaker sustained. 
An appeal from the decision of the chair promptly followed, and on a 
53Mark Sullivan, "The People's One Chance in Two Years," Colliers, 
XLII (March 6, 1909), 15. 
roll call vote Norris won 180 to 159. Ferris and Carter voted with 
Norris; the three Republicans adhered to the principles of "Cannon-
54 ism." 
Norris thereupon offered a substitute motion (H. R, 502) which 
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represented an agreement with Champ Clark, speaking for the Democratic 
caucus. The new motion proposed to establish a Cormnittee on Rules of 
ten members, six of the. majority and four of the minority, to be 
elected by the House. The Speaker was not to be a member, and the 
Cormnittee was to elect its own chairman. The Norris resolution passed 
by a final vote of 191 to 156. Again both Carter and Ferris gave a 
positive indication of their attitude toward progressivism by voting 
for the resolution. Creager, Morgan, and McGuire failed to join the 
"insurgent" Republicans, as they stood firmly with the "Old Guard" 
d S k C d h . . h 1 . 55 an pea er annon an cast t eir votes against t e reso ution. 
The law establishing postal savings depositories has often been 
cited as one of the progressive achievements of the Taft Administra-
tion, and it was by and large one which progressives favored. Since a 
provision of this kind had been endorsed by both party platforms of 
1908, it might have been expected to be a relatively uncontroversial 
measure. However, among the supporters of the postal savings idea 
there was a division between those who approved of the administration 
bill (S. 5876), and those who opposed it because they feared that 
deposits could be drained off to the large cities and Wall Street. 
Therefore, in the House, a substitute amendment was proposed by David 
54u. s., Congressional Re~ord, 61st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1910, XLV, 
Part 4, 3435. 
551bid., 3436 • 
Finley of South Carolina (H. Res. 729) which followed the theory of 
the postal savings bank plank of the Democratic Platform of 1908: 
We favor a postal savings bank if the guaranteed bank can not 
be secured, and that it be constituted so as to keep the de-
posited money in the communities where it is established. 
But we condemn the policy of the Republican party in propos-
ing postal savings banks under a plan of conduct by which it 
will aggregate the deposits of rural communities and re-
deposit the same, while under government charge, in the 
banks of Wall Street, thus depleting the circulating medium 
of the producing regions and unjustly favoring the specula-
tive market.56 
For some reason which is not clear, since the Bryan Democrats 
108 
and "insurgent" Republicans supported the idea of keeping deposits at 
home, they could not muster enough support to pass the substitute 
bill, even though George Norris lent his strong support. The vote was 
114 for and 195 against, as Ferris supported the substitute; McGuire, 
Morgan, and Creager opposed it; and Carter did not vote. The adminis-
tration bill was then presented and passed 192 to 113, as McGuire, 
Morgan, and Creager favored it, Ferris opposed it, and Carter did 
57 
not vote. 
The last major accomplishment of the Sixty-first Congress was 
the Mann-Elkins Act, which had been recommended by President Taft. It 
was generally favored by progressives, especially the railroad regula-
tion clause dealing with the long and short haul problem. But many 
progressives opposed the administration bill due to its lack of a 
provision for the physical evaluation of railroads and because of the 
broad powers given the Commerce Court. The progressives had managed 
56u. s., Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1910, XLV, 
Part 7, 77 58. 
57u. s., Congressional Record, 6lst Congo, 2nd Sess., 1910, XLV, 
Part 7, 7765-7767. 
109 
to add to the administration bill a provision which placed telephone, 
telegraph, and wireless companies under the jurisdiction of the Inter-
state Connnerce Connnission. Only Dick Morgan of the Oklahoma delega-
tion spoke on either the administration or substitute bill. Five days 
before the bill passed the House, he arose to support the administra-
tion proposal and to discuss the issue of rate discrimination in the 
Southwest. He saw no reason why rates charged by steamship companies 
carrying freight from New York to the Gulf ports should not be placed 
under the regulation of the Interstate Connnerce Connnission. He con-
eluded: 
If this control is not necessary, if there are no evils to 
remedy, if there are no wrongs to right, if there are no 
discriminations to correct, if there are no unfair methods 
of practices to abolish ••• then we lost nothing by 
giving this additional power to the Interstate Connnerce 
Connnission.58 
On May 10 the bill passed the House by a vote 201 to 126. The Okla-
homa delegation apparently held mixed emotions about the administra-
tion bill, as McGuire and Morgan voted for it, Carter voted against 
59 it, Ferris answered 11present," and Creager did not vote. 
As to further activity of the Oklahoma representatives during 
the Sixty-first Congress, both Scott Ferris anQ Dick Morgan deserve 
additional attention due to the remarks made on topics that were of 
interest to progressives. None of the other three is recorded as 
having introduced any significant legislation or delivered any major 
speeches. In the second session, Ferris introduced two measures 
58u. s., Congressional Record, 6lst Cong., 2nd Sess., 1910, XLV, 
Part 6, 5853. 
59u. s., Congressional Record, 6lst Cong., 2nd Sess., 1910, XLV, 
Part 6, 6033. 
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supported by progressives, especially the Bryan Democratic wing. 
The first bill (H. Res. 18173) was designed to prevent gambling in 
cotton and grain futures. It was referred to the Committee on Agri-
culture, but was never reported out. However, it is important to note 
that this proposal became law in the form of the Cotton Futures Act 
of 1916. The second bill (H. Res. 18174) concerned the improvement of 
the public highway and post road system in the United States. Both 
Ferris and Morgan spoke on behalf of the good roads movement, whose 
interests were finally put into law in 1916 as the Federal Highway Act. 
In his March 1, 1910 speech, Ferris pointed out that the Federal 
government had appropriated $7,000,000 between 1806 and 1838 for the 
improvement of highways, but since then they had appropriated nothing. 
Highways, stated Ferris, are not the property of one man or class of 
men, but are the property and interest of everyone, whether he be 
black or white, educated or uneducated, weak or strong, savage or 
civilized. "They are the property of us all, and we should all aid 
60 in their upbuilding," concluded the Oklahoma Democrat. 
In a later speech, Morgan likewise demanded aid in the improvement 
of the public highway system. A number of important matters had been 
considered by the Sixty-first Congress, asserted Morgan, but one of 
the great problems pressing for a solution had been neglected, that is, 
the development of the public highway network. He viewed the issue as: 
60u. s., Congressional Record, 6lst Congo, 2nd Sess., 1910, XLV, 
Part 3, 2571-257j. 
One of the important measures that must receive our serious 
attention in the future is the enactment of laws that will 
enable the Federal Government to aid, so far as it can 
under the Constitution, in the building and construction of 
better public highways throughout the various States of 
the Union. 61 
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Not concerned with legislation of the Sixty-first Congress, but 
a matter of definite interest to progressives was the conflict that 
erupted in 1910 between the Secretary of Interior, Richard Ballinger, 
and Gifford Pinchot, Chief of the United States Forest Serviceo This 
conservation controversy of 1909-1910 might have blown over, like many 
political squabbles, but the clash made national headlines for months 
and created even more of a split between progressives and conserva-
tives, between the anti-Roosevelt people and the ex-President's friends, 
and between conservationists and anticonservationists. 
The clash centered around certain water-power sites in Wyoming 
and Montana that had be~n withdrawn from sale during the Roosevelt 
Administration by Secretary of the Interior James R. Garfield. The 
new Secretary, Ballinger, doubted the legality of the action and re-
opened the lands to public entry. Pinchot publicly accused Ballinger 
of injuring the conservation movement in order to aid corporation 
interests. Siding with Pinchot was Louis Glavis, a special agent in 
the Interior Department, who was dismissed by order of President Taft. 
The feud was heightened when a Pinchot letter criticizing Ballinger 
was read before the Senate by Senator Jonathan Dolliver of Iowa, an 
"insurgent" Republican. Taft immediately ordered Pinchot 's removal 
• •· ~· • • ,_ •. ,• ~ '¥---" • ·- • ,l • "'" -· 
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from office. A joint Congressional committee was established to 
inquire into the administration of the Interior Department. While the 
majority of the committee, which the progressives accused as being 
packed with "stand-patters," exonerated Ballinger, the dispute had 
already become a major issue separating the progressives and conserva-
tives. It ultimately contributed to the break between Taft and Roose-
velt. Public feeling toward Ballinger was so unfavorable that he 
eventually resigned in 1911 to relieve the Taft administration of 
further political embarrassment. The only Oklahoman serving in the 
Sixty-first Congress to speak out on this conservation controversy 
was Scott Ferris, later to become chairman of the Committee on Public 
Lands during the Wilson administration. 
On January 7, 1910, the day after the Pinchot letter was read in 
the Senate by Dolliver, Ferris asked that the investigation of the 
Interior Department be conducted by the two Committees on Public Lands 
of the House and Senate. He felt that these two standing committees, 
which represented a large group of states, could give a more honest 
and less passionate evaluation than a special committee which would 
be appointed by the "stand-pat" leaders, which Ferris believed might 
be prejudiced. We must have a committee that is honestly and im-
partially constituted, demanded Ferris, because the American people 
are deeply interested in the matter and are entitled to know the 
truth. 
In response to a question of whether the Forest Service should 
be simultaneously investigated, Ferris quickly replied that 11no charges 
have been made against Pinchot, and the American people do not believe 
that he is in the wrong." He added that many may complain of Pin-
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chot•s policies, but, according to Ferris, honest policies do not make 
dishonest men or occasion their investigation. In relation to Agent 
Glavis being insubordinate to Ballinge;-, Ferris charged that "when it 
comes to conserving the Nation •s assets" some of the ·red tape and 
formalities should be disregarded. When the bandit comes in the 
nighttime to rob our home, declared Ferris, we are not so concerned 
about properties. Neither should properties enter in when the 
Nation's resources are involved. He concluded: 
We need fearless men like Glavis, who dares to attack 
superiors or anyone else, in order to let in the light 
of day. We need men like Pinchot, who stands willing 
to fight, even if it costs him his head.62 
Later in an April 20 discussion over a bill that had Ballinger•s 
support to reopen the lands in Wyoming that had been set aside in the 
Roosevelt Administration, Ferris again spoke on behalf of the con-
servationists. He urged "the friends of real preservation of the 
Nation's resources to help destroy" the resolution. As a final 
question in regard to the Ballinger-instigated bill, he asked, "Who 
ever heard of the Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Ballinger, who vouches 
f h . b"ll b . . . ?1163 or tis i , eing a conservationist. 
The stand taken by Scott Ferris on reform issues was making him 
the leading progressive spokesman from the Oklahoma delegation in the 
Sixty-first Congress. As further proof of his progressive leanings, 
Ferris delivered a bri1l'iartf resume of progressive leg is lat ion provided 
62u. s., Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1910, XLV, 
Part 1, 399-400. 
63 u. s., Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 2nd S~ss., 1910, 
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fbr in the Oklahoma state constitution. In a June 9, 1910 speech, 
he explained that the document had advanced legislation fashioned in 
the interests of the people and "agreed to force as far as possible 
the railroads, the Standard Oil Company and its various subsidiary 
companies to submit to reasonable regulation ••• and to bear their 
just portion of the taxes." A corporation connnission had been es-
tablished, said Ferris, to provide that the railways would not be 
guilty of merger and would submit to decent regulations. He pointed 
to the eight-hour day which was unpopular with the interests and 
corporations, but would ever be appreciated by the toilers of the land. 
Ferris then praised the constitution makers for such progressive 
political reforms as the initiative, referendum, and direct election 
of United States Senators. These principles 11render men powerful in 
fact as well as in theory," said Ferris. These laws are unpopular 
with the 11boodlers, tricksters, and ringsters," stated Ferris, "but 
they are near and dear to the people, for whom we should at all times 
act.'' A note of praise was given to the 11 insurgent" Republicans by 
Ferris for supporting the above reforms. "They dare to think, to act, 
and to do for and in behalf of their constituency, they must have the 
executioner's ax applied to their heads, as 'shooting is too good for 
them,' in the language of Uncle Joe. 11 He concluded his remarks by 
eulogizing the Oklahoma constitutional convention members: 
There were no reactionaries, no standpatters, no Cannonites, 
no Aldrich it es, no high-tartff-rob-the-peopl,ei.te~, but they 
were a body of patriotic men who were sworn to do their duty, 
and they did it well.64 
64u. s., Congressional Record, 6lst Gong., 2nd Sess., 1910, XLVIII, 
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Thus it appears that the Lawton Democrat from Oklahoma's fifth district 
espoused many of the principles favored by the progressive movement. 
In conclusion, the Sixtieth Congress has been remembered for its 
inactivity except for the Aldrich-Vreeland Act and the Second Employ-
er's Liability Act. In contrast, the Sixty-first Congress is more 
important to this study because of .the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, the 
victory over "Cannonism," and the Ballinger-Pinchot controversy, all 
of which rent in twain the "stand-pat" from the progressive elements 
of the American political scene. It is also noteworthy as, the Congress 
in which progressives of both parties developed a pattern of coopera-
tion which enabled them, in some instances, to modify greatly the 
nature of legislation. 
In evaluating the progressive nature of the Oklahoma delegation 
in the Sixtieth Congress, only limited observations can be made due 
to the paucity of significant legislation and the relative inactivity 
of the delegation. The major consideration of the Congress was the 
Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1908, which was passed to cope with the 
economic recession of 1907, but was opposed by leading progressives 
like LaFollette, who saw it as creating an economic strangulation of 
the money supply by Wall Street. As to the stand taken by Oklahomans, 
only Bird McGuire supported the measure which had been proposed by the 
''stand-patter" Nelson Aldrich. His vote for the bill indicates his 
continued support for the Cannon-Aldrich "stand-pat" faction rather 
than the Norris-LaFollette "insurgent" brand of Republicanism. The 
four Democrats, Carter, Ferris, Fulton, and Davenport, voted against 
the act, thereby showing their opposition to 11stanc;l-pat" economic 
policies, and placing themselves in a favorable light with leading 
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progressives such as Bryan and LaFollette. 
In contrast to the Aldrich-Vreeland Act, McGuire joined with the 
four Democrats in supporting social reform passed in the shape of the 
Second Employer's Liability Act of 190.8. The second social justice 
measure that came before the House was the bill which would have 
created a Bureau of Mines in the Interior Department. It received the 
support of the four Democrats, with McGuire not voting. It would seem 
that, at least in the Sixtieth Congress, all of the Oklahoma delegates 
favored the social justice phase of the progressive movement. However, 
it is also apparent that none of them felt strongly enough about social 
reform to lend vocal support on the House floor for these billso 
Although most of the Oklahoma Congress~en remained silent, two 
of them were active in presenting progressive legislation for House 
consideration. Both Ferris and Fulton proposed bills dealing with 
such progressive ideals as direct election of United States Senators; 
initiative, referendum, and recall; regulation of trusts; and the 
income tax. The lack of vocal support does not hide the fact that 
both Fulton and Ferris espoused ideas that had long been of interest 
to the progressive movement. The scarcity of debate on the part of 
the Oklahoma delegates can be attributed, in some degree, to the fact 
that they were neophytes in the halls of Congresso But the experience 
they gained in the Sixtieth Congress would be reflected by their 
activity in the more spirited sessions of the Sixty-first. 
With two changes, Republicans Morgan and Creager replacing Demo-
crats Fulton and Davenport, Oklahomans played a more active role in 
the decision-making process following the 1908 elections. The stand 
taken by the Oklahoma representatives on the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, 
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that monument to "stand-pat" Republicanism, provides the first signifi-
cant signal as to how they would react to progressivismo As evidenced 
by their voting record and strong speeches for protection, both 
McGuire and Creager connn.unicated their total support on behalf of 
the trusts and "stand-pat" principles. On the other hand, Morgan, 
the third Republican, was indecisive on the tariff. He voted for 
higher duties in the Gonnn.ittee of the Whole, but voted with the pro-
gressives in opposing higher duties on certain items. Morgans record 
on the tariff indicates a trend that began to be visible in the Sixty-
first Congress. That was the tendency of many delegates of hitherto 
unimpeachable conservatism to begin to reflect the growing progres-
sive sentiment of their constituents. Both Democrats Carter and 
Ferris voted against higher duties on all connn.odities and delivered 
strong speeches against what they considered an atrocious tariff 
policy. Their opposition to this symbol of "stand-pat" conservatism 
implies the beginnings of progressivism in their legislative records. 
The first great progressive success was the victory over :1·•,~anttc:i'tt=-' 
ism." It is notable because for the first time both progressive 
Democrats and Republicans teamed to defeat one of the important leaders 
of the "stand-pat" philosophy. Both Garter and Ferris, continuing in 
the progressive tradition, aided in reforming the House rules to strip 
Speaker Gannon of his autocratic methods. On the other hand, the 
three Republicans voted against the Norris resolution, indicating that 
they did not join the "insurgent" progressive branch of the Republi-
cans. 
On the income tax amendment resolution, there was little oppo-
sition among the Oklahoma delegates. However, this is not a signifi-
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cant measure of progressivism since the majority of the "stand-pat" 
Republicans also supported the amendment idea, rather than the rider 
attached to the tariff bill, in hopes that the states would never 
ratify such an amendment. 
The postal savings bank issue and the Mann-Elkins Act are con-
' 
fusing because they were generally supported by progressives, but 
various propositions were offered in both measures that the progres-
sives disliked. The postal savings bill supported by the Taft adminis-
tration was opposed by rural progressives because they felt it would 
drain money off to the big cities. Morgan, McGuire, and Creager voted 
for the administration proposal. Carter and Ferris held true to their 
progressive ideals, and voted for the substitute bill which would have 
kept money closer to home and away from Wall Street. Thus, once again, 
the three Republicans from Oklahoma failed to join many of the "insur-
gent" Republicans such as Norris who favored the substitute bill. 
The railroad regulation part of the Mann-Elkins bill was also 
favored by the progressives, but they opposed the administration bill 
due to its lack of a provision for the physical evaluation of rail-
roads and the broad powers given the Commerce Court. This may have 
accounted for the reluctance on the part of Carter and Ferris to 
support the otherwise progressive measure. The three Republicans 
voted along party lines as they supported the original administration 
bill. But it should be pointed out that Morgan again diverged from 
the pattern set by McGuire and Creager, as he made a strong speech in 
regard to strict enforcement of the long and short haul clause. 
In reviewing the actions of the Oklahoma delegation in the Sixty-
first Congress, it is evident that Ferris and Carter emerge as the most 
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outspoken for progressive ideals, with Ferris being the most vocal in 
his stand against the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, 11Cannonism," and Interior 
Secretary Ballinger 1 s conservation policies. McGuire, Morgan, and 
Creager maintained strong ties with the "stand-pat" Republicans, and 
usually did not join the "insurgent" element in their drive for re-
form. However, Morgan, as indicated earlier, may have begun to shift 
with the growing progressive sentiment, as he, on occasion, voted 
with the progressives. This may have also reflected the split be-
tween McGuire and Morgan over the distribution of party patronage in 
Oklahoma Republican circles. 
The next step of the progressives would be the election of 1910, 
when they hoped to capitalize upon public dissatisfaction with the 
"stand-pat" Republican policies. The next chapter will deal with the 
Oklahoma House delegation in relation to the consequences of these 
off-year Congressional elections and the attempt on the part of the 
progressives to expand their influence in the Sixty-second Congress. 
CHAPTER V 
THE 1910 ELECTIONS AND THE SIXTY-SECOND CONGRESS 
In the off-year Congressional elections of 1910, President Taft 
and the Old Guard joined forces in an attempt to root "insurgency" 
out of the Republican Party. A plea was made by Taft to re-elect 
Congressmen who had been his staunch supporters. The "insurgents," 
in turn, were goaded by the administration's attacks into virtually 
declaring their independence from the party dominated by Aldrich, 
Cannon, and Taft. According to Arthur Link, leading historian of the 
period, the flames of Midwestern progressivism had become the "raging 
prairie fire of insurgency," and the revolt was spreading to all sec-
tions of the country except the Republican "rotten boroughs" of the 
South. The battles that shaped up for the fall of 1910 would decide 
the fate of Republicanism in the nation as well as in the Mississippi 
1 Valley. 
The Dem.0C.ratic )?arty; like its ancient rival, was at a critical 
juncture in its career i-n 1910. It had been fourteen years since 
William Jennings Bryan had ca'ptured leadership of the party, and it 
had been fourteen years since the Democrats had possessed patronage 
or national office. Democratic hopes of profiting from the Congres-
sional elections in November, 1910, exceeded their wildest expecta-
1 Arthurs. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-
.!2!Z. (New York: Harper and Row, 1954r;-s-6. 
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tations. As Link points out, it was a virtual Democratic landslide 
throughout all sections of the country except the Pacific coast. 2 The 
House of Representatives went Democratic for the first time since 
1892: 227 Democrats, 162 Republicans, and 1 Socialist were elected. 3 
Several factors may have contributed to the Republican decline. 
The Payne-Aldrich Tariff and Taft •s support for it may have been the 
final straw. Certainly the high cost of living, of which the tariff 
was thought to be the partial cause, did not help the Republicans. 
The open division within the Republican ranks, as well as the tra-
ditional off-year Congressional gains by the party out of office, 
also aided the Democratic cause. 
The purpose of the initial segment of this chapter will be to 
examine the critical contests of 1910 in the five Oklahoma districts 
in an attempt to ascertain whether the Republican decline, which was 
evident in the nation, carried into Oklahoma. Attention will also 
be focused on the 1910 campaign issues and their relation to progres-
sivism. The last part of the chapter will look at the Oklahoma 
delegation in the Sixty•second Congress, which would now be under 
Democratic leadership, to see if any noticeable changes would occur 
in their sentiment toward progressivism. 
The Oklahoma races in 1910 lined up as follows: Incumbent 
Republican Bird McGuire from Pawnee was challenged by Neil McNeill, a 
Democrat also from Pawnee, in the first district; Incumbent Dick Mor-
gan, a Woodward Republican, faced former Congressman Elmer Fulton, an 
2Ibid., 6. 
3Ibid., 7 • 
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Oklahoma City Democrat; Incumbent Republican Charles Creager of 
Muskogee and former Congressman James Davenport of Vinita squared off 
in the third district; Charles Carter, the Democratic incumbent from 
Ardmore, received competition from Charles M. Campbell of Ardmore in 
the fourth district; and J. H. Franklin of Lawton challenged Scott 
Ferris, the Democratic incumbent from Lawton, in the fifth district. 
Based on past legislative records, the contests in the Oklahoma 
districts were looked upon with particular interest as affording an 
opportunity, in some degree, of determining the extent to which the 
people would react to the all-important basic division between the 
progressive and the 11standpatter." 
National attention was directed toward the Oklahoma elections 
with an article, "Choose Your Congressman," by Frederic c. Howe, a 
leading "muckraker," in the progressive Everybody's Magazine. 4 Howe 
categorized the incumbent Congressmen into the following groups: 
insurgents, near-insurgents, system Democrats, and system Republicans. 
He classified the insurgents as those who had "jeopardized their 
political careers in Washington and at home to organize the fight on 
Cannon and Cannonism. 11 In addition, he described them as representing 
"Progressive ideas rather than Privilege,'' and they had "created the 
4Frederic c. Howe, "Choose Your Congressmen,'' Everybody's Maga-
~, XXIII (October, 1910), 593-601. 
12'3 
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new issues which have since awakened the country." The near-insur-
gents, according to Howe, were those who had voted to eliminate 
Cannon from the Rules Committee on March 18, 1910, but had shown 
5Ibid., 600. 
Cai"d:fornia: 
E. A. Hayes 
Iowa: 
J. w. Good 
G. N. Haugen 
E. H. Hubbard 
N. E. Kendall 
c. E. Pickett 
Frank P. Woods 
Kansas: 
E. H. Madison 
Victor Murdock 
Minnesota: 
c. R. Davis 
C. A. Lindbergh 
A. J. Volstead 
Insurgents 
Nebraska: 
E. H. Hinshaw 
N. P. Kinkaid 
G. w. Norris 
North Dakota: 
A. J. Gronna 
Washington: 
M. Poindexter 
Wisconsin: 
William J. Cary 
H. A. Cooper 
J. H. Davidson 
A. W. Kopp 
G. Kuestermann 
Irvine L. Lenroot 
E. A. Morse 
John M. Nelson 
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"little other evidence of Progressive sympathies."6 None of the 
incumbent Republicans from Oklahoma, McGuire, Morgan or Creager, 
appeared on either the insurgent or near-insurgent list. The system 
Democrats were named by Howe because they "bolted their party as an 
opposition party, and joined .the Republican regular members to keep 
61bid., 600. 
Near-Insurgents 
Indiana: 
William o. Barnard 
Iowa: 
Albert E. Dawson 
Massachusetts: 
Butler Ames 
A. P. Gardner 
Michigan: 
James c. McLaughlin 
Charles E. Townsend 
Minnesota: 
Clarence B. Miller 
Halvor Steenerson 
New York: 
Hamilton Fish 
Otto G. Foelker 
Herbert Parsons 
Ohio: 
David A •. Hollingsworth 
Paul Howland 
A. R. Johnson 
E. L. Taylor, Jr. 
South Dakota: 
E. w. Martin 
7 Cannonism in power." Neither Ferris nor Carter, the two Oklahoma 
Democrats, could be found on this list. Howe's last category was 
71bid., 600. 
System Democrats 
Florida: 
s. M. Sparkman 
Georgia: 
w. G. Brantley 
w. M. Howard 
L. F. Livingston 
Illinois: 
J. T. McDermott 
Louisiana: 
R. F. Broussard 
Albert Esopinal 
Massachusetts: 
J. A. Keliher 
Joseph F. O'Connell 
A. J. Peters 
Nevada: 
G. A. Bartlett 
New York: 
M. F. Conroy 
John J. Fitzgerald 
Charles v. Fornes 
H. M. Goldfogle 
Joseph A. Goulden 
Francis B. Harrison 
G. H. Lindsay 
D. J. Riordan 
Tennessee: 
John A. Moon 
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under the caption titled "system Republicans •118 Before naming these 
Congressmen, Howe explained the rationale used in the last category. 
8Ibido, 601. 
S'ystem Republicans 
California: 
W. Fo Englebright 
Julius Kahn 
Joseph R, Knowland 
James c. Needham 
Sylvester C. Smith 
Connecticut: 
Ee Stevens Henry 
Edwin w. Higgins 
Ebeneezer J. Hill 
N. D, Sperry 
John Q. Tilson 
Delaware: 
William H. Heald 
Idaho: 
Thomas R. Hamer 
Illinois: 
Joseph G. Cannon 
Pleasant T. Chapman 
George Eo Foss 
Charles E. Fuller 
Joseph V. Graff 
Franko. Lowden 
Frederick Lundin 
William J. Moxley 
William B. McKinley 
James McKinney 
Martin B. Madden 
James R. Mann 
George w. Prince 
William Ao Rodenberg 
Howard M. Snapp 
John A. Sterling 
No B~ Thistlewood 
William WP Wilson 
Indiana: 
Edgar D. Crumpacker 
Kentucky: 
Joseph B. Bennett 
Don Co Edwards 
John w. Langley 
Maine: 
Frank E. Guernsey 
Maryland: 
John Kronmiller 
Sydney E. Mudd 
George A. Pearce 
Massachusetts: 
Frederick H. Gillett 
Williams. Greene 
George P. Lawrence 
Samuel Wo McCall 
Ernest w. Roberts 
Charles Qo Tirrell 
Charles G. Washburn 
John W., Weeks 
Michigan: 
Edwin Denby 
Gerrit J. Diekema 
Francis H. Dodds 
Joseph H. Fordney 
Washington Gardner 
Edward Lo Hamilton 
George Alvin Loud 
Henry McMorran 
Samuel w. Smith 
H. Olin Young 
Minnesota: 
Frank M. Nye 
Frederick c. Stevens 
James A. Tawney 
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Iowa: 
Charles A. Kennedy 
Walter I. Smith 
Kansas: 
Daniel R. Anthony, Jr. 
Philip P. Campbell 
Montana: 
Charles N. Pray 
New Hampshire 
Frank D. Currier 
Cyrus A. Sulloway 
New Jersey: 
John J. Gardner 
Benjamin F. Howell 
Henry c. Loudenslager 
Richard Wayne Parker 
Ira w. Wood 
William H. Wiley 
New York: 
De Alva s. Alexander 
John E. Andrus 
Williams. Bennet 
Thomas w. Bradley 
William M. Calder 
William w. Cocks 
William H. Draper 
Michael E. Driscoll 
Cyrus Durey 
John w. Dwight 
George w. Fairchild 
J. Sloat Fassett 
Charles L. Knapp 
Charles B. Law 
George R. Malby 
Charles s. Millington 
J. Van Vechten Olcott 
Sereno E. Payne 
James s. Sinunons 
George N. Southwick 
Edward B. Vreeland 
Richard Young 
North Carolina: 
Charles H. Cowles 
John G. Grant 
John M. Moorehead 
Missouri: 
Richard Bartholdt 
Harry M. Coudrey 
Charles Ao Crow 
Politte Elvins 
Charles H. Morgan 
Arthur P. Murphy 
Pennsylvania: 
Andrew J. Barchfeld 
Charles F. Barclay 
Arthur L. Bates 
Henry Ho Bingham 
James F. Burke 
Thomas s. Butler 
Joel Cook 
Allen F. Cooper 
John Dalzell 
Benjamin K. Focht 
W. w. Foulkrod 
Alfred B. Garner 
William H. Graham 
William W. Griest 
George F. Huff 
Daniel F. Lafean 
J. N. Langham 
George D. McCreary 
Reuben o. Moon 
J. Hampton Moore 
Martin E. Olmstead 
Henry w. Palmer 
Charles c. Pratt 
John M. Reynolds 
John K. Tener 
Irving P. Wanger 
Nelson P. Wheeler 
Rhode Is land: 
Adin B. Capron 
William Payne Sheffield 
South Dakota: 
Charles H. Burke 
Tennessee: 
Richard w. Austin 
Walter P. Brownlow 
Utah: 
Joseph Howell 
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Ohio: 
Ralph D. Cole 
Albert Douglas 
Herman P. Goebel 
James Joyce 
J. Warren Keifer 
James Kennedy 
Nicholas Longworth 
W. Aubrey Thomas 
Oklahoma: 
Charles E. Creager 
Bird S. McGuire 
Dick T. Morgan 
Oregon: 
W. R. Ellis 
Willis c. Howley 
Vermont: 
David J. Foster 
Frank Plumley 
Virginia: 
c. Bascom Slemp 
Washington: 
William E. Humphrey 
West Virginia: 
Joseph H. Gaines 
William Po Hubbard 
James A. Hughes 
George c. Sturgiss 
Harry c. Woodyard 
Wisconsin: 
John J. Esch 
Wyoming: 
Frank W. Mondell 
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The following Republicans supported Cannon and Cannonism. 
Through the organization of the House, and the preservation 
of the rules, they are responsible for the Payne-Aldrich 
Tariff bill. We do not attempt to pass on the honesty 
and integrity of these men, nor do we know the motives 
which prompted them in supporting Cannonism; but the roll-
call finds them on the side of Privilege. To the voters 
of a district familiar with the declarations, pledges, or 
character of these men this record is furnished to aid 
them to a choice which should be influenced by some consider-
ation for the American people as a nation.9 
Following down the list of states, Howe named the three Oklahoma 
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Republicans, McGuire, Morgan, and Creager. In a damning indictment of 
the system Democrats and system Republicans, Howe concluded his 
article with a section subheaded "Is Your Congressman For or Against 
You?" Howe stated: 
What is the cure? We used to think that the remedy was to 
put somebody in jail, to levy a twenty-nine million dollar 
fine, or to change some charter or to amend some law. 
Now we see ••• that we must abolish Privilege.; we must 
repeal all the privileges that are created by law. That 
is a long process, and necessarily a slow one, but we 
can begin it now. How? 
BY GOING TO THE POLLS ON NOVEMBER 8 AND VOTING FOR MEN WHO 
WILL REPRESENT US; OR, IF THERE ARE NO CANDIDATES THAT 
REPRESENT US, THEN WE MUST DEFEAT THOSE REPRESENTATIVES 
REGARDLESS OF PARTY, WHO HAVE SHOWN BY THEIR RECORDS 
THAT THEY REPRESENT NOT US, BUT--PRIVILEGE.10 
Thus a nationally known progressive magazine, by including the three 
Oklahomans as system Republicans, had called for their defeat because 
they represented the privileged classes. On the other hand, neither 
of the two Democrats from Oklahoma was listed among the system Demo-
crats. What impact, if any, the article might have on Oklahoma voters 
would not be determined until the polls closed on election day in 
9Ibid;, 600. 
lOibid., 597. 
November. The article drew further attention, and perhaps was of 
more significance to Oklahoma voters, when the Oklahoma City Daily 
11 Oklahoman reprinted a major portion of the Howe column. The edi-
torial, entitled "The System Republicans," emphasized the procedure 
that Howe had used in categorizing Congressmen, and pointed out that 
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neither Carter nor Ferris was included in the !'system Democrats." But 
the major focus of the article was concentrated on the fact that the 
three Republicans from Oklahoma, by being listed as "system Republi-
cans," had supported 11the interests that have made the cost of living 
burdensome to the American consumer. 1112 
Three days later the Daily Oklahoman continued its attack on the 
three Republican Congressmen with an editorial headed "Oklahoma's 
Stand-pat Congressmen." It listed a number of conunodities, indicating 
the real value in one column and in a second column displayed the 
effects of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff on the same goods. The statistics 
were based on $10 purchases. 
Tariff Rate Real Value Tariff 
13 
Sugar, 60.80 per cent • • • • • • • • • • • $6.25 $3.75 
Glassware, 60 per cent • • • • • • • • • • $6.25 $3075 
Window glass, 84 per cent • 0 0 • • • • • • $5.45 $4.57 
Soap, 46 per cent • • • • • • • • • • • • • $6.84 $3o 16 
Machinery, 45 per cent • • • • • • • • • • $6.89 $3.11 
Meta 1 Too ls, 45 per cent • • • • • • • • • $6.89 $3.11 
Tinware, 45 per cent • • • • • • • • • • • $6.89 $3ell 
Stockings, $1 dozen, 33 per cent • • • • 0 $5.31 $4.69 
Shirts, 60 per cent • • • • • • • • • • • $6025 $3.75 
Blankets, 107 per cent • • • • • • • • • • $4.83 $5.17 
Flannels, 144 per. cent t' • 'I! . . . . . • .. " $4.09 $5.91 
11 Arthu~ s .•. L,ip.k, "The Progressive Movement in the South, 1870-
1914,11 North Carolina Historical Review, XXIII (April, 1946), 193., 
12 . . ,, ..•.. ;> .. 
Oklaho~. ~:a:tY. Daily :Oklahoman., ·oc.~oher 26, 19'1011' ,, 
13ok1ahoma City Dfiily Okl.ahp)llapt October 29, 1910" 
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According to the editor, this was the type of legislation that Morgan, 
McGuire, and Creager had voted for and had called the best tariff bill 
ever written. The tariff money, stated the article, goes into the 
"coffers of the trusts," and the table shows the results of the three 
Republican's 11 subserviency to the Cannon-Aldrich gang." In conclu-
sion, the editorial asked: "Did they represent you and safe-guard 
your interests, Mr. Average Man, as an agent should?1114 
Further editorials lambasting the three 11standpat" Republicans 
were found in the Oklahoma Farmer~ Laborer, a Guthrie based publi-
cation that spoke for organized farmer and labor groups, and the 
Ponca City Democrat, a Democratic newspaper located in the strongly 
Republican first district. In a late September editorial, the Farmer 
and Laborer noted the Republican leaders' argument that Oklahoma's 
three 11standpat11 Congressmen should be re-elected in order to serve 
their people as members of the majority party in the House. The 
article declared that the next House was as sure to be Democratic as 
it was sure to meet, and if the Republicans used the same logic as 
they had previously, the question should be asked, "What good can 
three 'standpat' Republicans from Oklahoma accomplish in the House 
with a Democratic majority against them?" The article thus called 
for the election of Fulton, Davenport, and McNeill so as to oust the 
15 
11standpatters11 from Oklahoma. 
The editor of the Ponca City Democrat analyzed the elections of 
1910 as a test between the 11 standpatters" and the "insurgents." He 
14Ibid. 
15 The Oklahoma Farmer~ Laborer, September 30, 1910. 
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_ .. hel--.ieved that Oklahoma ·Republicans had not seen the handwriting on 
the wall, because in every other state, the "insurgents" were now the 
Republican Party. The 11standpat11 program, he added, has "once and for 
all taken the count." In conclusion, the Ponca City paper editorial-
ized: 
On November 9 the McGuire, Morgan, Creager cabal will be 
forced to read what other leaders in other states have 
already read. And they will not reguire a Lick tele-
scope to do the reading act either.I6 
Thus the elections in the first, second, and third districts of 
Oklahoma drew attention from both the urban and rural press as well 
as a farmer and laborer publication. 
In the heavily Republican first district, McGuire, the incumbent 
Republican from Pawnee, received opposition in the person of a thirty-
five-year-old bachelor, Neil McNeill, a county court judge also from 
Pawnee. The campaign did not feature one particular topic as several 
issues were raised in the newspaper coverage. The pro-McGuire publi-
cations in the first district, such as the Pawnee Times-Democrat, 
Blackwell Times-Record, and Chandler News-Publicist, praised McGuire's 
past record and emphasized the fact that he was 11 dean11 of the Oklahoma 
delegation. By virtue of his seniority, the papers pointed out, the 
first district incumbent would be of more benefit to his constituencyo 
In addition they stressed that McGuire would be able to accomplish 
more with the Republican controlled White House and Senate than would 
a young and inexperienced Democratic legislatore 
According to the editorials, the Pawnee Republican should be 
16Ponca City Democrat, September 22, 19100 
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re-elected to comply with President Taft's advice. Concentrating most 
\ 
of their statements on McGuire's seniority, the pro-McGuire papers noted 
his strong position as chairman of one House committee and ranking 
third on another. 17 
In contrast, the pro-McNeil! papers, which included not only the 
Pawnee Courier-Dispatch and Ponca City Democrat of the first district, 
but also the Daily Oklahoman and the Oklahoma Farmer and Laborer out-
side the first, attacked McGuire on several counts and praised the 
progressive platform of Judge McNeill. They pointed out that McNeil! 
was running on an issue-oriented campaign of "less tariff, no trusts, 
no Cannon, more progress." T~e Farmer and Laborer denounced the Repub-
lican newspapers of the first district for calling McGuire a progres-
sive: "That is on a par t.rith calling the devil an angel. II The papers 
favoring McNeill stated that he would be a "progressive worker" as 
compared to McGuire's record of doing nothing but telling "fish 
stories" to the people of the first district. 
In an editorial entitled "McGuire Going Down," the Daily Oklahoman 
of October 19, 1910, proclaimed that the delegate from the first dis-
trict was to regret that he had chosen "to stand pat as a standpatter." 
McGuire now believes, said the Oklahoman, that "standpatism" is the 
political millstone around his neck that will drag him below the sur-
face in the upcoming election. The article concluded by saying that 
the tariff and the high cost of living represented the best argument 
17 Blackwell Times-Record, June 16, 1910; Chandler News-Publicist, 
June 3, 1910; and Pawnee Times-Democrat, October 20, 1910. 
18 
against sending "stancipatters," like McGuire, to Congress. 
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The results of the November 8 election showed McGuire the winner 
by a margin of 1,866 votes. 
McGuire 
McNeill 
Others 
20,301 
18,415 
2,522 
49.2% 
44. 6i'o 
6.2%19 
This represented a decrease of 925 votes from McGuire's victory margin 
of 2,811 in the 1908 election, when he received 50.6% of the total 
vote. This was the first time that the Pawnee Republican had received 
less than half of the total vote in any of his five races thus far, 
from 1903 to 1910. Although he was the ·victor, the results indicated 
more dissatisfaction among McGuire's constituents than he had pre-
viously encountered in the strongly Republican first district. Ap-
parently his seniority on committees and prestige as being "dean" of 
the Oklahoma delegation prevailed over the tariff issue raised by his 
opponent. 
Even more interest was stimulated in the second district, where 
incumbent Republican Dick Morgan faced former Congressman Elmer Fulton, 
an Oklahoma City Democrat. Most of the interest was generated by the 
fact that the leading daily newspapers of Oklahoma City, the Daily 
Oklahoman and the Times, carried on a running editorial battle in sup-
port of Fulton and Morgan, respectively. The Times began their attack 
on Fulton and defense of Morgan in an early campaign editorial titled 
18oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, October 19, 1910; Pawnee Courier 
Dispatch, September 22, 1910, September 29, 1910, October 20, 1910; 
Ponca City Democrat, November 3, 1910; and The Oklahoma Farmer and 
Laborer, August 2, 1910. 
19samuel Kirkpatrick, David R. Morgan, and Larry G. Edwards, 
Oklahoma Voting Patterns: Congressional Elections (Norman: Bureau of 
Government Research, 1970), 33-34. 
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"Old 'Free Trade' Again." The September 28, 1910 article roundly de-
nounced Fulton for his support of free trade. The facts showed, said 
the editorial, that the free trade idea, espoused by Fulton, would 
mean a drop in wages of 60 per cent for skilled laborers and 40 per cent 
for common labor. It further pointed out that these same laborers are 
the chief consumers of farm products such as wheat, and if free trade· 
was again imposed, the farmer would lose money on his produce prices. 
Therefore, the editorial concluded, "Don't take any chances on voting 
20 for a man like Fulton." 
In a quick rebuttal to the Times editorial, the Daily Oklahoman 
editorial page of October 5, 1910, carried an article comparing the 
records of Morgan and Fulton and posing the question whether Morgan 
truly represented his constituents in the Sixty-first Congress. The 
editor answered by reviewing Morgan's voting record on what was termed 
as critical decisions: 
The election of the speaker of the house, on which occasion 
Morgan voted for Cannon; the rules fight, where Morgan went 
on record favoring the old system of 'gagging' legislation 
which opposes Cannonism; the Payne-Aldrich tariff bill, on 
which Morgan voted 'aye,' and thereby raising the cost of 
lumber, sugar and other necessities of life and lowering 
the duty on luxuries.21 
The article went on to say that Morgan had acted in direct opposition 
to his campaign pledges of 1908, and every time the "machine" had sig-
naled for Morgan's vote, he had "delivered it as graciously as a royal 
flunkey hands a card to his master." 
Unlike Morgan, the Oklahoman stated that Elmer Fulton had never 
20 Oklahoma City Times, September 28, 1910. 
21 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, October 5, 1910. 
been criticized for any bill that he had introduced while a member of 
the Sixtieth Congress. It added that Fulton had voted against Cannon 
and his machine in all legislative matters so as to bring government 
22 back to the wants and needs of the connnon peopLe. 
As the campaign in the second district became more heated, the 
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two newspapers of Oklahoma's largest city carried more statements con-
cerning the race. However, as in many political contests, the major 
issues were not always given priority in the printed discussions. Such 
was the case in the October 14, 1910, editorial in the Oklahoman head-
lined "Labors of a Statesman." It told of Morgan's procurement of 
35,000 packages of garden seeds for the people of the second district. 
In a satirical tone, the article asserted that it must have taken a 
great deal of statesmanship and long experience to address the names 
of these 35,000 packages, even though Morgan's secretary, whom the 
government pays, could have done the job. It is doubtful, alleged the 
editor, that either Cannon or Aldrich with all his reputed power could 
have ever bestowed such a magnificent gift on their constituents. 
"Picture to yourself an old man, with straggling gray hairs clinging 
to a moisture laden brow, toiling throughout the hot sunnner days" in 
order that his "clamoring constituents" might have garden seeds. 23 
From this editorial, Morgan was labeled "Garden Seed Dick" by his 
opponents, and the title was used throughout the campafgn. This edi-
torial initiated a series of "mud slinging" tactics employed by both 
candidates. 
22Ibid. 
23oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, October 14, 1910. 
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On the heels of the "garden seed!' editorial, the Times began a 
vitriolic attack on Fulton's association with the so-called "salary 
grab." The editorial of October 18, 1910, proclaimed that the United 
States government had paid the campaign expenses of Fulton in the 1907 
election. According to the article, the former Congressman's term 
began on November 16, 1907, with statehood, and ended March 3, 1909, 
a period of fifteen months. Yet, the Times alleged, the official 
records show that Fulton drew salary at the rate of $7,500 per annum 
from March 4, 1907, till March 4, 1909. This meant, declared the 
editor, that Congressman Fulton drew salary from the government eight 
months before he was elected to the office and before such an office 
existed. "He knew. that he was taking something that did not 
belong to him," affirmed the article, "money which he had not earned." 
In short, the editorial concluded, "it wasGRAFT. 1124 This inaugurated 
substantial discussion that took precedence over the other issues, 
especially in Republican controlled newspapers where. Fulton was over-
whelmingly indicted for his "dishonesty.". Two days later, the Times 
editorialized: 
Fulton says that he participated in the salary grab because 
others did the same thing. To which we might add that 
there also is considerable precedent for stealing, but 
that does not excuse the crime.25 
~he Oklahoman then attempted to bring the voter's attention back 
to the fact that Morgan had supported the tariff of 1909. ''Morgan, 
Political Pendulum" was the headline of an editorial in the October 
24 Oklahoma City Times, October 18, 1910. 
25 Oklahoma City Times, October 20, 1910. 
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22, 1910 issue. It announced that the incumbent Republican had 
claimed to have voted for ah appropriation of $250,000 per annum for 
a tariff commission to investigate the cost of production at home 
and abroad. But, the Oklahoman asked, "why didn't the Republicans 
want a commission to do this investigating before the passage of 
that nefarious bill? Because the trusts, their masters, did not want 
it." It accused Morgan of enlisting as a high private in the "Stand-
pat-Cannon-Aldrich brigade" which, realizing widespread dissatisfaction 
with the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, wanted to appease the voters by adopt-
ing the tariff commission plan. 26 
"Salary Grabber" was the editorial featured in the October 24, 
1910 copy of the Times. "Let Fulton, the salary grabber, stay at 
home," voiced the article, "and send Dick Morgan back to Congress." 
The question was asked of the voters as to whether they wanted Fulton, 
free trade, and 4-cent totton, or Morgan, protection, and 15-cent 
cotton. It elaborated further by saying that Morgan had secured over 
a million dollars in appropriation~ for the second district, while 
Fulton had secured nothing. 27 
Both papers carried lengthy articles on October 29, 1910 in which 
they stressed the weaknesses of their respe~tive opponents. The Times, 
in front page headlines, told of the fact that ·Fulton's "salary grab" 
was being exposed to the· voters of the second district. It related how 
Mdrian·and Ftiltdn had enc6untered ~ach other face to face at a politi-
cal rally at Cherokee. In the debate, Morgan had charged Fulton with 
accepting $5.,255;14 for eight months when he was still a private citi-
26 
>. Oklahoma ~itx Daily QlsJahoIIJ.an,,-.,Oct,gber 22, 1910. 
27 Oklahoma City Times, October 24, 1910. 
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zen. The article reported that Fulton presented an extremely weak de-
28 fense of the "salary grab" charge. In dissimilar fashion, the Okla-
homan published an article on the same Cherokee debate under the title 
"Fulton Lambasts Morgan's Record." According to the article, Morgan 
publicly admitted that he had been wrong in voting with the "interests." 
Furthermore, Morgan refused to debate wi~h Fulton at any later date, 
and evaded all questions that Fulton posed to him concerning his vote 
against free lumber, free leather goods, and free farm implements. 29 
The last editorial of the campaign was presented by the Oklahoman on 
November 2, 1910. It was entitled "Morgan: Brazen Standpatter," and 
included a cartoon assailing the second district Congressman for not 
being ashamed of his vote for the tariff on lumber when hundreds of his 
30 
constituents were living in sod houses. 
Thus the campaign ended to await the results of the November 8 
election which would determip.e how the voters would respon:l to what ap-
parently became the principal campaign issues: Morgan's assaults on 
Fulton's "salary grab" and Fulton's charges in regard to Morgan's 
"standpattism" on the tariff and Cannon. Morgan won re-election to the 
Sixty-second Congress by a margin of 1,072 votes. 
Morgan 
Fulton 
Others 
25, 134 
24,062 
5,382 
46 o 5io 
43 o 7io 
9.8% 
These statistics reveal that Morgan's margin was approximately the same 
as it was in 1908, when he defeated Fulton by 924 votes and garnered 
28 Oklahoma City Times, October 29, 1910. 
29 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, October 29, 1910 
30 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, November 2, 1910. 
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31 46.3% of the total vote. It appears that Fulton's emphasis on Mor-
gan's "standpatter" platform of high tariff and Cannonism was effective-
ly counteracted by Morgan's charges of Fulton's dishonesty connected 
with drawing money when he was not serving as delegate for an eight 
month period. 
As in the second district, two former opponents, Charles Creager, 
the Republican incumbent, and James Davenport, representative to the 
Sixtieth Congress, struggled for the third district House seat in 1910. 
Most of the pre-election activities were covered by the Republican con-
trolled Muskogee Phoenix, Creager's hometown paper; the Tulsa Democrat, 
a Davenport outlet; and the Vinita Daily Chieftain, which supported 
their local candidate, Davenport. The campaign coverage became more 
frequent by the middle of October as the Vinita paper contained a front 
page article on a Davenport speech which accused Creager of refusing to 
debate the tariff issue. Davenport felt that Creager had declined to 
discuss the issue because the people knew that the incumbent had not 
worked for their interests. 32 
The Tulsa Democrat editorial page on October 12 included an article 
on the records of both candidates. The issues were quite clear, de-
clared this pro-Davenport publication, because tariff reduction and a 
lower cost of living would have been in the interests of the masses. 
But instead, Creager had voted the tariff upward, which suited the 
wishes of a few "trust barons in New York." On the other hand, the 
article heralded Davenport'~ platform for a revision of the tariff 
downward, and an income tax to make the rich pay their just proportion 
31K· k 'k 1 Okl h . 34 ir patric, et a., a oma Voting Patterns, • 
32vinita Daily Chieftain, October 11, 1910. 
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33 
of the burdens of government. It was apparent that the leading Daven-
port newspapers had decided that the tariff would be the key issue as 
far as they were concerned. 
Continuing their assaults on Creager, the Daily Chieftain in an 
October 13 editorial portrayed him as two-faced. To the "standpatters," 
Creager puts forth statements that he is so "steadfast with the regulars 
that he is often mistaken for Joe Cannon." However, to the progressive 
Republicans, he would have them believe that he was a "simon pure insur-
gent." The story explained that Creager had stated that he would have 
been an "insurgent" if the "insurgents" had controlled Congress? but it 
appeared to the paper that he had missed a wonderful opportunity "to 
get in the progressive move, when the rules were revised." Instead, he 
voted with Cannon and the regulars, but would have the people of the 
third district believe that he would have "insurged if the insurgents 
controlled. 1134 
On October 29, the Muskogee Phoenix, printed in the largest city 
of the district, finally came to the defense of Creager's stand on the 
tariff. It was a lengthy editorial describing the situation in regard 
to the wage difference between Windsor, Canada and Detroit, Michigan. 
The question had been presented by Democrats as to why workingmen in 
Windsor could buy a suit for $10 and the same suit cost Detroit labor-
ers $18.64. The Democratic leaders avowed that it was because of the 
"velvet that goes to the wool trust." However, the Phoenix editorial 
queried: "Why don't those workingmen move just across the river if 
they can get things so cheap?" The answer was simple according to 
33Tulsa Daily Democrat, October 12, 1910. 
34vinita Daily Chieftain, October 13, 1910. 
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Creager's hometown paper. It was because the workers of Detroit were 
being paid the highest wages in the world due to the existing tariff 
schedules. The article pointed out that the workers might save $8.64 
on a suit of clothes by moving across the river; but was it worth it if 
they lost $600 per year on wages, even if they could get a job under 
35 the old Democratic free trade theory. 
In a quick reply, the Vinita Daily Chieftain reaffirmed its anti-
Creager sentiments by expounding on the evils of the trusts. In an 
October 31 editorial, the northeastern Oklahoma daily severely criti-
cized the role of trusts in their campaign contributions to Creager. 
It reasoned that the "oil trust, sugar trust, harvester trust" donated 
large sums to Creager's campaign treasury due to the fact that he "can 
be depended upon to continue collecting excessive toll from the con-
36 
sumer in the United States." 
The tariff continued to be the main issue in the third district 
race, but on election day, the Muskogee Phoenix attempted to divert 
people's attention to Creager's service to the city of Muskogee, par-
ticularly the federal building appropriation, the federal jail site, 
the Cherokee payment of $4 million, most of which went to Muskogee, and 
numerous rural routes. In addition, the article corrrrnended Creager for 
his important position on the Public Grounds and Buildings Corrrrnittee, 
which, according to the Phoenix, was "alone sufficient to induce every 
37 loyal Muskogee citizen to vote for Mr. Creager's return." 
The election results in the third district contest were as 
35 Muskogee Phoenix, October 29, 1910. 
36vinita Daily Chieftain, October 31, 1910. 
37 Muskogee Phoenix, November 8, 1910. 
follows: 
Davenport 
Creager 
Others 
25,312 
22,367 
2,923 
50.2% 
44.0% 
6.8%38 
The 2,945 vote margin rolled up by Davenport signaled a definite 
reversal to the 1908 election statistics, when Creager had defeated 
143 
Davenport by 1,071 votes. Over-all, Davenport picked up 4,016 votes 
over his 1908 showing, and carried Muskogee County. Because the 
tariff was the primary campaign issue in the third district, the 
results indicated, to some degree, the dissatisfaction with Creager's 
record. This election, perhaps more than any other of the 1910 Con-
gressional races in Oklahoma, reflected the attitude of the voters 
in regard to "standpat" versus progressive ideals because the 
campaign had been conducted largely on the issues of the tariff and 
Cannonism. 
In the heavily Democratic fourth and fifth districts, incumbents 
Charles Carter and Scott Ferris, both Democrats, faced slight opposi-
tion as they won easy re-election by approximately two-to-one margins. 
Carter outdistanced Charles M. Campbell, Ardmore Republican, by a 
vote of 21,959 to 11,979, with Ferris rolling over J. H. Franklin, 
Republican from.Lawton, 28,600 to 13,425. 39 The newspapers of both 
districts were primarily Democratic, and therefore extremely laudatory 
in their statements concerning Carter and Ferris. The Daily Ard-
moreite, a progressive minded newspaper, applauded Carter's record in 
a September 20, 1910 editorial. It pictured Carter as an insurgent 
38K· k ' k 1.r patr1.c, et al., Oklahoma Voting Patterns, 34-35. 
39Ibid., 35-36. 
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who stood against Cannon, even though he lost his seat on the Indian 
Affairs Committee over it. "His home people think a thousand times 
more of him because he refused to bow to such men." The editorial 
pointed out that LaFollette and Cummins had, like Carter, felt the 
sting of the "special interests. 1140 In a later editorial, Carter was 
again complimented for his courageous act of voting against Cannon 
"at any personal cost. 11 It declared that Oklahoma needed a man like 
Carter whose election was not forced by campaign contributions by 
the "interests who will control those whom they elect." The voters 
of Oklahoma as well as the fourth district need a man, demanded the 
editorial, who will do his part in providing a tariff law that will be 
in the interests of the people instead of the "special interests who 
41 have heretofore had the tariff lawmakers on their payroll." 
Finally, just prior to the election, the Ardmoreite printed a 
letter from Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of 
Labor, endorsing Carter's re-election. Gompers expressed his appreci-
ation to the fourth district Congressman for responding to labor's 
call. He pointed out that Carter had voted in the Sixty-first Congress 
for several bills which passed the House and were of great interest 
to labor including the mine worker's bureau bill, the eight hour 
legislation affecting construction of battle ships, and the postal 
savings bank bill, and had declared his support for the Wilson bill 
42 
which would grant relief from the injunction abuse. Hence Gompers 
ringingly endorsed Carter. It appeared that the fourth district was 
40The Daily Armoreite, September 20, 1910. 
41The Daily Ardmoreite, October 16, 1910. 
42The Daily Ardmoreite, October 27, 1910. 
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safe for the Democrats and a progressive one as well. 
Scott Ferris won re-election by the widest margin of any of the 
1910 Congressional contests. He received the strong support of not 
only the Lawton Constitution-Democrat, the Democratically controlled 
newspaper in his hometown, but most of the other papers of the fifth 
district, including the Maysville News, Comanche Reflex, Mangum Star, 
Cornish News, and Duncan Eagle. Ferris was also beginning to make an 
impression outside his district as evidenced by the solid support 
given to him by the Daily Oklahoman, considered by many the leading 
outlet in Oklahoma for progressive views. Various conu:nents from 
newspapers around the district were published in the Constitution-
Democrat on November 3 just before the election. The Maysville News, 
in reference to a speech by Ferris, said: "He made it plain to the 
listeners that the Payne-Aldrich tariff bill was all wrong for the 
people of Oklahoma and the West, and also explained it was a good 
thing for a handful of eastern manufacturers." Ferris was described 
by the Comanche Reflex and the Mangum Star as a hard working young 
Congressman who had made an earnest attempt to keep in touch with the 
people of his district, and represent them intelligently. 43 
At Cornish and Duncan, the fifth district Democrat addressed 
large crowds during the campaign, and again dealt with the evils of 
the Republican instigated Payne-Aldrich tariff. He conu:nented on some 
of the different schedules, and demonstrated how they would be of 
benefit to certain Eastern trusts. Speaking out against his Republican 
colleagues from Oklahoma, he concluded his speeches by showing how they 
43Lawton Constitution-Democrat, November 3, 1910. 
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. . 44 had voted against the interests of the people of Oklahoma. 
Ferris likewise received strong approval in the November 5 edition 
of the Daily Oklahoman. The editorial entitled "Organized Labor's 
Friend" expounded on Ferris' outstanding labor record, and defended his 
stand for labor despite one or two untruthful assertions made by 
partisan Republican leaders. 45 It appears that Ferris was not only 
attracting attention in the fifth district, but from other sections 
of the state as well. He was also beginning to utilize his fifth 
district political base to speak out against what he considered the 
"standpat" atrocities conunitted by the Republican members of the 
Oklahoma delegation. 
The elections of 1910 in Oklahoma proved somewhat disappointing 
to men of the progressive spirit because of the failure to unseat 
McGuire and Morgan, who had held steadfastly te.,;the "standpat" princi-
ples during the Sixty-first Congress. These two candidates, it appears, 
effectively nullified the progressive drive to oust them by stressing 
their experience, in McGuire's first district case, or revealing a 
scandal, as Morgan had done in the second. 
The national trend of a Democratic landslide carried only into 
the third district of Oklahoma, where Davenport won a convincing vie-
tory over the incumbent, Creager. Because the fourth and fifth 
districts were conceded to Carter and Ferris, respectively, the third 
district appears to be the only area where some measure of the effects 
of "standpat" versus progressive principles could be taken. Both 
44Ibid. 
45oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, November 5, 1910. 
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candidates, Creager and Davenport, addressed themselves to the major 
issue in 1910, that is, the Payne-Aldrich tariff. Creager possessed 
no distracting issue such as Morgan in the second, nor could he rely 
on his seniority as McGuire did in the first. The result was a 
victory for Davenport, the apparent progressive, over the "stand-
patter," Creager. Thus, the Oklahoma delegation to the Sixty-second 
Congress was realigned only in the third district. Morgan and McGuire 
joined the other 160 Republicans; Ferris, Carter, and Davenport became 
a part of the 227 Democrats who were now in the majority. 
Cordell Hull, a vet·eran House member from Tennessee, gave a 
succinct analysis of what the Sixty-second Congress might hold in 
store for the nation, and the temper the Democrats hoped to establish: 
The Democrats carried the House of Representatives by a 
suitable majority. Now at last we had the power, and 
with it the chance to put into effect some of the ideas we 
cherished ••• we then went to work night, day and Sunday--
with enthusiasm.46 
Hull's hopes were fulfilled as the special session of the Sixty-second 
Congress, which convened from April 4 to May 23, 1911, passed five 
major bills and related minor ones, and little that was not germane 
was allowed to enter the debates. All this was done by a party that 
had neither the Senate nor the White House at its corrnnand, drawing up 
its own program, with the exception of the Canadian Reciprocity Treaty. 
The Sixty-second would bear closer examination by those political 
analysts who contend that the American Congress is incapable of formu-
lating a legislative program of its own, and that this function must, 
according to protocol, b~ left to the executive branch. 
46 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: Macmillan, 
1948), I, 62. 
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What would be seen was the enactment of more progressive legis-
lation than in any Congress since the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury. In the House, major tariff reductions for which there had been 
popular outcry, especially among progressives, were achieved; steps 
were taken to improve election morality and popular control of repre-
sentatives; some twenty bills were introduced and many passed in an 
attempt to alleviate pre'ssing industrial problems; and several reso-
lutions were initiated and passed for the benefit of the hard-pressed 
agricultural sector of the population. 
First on the House agenda was the election of a new Speaker. 
Champ Clark of Missouri, who had been Democratic minority leader; 
was elected over James Mann of Illinois by a vote of 220 to 131. The 
Oklahoma delegation voted along party lines, as Carter, Ferris, and 
Davenport supported Clark, while McGuire and Morgan backed Mann. 
Clark then gave an address in which he outlined six aims of the Sixty-
second Congress. He promised an "honest, intelligent revision of the 
tariff downward. which would reduce the cost of living by eradi-
cating the enormities and cruelties of the present tariff bill." 
A resolution to provide a constitutional amendment for the election 
of United States Senators by popular vote was the second request 
from Clark. A third aim of the session, according to Clark, would be 
a change in the House rules to provide for "intelligent consideration 
of measures for the public good." He then asked for economy in ex-
penditures in the House as well as the nation. A fifth objective set 
by Clark was the publication of campaign contributions and disburse-
ments before elections; and last, he called for the admission of both 
47 Ariz01.1a and New Mexico as states. 
-. 
After dispensing with the opening fonnalities,. the House began 
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the consideration of H. J. Res. 39, which called for the direct elec-
tion of United States Senators, a matter that concerned progressives 
not only because it would democratize the election machinery, but 
also provided a means to attain more significant ends, such as rail-
road and trust regulation. On April 13, 1911 the resolution was pre-
sented and two members of the Oklahoma delegation, Ferris and Morgan, 
wasted no time in speaking on behalf of the proposal. 
Ferris expressed his wholehearted support of the resolution be-
cause "it accomplishes what 90 per cent, nay, I believe, 99 per cent, 
of what the people desire." He congratulated the Committee on 
Election of President, Vice-President, and Representatives for causing 
H. J. Res. 39 to be the first bill reported by a Democratic committee. 
It would be a "beautiful tribute to the House of Representatives ••• 
to the American people ••• and a beautiful compliment to the_ Demo-
cratic Party~'' declared Ferris, to pass this as the first biil of 
the new Congress. He then c~stigated the Republican Party for refusing 
to enact such a law while they controlled the White House and Congress 
for 16 years. 
Reviewing the graft and corruption that existed in state legis-
latures where Senators were elected, Ferris demanded that the people 
be given the choice of selecting their representatives to the upper 
House. "I can never think it less safe to trust all the people of any 
State than it is to trust a few of the same people of the same State," 
47u. s., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, 
XLVII, Part 1, 6~7. 
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were Ferris' sentiments. He believed that closer contact with the 
people could only be acquired by forcing the candidate to consult 
them; and this close acquaintance would allow the people to punish or 
reward their representative and his actions. There will be a faith 
placed in the people, Ferris asserted~ and they are entitled to it 
and to the purification of elections that will become a reality with 
this much needed reform. 
According to Ferris, opposition to the measure was based on the 
theory that it was revolutionary and socialistic. He answered these 
charges by saying that they were not based on fact and exclaimed: 
It is common justice and common sense. It is but the doing of 
exact justice to a people who have long been denied that right 
to select their Members of Congress in both branches.48 
Ferris' interest in the principle of direct election of United States 
Senators was of long standing, as he had introduced a resolution to 
-
that effect in each session since becoming a member of the House. 
In his speech Ferris avowed that he would continue to propose such 
legislation as long as he remained in the House. And at each occasion 
this principle was to be discussed, he declared that he would appear 
like "Banquo's ghost" until it became the law of the land. He con-
eluded his remarks by saying: 
Pass this resolution and the American people will see we 
intend to keep the faith when in power that we advocate 
when not in power. Pass this resolution and make 
responsive that body which is too far removed from the 
aches and pains of the people. Pass it and endear 
yourselves to the people of all political faiths and 
enact a reform from which no ill effects can emanate.49 
48u. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, 
XLVII, Part 1, 221-222. 
49Ibid., 228. 
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Therefore, Scott Ferris, complying with the program outlined by 
Speaker Clark, made another positive move in the direction of progres-
sivism. He was to be joined in his support of the measure by a fellow 
delegate, Republican Dick Morgan. 
Congressman Morgan, delivering his speech almost immediately after 
Ferris, enumerated six reasons why he supported the resolution. He 
stated that he represented a district that was evenly divided in 
politics, and he believed that he expressed the will of all his 
constituents, Republicans and Democrats, in supporting this measure. 
Secondly, Morgan felt that in governmental affairs, especially legis-
lative matters, that power should be distributed rather than concen-
trated. As a third reason, Congressman Morgan'said that, i~ his 
judgment, better men would be elected to the Senate. It was his be-
lief, that if the people voiced their opinion, men who had a reputa-
tion for ability, integrity, and high character would be selected •. 
This reasoning led Morgan to argue that with more capable men in the 
Senate, better laws would be enacted because the ability of legisla-
tors is reflected in the laws they enact. A fifth point that Morgan 
mentioned was that a resolution of this type would make the Senators 
more responsible to the will of the people. And finally, he saw the 
direct election method as a technique in promoting the purity of 
elections. Granted corrupt methods may still be employed, concluded 
Morgan, but "it is more difficult to corrupt the people constituting 
the many than to corrupt the legislators constituting the few. 1150 
Thus there seemed to be strong agreement between two members from the 
50 U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, XLVII, 
Part 1, 260. 
152 
Oklahoma delegation on the question then before the House. These two 
strong supporting statements, however, were not equaled by any of the 
other Oklahoina House members, and the only indication in regard to 
their feelings on the subject was to be their vote on April 13, 1911. 
The bill passed the House by more than the two-thirds required for 
a joint resolution: 296 for, 16 against, and 77 not voting. Ferris 
and Morgan were joined by Carter in casting "yeas" in favor of passage. 
However, McGuire and Davenport, for some reason, did not pair or vote 
on this important legislati?n. 51 On May 13, 1911 the amendment was 
-
sent to the states for ratification, and eventually became the Seven-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Following in rapid succession to the direct election of United 
States Senators resolution was a bill requiring that publicity be 
given on campaign expenditures before elections (H. R. 2958). There 
appeared to be no opposition to this reform measure as it took only 
one day for debate and passed the House by a vote of 307 to O, with 
three of the Oklahoma delegates commenting on the value of the 
52 
measure. McGuire delivered his remarks on April 14, 1911, the day 
of passage. He believed that more honest elections could be guaranteed 
by the bill, and it would make men more honest in their campaigns. In 
addition, McGuire argued that there should also be a provision to 
force the candidates to account for expenditures prior to the nomina-
tion; that is, the present bill did not go far enough "to be square 
51 . U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, XLVII, 
Part 1, 242-243. 
52 U. s., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, XLVII, 
Part 1, 268. 
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53 
with the people." However, McGuire did not offer any amendment to 
the resolution expressing his additional interest. It was his only re-
corded speech of the Sixty-second Congress. 
Both Morgan and Ferris commented on the merits of the bill, but 
not until more than a year later. On May 31, 1912, Ferris, in review-
ing legislation of the Sixty-second Congress, pointed proudly to the 
campaign publicity proposal. He declared that such legislation was 
needed so that 11the people shall know who puts up the money to elect 
men to Congress." Asserting that it was a bill in the interests of 
the people, Ferris said it was action "that the people want and would 
54 be wholesome for them to have." Morgan spoke in August of 1912 on 
the general subject of improving the political machinery. There seemed 
to be little doubt in Morgan's opinion that the publication of cam-
paign expenses was a necessity in streamlining the democratic process. 
He stated: 
In order that the will of the people may be supreme and 
that we remove every obstacle which might thwart the will 
of the people, and in order that the voice of the people, as 
expressed at the ballot box, shall have full sway in this 
country, we should, so far as possible, by laws limit, re-
strict, control, and prohibit the excessive use of money 
in election campaigns.55 
Hence, only Carter and Davenport failed to lend vocal support for the 
bill. However, Carter did vote for the bill, but again Davenport was 
recorded as not voting. Consequently, within the Oklahoma delegation, 
53Ibid., 260. 
54 U.S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1912, 
XLVIII, Part 8, 7467. 
55 U.S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1912, 
XLVIII, Part 12, 781. 
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as well as the entire House, there was slight disagreement over the 
first two bills of the Sixty-second Congress, both of which fell into 
the realm of political reform. But the story was to change as the 
House took up H. R. 4412, a bill to promote reciprocal trade relations 
with the Dominion of Canada. 
As in 1909 the tariff still remained the major dividing line be-
tween progressives and conservatives in each party. Protectionist 
views were characteristic of Republican "standpatters," just as a stand 
for lower tariffs characterized Republican "insurgents" and progressive 
Democrats. The Canadian Reciprocity Treaty, initiated by the White 
House, did not propose any drastic alteration of the tariff schedules. 
It would have admitted into both countries, free of duty, certain agri-
cultural products, and a few raw materials, such as lumber and wood 
pulp. Nevertheless, it was bitterly opposed by the protectionists. 56 
To complement the reciprocity treaty, the House proceeded promptly to 
the passage of a Farmer's Free List which would remove tariffs on a 
considerable number of items used by farmers, such as farm implements, 
fence wire, cotton bagging, meats, cereals, and· leather boots and shoes. 
Two of the Oklahoma Congressmen, Ferris and Morgan, were inter-
ested enough in the reciprocity issue to speak on the House floor. 
Ferris, delivering his speech on April 18, 1911, argued for the measure 
because it would reduce tariffs or place on the free list approximately 
600 items from the Payne-Aldrich rates, and not a single schedule was 
to be increased. There should be absolute free trade between the 
tw:o countri.es, Ferris said, Just the same as .existed between .the 
states of the union. He told of the arguments presented by the pro-
56F. W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States (New York: 
G. P. Putnam's Sons, T9T4), 414. --- ----
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tectionists against the treaty, that is, it would reduce the price of 
land, reduce the wage scale, and be detrimental to the farmer's 
interests. In answer to these charges, the Lawton Democrat declared 
that the value of lands in Canada and the United States of similar type 
are essentially the same, so therefore "the scarecrows erected by the 
protectionists and high-tariff advocates are again not trustworthy." 
This treaty presents a wonderful opportunity, Ferris added, to reduce 
the "exorbitant burdens of the Payne-Aldrich law that was so recently 
I 
by the people universally repudiated." In regard to wage scales, 
Ferris showed that wages were approximately the same in Canada as in the 
United States. The question on this issue, proclaimed Ferris, is 
whether the high protectionists will make the "laboring men carry the 
load for their high protection schemes when the laboring man gets 
none of the profit or glory." Too long have the laboring people of 
this country "borne the brunt of selfish manufacturers, monopolists, 
and trusts," stated Ferris. 
Representing primarily an agricultural district, Ferris was quite 
emphatic in explaining how the treaty, rather than being detrimental 
as high tariff advocates had claimed, would be beneficial to the 
farmers. He quickly pointed out that lumber, barbed wire, and wood 
pulp would be placed on the free list. Referring to the free lumber 
provision, Ferris said: "I ask the high protectionists who are 
opposing this treaty, Will that do the American home builder of the 
broad prairies good or harm? Will it not be beneficial to every citi-
zen in all the land save the Lumber Trust?" He concluded his argument 
for free lumber by saying that the timberlands of the country had been 
held by a few "lumber barons" while the American people had gone 
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"homeless and roofless." 
Elaborating on the value of the treaty, Ferris maintained that 
the farmers of the country would appreciate the duty provision of free 
barbed wire. This is a connnodity, he added, that is used extensively 
for fencing "throughout the length and breadth of the country." The 
people who will not appreciate this schedule will be the "Iron and 
Steel Trust," and, Ferris explained, the opponents of the proposition 
are those who are more "concerned about the farmer that farms the 
steel mills in the heart of Pittsburgh." 
Another item to be placed on the free list, wood pulp, was to be 
an advantage for the farmer, according to Ferris, because it would 
allow him to buy schoolbooks for his children. Furthermore, it would 
place "books and magazines within more easy reach of both rich and 
poor." Of course, Ferris suggested, there would be protests from the 
"Paper Trust of New England," but: 
We must legislate for all as distinguished from the few •••• 
We mu$t not sit here and allow the few New England selfish 
paper trusts to fatten at the expense of the many when it 
strikes at the intelligence and the advancement intellectually 
of our very Republic.57 
In relation to the argument presented by the high tariff people that 
certain agricultural products, such as wheat and corn, would be left 
unprotected, Ferris countered with the reasoning that there was not a 
country in the world that could compete with the United States in the 
production of those connnodities. For example, Ferris pointed out that 
the United States produced 3,125,713,000 bushels of corn in 1910, of 
which 44,072,209 bushels were exported to Canada. On the other hand, 
57u. s., Gpngressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, 
XLVII, Part 1, 369-370. 
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Canada in 1910 produced only 18,726 bushels of which 5,881 were im-
ported into the United States. "Can there be a man so ignorant or un-
fair as to claim that Canada is any competitor to our producers," 
declared Ferris. Concluding his remarks in support of the reciprocity 
treaty, Ferris pleaded that the House not let the "greedy monopolist 
pick the threadbare pockets of the needy" behind the tariff walls of 
the "vicious and unconscionable duties of the Payne-Aldrich tariff 
bill. 1158 
Two days later Dick Morgan rose on the House floor to speak 
against the Canadian reciprocity plan. Holding true to his 1909 pro-
tectionist views, he declared that the measure would do irreparable 
damage to the farmers and gypsum industries of his home district. The 
agricultural products that were to be placed on the free list would 
put the Canadian farmers, Morgan reasoned, in direct competition with 
the farmers of the United States. "Agriculture will be robbed of any 
direct benefit from our protective tariff policy," declared Morgfl,p. •. 
It was his contention that the reciprocity plan had not been previously 
presented to the American people in either 1908 or 1910, and he felt 
that the farmer and others should have the opportunity to be heard on 
the subject. The effect on the farmer, according to the second district 
Congressman, would be far reaching because it would result in: 
1. Reduction in the extent of his market. 
2. Reduction in the price of his products. 
3. Reduction in the value of his land. 
4 • . Reduction in his annual profits. 
5. Reduction in his ability to support his family. 
6. Reduction in his value as a citizen.59 
58Ibid., 371. 
59 U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, XLVII, 
Part 1, 470. 
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He proceeded to elaborate on the six points by suggesting that the 
reciprocity law would force the farmers of America to divide their 
customers with the farmers of Canada, and thereby reduce the market 
considerably. With the increased competition and the law of supply and 
demand in effect, Morgan argued that prices would naturally be forced 
downward. As the price of farm products decreased, the value of farm 
land would subsequently be lessened, reasoned Morgan. Continuing his 
logic, the Woodward Republican alleged that a reduction in profits 
for farmers would naturally follow the three propositions first enumer-
ated. "Canadian reciprocity will reduce the ability of the farmer to 
provide for his family," and these conditions will make farm life so 
unattractive that it will cause the desertion of thousands of farms, 
asserted Morgan. And finally, if the farmer is subjected to these 
conditions, Morgan informed his colleagues, you have thereby made him 
a less valuable citizen due to the fact that he has been "shorn of the 
means whe-reby he might serve his country." 
In contrast, Morgan pointed out how the resolution would aid the 
farmers of Canada. He believed that the bill should be amended to 
read as follows: 
A bill to encourage Canadian agriculture, extend the market 
of the Canadian farmer, increase the prices of his products, 
augment the value of his land, magnify his annual profits, 
and make him a more valuable citizen of the British Empire.60 
He maintained that his vote would be cast for the farmers of America 
rather than for the fartners of Canada. 
Another major consideration of Morgan in his April 20 speech was 
the fact that gypsum would be placed on the free list by the reciprocity 
60Ibid. 
159 
measure. This schedule was of particular importance to the second 
district because of the growing gypsum industry in that area. Morgan 
advanced the argument that large importations of gypsum from Newfound-
land, Nova Scotia, and Cape Breton would decrease the demand for gypsum 
from his home district. He pleaded with House members to allow the 30 
cents per ton duty to remain in order to protect the gypsum mills of 
Oklahoma. For these reasons, Morgan concluded his speech, "I can not 
61 
vote for the so-called reciprocity treaty." 
The next day Morgan again made a request that the House seriously 
consider the gypsum free list issue. He felt that the treaty dis-
criminated against the infant gypsum industries of Oklahoma. "My 
congressional district has the crude gypsum sufficient to supply not 
only the United States, but the entire world," and Morgan stated that 
he firmly believed in the policy of protection so that this grave 
62 injustice would not be allowed. It appears that Morgan failed to 
realize that Oklahoma gypsum would not be greatly threatened by 
imports if such large quantities were already being produced. 
The same day as Morgan's final plea, the House voted on the 
Canadian Reciprocity Treaty. The vote was 268 for and 89 against, 
with the Oklahoma delegation casting three in the affirmative, Carter, 
Ferris, and Davenport, and Morgan and McGuire against. 63 The bill also 
passed the Senate on July 22, and President Taft signed it on July 26, 
1911. In the meantime, however, the Canadian Liberal Party adminis-
61Ibid., 471. 
62 · U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess.,· 1911, XLVII, 
Part 1, 556. 
63Ibid., 559-560. 
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tration, which favored the reciprocal arrangement, had been overthrown, 
and the new Conservative Party government repudiated the measure, 
largely because of widespread popular fear that it might lead to the 
annexation of Canada by the United States. 
In analyzing the stand taken on the reciprocity bill, it appears 
that Ferris reasonably justified his posture by arguing that there 
was no need for tariffs on such agricultural products as corn and 
wheat because of their overabundance. Importation of these commodi-
ties would provide the American farmer with no significant competition. 
On the other hand, Morgan in opposing the measure was more concerned 
with the protection of the gypsum industries in his district, but did 
argue that Canadian farm produce would hamper the American farmer's 
market. However, as Ferris pointed out, the free lumber, barbed 
wire, and wood pulp would be of more importance to the farmer than 
the protection of wheat and corn. Thus Morgan and McGuire were 
adhering to the "standpat" principles on tariff reform in opposing 
one of the progressive measures that had been recommended to Congress 
by the Taft administration. 
To complement the Canadian Reciprocity agreement and provide 
additional aid to farmers, H. R. 4413, commonly called the Farmer's 
Free List bill, was next considered by the Sixty-second House. This 
resolution was designed to place on the free list commodities that 
were of consumer importance to the farmer including agricultural 
implements, cotton bagging, cotton ties, leather boots and shoes, 
meats, cereals, bread, sewing machines, and salt. Originating in the 
Democratic House, it met Taft's opposition because it went too far. 
Representative Oscar Underwood, Chairman of the House Ways and 
Means Committee and author of the Farmer's Free List bill, yielded 
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twenty minutes to Charles Carter of Oklahoma on May 6, 1911. Deliver-
ing his first speech of the Sixty-second session, Carter declared his 
enthusiastic support for the measure. He argued that it was a logical 
complement to the reciprocity bill in that "it unlocks to a freer ex-
change of commodities the door so long kept closed by the restrictive 
policy of Republican protection." Moreover, Carter heralded the bill 
as a step in the reduction of the much discussed high cost of living, 
which, he felt, fell most acutely on the farmer and laborer. Carter 
asserted that the "apostles of high protection" had always claimed 
that in giving the farmer cheaper commodities that an injustice was 
being done to the workingman because he would suffer lower wages, but 
now Carter disclosed, they "seem to be impaled on the other horn of 
the dilemma," because they state by giving the laboring men cheaper 
commodities that an injustice is levied on the farmer. Carter declared 
that the high protectionists had set their argument "like the Arkansas 
negro set his 'coon trap--so as to catch'em a-comin' and a-gwine. 11 
Furthermore, he accused the high tariff advocates of being "profes-
sional political acrobats," but did not feel they were capable of per-
forming the feat of "riding two horses going in exactly opposite 
directions." 
Carter then asked who actually paid the cost when a manufacturer, 
under a protective policy, received higher prices for his products. 
According to Carter, the answer was simple. 
The farmer knows that if the protected manufacturing industry 
is given an additional profit, it is done at the expense and 
discouragement of agricultural and pastoral pursuits, and you 
can not longer throw dust in the eyes of the American farmer 
with your protective-farm-product 'bunco. 1 64 
Comparing the Canadian Reciprocity Treaty and the Farmer's Free List 
with the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, Carter denounced the protectionists 
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for not wanting to give to the farmer something substantial like "free 
shoes, free saddles, free harness, and free belting." How perfectly 
in keeping with the "blood-sucking policy of a high protective tariff," 
exclaimed Carter, is the refusal to give the farmer free barbed wire 
and free cotton ties. He then castigated the "Agricultural Implement 
Trust" which "sits upon the neck of the American farmer like the Old 
Man of the Sea sat on Sinbad the Sailor." He thought the American 
farmer had too long been "tortured" by this "hydra-headed monster," 
referring to the implement industry. Believing that the bill under 
consideration would go a long way in clipping the "tentacles" of the 
implement "monster," Carter contended that the farmer would be given 
"free plows, free harvesters, free reapers, free cotton gins, and 
free farm wagons." 
Continuing his remarks, Carter pointed out that two and one-half 
years earlier the major parties had both promised a revision of the 
tariff downward. But, he recounted, the high protectionists for five 
long months had "dickered, wrangled and jangled, growled and howled 
••• over a putrid carcass." The result was the Payne-Aldrich tariff 
which violated every campaign promise that had been made to the people. 
"They asked you for bread and you gave them a stone," Carter eloquently 
concluded. 65 
64u. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, XLVII, 
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On May 8, 1911, the day the bill was to be voted on, Dick Morgan 
offered an amendment to the resolution. He believed that the pending 
resolution involved two classes, manufactured articles which the 
farmer purchased and used, and those commodities made from farm 
produce. Therefore, he requested in his amendment that certain items 
manufactured out of farm products, such as lard, sausage, and various 
types of pickled, dried, and smoked pork, veal, beef, and mutton, be 
deleted from the free list. If these items are not protected, argued 
Morgan, then the farmer's price for the produce from which they are 
derived would be reduced accordingly. Despite Morgan's plea, the amend-
ment was rejected when George Norris, Nebraska "insurgent," called for 
a division of the House and the "noes" prevailed. 66 
Later that day the Farmer's Free List proposition passed the 
House with 236 favoring and 109 opposing. Morgan's objection to the 
farm produce provision was apparently not strong enough to overcome 
his support for the over-all plan of the bill, as he united his vote 
with the three Democrats, Carter, Ferris, and Davenport, in upholding 
the resolution. Only McGuire voted against the bill. 67 The Senate 
passed the House version of the bill in mid-summer, but on August 
18, President Taft vetoed the measure, and it was returned to the 
House for reconsideration. Carter, Ferris, Davenport, and Morgan 
joined 223 other House members in an attempt to override the veto, 
but the effort failed when 126 voted to sustain the veto. McGuire, 
although not voting, would undoubtedly have voted to sustain since he 
66u. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, XLVII, 
Part 2, 1112-1113. 
67Ibid., 1121. 
had previously opposed the measure when it originally passed the 
68 House. 
On this issue, Carter, Ferris, and Davenport held to their 
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principles of tariff reform; McGuire remained steadfast in his support 
of high protection; but Morgan reversed his stand from what it had 
been on the reciprocity measure. The second district representative 
was still concerned about placing farm produce on the free list, but 
must have realized that he would be held responsible by his agri-
cultural constituents if he did not vote for the duty free entry of 
agricultural implements and other articles of consumer interest to 
the farmers. 
Later in the session two other bills concerning tariff revision 
were introduced in the House. These were H. R. 11010, created to re-
duce the duties on wool and manufactures of wool, and H. R. 12812, de-
signed to reduce the duties on manufactures of cotton. Both were pro-
posed by Representative Underwood, a leading spokesman for tariff 
reform. These bills were of concern to progressives because of their 
reform nature, but also because a reduction in tariff on the staples, 
from which most clothing was made, would be a great benefit to the 
masses. 
Only Morgan of the Oklahoma delegation spoke on either of the 
tariff resolutions, and his remarks were directed to the wool.bill. 
He was primarily concerned with the reduction of raw wool, admitting 
that a modification of the present tariff on wool manufactures would 
be in order. But he stated that he could not support the Underwood 
68u. s., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, XLVII, 
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measure because of the injustice committed to the wool growers. It 
was Morgan's theory that additional tariff reductions were premature, 
and that more scientific investigation of tariff legislation should 
take place. He advocated waiting for the report that was forthcoming 
from a tariff commission that had recently been appointed by President 
Taft. Then, Morgan declared, we will have more accurate information 
as to the difference between the cost of production at home and abroad, 
and will be better prepared to fix rates of duties so they will more 
nearly equalize the difference between the cost of production in the 
United States and other nations. Continuing, Morgan described the 
existing tariff on wool as non-excessive. He pointed out that foreign 
wool growers pay the existing tariff rates and still compete in our 
markets with American wool growers. "If under present rates they can 
compete," Morgan said, 11\llnder the proposed rates they can destroy." 
Morgan concluded his June 17, 1911 speech by saying: 
I will vote for any reasonable reduction that does not 
mean annihilation to American industries, but if to get 
this reduction on woolen and worsted goods you demand that 
I shall vote to confiscate the property of the woolgrowers 
of the country, I refuse to follow you. In order to make 
reasonable reduction in the tariff on wool it is not 
necessary that you inflict irreparable injury upon the 
woolgrowers.69 
Three days later, on June 20, 1911, the day the woolen bill 
passed the House, Morgan delivered another speech urging the House to 
await the tariff commission study before voting. He cited from the 
Democratic platform of 1908 a phrase stating that articles entering 
into competition with trust controlled products should be placed upon 
69u. s., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, 
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the free list. If this promise is to be carried out, Morgan suggested, 
the only way it can be done is to first ascertain whether or not the 
articles on the woolen schedule "enter into competition with trust 
controlled products." Morgan argued that there was no information in 
the Ways and Means Connnittee report to show that the articles under 
consideration were trust controlled products. Therefore, he con-
eluded that he could not support such a tariff measure or any future 
tariff bill unless he had additional information. 70 None of the re-
maining Oklahoma delegates spoke for or against the tariff revision 
bill, so their vote was their only expression of sentiment. 
Just before the vote was taken on H. R. 11019, Representative 
Sereno Payne of New York introduced an amendment to reconnnit the wool 
reduction resolution to the Ways and Means Connnittee. His lineof rea-· 
soning followedMorgan' s in that he felt that more study was needed be-
fore such hasty action was taken. Apparently the tariff "standpatters" 
were hoping to delay passage by using this method of stalling. The 
resolution offered by Payne, House sponsor of the 1909 tariff, was de-
feated by a vote of 197 to 118, with 66 not voting. Morgan and McGuire 
voted for reconnnittal; Carter and Ferris against; and Davenport was 
absent. The vote was then taken on the Underwood woolen bill and the 
results were 220 for, 100 against, and 61 not voting. Davenport was 
present on this vote and joined Ferris and Carter in supporting the 
wool reduction. McGuire and Morgan cast "nays" on the resolution. 71 
The Senate and House eventual.ly agreed to consider a Conference 
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Part 3, 2340. 
71 Ibid., 2355-2357. 
167 
Committee report, which was presented to the House on August 14, 1911. 
Carter, Ferris, and Davenport voted for the report, while Morgan 
72 
opposed, and McGuire failed to vote. But President Taft wasted no 
time in vetoing the measure on August 17, 1911. Congressman Underwood, 
the bill's sponsor, asked for passage over the presidential veto on 
August 18. The vote was 227 "yeas," 129 "nays," and 27 "not voting." 
Carter, Ferris, and Davenport voted in the affirmative, Morgan in the 
negative, and McGuire again failed to vote. So the two-thirds neces-
sary to override the White House veto failed. 73 
The other tariff measure, H. R. 12812, was also introduced by 
Underwood. It provided for a reduction of duties on manufactures of 
cotton. There were no comments offered from any of the Oklahoma dele-
gates in the preliminary debate on the resolution. Again Payne moved 
to recommit the bill to the Ways and Means Committee to hold it there 
until the tariff commission could make a complete investigation in 
regard to cotton. The recommittal amendment failed, 186 to 106, with 
87 not voting. Morgan voted for recommittal, whereas Carter, Daven-
port, and Ferris registered their votes against, and McGuire was 
absent. The bill then passed 202 to 90, with 88 not voting. Affirma-
tive votes were recorded for Carter, Ferris, and Davenport, Morgan 
74 
opposed, and McGuire did not vote. 
On August 21, 1911 the bill was returned to the House with Senate 
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amendments which Speaker Clark stated amounted to virtually the same 
bill that Underwood had introduced. It likewise passed, 180 for, 107 
against, and 88 not voting. Again Carter, Ferris, and Davenport 
held firm in their support of tariff reduction, while Morgan opposed. 
McGuire, by not voting, managed to miss all the roll calls on this 
75 
measure. The Underwood cotton tariff bill was also vetoed by Pres-
dent Taft because, as he explained in his veto message, the legislation 
had been hastily prepared without any scientific investigation. Repre-
sentative Underwood, realizing that there was not the two-thirds 
needed to override the veto, asked that Taft's veto message be printed 
d h W d C . 76 an sent tote ays an Means ommittee. 
Thus ended the long discussion over tariff reform in the Sixty-
second Congress. The House had concurred with the administration pro-
posal for Canadian Reciprocity which progressives believed was a step 
in the right direction. But the complementary Farmer's Free List, 
wool, and cotton tariff reduction, which progressives also endorsed, 
failed chiefly because not enough support could be mustered to over-
come the administration's opposition. Carter and Ferris not only 
voted for tariff reduction, but also made forceful speeches on behalf 
of tariff reform. Davenport remained silent on the topic, but indi-
cated his support by voting in the affirmative on the tariff bills. 
On the other hand, McGuire adhered to his past performance by opposing 
all forms of tariff reduction, even the administration-backed recip-
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rocity agreement. He missed the cotton tariff bill votes as well as 
the final two votes on the wool measure, but undoubtedly would have 
voted negatively. Morgan was the interesting case as he also defied 
President Taft by speaking and voting against reciprocity, primarily 
because the gypsum industries of his home district were to lose their 
protection. However, he supported the Farmer's Free List, perhaps 
realizing that he had better take cognizance of the fact that he repre-
sented not only the gypsum interests, but also a considerable number 
of farmers. But on the wool and cotton tariff reduction propositions, 
he returned to his "standpat" posture due to his belief that more re-
search was necessary which, he felt, could be supplied by the newly 
created tariff connnission. 
The first session of the Sixty-second Congress was to consider 
one more issue that concerned progressivism, the statehood bill for 
New Mexico and Arizona (H.J. Res. 14). The debate on admitting the 
two states was especially illuminating with respect to the progressive 
political outlook because the constitution of Arizona provided for the 
initiative, referendum, and recall. For this reason a good many people, 
including President Taft, had opposed admitting Arizona as a state. 
The President was particularly critical of the clause in the Arizona 
document which provided for the recall of judges. He regarded that 
clause as being destructive of the independence in the judiciary, and 
he felt it would subject the rights of the individual to the possible 
tyranny of a popular majority. The admission of Arizona thereupon be-
came a popular progressive cause, and those who opposed admission were 
placed in the "standpat" category by progressives. 
Both Morgan and Ferris spoke at length on the Arizona and New 
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Mexico Joint Enabling Act on May 22, 1911, the day it passed the House. 
Both recommended passage as they addressed themselves to the bene-
ficial aspects of not only the initiative and referendum clauses, but 
also the controversial recall of judges section. In addition, Ferris 
discussed some of the additional progressive features of the Arizona 
constitution such as the secret ballot, direct primary, and campaign 
expenditure publicity. 
Speaking first, Morgan proclaimed that he planned to vote for the 
bill because there should be an enlargement of the powers of the 
people to participate directly in the administration of state affairs. 
Morgan disclosed that opponents to the bill had suggested that the 
recall of judges provision would serve as a great danger to free 
institutions. However, as Morgan saw it, "the public official is 
rightly regarded as the servant of the people" and "the judiciary and 
our courts are creatures of the people." Therefore, if the services 
of any public official, including judges, are not satisfactory, Morgan 
argued, then the people should have the right to remove them and 
select another. He believed that the initiative, referendum, and re-
call would serve as instruments "in the hands of the people whereby 
they can more speedily secure what is right and just and best for all. 11 
And in defiance of President Taft's dissatisfaction with the recall 
clause, Morgan concluded by saying: 
In my opinion, the recall provision applied to judges will 
not destroy the independence of judges or interfere with 
the administration of justice •••• The able, honest, 
upright, conscientious judge will not have and need not 
have any fear of being recalled.77 
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Immediately following Morgan and reinforcing his thoughts was 
Ferris of the fifth Oklahoma district. He viewed the Arizona constitu-
tion as the handiwork of men who were concerned with rights of people: 
"It is an embodiment of human liberties and human rights made by men 
who believe in humanity and scringe for their every ache and pain." 
In regard to the initiative principle, the Lawton Democrat told of 
the beneficial results that it had provided for the people of Oklahoma. 
Those who described it as "fanaticism" were making indictments that 
were "faulty and untrue." To Ferris it was a right vested in the 
"hollow hand of each citizen • • • to play his part in initiating 
legislation when recreant legislatures fai1 or refuse to act." 
The referendum principle, according to Ferris, permitted the 
people of a state to remove from the statutes a law that had been 
passed through "inadvertence or corruption." He revealed that many 
opponents of the principle had argued that the instances would be so 
rare when it was needed that it was undesirable. But, declared Ferris, 
the principle is "soundeven if such a case did not occur once in an 
age." Concluding his remarks on the referendum issue, Ferris stated: 
It would stand as a solemn sentry ever patiently guarding 
the people's rights, inexpensive and unpretentious when 
not in use, ever courageous and willing to act when 
encroachments and usurpation appear.78 
Then Ferris delivered a convincing argument for the recall of 
public officials, either elective or appointive. He contended that 
President Taft, in opposing this clause, was transgressing "the spirit 
and letter of the Federal Constitution when he meddles with the pro-
visions of their State constitution so long as it is republican in 
78Ibid., 1461. 
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form." In regard to Taft's argument that the recall might impair the 
right of the officer recalled, Ferris maintained that while it might 
be true that to remove an "unworthy officer" would damage the pride of 
one citizen; it was also true that "his obnoxious retention would 
wound the pride of the entire citizenship that placed the mantle of 
power about him." Ferris terminated his defense of the recall clause 
by arguing: 
I can not but firmly believe it will be the one superior 
agency that will pull up and eradicate the weeds of corrup-
tion and neglect now luxuriantly growing in by far to.o many 
of the fence corners of the legislatures and congresses.79 
The next day, Republican Minority Leader James Mann of Illinois 
introduced a motion to recormnit the bill with an amendment striking 
out Section VIII which provided for recall of judges. The Oklahoma 
delegation vote reveals that McGuire was the lone affirmative vote 
backing Mann's proposal. Ferris and Morgan, abiding by their verbal 
support, cast ''nays" on the recormnittal motion. Carter, although 
absent, paired against recormnittal, while Davenport did not vote. The 
Mann proposition being defeated, a vote was then taken on H. J. Res. 
14, the Arizona and New Mexico Joint Enabling bill. It passed the 
House with no vote being recorded. 80 
The Senate, after lengthy debate, passed the joint resolution on 
August 8, 1911. However, on August 15, President Taft, as expected, 
returned the resolution to Congress without his approval based upon 
his objection to the recall of the judiciary section in the constitu-
79Ibid., 1464. 
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tion of Arizona. After due consideration by the House Cormnittee on 
the Territories and consultation with members of the Senate, a resolu-
tion was presented which would require Arizona as a precondition for 
her admission to resubmit the question of the recall of the judiciary 
to her voters. This brought Davenport of Oklahoma to his feet to 
speak against the proposed revision. 
Davenport delivered his only speech of the Sixty-second Congress 
on August 19, 1911, in support of the recall clause. He declared his 
approval of the initiative and referendum sections of the Arizona 
document, and then proceeded to give an eloquent defense of the right 
of recall. In his experience of practicing law, Davenport related 
that he had never found a judge that was "any more sacred than any other 
gentleman filling a public trust." He said that he firmly disagreed 
with the President's views, and believed that if judges were subject 
to the recall "their decisions would not be written by representatives 
of the special interests or the corporations," although many decisions 
had been written in that manner in the past. In not approving the 
resolution, the President, Davenport maintained, had refused to approve 
what the people of Arizona desired. By his action the President has 
told the people of Arizona, Davenport continued, that they cannot be 
admitted into the Union as a state "unless you incorporate into your 
constitution what I believe should be in it." Arguing that the closer 
you can bring government to the people the better government you have, 
Davenport concluded his remarks by saying that the real issue now con-
fronting the people of the United States was "shall this Government be 
174 
h 1 h , I 81 administered by t e peop e or t e interests. ' 
Not until Arizona removed the objectionable recall provision was 
it granted admission, along with New Mexico, in 1912. Once in the 
Union, to the rejoicing of progressives, the Arizona citizenry pro-
ceeded to add the questioned clause, and there was nothing Taft could 
do about it. 
Again it appeared that among the Oklahoma delegates to the Sixty-
second Congress there was little disagreement over the question of 
political reform. McGuire, who had vigorously supported the campaign 
publicity act, was the lone opponent to the Arizona statehood issue. 
The remaining four representatives energetically supported the 
measure, especially Ferris, Morgan, and Davenport, who conveyed their 
sentiments through speeches on the House floor. 
Thus ended the first session of the Sixty-second Congress, which 
proved to be a profitable one for progressives. In less than two 
months, the House had introduced and passed legislation dealing with 
both political and economic reform. The two remaining sessions which 
followed were hardly less impressive as the Congress devoted more 
attention to social reform issues. In the course of the next sixteen 
months the House voted to establish a Children's Bureau in the Depart-
ment of Commerce and Labor, set up the parcels post system, established 
an eight-hour day for workers on government contracts, limited the use 
of injunctions in labor disputes, and adopted a system of workmen's 
compensation for railway workers. Not all these bills became law. 
The House members nevertheless accomplished their purpose of demon-
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strating that they could be expected to respond to the progressive 
demands of the hour. 
The humanitarian strain among progressives was strong. A concern 
for the welfare of children began to show up in numerous ways. For 
one thing, there was the problem of child labor. Children of very ten-
der years were working from dawn till da:rk in factories, ruining their 
health in many cases and losing any opportunity for education. The 
National Child Labor Committee and well known reform workers such as 
Jane Addams urged Congress to establish a federal Children's Bureau 
which would undertake studies of the problems of children and provide 
information to the various state and local groups working for child 
welfare. 82 
Answering the call for a Children's Bureau, Senator William E. 
Borah of Idaho introduced such a bill (S. 252) in the second session of 
the Sixty-second Congress. Apparently with little debate on the pro-
posal, the Hou§§ passed the Borah bill on Ap~il 2, 1912, by a vote of 
177 to 17, with 190 not voting, A week later the bill was signed into 
law by President Taft. 83 Among the Oklahoma delegates, there was no 
opposition found a§ ferris, Morgan, and Davenport were recorded in 
favor of the bill, while Carter and McGuire were absent.· Only Scott 
Ferris of the Oklahoma representatives addressed himself to the issue. 
On May 31, 1912, he reviewed several pieces of legislation that had 
received the app1;.oval of the Sixty-second House, and the Children's 
Bureau Act was included in his list. He described the resolution as 
82stephen B. Wood, Constitutional Politics in the Progressive Era: 
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creating an agency ~10 care for the children of unfortunate circum-
stances and com!l.iti~in,s :that "human flesh and blood were not intended 
to endure." The bureau, according to Ferris, would deal with the 
problems of "unclaimed infants, infanticide, orphanage, desertions, 
and dangerous and deleterious occupations" that would blight the future 
of children. In his summation, Ferris declared that it was a resolu-
tion that displayed "the religion of human sympathy, human justice, and 
equal rights. 1184 Although none of the Oklahomans disapproved of the 
resolution, it appears that Ferris still remained the most outspoken 
of the Oklahoma Congressmen for progressive causes. 
The parcels post issue had been debated for some time, dating from 
the late nineteenth century. It was heavily favored by rural areas be-
cause they distrusted the private express companies which charged ex-
85 
orbitant rates. A government owned parcels post, according to the 
argument presented, would provide a cheap means for sending farm pro-
duce to town and a cheap means by which the farmer could supply his 
needs without a time consuming trip to the source of supply. The 
proponents pointed to the English and German systems as models, and 
argued that the parcels post system would also reduce the cost of 
living. 
In the second session, the provision for an experimental parcels 
post, which would include rural delivery, was introduced in the form 
of a rider to a Post Office appropriation bill (H. R. 21279) by 
Congressman John A. Moon of Tennessee. In this form it passed both 
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houses and was approved by the President on August 24, 1912. All of 
the Oklahoma delegates, with the exception of Davenport, who did not 
vote, were among the 240 House members supporting the bill. There 
86 h d h h 61 . 86 were members w o vote against t e provision, wit not voting. 
It is not too surprising to find unanimity among the Oklahomans on this 
issue since it was of such vital interest to farmers, a group that the 
Oklahoma House members considered a major part of their constituency. 
However, none of them felt strongly enough about the issue to lend 
vocal support to Moon's rider. 
Of the twenty labor bills which the Chairman of the House Labor 
Connnittee, William B. Wilson of Pennsylvania, claimed for the Sixty-
second Congress, perhaps the most significant were the various pro-
visions for an eight-hour day, the anti-injunction bill, and the 
k I • .b"ll 87 wor mens compensation i • The increasing willingness of Congress 
to legislate an eight-hour day for workers undet its jurisdiction 
stands out in a period when unregulated private industry often worked 
people for sixty or more hours a week. 
With the introduction of H. R. 9061, which provided that workers 
on government contracts should be limited to an eight-hour day, Congress 
reached with a long arm into industry, for a plant working on govern-
ment orders could not very well work some of its people longer than 
others. The bill, introduced by Representative Wilson, was passed on 
86u. s., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1912, XLVIII, 
Part 6, 5752. 
87u. s., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1912, XLVIII,. 
Part 11, 10679-10682. 
178 
December 14, 1911, with no vote being recorded. 88 After some debate 
in the Senate, it was sent back to the House with amendments. Wilson 
moved on June 5, 1912, that the House concur with the Senate revisions, 
and the motion was agreed to with no one demanding a roll call. The 
vote was unanimous in the House, and the President approved the bill 
on June 8, 1912. 89 
Only Ferris of the Oklahoma contingent spoke for the eight-hour 
day issue. In a short speech on May 31, 1912, he explained how the 
resolution had long been needed by labor. He said: 
This bill ••• is the hope of labor in the morning 
with dinner pail in hand as he goes to his daily task; 
is the dream of labor as he returns at night with tired 
muscles, but with rested brain.90 
We are only keeping our word to American labor, Ferris concluded, with 
the enactment of such legislation. Once again, the Lawton Democrat 
had provided the only voice for Oklahomans in the United States House. 
The resolution to limit the use of the injunction in labor dis-
putes was brought to the floor of the House by Henry D. Clayton, 
Chairman of the House Judiciary Conunittee. On May 14, 1912, the 
House passed his bill providing that, in general, no injunction should 
be issued in a labor dispute unless it was necessary to prevent 
irreparable injury to property for which there was no adequate re-
course at law. The vote was 243 "yeas," 31 "nays," 6 "present," and 
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113 "not voting." Four of the five Oklahoma Congressmen, Carter, 
Ferris, Morgan and McGuire, cast votes in the affirmative, while Daven-
91 port answered the roll call as "present." 
Two of the representatives from Oklahoma declared not only roll 
call support, but also commented on the merits of the anti-injunction 
proposition. The first to speak was Ferris. This bill will guarantee 
the laborer his solemn rights, asserted Ferris, and will "lift aloft 
the standard of his manhood and the improvement of his future." Con-
tinuing, he said that the Clayton bill would give to the laborer his 
constitutional rights, and he reminded his colleagues that the pro-
posal had been the hope of the country's toilers since his boyhood. 
This is the "resurrection" of labor's rights, their "hope by day," 
their "dream by night," argued Ferris. And even though the "great 
modern trinity of standpatters, Cannon, Fordney, and Dalzell," have 
voted against the bill, Ferris proclaimed that the "supreme wish of 
92 labor" had finally been granted. 
Joining Ferris in support of the bill was Morgan. He informed 
the House members on July 9, 1912 that there were about 35,000,000 
persons engaged in gainful occupations; 11,000,000 on the farm, 
7,000,000 in domestic and personal service, 7,000,000 in trade and 
transportation, and 9,000,000 in manufacturing and mechanical pursuits. 
It is this "army of toilers," avowed Morgan, that gives our country its 
wealth and prosperity. Therefore, Morgan reasoned that Congress should 
be concerned about the advancement, welfare, and happiness of this 
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"grand army of workers. 11 He acknowledged that only a small percentage 
of the American workers were organized, but that all wage earners 
benefited from the "battles fought and won by organized labor." Morgan 
ended his remarks by saying that as long as he was intrusted with 
legislative power he would vote for all measures which would contribute 
to the welfare of labor. 93 Unfortunately for labor and others inter-
ested in this measure, it was referred to the Senate Cormnittee on the 
Judiciary and left unfinished in the Sixty-second Congress. 
For years reformers had been increasingly troubled by the defense-
lessness of industrial workers, who ran a considerable risk of being 
injured on the job. In addition, the worker~ under the cormnon law as 
interpreted by American courts, had very little chance to recover 
damages if they were injured. There had been an uphill fight in many 
state legislatures and in Congress itself to modify the old cormnon 
law doctrine of the "fellow servant" (if an accident could be laid at 
the door of a negligent fellow employee, the employer might get off 
free) and "assumption of risk" (if you took a job knowing it to be 
dangerous it was nobody's fault but your own if you got injured or 
killed). 
As recently as 1908 Congress had enacted a good Employer's 
Liability law. In the meantime, the newer concept of workmen's compen-
sation, i.e., compensation for every injury regardless of liability, 
was gaining ground. A bill, introduced by Senator George Sutherland 
of Utah, reached the House floor in March of 1913. s. 5382 provided 
for compensation for railway employees in case of accidental injuries 
93u. s., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1912, XLVIII, 
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which resulted in disability or death. The resolution was opposed 
by many of the progressives because they felt some of the provisions 
inserted by the Taft administration were highly favorable to the rail-
roads and also because: 
••• the rates of compensation provided for in this bill 
are so at variance with the amounts that may be recovered 
under the existing law and in many instances so small that 
they are wholly inadequate to the necessities of the 
injured employees •••• 94 
Consequently many of the House members who customarily took the progres-
sive view of legislation argued against, and either voted against the 
bill or were recorded as not voting. 
The vote came on March 1, 1913, and the results were 218 for, 81 
against, and 80 not voting. Among those in favor of the act were 
Carter and McGuire of Oklahoma. Davenport, Ferris, and Morgan were 
d d . 95 recor e as not voting. It was not unusual for Davenport to be 
absent, but the failure of Ferris and Morgan, who were quite faithful 
in answering roll calls, to vote on the bill displays some reluctance 
on the part of these two men who heretofore had supported the laborer's 
cause. This may have been due to the fact that they disapproved of 
the administration's provisions which were considered unfavorable by 
many of the traditional House progressives. The Senate failed to con-
cur with House approval as Senator Hoke Smith of Georgia threatened a 
filibuster, and therefore Sutherland withdrew a motion to concur on 
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March 2, 1913 because he felt it useless. 96 
Certain resolutions of a progressive nature were introduced by 
Oklahoma representatives, but never acted on by the Sixty-second 
Congress. Most of these proposals were concerned with benefitting the 
agricultural sector of the population. Ferris continued his relentless 
campaign for a bill to prevent gambling in cotton and grain futures 
as he presented H. R. 1324 on April 4, 1911. It was referred to the 
House Committee on Agriculture, but was never reported out. Similar 
Ferris resolutions had encountered the same fate in the Sixtieth and 
Sixty-first Congresses. 
Morgan wrote two bills that were of interest to progressives, 
H. R. 18711, which would provide for the regulation of corporations 
engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, and H. R. 20282, which 
would provide for the establishment of agricultural extension depart-
ments in connection with agricultural colleges. He introduced the 
first bill on January 25, 1912, and it was referred to the House 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. About a month later, 
the second district Congressman spoke on the subject of controlling 
industrial corporations, a topic relevant to his bill. He emphati-
cally stated that further control of industrial corporations should 
be extended because the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 had become 
antiquated to deal with the problems of increased industrial concen-
tration. There is sufficient evidence, Morgan alleged, to show that 
many of these corporations have the power to arbitrarily control the 
prices of common goods. ''We should proceed with unflinching firmness 
96u. s., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 3rd Sess., 1913, XLIX, 
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and determination to enact such laws as will wrest this power from 
them," added Morgan. The objectives of his anti-trust legislation, 
according to Morgan, were to create a seven man interstate corporation 
commission with jurisdiction over industrial corporations which would 
be equivalent to the jurisdiction that the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion exercised over railway corporations; to place industrial corpora-
tions with gross annual receipts in excess of $5,000,000 under the 
commission's supervision and control; to establish a new code of 
business ethics which would require the corporations to dispose of 
their products at just and reasonable prices; and to conduct their 
business by using methods that would not be unfair, unjust, or un-
reasonable, or dangerous to the public welfare. 
Continuing, Morgan believed that the people of America had a right 
to complain on account of monopolistic control of prices, and there-
fore the government "should extend its strong arm around the people to 
protect them and make them secure from monopolistic prices." He 
maintained that his bill would not be in conflict with the Sherman Act, 
but that it would aid in its enforcement. However, he pointed out 
that the 1890 law sought to destroy monopoly, whereas his act would 
control so as to preserve competition. 
Morgan likened the growth of monopolistic power to a disease 
that had gotten out of control. He said: 
We do not allow the malady to go on indefinitely, slowly 
but surely sapping the life and vitality of the patient. In 
like manner we should treat our industrial system, now infected 
with a malignant monopolistic fever. In spite of our efforts 
to prevent and destroy, the malady has grown more virulent 
•••• Let us act the part of a wise physician--continue our 
efforts to destroy the disease, but in the meantime 
apply some remedy that will keep it under control.97 
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It was Morgan's theory that competition should never be eliminated, and 
that under no circumstances should the people surrender this "mighty 
agency as a factor in our industrial system." On the other hand, he 
argued, where competition has been eliminated the government should 
provide a substitute: "Control is the only substitute for competition. 
Control must begin where competit_ion ceases." He concluded his lengthy 
remarks in defense of his bill by saying: 
The people of the United States are now in a second great 
struggle. Their antagonist at this time is our great 
industrial corporations. These gigantic organizations are 
strongly intrenched •••• These great corporations will 
not recede, they will not retreat, they will not willingly 
surrender a single advantage they enjoy. The interests 
of 90,000,000 people are at stake •••• Let us not disappoint 
the people in their expectations. Let us give them the same 
instrument of warfare ••• that they used so successfully 
and effectively in their contest.with the great:railroad 
corporations. Let us create a great interstate corporation 
commission, clothe it with ample power and jurisdiction, 
and direct it to proceed forthwith to bring our gigantic 
industrial corporations into subjection.98 
Thus it appears that Morgan was promulgating legislation that had the 
appearance of both Roosevelt's "New Nationalism" plan and Wilson's 
"New Freedom" platform. It resembled the "New Nationalism" theory 
in that it recognized industrial units as the most effective agencies 
of business, but believed that their activities should be brought 
under strict public control by the use of a national commission. 
Morgan's ideas were also similar to Wilson's "New Freedom" ideals in 
that they both wanted to abolish special privileges so as to preserve 
97u. s., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1912, XLVIII, 
Part 3, 2241-2242. 
98Ibid., 2243-2244. 
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and restore competition in business. It would seem that Morgan's 
proposal coming in the latter days of the Taft Administration was a 
precursor to the Clayton Anti-Trust and Federal Trade Commission Acts, 
which would not become a reality until 1914 during the first Wilson 
term. 
The second bill to be introduced by Morgan was an elaboration of 
a resolution presented by Representative Asbury Lever of South Caro-
lina. Lever's act provided for the establishment of agricultural ex-
tension departments in connection with agricultural colleges to 
disseminate practical information to the farming populace on subjects 
relating to agriculture and home economics. Morgan's bill broadened 
the scope of Lever's proposal so as to require instruction of this 
type be given in graded rural schools. Morgan maintained that this 
form of education should be given "to the boys of to-day who will be 
the farmers of tomorrow." The Woodward Republican, however, strongly 
supported the Lever bill, and explained that his resolution was pre-
sented because he felt it would improve the existing agricultural ex-
tension proposition. 99 Neither Lever's nor Morgan's bill was accepted, 
although the Senate passed Lever's bill with amendments, most of which 
concerned the topic of matching funds provided by the states. The 
House could not agree on the Senate amendments, and so it was referred 
to a Conference Committee, where it died for the Sixty-second Congress. 
Morgan's bill was submitted to the House Committee on Agriculture on 
February 16, 1912, but was never reported out. The agricultural ex-
tension program had to await the approval of the Sixty-third Congress, 
99u. s., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1912, L, 
Part 7, 310-311. 
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where it was enacted in 1914 as the Smith-Lever law. Again it seems 
as if Morgan was in the vanguard of promoting progressive legislation 
that would become major considerations during the Wilson administra-
tion. 
In conclusion, the record of the Sixty-second Congress, for which 
Oklahoma Congressmen could take partial credit, was outstanding from a 
progressive point of view. The members of the 1911 to 1913 session 
could claim that serious efforts had been made to reduce the tariff 
and make the cost of living cheaper. In the Oklahoma delegation, 
Ferris, Carter, and Davenport lent strong support to this effort by 
speaking and voting for Canadian Reciprocity, Farmer's Free List, and 
wool and cotton duty reductions. Morgan was something of an enigma 
on the tariff question as he disapproved of the Canadian Reciprocity 
Treaty and the wool and cotton revisions, but declared his support 
for the Farmer's Free List proposal, perhaps realizing that a majority 
of his constituents were agricultural. McGuire remained a steadfast 
protectionist on all occasions when tariff reduction was presented. 
The Sixty-second Congress could also take credit for the serious 
effort to make political life both cleaner and more democratic. Okla-
homa representatives found little to disagree with on this issue, 
which included direct election of United States Senators, a campaign 
publicity act, and Arizona and New Mexico statehood. There was no 
opposition to the first two measures, although Davenport and McGuire 
were absent on the direct election of Senators vote, and Davenport 
was also absent on the campaign publicity roll call. The record indi-
cates that three of the Oklahomans, Ferris, Morgan, and McGuire, 
spoke in direct support of these resolutions; Morgan and Ferris 
on direct election of Senators, and McGuire and Ferris on campaign 
publicity. The only dissent on political reform came when McGuire 
refused to support the Arizona and New Mexico joint statehood bill 
because of the recall of judges provision in the Arizona document. 
However, the other four favored the right of initiative, referendum, 
and recall, with Ferris, Davenport, and Morgan delivering forceful 
remarks in favor of these principles provided for in the Arizona 
constitution. 
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The Oklahoma representatives could take some of the credit for 
the earnest attempt made by the Sixty-second Congress to establish 
more humane conditions in industry. There was no opposition among the 
Oklahomans to the creation of a Children's Bureau, the eight-hour day 
proposition, the anti-injunction bill, or the workmen's compensation 
measure. Ferris delivered strong supporting statements on behalf 
of three of the four measures, the Children's Bureau, the eight-hour 
day, and the anti-injunction issue. On the anti-injunction proposal, 
Ferris was joined by Morgan, who conveyed strong sentiments in favor 
of the bill. The other Oklahoma delegates remained silent, but did 
extend roll call support. The Oklahoma delegates displayed a broad 
progressive spirit by favoring these social welfare proposals since 
they represented primarily agricultural districts which contained few 
large urban areas. But the interests of the farmer were not completely 
excluded by the Oklahoma delegation as well as by the entire Sixty-
second Congress. 
Long demanded by rural areas, the parcels post system was created 
with the help of Carter, Ferris, Morgan, and McGuire, with Davenport 
not voting. In addition, Ferris and Morgan introduced legislation 
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providing for the prevention of gambling in cotton and grain futures 
and agricultural extension education, respectively. Apparently both 
men were forerunners in the advancement of legislation of particular 
importance to farmers, and would continue their legislative battles 
for these bills until they became law during the Wilson administration. 
In regard to economic reform other than the tariff, Morgan stands 
out among the Oklahoma delegates for his recommendation dealing with 
anti-trust legislation. Of growing concern to progressives, the issue 
was to become a controversial topic in the 1912 presidential campaign 
and would not be resolved until the first Wilson administration. 
What explanations can be offered for this manifest change in the 
character in Oklahoma representation? Probably two factors were at 
work. First,the.general public sentiment for reform was making pro-
gressivism almost fashionable. In Washington, Oklahoma Congressmen 
read the same papers, listened to the same speakers, became acquainted 
with pressure groups urging reform, and rubbed elbows with progressives 
in the Congressional chambers. 
Secondly, at home the Oklahoma population was becoming better 
informed. In the rural areas and growing cities, there was a signifi-
cant increase in the diffusion of information. Newspapers, such as the 
Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, were propounding the benefits of re-
form. There also appeared to be a broadening of opinion due to lec-
ture tours and the increased circulation of the writings of social, 
political, and economic reformers. The next chapter will examine the 
Sixty-third Congress to determine whether the tendencies evident in 
the Sixty-second would become more marked. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1912 
AND THE SIXTY-THIRD CONGRESS 
After harvesting the fruits of Republican dissension and popular 
protest against the Payne-Aldrich Tariff and the Ballinger Affair in 
the congressional and gubernatorial elections of 1910, the Democrats 
looked with great anticipation to the presidential contest of 1912. 
However, a crucial struggle ensued for control of the party. Bryan 
remained titular head of the party, but he announced soon after the 
elections of 1910 that he would not be a candidate for a fourth nomina-
tion, and a host of new leaders emerged to claim his mantle. Woodrow 
Wilson, who had made a brilliant campaign for the governorship of New 
Jersey, quickly rose as the most formidable Democratic claimant. 
After his election in November of 1910, Wilson, in a spectacular dis-
play of leadership, forced through a reluctant legislature a series 
of measures for which New Jersey progressives had been fighting for 
almost a decade: a direct primary, corrupt practices l~gislation, 
workmen's compensation, and effective state regulation of railroads 
and public utilities. 1 As a consequence of these triumphs, by the 
summer of 1911 many progressive Democrats throughout the country were 
looking to Wilson as their spokesman. For his part, Wilson threw 
1 Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-
1917 (New York: Harper and Row, 1954~10:-
t89 
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himself into the movement for his nomination for the presidency with 
such vigor that it seemed at the beginning of 1912 that he would easily 
win leadership of the Democratic Party. 
Wilson's apparent success made the meteoric rise of his chief 
rival, Champ Clark of Missouri, Speaker of the House, all the more 
surprising. In contrast to Wilson, who represented the newcomer and 
the nonprofessional in politics, Clark was an old-line politician who 
had served in the House since the 1890 1 s. Although he had accumulated 
a consistent progressive voting record over the years, he had never 
originated any legislation of a progressive nature: Having been a 
politician of the Populist type, Clark inherited most of Bryan's 
following in the West. In addition, he made a number of alliances 
with eastern and southern state organizations, and won the support of 
William Randolph Hearst and his chain of newspapers. 
Thus, while Wilson campaigned fervently and won 248 delegates, 
almost one-fourth of the total convention vote of 1,088, Clark negoti-
ated shrewdly and harvested a crop nearly twice as large, 436 dele-
2 gates. To make matters worse for Wilson, Oscar W. Underwood of 
Alabama, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Corrunittee and the pre-
eminent Democratic tariff reformer, had entered the contest, and won 
over one hundred southern delegates who probably would have otherwise 
gone to Wilson. 3 It was a critical moment in the life of the Demo-
cratic Party when the delegates assembled in national convention in 
Baltimore on June 25, 1912, and the Oklahoma Democratic delegation 
2Ibid., 12. 
3Arthur S. Link, ''The Underwood Presidential Movement of 1912," 
Journal of Southern History, XI (May, 1945), 230-245. 
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was to play an important role in the outcome. 
In the pre-convention activities in Oklahoma, Senator Thomas P. 
Gore and future Congressman William H. Murray served as the Wilson 
leaders; Senator Robert L. Owen and Representative Scott Ferris favored 
Clark for President. Both sides tried to persuade the county Demo-
cratic conventions to endorse their candidate and send delegations to 
the state convention pledged to him. When the county conventions met, 
4 Wilson was endorsed by thirty-three counties, Clark by only twenty. 
Wilson showed surprising strength over the entire state, while the 
Clark supporters were centered primarily along the Missouri border. 
The opposing factions prepared to resolve the conflict at the state 
convention to be held at Oklahoma City on February 22, 1912. 
Gore and Ferris tried to prevent a floor fight at the convention 
by suggesting that the delegation be divided equally between Wilson 
and Clark, but this conciliatory effort failed. Murray led the 
Wilson forces on the convention floor and attempted to gain control of 
the convention cormnittees. 5 He kept the Wilson men united during the 
proceedings, in which both sides claimed a majority. Fearing that 
further strife would lead to defeat in the general election, both 
groups finally agreed to a divided delegation, with each candidate 
6 to have ten of the twenty votes. Should either Wilson or Clark 
withdraw, the remaining candidate would receive all the votes. 
At Baltimore, Murray was the showman of the Oklahoma delegation, 
4oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, February 12, 1912. 
5The Daily Ardmoreite, February 23, 1912. 
6oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, February 24, 1912; Johnston 
County Capital-Democrat, March 7, 1912. 
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and as at Denver in 1908, "Alfalfa Bill" did not disappoint his 
audience. In the lobby of the Emerson Hotel, wearing three day's 
growth of beard and puffing on a corncob pipe, he taught the bellboys 
7 
to sing Wilson's campaign songs. Murray had come out for Wilson as 
early as December 21, 1911, in a letter which praised the New Jersey 
governor as "progressive, clean, able, and scholarly," and stated 
that he was the only candidate who could get the independent vote 
necessary to win the Presidency. 8 Murray tried to gain control of 
the delegation, but the presence of Gore, Ferris, and Owen among its 
members prevented anyone from dominating the group. He also wanted 
9 to serve on the resolutions connnittee, but was not selected. Murray 
did become a member of the staff of Wilson managers that met to map 
10 
convention strategy. However, it was on the convention floor that 
he rendered his greatest aid to the Wilson cause. 
During the deliberations of the convention, the division within 
the Sooner delegation was made apparent when Gore seconded the nomina-
tion of Wilson and Ferris gave a similar speech for Clark. On the 
first nine ballots Oklahoma cast ten votes each for Wilson and Clark, 
a split which reflected the plight of the entire convention. The 
delegates were deadlocked between Clark and Wilson even though the 
Speaker took a connnanding lead in the early balloting. Then on the 
tenth ballot, Charles Murphy, the political boss of the ninety 
7 Muskogee Times-Democrat, June 24, 25, 1912. 
8 Shawnee News-Herald, July 6, 1912. 
9 Muskogee Times-Democrat, June 25, 1912. 
lOArthur S. Link, "The South and the Democratic Campaign of 1912," 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1945, 413. 
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Tammany-controlled New York delegates, cast the state's votes for 
Clark, giving him a majority, but not the necessary two-t,hirds. Not 
since 1844 had a Democrat obtained a majority in a national conven-
tion and then failed to win the nomination. 11 As the states following 
New York were polled, each side watched for a break to Clark, but it 
never came. When the Sooner State was called, a delegate asked for a 
poll of the twenty men, as he had instructions to vote for Wilson first 
and Clark second, and now it appeared that the convention was shifting 
to Clark. It was at this point that Murray, collarless and wiping 
his face with a red bandanna, declared that he did not mind the dele-
gation being polled, but "we do insist that we shall not join Tammany 
. k' h . . ,,12 in ma ing t e nomination. This reference to New York and its 
switch to Clark brought on a Wilson demonstration that lasted fifty-
five minutes. When the uproar subsided, the Oklahoma delegation stood 
firm with ten votes for each of the major contenders. Murray and Gore 
held their men together through 46 ballots, when Underwood switched 
his support to Wilson and gave him the two-thirds necessary to win the 
nomination. 
Murray's demonstration-provoking speech on the tenth ballot was 
credited by Wilson's secretary, Joseph Tumulty, with keeping Clark 
from getting the full benefit of the New York shift. According to 
Tumulty, Murray's statement stemmed the tide to Clark and changed the 
whole complexion of the convention. 13 Ray Stannard Baker, one of 
111· k in, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917, 13. 
12 Urey Woodson, (ed.), Democratic National Convention Proceedings, 
1912 (Chicago: Peterson Linotyping Co., 1912), 219-220. 
13 Joseph P. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson~! Knew Him (Garden City: 
Doubleday, Page and Co., 1921), 119-120. 
Wilson's biographers, praised Murray's effort to stop the move to 
14 Clark and wrote "Alfalfa Bill struck the keynote of the hour." 
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The Oklahoma delegation retu·rne,d home belie.ving that they had played 
a major role in Wilson's nom-i1:tation. Thus control of the Democratic 
Party was given over to its progressive element, and without any 
open rupture or more than the usual dissension. 
The Republican Party, however, did not resolve its dilemma so 
happily. The elections of 1910 had amounted to a mass repudiation 
of Taft's leadership, and the "insurgents" had made it plain that 
they would not tolerate Taft's renomination. All they lacked was a. 
dynamic leader of national standing to unite their ranks and lead 
their campaign. Many signs pointed in 1910 and early 1911 to Senator 
Robert M. LaFollette of Wisconsin as this leader, especially after 
prominent "insurgents" formed the National Progressive Republican 
League in January, 1911, to fight for the Senator's nomination. La-
Follette had ~he support of a small and dedicated band of individuals, 
but the great mass of Republican progressives wanted Roosevelt. 
Convinced that his party faced certain defeat if Taft was renominated, 
and persuaded that LaFo~lette could never be nominated, Roosevelt 
at last gave in to the pleas of his friends and announced his candi-
dacy for the Republican nomination on February 24, 1912. 15 
The battle for control of the Republican Party that occurred 
from March through May of 1912 was bitter. In the thirteen states 
that held presidential primaries, Roosevelt won 278 delegates, as 
14Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson Life and Letters, Governor 
1910-1913 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,-r§°31), 349. 
15Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917, 13-14. 
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compared to 48 for Taft and 36 for LaFollette. However, Taft con-
trolled the southern states, had the support of ''Old Guard'' strongholds 
like New York, and dominated the Republican National Corrnnittee. Conse-
quently, the Taft forces organized the national convention that met in 
Chicago on June 18, awarded themselves 235 of 254 contested seats, and 
proceeded to renominate the President on the first ballot on June 1. 
Meanwhile, over 300 Roosevelt delegates had stormed out of the conven-
tion and, in consultation with Roosevelt, had decided to go back to 
Chicago and form a new party dedicated to advancing the cause of pro-
gressivism. The result was the Progressive Party, organized in 
16 Chicago on August 5 and 6, 1912. 
The confusion in which the nation's voters approached the tri-
cornered presidential battle was deepened in Oklahoma by the fact that 
the Progressive Party was not on the ballot. Yet all but one or per-
haps two of the Republican candidates for elector were corrnnitted to 
Roosevelt instead of Taft, and it was generally believed that the 
entire group would support whoever showed stronger in the electoral 
college. It was a peculiar dilerrnna for Oklahoma Republican Party 
officials, most of them emotionally attached to Roosevelt, but 
serving under the dispensation of Taft. In the crisis, State Chairman 
Jim Harris of Wagoner announced that, to allay possible discord, there 
would be no state·convention. Despite such efforts to promote harmony, 
there was a great deal of activity in Oklahoma in Roosevelt's behalf. 
A Progressive Party organization emerged, and its chairman, Alva L. 
McDonald of El Reno; L. G. Disney of Muskogee, who had unsuccessfully 
opposed Charles Carter in the 1907 fourth district Congressional race; 
16Ibid., 15-16. 
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E. N. Wright of Olney, Republican candidate for the Carter seat in 
1912; and Frank Frantz of Bartlesville attended the Bull Moose con-
vention and returned home to campaign for the Progressive Party plat-
17 form. 
Roosevelt made a tour of Oklahoma on September 24, 1912, speaking 
before enthusiastic crowds at Chandler, where he said "no honest man 
18 
should vote the Republican ticket this year," Shawnee, McAlester, 
and Oklahoma City. Jane Addams, the well known social reformer', and 
Senator Henry Allen of Kansas visited Oklahoma to speak for Roosevelt. 
Even though most of the campaign activity centered on Roosevelt, the 
Republican press of the state remained in Taft's camp. This fact was 
pointed out in the Shawnee News-Herald of October 22 which stated, 
on its editorial page, that the '~rogressives are without a newspaper 
19 
organ of any consequence in the whole state." The Oklahoma City 
Times, Muskogee Phoenix, and Tulsa World, representing Oklahoma's three 
largest cities, endorsed Taft, but in an attempt to display unison, 
emphasized how the Republicans and Progressives had fused to promote 
20 political harmony. Dennis T. Flynn, former territorial delegate, 
carried the brunt of the battle for the regular Republicans, but his 
campaign speeches were aimed primarily against the Democratic state 
administration rather than against Wilson. 21 
17James R. Scales, "The Political History of Oklahoma, 1907-1949," 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1949, 146. 
18shawnee News-Herald, November 1, 1912. 
19 Shawnee News-Herald, October 22, 1912. 
20oklahoma City Times, October 31, 1912. 
21 Scales, 147. 
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The Democratic press did all it could to encourage the Republican 
split so as to ensure a presidential victory. The theme of the Demo-
cratically-controlled newspapers was to concentrate on forcing the 
ten Republican electors to declare their position for either Taft or 
Roosevelt so the Republican voters would know where they stood. The 
Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, Shawnee News-Herald, and Enid Morning 
News urged Oklahoma Republicans to write each Republican elector and 
"compel him to publicly announce for whom he will vote in the electoral. 
college if he is chosen to the college." They stressed that all of 
the electors on the Democratic ticket were pledged to Wilson, and that 
the Democratic voter knew exactly how his vote would be counted when 
he went to the polls in November. The varying reports on how the Re-
publican electors stand, declared the Democratic press, makes it 
"plain that someone is getting the double-cross." "Somebody is being 
fooled" added the Morning News, and the only way the riddle will be 
solved was for each candidate on the Republican electoral ticket to 
make a specific declaration of his position. In conclusion, the 
Democratic publications asked: "Will these candidates have the courage 
to declare themselves, or will they permit themselves to be gagged by 
the Politicians?1122 Apparently the influence of these corrunents had 
some effect on the voters of Oklahoma as Wilson rolled up !a plurality 
of over 28,000. Wilson's vote was not a majority, however. Pre-
senting their strongest alliance, a combination of the Farmer's Union 
of the southwest and the United Mine Workers of the southeast, the 
Socialists polled over 43,000 votes for Eugene V. Debs. The results 
22oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, October 12, 1912; Shawnee News-
Herald, November 1, 1912; and Enid Morning News, October 13, 1912. 
were as follows: 
Wilson 
Roosevelt-Taft 
Debs 
119, 140 
90, 742 
43,755 
46. 9% 
35.8% 
17.3%23 
The census of 1910 revealed that Oklahoma had a population in-
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crease of such magnitude as to give the state three additional cong-
ressmen. The legislature failed to redistrict in 1911, which meant 
that the new congressmen would be elected at large in 1912. The 
Democrats engaged in a free-for-all primary, with twenty-eight candi-
dates running for the three posts. William H. Murray of Tishomingo, 
Joseph B. Thompson of Pauls Valley, and Claude Weaver of Oklahoma 
City were the victors in the August 6 primary. Murray, his name 
undoubtedly the best known, led the large field of candidates with 
39,140 votes; Thompson was second with 31,887; and Weaver was third 
with 26,923. 24 
All three winners had campaigned on progressive platforms in the 
pre-primary battle. Murray stated that he had neither the time nor 
money to conduct a major primary campaign, but was running on a plat-
form of tariff reform, the direct election of United States Senators, 
and an extensive federal program of irrigation. He asked his friends 
first to search out his name among the list of candidates and then 
vote for two others. The Democrats would need a strong ticket in the 
fall, and Murray urged voters to consider this factor when selecting 
. l . 25 congressiona nominees. During the sununer Murray wrote letters and 
23samuelA. Kirkpatrick, et al., Oklahoma Voting Patterns: Presi-
dential, Senatorial, and Gubernatorial Elections (Norman: Bureau of 
Government Research, 1970), 36. 
240. irectory: 
Board, 1915), 85. 
State of Oklahoma (Oklahoma City: 
25~ohnston Cqunt1 Capital-Democrat, May 16, 19q; Democrat, May 11, 19 2. · · · · 
State Election 
Muskogee Times~ 
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mailed campaign cards but made no personal appearances other than at 
Medford, where he conferred with William Jennings Bryan, who was on a 
k . 26 spea 1ng tour. Campaign letters, accompanied by sample ballots 
emphasizing the location of Murray's name, called hii;n a "progressive 
candidate" whose nomination had been conceded by his opponents. The 
letter announced that he would spend fifteen to twenty days campaign-
ing for Wilson in the fall, but that he would not campaign before the 
primary. 27 Murray's campaign strategy was successful. 
Weaver, in contrast to Murray, conducted an extensive campaign 
and outlined an elaborate platform. Like Murray, he favored tariff 
revision downward, calling for duties to be highest on luxuries and 
lowest on necessities. Describing the trust problem as the most 
difficult the nation faced, Weaver called for the replacement of the 
Sherman Act, by more stringent legislation .that would include peni.:.. 
tentiary imprisonment for violaters. He supported the initiative, 
referendum, and recall, and demanded that there be direct primaries 
for all offices, including President and Vice-President. Also included 
in Weaver's platform were planks upholding the eight-hour day, general 
28 
employer's liability, and a separate federal department of labor. 
Weaver had set the progressive tone for his upcoming general election 
race. 
Former Democratic State Chairman Thompson also spoke out for 
26 Johnston County Capital-Democrat, June 13, 1912. 
27Letter, William H. Murray to Charles L. Daughtery, July 18, 
1912, Daugherty Collection, Division of Manuscripts, University of 
Oklahoma Library. 
28campaign Book of Claude;Weaver, Claude Weaver Collection, Divi-
sion of Manuscripts, University of Oklahoma Library. 
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progressive measures in the 1912 primary race. In a political adver-
tisement that appeared in the Johnston County Capital-Democrat, 
Thompson was described as a "PROGRESSIVE AND REFORM DEMOCRAT." It 
stated that he believed in the initiative, referendum, and recall 
principles, and supported the direct election of not only United States 
29 Senators, but also of United States Marshals, Attorneys, and Judges. 
There was little doubt that the Democrats had selected three at-large 
candidates who at least paid lip service to progressive causes. Time 
would tell whether the rhetoric would be bolstered by action. Ideo-
logically, Murray's association with Wilson had embued him with the 
progressive principles of the New Jersey governor. Weaver's platform 
was the most specific of all three candidates as he touched on 
economic reform in his tariff plank, political reform in his support 
of direct primaries, and social reform in his overtures to labor. As 
State Chairman, Thompson had led the Bryan forces to victory in 
Oklahoma in the presidential contest in 1908, and he appeared to 
follow the progressive line long advocated by Bryan-type Democrats. 
Alvin D. Allen of Waurika, James L. Brown of Oklahoma City, and 
Emory D. Brownlee of Kingfisher were the three Republicans chosen to 
run for the at-large seats in the Republican primary. Allen polled 
17,853 votes; Brownlee, 15,275; and Brown, 19,260. 30 The Republican 
press across the state paid little attention to the primary race, and 
no information was divulged as to the ideological position of Allen, 
Brown, or Brownlee. Apparently the Republican newspapers intended 
29 Johnston County Capital-Democrat, August 8, 1912. 
300. 1.rectory: 
Board, 1915), 86. 
State of Oklahoma (Oklahoma City: State Election 
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to remain as silent as possible on differing positions, if any, so as 
to prevent any more dissension than already existed. 
The at-large races in the general election of November, 1912, 
attracted little or no notice throughout the state. Only Murray of 
the at-large candidates intrigued the state press, and this was due to 
his political appeal and national notoriety. He was asked by the 
state Democratic organization to campaign for all nominees from Wilson 
on down the political hierarchy. From early September until the 
November election, he answered the call by speaking from one end of 
the state to the other, carrying the message of Wilson's "New Freedom" 
platform. He wrote to his wife, Alice, that it was one of the most 
31 
extensive campaigns of his career. Murray's speeches concentrated 
mainly on the banking and currency question. He pointed out that 
Wilson was the only presidential candidate who offered any remedies 
for breaking up the banking and credit monopoly. According to Murray, 
this issue alone should entitle Wilson to the support of all progres-
sives. He usually concluded his speeches by puncturing the '~reten-
sions" of Roosevelt's platform by showing that it completely ignored 
the farmer, especially on the subject of rural credits. 32 
Former State Senator Thompson, an arch-foe of corporations, 
carried his progressive demands into the general election campaign. 
Serving the Cleveland-Garvin-McClain County Senatorial District, he 
had introduced much of the early regulatory legislation in Oklahoma, 
including the law prohibiting corporate contributions to political 
31Letter, William H. Murray to Alice Murray, October 22, 1912, 
William H. Murray Collection, Divisions of Manuscripts, University of 
Oklahoma Library. 
32 Shawnee ~-Herald, October 5, 1912. 
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campaigns. He believed that a law of this type should be passed at 
the federal level, and, in addition, felt there should be a law pro-
hibiting a public official from accepting employment from a corpora-
tion while in office, for, as Thompson stated, "no man can serve two 
masters." 33 
Weaver, who was an old-time handshaking campaigner, stated in his 
speeches that "the protective tariff is an insidious system of petty 
larceny by which the masses are pilfered to make the rich the favored 
few." He supported the 1912 Democratic platform which called for a 
tariff for revenue only. Weaver was convinced that the tariff was the 
"mother of the trusts" as he declared: 
Vast corporations engaged in interstate commerce, enriched 
by the tariff's special privilege, have combined to restrain 
trade, to destroy competition, and to crush lesser concerns, 
thereby constituting the private monopoly known as trusts 
•••• Entrenched behind ill-gotten millions, by bribery they 
have attempted the wholesale corruption of the general 
electorate and of state legislatures •••• And where they 
could not write they have defied the law.34 
Weaver idolized Wilson and, if elected, stated that he would provide 
unyielding support for the "New Freedom" principles of tariff reform 
and trust regulation. 
The two Oklahoma City newspapers gave scant coverage to the 
races for Congressman-at-large. Although not specifically endorsing 
the Republican candidates, the Times, a Republican organ, carried an 
editorial on October 31, 1912, entitled "Republicans and Progressives 
Unite." It stated that of the twenty-'eight Democrats running for 
33 Johnston County Capital-Democrat, August 8, 1912. 
34weaver Campaign Book, Claude Weaver Collection, Division of 
Manuscripts, University of Oklahoma Library; Oklahoma City Daily 
Oklahoman, April 22, 1912. 
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Congressman-at-large, only three were chosen, and the question was 
posed as to how many of the voters across the state could have been 
familiar with the three selected. The result, according to the 
editorial, was that many voted for the first three names on the .list, 
whether they were good, bad, or·indifferent. Therefore, the article 
declared that when a choice is given, the position on the ballot be-
comes more important than the personal character or ability of the 
candidate. With the Bull Moosers and Republicans working together, 
the editorial concluded, the country will be saved from bad or in-
capable officials. 35 The Times had thus implied that the Democratic 
candidates had been elected because of their place on the ballot, and 
that the voters had made their judgment disregarding the candidate's 
capabilities. In analyzing the Times editorial, the evidence shows 
that it was clearly in error because the Democratic ballot listed the 
candidates alphabetically, with the names of Murray and Thompson 
appearing quite low among the candidates, and Weaver's name last. 
Consequently, the Times presanted a weak argument for supporting the 
Republican candidates because it made no mention of the qualifications 
of Allen, Brown, or Brownlee for serving in Congress, and attacked the 
Democratic candidates by using incorrect facts. 
-Like the Times, the Democratic Dai!y Oklahoman in an October 8, 
1912, editorial endorsed no specific candidates, but called for the 
election of a Congressional delegation that would be entirely Demo-
cratic. Pointing out that Wilson would be the next president, the 
article said that Republican representatives would receive little 
35oklahoma City Times, October 31, 1912. 
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recognition on affairs concerning Oklahomans. "Why have one or more 
Republican dummies in congress?" stated.the Oklahoman. The editorial 
asserted, in conclusion, that it was time for Oklahoma to make itself 
a force in Washington, and the means for accomplishing this end wa~ to 
elect a solid Democratic delegation. 36 
Thus in an indirect fashion both papers were supporting their 
respective candidates for the at-large seats, but certainly not in the 
positive manner thatboth papers had displayed in the 1910 second 
district election. It appears that, to some degree, the press, both 
Democratic and Republican, had conceded victory to the Democrats, 
especially Murray, whose name had become almost synonymous with Okla-
homa. The relatively unknown Republican candidates for the at-large 
seats were not helped by the reluctance on the part of the Republican 
officials and the Republican press to lend support in their efforts 
to prevent further rupturing of the Oklahoma Republican Party. 
All three Democrats were victorious in the November. 5 general 
election. Murray led the ticket in the race for Congressman-at-large, 
receiving 121,411 votes. He was followed by Weaver, with 120, 753, and 
Thompson, with 120,346. The leading Republican in the race, Allen, 
polled only 87,469 votes, or 32,877 fewer than Thompson, the lowest 
Democrat. Brown and Brownlee, the other Republican candidates, finished 
fifth and sixth in the balloting, with 8'7 ,264 and 86,883 votes, 
. l 37 respective y. 
With the failure of the state legislature to redistrict Oklahoma, 
36oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, October 8, 1912. 
37Kirkpatrick, et al., Oklahoma Voting Patterns: Congressional 
Elections (Norman: Bureau of Government Research, 1970), 41. 
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the original five Congressional districts remained intact for the 
1912 elections. In the first district, incumbent McGuire sought his 
sixth consecutive tenn to the United States House. He was challenged 
by John J. Davis of Chandler. During the campaign, the pro-McGuire 
newspapers, such as the Newkirk Republican News-Journal and the Enid 
Events, re-emphasized the length of service given by McGuire to the 
people of Oklahoma, and reasoned that he had become a more capable 
public servant because of his long experience in the House. The New-
kirk paper editorialized: "To change from an experienced, capable man 
to an inexperienced and uninformed man would be as foolish as to put a 
1 h b . ,,38 te egrap operator in a ca to run an engine. Besides his experi-
ence, the Republican press of the first district praised McGuire for 
his stand on the tariff. They argued that his support of the tariff 
was necessary in order to keep the business of the country stable, and 
would prevent the Democratic Party, with its slogan of "tariff for 
revenue only," from paralyzing the economy as it did in 1893. 39 
As indicated by the Congressional Record, McGuire had devoted 
considerable time to bills concerning pension increases for his con-
stituents. The Republican press did not let the voters forget this 
service as evidenced by a front page article in the Enid Events just 
prior to the 1912 election. It applauded McGuire's efforts in the 
last Congress in securing quick action on pensions for old soldiers 
in his district. According to the article, McGuire had sent out 
applications to old soldiers while the veteran's pension bill was still 
38Newkirk Republican News-Journal, October 4, 1912. 
39Newkirk Republican News-Journal, October 25, 1912. 
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being considered. Hence, the old-soldiers in the first district, the 
story declared, would receive their increased benefits months before 
those of other districts across the nation. 40 Thus it appears that 
McGuire would again count, as he had in the past, on his experience and 
his loyalty to constituents to attain his objective of a sixth term 
in Congress. 
The Democratic newspapers from both the first district and around 
the state realized that for the first time there was a golden oppor-
tunity of defeating McGuire because of the expected landslide for 
Wilson, who, they hoped, would carry several Democrats into of£.ice with 
him. Their anticipations were also heightened with the splintering of 
the Republican Party, which might lead some progressive Republicans, 
who did not agree with McGuire's "stand-pat" record, to vote for a 
Democrat,particularly if he was a progressive one. The Democrats felt 
they had a progressive candidate in the person of Davis, and the 
Democratic press emphasized this fact. The Enid Morning News editorial 
page of October 26, 1912 proclaimed that the re-election of McGuire 
would be a victory for "stand-pat" Republicanism, and a defeat for the 
progressive cause. If McGuire is re-elected, avowed the article, the 
sincere progressive will find little satisfaction in the result, be-
cause in the first district there is one chance for a definite victory 
f . . 41 or progressivism. In regard to the first district contest, the 
Democratic Shawnee News-Herald of October 29 queried: "Is it not time 
for the voters of the first Congressional district to put an end to the 
40Enid Events, October 25, 1912. 
41Enid Morning News, October 26, 1912. 
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misrepresentation of their great district in the House of Representa-
tives?1142 Despite the intensive Democratic effort, McGuire was success-
ful in his bid for a sixth consecutive term, although by the narrowest 
margin of his political career. The results were as follows: 
McGuire 
Davis 
Others 
19,035 
18,456 
4,768 
43.0% 
41.7% 
15. 3%43 
Davis carried Kay, Noble, Pawnee (McGuire's home county), and Payne, 
but McGuire remained in firm control of the traditionally Republican 
44 
counties of Garfield, Kingfisher, Lincoln, and Logan. The Wilson 
presidential victory undoubtedly strengthened the position of Davis, 
while the Republican dissension created problems for McGuire. Apparent-
ly, McGuire's experience once again prevailed over the inexperienced 
Democratic candidate. But the narrow margin of victory and the fact 
that McGuire had less than a majority, indicated that the voters were 
not fully satisfied with McGuire's representation. 
The other Republican incumbent, Morgan, seeking his third term, 
was opposed by Judge John J. Carney of El Reno, who considered himself 
a progressive Democrat. A Daily Oklahoman article of November 3 
entitled "Carney Will Guard People's Interests," outlined his platform 
in detail. Carney believed that the Constitution should be amended so 
as to provide for the nomination and election of presidents, senators, 
supreme court judges, and all federal authorities by direct vote of the 
people, eliminating the electoral college and other indirect methods. 
42 Shawnee News-Herald, October 29, 1912. 
43K· k . k 1 Okl h V . P C . 1 ir patric, et a., a oma oting atterns: ongressiona 
Elections, 41. 
44Ibid. 
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"No man was ever big or great enough to be able to withstand the 
corrupting influence of unlimited power conferred upon him for life," 
said Carney. Recommending that more suitable laws be placed on the 
statute books to deal with the trusts, Judge Carney stated that in his 
opinion the "inefficient Sherman anti-trust law had proven to be 
inadequate." Tariff revision must also be included in a program for 
the betterment of the nation, affirmed Carney, and he described the 
Payne-Aldrich Tariff as not being "written in the interests of the 
people ••• but was written at the dictation of the special interests 
of the country." "I have been a progressive ever since I was 15 years 
old," announced Carney, and to lend credence to this st;atement, he 
explained that in the Oklahoma constitutional convention he had voted 
for the initiative, referendum, and recall provisions; for child labor 
laws; and for a graded income and inheritance tax, designed to prevent 
the great accumulation of wealth in the hands of one. Carney concluded 
his Oklahoma City speech by saying: 
I am an ultra-progressive. All democrats must be progressive, 
because it means but a recognition of justice and human rights. 
If progressive legislation is not enacted within a few years, the 
country is going to .have serious trouble, just as foreign 
countries have had and just as occurred in other great republics 
immediately before they tottered to their fall. It is because 
the republican party does not represent the people and has been 
taking care of the big interests too long.45 
There could be no uncertainty on the part of the second district voters 
that Carney stood for reforms of all types, economic, political, and 
social. 
The Democratic Daily Oklahoman, a long time critic of Morgan, 
continued its scathing attacks on the Republican incumbent in the 1912 
45 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, November 3, 1912. 
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contest. In an editorial of October 14 headlined "Tearing Off the 
Mask," the paper castigated Morgan for his performance in the House. 
The mask over the face of Morgan has been removed, alleged the story, 
and his countenance clearly reflects a "stand-pat" expression. Ex-
plaining that Morgan was a Taft Republican, the article maintained 
that Roosevelt Republicans, if they were to be consistent, could not 
vote for him. The editorial pointed to Roosevelt's statement at 
Chandler in September, in which he said that no honest man could vote 
the Republican ticket in 1912. Therefore, the Oklahoman reasoned, if 
Roosevelt followers voted for Morgan, they were already branded by 
R 1 d . h 46 ooseve t as is onest men. It appears that the Oklahoman was in-
ferring that Bull Moosers, to be true to their principles, had no 
choice but to cast their ballots for the more progressive candidate, 
Judge Carney. 
During the midst of the heated campaign in the second district, 
Alva McDonald, chairman of the Oklahoma Progressive Party, declared 
that he could not support Morgan because the latter was for Taft, 
and had the support of Flynn. Explaining that his decision was purely 
a personal matter, McDonald informed the public that he would vote 
for Carney. The Democratic press wasted no time in using this 
announcement as further argument for the support of Carney. The Enid 
Morning News urged all Roosevelt supporters in the second district to 
follow McDonald's lead. If Morgan is re-elected, the October 16 edi-
torial argued, he will owe his re-election to the votes of Roosevelt 
Republicans; but, if he is defeated, the "defeat will be a victory for 
46 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, October 14, 1912. 
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the people in which the Progressives as well as the Democrats will 
. 1147 participate. 
McDonald continued to speak out against Morgan, particularly his 
as.s.c~c.i,a;tl,;ii»n· 't.ttfth.'Fl)ttm. The Bull Moose Chairman disliked the manner in 
which Flynn, who had been a delegate to the Republican national con-
vention, helped participate in the "stealing" of the nomination by 
Taft. McDonald accused Flynn of aiding the Taft people in "stealing" 
two delegates from the Oklahoma third district who rightfully belonged 
to Roosevelt. The Democratic press capitalized on the McDonald-Morgan-
Flynn feud, as Renfrew's Record, an Enid based Democratic publication, 
carried a front page article which stated: "We have been hearing from 
progressives from all over the second district. They absolutely will 
not stand for any man who has the support of Dennis T. Flynn." The 
pro-Carney paper summarized the campaign by saying that Flynn's open 
endorsement of Morgan had "just about baked Uncle Dick's dough and 
48 given the cake to Judge Carney." 
In what seemingly became the major issue of the campaign, the 
Republican press, led by the Oklahoma City Times, Cherokee Republican, 
and Woodward News-Bulletin, counteracted the McDonald move by pointing 
out that Morgan should not be punished for Flynn's actions in Chicago. 
The Times of October 18 carried an editorial headlined "McDonald's 
Queer Choice," which reasoned that if the Bull Moosers start voting 
against the Taftites, the Taftites may retaliate and vote against the 
Rooseveltites, and, consequently, both may lose out to the Democrats. 
47Enid Morning News, October 16, 1912. 
48 Renfrew's Record, October 18, 1912. 
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The course set by McDonald, according to the article, is "foolish and 
suicidal." The Times concluded by saying: 
Is it not foolish for the Bull Moosers to sacrifice the 
State to the Democrats because they prefer Roosevelt to 
Taft, when it has been promised that the Progressives and 
Republicans may disagree on the national ticket and vote 
for all the Republican state, congressional, and county 
tickets regardless of whether the candidates are for Taft 
or Roosevelt.49 
The obvi,ous attempt on the part of the Times to placate the 
differences created by the McDonald announcement was taken up by the 
Cherokee Republican in an October 25 editorial. Whereas the Times had 
taken great pains to smooth over the apparent rupture, the Cherokee 
paper castigated McDonald's declaration for Carney, and listed several 
reasons why McDonald had suddenly turned against Morgan. The article 
told of McDonald's attempt to secure appointments for a United States 
marshalship and a post office, which he had failed to receive, and then 
pointed out that he had tried to obtain a position through Morgan as 
an appraiser of the segregated coal and asphalt lands, which also 
failed. Because of these factors, the editorial asserted, Morgan 
ceases to be progressive in the eyes of McDonald. Hopes for appoint-
ment, none of which McDonald had received, have certainly influence;! 
the "violent progress with which he is innoculated, 11 concluded the 
d . . l 50 e 1.tor1.a. 
In a speech at Woodward, his hometown, Morgan endeavored to clear 
the air concerning his position in the controversy as well as outline 
his stand on national issues. He urged all voters to support the ten 
49 Oklahoma City.Times, October 18, 1912. 
50 Cherokee Republican, October 25, 1912. 
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Republican electors regardless of whether they were for Taft or 
Roosevelt. The Progressive Party has no slate of candidates for 
county, district, or state offices, explained Morgan, and, therefore, 
he wanted their support in his bid for re-election. Attempting to re-
solve the ideological differences between the Progressives and Republi-
cans, Morgan suggested that there were two great national issues 
involved in the campaign. One was the tariff; the other was the trust 
problem. Both the Republican Party and the Progressive Party, according 
to Morgan, supported a protective tariff policy. Likewise, both 
parties in their 1912 platforms had declared as being in favor of an 
interstate trade commission 'that would have jurisdiction over large 
corporations corresponding to.~the authority the interstate commerce 
commission had over railways and express companies. As Morgan viewed 
the two issues, the Republican and Progressive Parties were united for 
"protection, to maintain our industrial prosperity, and a national 
trade commission to protect the people from prices which may be the 
result of monopolirsitc powe·r." In his concluding remarks, he empha-
sized the fact that he had introduced in the House the first bill to 
create an interstate trade commission, and had made the first speech 
. h H d . h . . 51 int e ouse a vacating sue a commission. Morgan's overtures for 
appeasement were apparently successful, as he was re-elected for a 
third term. 
Yet Morgan, like McGuire, won by the smallest margin of his 
career. Carney rolled up over a 2,000 vote majority in the contiguous 
counties of Oklahoma, Caddo, Canadian, and Blaine, but it was not 
51 Woodward News-Bulletin, October 25, 1912. 
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enough to combat the strength that Morgan showed in the northwestern 
counties of the second district. The results were as follows: 
Morgan 
Carney 
Others 
24,349 
23, 773 
7 ,486 
43.7% 
42.7% 
13.6%52 
The slim 576 vote margin can be attributed to several factors. As in 
the first district race, the strength of Wilson leading the ticket 
aided Carney. The continual harrassment of Morgan's "stand-pat" 
record by the Daily Oklahoman apparently had some impact on the Okla-
homa Coµnty voters as well as the neighboring counties of Caddo, 
Canadian, and Blaine. And finally, Judge Carney presented a strong 
progressive platform, which may have enticed many Bull Moosers, led by 
McDonald, to cross party lines and support Carney. On the other hand, 
Morgan campaigned hard in his home area, which allowed him to carry 
Woodward, Woods, Alfalfa, and Major Counties by sizeable margins. It 
appears that he sufficiently convinced many of the Bull Moosers that 
his position on national issues was no different from Roosevelt's. 
Morgan also pointed proudly to his national trade commission bill, and 
seemingly got extra political mileage on this proposal. 
The Republicans did not fare so well in the three remaining 
districts. Incumbent James Davenport was confronted by a millionaire 
Tulsan, J. B. Daniel, in the third district~ Oa:tdEH,- during·:most of 
the campaign, attacked Davenport's record in the Sixty-second Congress. 
In an open letter to Davenport which was reprinted in the Tulsa Democrat, 
Daniel asked of Davenport: ''How many bills did YOU introduce, and get 
through Congress? Name ONE?" Davenport was described by Daniel as 
52K· k 'k 1 Okl h V ' P 1r patric, et a., a oma oting atterns: Congressional 
Elections, 37. 
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having utterly failed to do one single thing of merit in Congress, 
which, according to Daniel, had given him a name not only among his 
colleagues in Washington, but among his constituency in Oklahoma, as 
''Do-Nothing Davenport." "The name is certainly well applied," argued 
Daniel, "as your record shows." In the same letter, Daniel outlined 
his views on the issue of free trade versus protection. He contended 
that the American people had experienced enough of the free trade 
principle in the 1890's, and informed Davenport that the free trade 
idea would do away with all protection of the farmer, the laborer 
and mechanic, as well as the manufacturer. This would have disastrous 
effect on the third district, said Daniel, which is one of the richest 
in the country in terms of oil, gas, lead, and zinc. Daniel affirmed 
his belief in a "conservative, scientific, non-partisan revision of 
the tariff downward," but not to the extent that "it bankrupts the man 
who manufactures the product." 
In regard to other issues, Daniel stated that he was for direct 
election of United States Senators, the eight-hour day, and the employ-
ment of union labor on all public buildings. "With me, organized 
labor is a matter of principle," avowed Daniel, "and not a matter of 
bait for votes." Other reforms which Daniel approved were a children's 
bureau, a child labor law, workmen's compensation, and old-age 
pensions. 53 It appears that Daniel took a progressive stand on all 
issues except the tariff. 
Davenport based his campaign mainly on his progressive voting 
record, but also aimed his speeches at the wealth possessed by Republi-
53 Tulsa Democrat, October 22, 1912. 
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can Daniel. Davenport alleged that Daniel had made it known openly 
that he planned to spend $100 in each of the 700 voting precincts in 
the third district in an eftort to secure his election. Consequently, 
Davenport placed considerable emphasis on the issue of the publication 
of campaign expenses. He stated that legislation along these lines 
was needed to prevent the corruption of government by big business, 
and added that he did not think that Daniel had complied with existing 
1 h b . 54 aws on t e su Ject. 
Further interest on the campaign money issue was aroused when 
Congressman Ferris came to Tulsa to stump for Davenport. Ferris de-
clared that he thought it was both "impudent and preposterous" for 
Daniel to let it be known that he expected to spend $100 per precinct 
in order to unseat Davenport. "The 300,000 bright and intelligent 
citizens of this district cannot be bought like beef over a butcher's 
scale," argued Ferris. Emphasizing Davenport's experience, Ferris main-
tained that the third district Democrat was acquainted with committee 
work in Washington, and that he had always been found voting on the 
"side of the right." Ferris ended his Tulsa speech by asking: ''Who 
is Daniel? The answer is, he has never held any office within the gift 
55 
of any people." 
Davenport with the aid of fellow Congressman Ferris won easy re-
election on November 5. He displayed well...,distributed voting strength, 
as he carried all but two of the nineteen counties in the third dis-
trict, Nowata and Creek. The totals for the election were: 
54 Tulsa Democrat, October 24, 1912. 
55 Tulsa Democrat, October 20, 1912. 
Davenport 
Daniel 
Others 
27,184 
20,884 
6,826 
51.3% 
38.0% 
10. 7%56 
Davenport's margin of 6,300 votes was considerable. It more than 
doubled his previous victory margins of 2,747 in 1907 and 2,945 in 
1910. Seemingly, Davenport capitalized on the campaign expenditures 
issue by re-iterating the fact that Daniel was a millionaire, and was 
exceeding the financial limitations placed on political candidates. 
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Another factor in accounting for Davenport's convincing victory was the 
participation by Ferris, who had become the leading progressive spokes-
man from the Oklahoma Congressional delegation. Apparently, the voters 
of the third district were satisfied with Davenport's performance in 
the Sixty-second Congress. 
The landslide trend established by the Democrats in the third 
district would continue in the traditionally Democratic fourth and 
fifth districts. Although Charles Carter, the Democratic incumbent, 
won re-election by a comfortable margin in the fourth district, the 
victory would have been in jeopardy if the Republican and Socialist 
candidates had combined their total vote. Therefore, Carter campaigned 
more extensively in 1912 than he had in any of his three previous 
races. It was necessary for Carter to make his position clear on 
national issues, particularly those of a progressive nature, because he 
was challenged by a Bull Moose Republican, E. N. Wright of Olney, who 
had attended the Progressive Party convention and had campaigned for 
Roosevelt in Oklahoma. In addition, the Socialist Party presented a 
formidable candidate, Fred Holt of McAlester, a United Mine Workers 
56K· k · k 1 Okl h V . P ir patric, et a., a oma oting atterns: Congressional 
Elections, 37. 
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official, who showed strength in the coal mining area in and around 
Pittsburg County. 
In a Wilson-for-President rally held at Durant in late October, 
Carter made it clear that he was a Wilson man by describing the New 
Jersey governor as a "grand and matchless statesman." The theme of his 
speech was of considerable interest to Oklahomans because it concerned 
the settlement of tribal affairs. Carter, a full blood Choctaw, de-
nounced Taft and Roosevelt for their lack of sympathy in adjudicating 
land titles, and in their presidential terms, he said they had com-
pletely failed "to execute expeditiously the laws which we have placed 
on the statute books for the settlement of tribal affairs." According 
to Carter, there was but one man in the presidential race who had not 
proven his absolute antagonism to the people of Oklahoma, and that was 
Wilson. Concluding his speech, Carter said: 
Let us discard prejudice, and for one time in life cast an 
unbiased intelligent vote for the interest of ourselves 
••• and for the interest of progress.57 
Carter continued to wage a strong campaign, and ended his speaking 
tour at another Wilson rally at Ardmore on November 2. He directed 
most of his comments toward the Bull Moose platform, explaining that 
most of the reform measures espoused by the new party had been lifted 
from former Democratic platforms. "The Bull Moosers now promise us 
direct election of United States Senators which during its very first 
session a Democratic House insisted in submitting to the different 
states an amendment to that effect," declared Carter. Another promise 
that the Bull Moosers make is the publicity of campaign contributions, 
57The Daily Ardmoreite, October 28, 1912. 
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a principle, according to Carter, that the Democratic House had also 
fulfilled in its first session. On the issue of labor injunctions, 
Carter stated that the Bull Moosers were merely adopting a Democratic 
plank, since the Democratic Party, "ever since the first use of the in-
junction writ against the laboring people," had opposed injunctions. 
The Bull Moosers had promised a separate Department of Labor and an 
-
income tax. These reforms have not only been promised by the Democratic 
Party, but, asserted Carter, they have been given legislative attention 
b h D . H 58 y t e emocratic ouse. 
Thus it seems that Carter was attemping to negate his chief 
opponent, Wright, who was of Bull Mooser orientation. Wright had 
attended the Progressive Party convention in August, and had returned 
to the fourth district to campaign for the Progressive platform of 
woman's suffrage, the recall of judicial decisions, and restrictions on 
. 59 the political activity of Federal appointees. Incumbent Carter also 
aligned himself closely with Wilson in hopes that it might bear fruits 
of victory. Whatever Carter's strategy may have been, it worked as 
he won by 12,474 votes over the nearest candidate, Socialist Holt. 
Holt had attempted to form an alliance consisting of the United Mine 
Workers and the Farmers' Union, and, although running behind Carter 
in each of the twenty counties of the fourth district, showed a great 
deal of strength in his home county, Pittsburg, which was the center of 
most 1 b . . . 60 a or union activity. Holt ran ahead of the Republican, Wright, 
in Pontotoc, Marshall, McCurtain, Johnston, and Bryan Counties; and his 
58The Daily Ardmoreite, November 4, 1912. 
59 Scales, "The Political History of Oklahoma, 1907-1949," 146. 
60rbid., 148. 
margin in these counties, along with scattered support elsewhere, 
helped him to outpoll Wright by 274 votes in the final tally. The 
results were as follows: 
Carter (D) 
Holt (S) 
Wright (R) 
23,987 
11, 513 
11, 239 
51.3% 
24.6% 
24.1%61 
Carter won by a clear majority, but the combined Socialist-Republican 
vote of 22,752, or 48.7%, would lead one to speculate that perhaps 
Carter was not as popular as he thought, and that in the future he 
might have to devote more attention to the diverse elements of his 
district, especially when he did not have the popular coattails of 
Wilson to help his cause. 
Congressman Ferris of district five won an overwhelming victory 
for re-election on November~. Because of his popularity and well 
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known speaking ability around the state, Ferris spent considerable time 
stUIJ!.ping for other Congressional candidates, especially Davenport in 
the third and Carney in the second. He opened his own campaign on 
October 2 in Shawnee, where he heralded the standard bearer of the 
Democratic Party, Wilson. He firmly enunciated his support for Wilson, 
and stated that "every Democrat and every real progressive" should vote 
for him. Ferris proclaimed that the time had come "when party ties and 
party traditions must be made subservient to the interests of the great 
mass of the people." In Ferris' opinion, the G. O. P., based on its 
record and promises, had failed to do this, and did not deserve to 
succeed in 1912. He believed that "a new era is at hand, and political 
parties must be known by what they do, and not what they promise." 
61K· k · k 1 Okl h V . P ir patric, et a., a oma oting atterns: Congressional 
Elections, 38. 
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Congressman Ferris then reviewed the actions of the Democratic House 
in passing bills, some of which had become law, but others which had 
been defeated, Ferris said, by the "stand-pat Senate, and others have 
been killed by the presidential veto." Among the measures that he 
mentioned in his Shawnee speech were the bills providing for a Consti-
tutional amendment for the direct election of United States Senators, 
free lumber, income tax, farmer's free list, free wool, Arizona-New 
Mexico statehood, and an eight-hour day. He concluded his address by 
castigating President Taft for his lack of concern for these issues. 
When these bills came up to the President for his signature, 
it does seem, friends, does it not, that he would at least 
once have taken his stand with the 92,000,000 people of this 
nation? But he didn't do it. He preferred to stand with the 
steel trust, and the lumber trust, and the harvester trust. 
I don't know what can be the matter with him.62 
In a speech at Alva on October 18, Ferris again took up the issue 
of tariff legislation. He reminded the voters that the big duty reduc-
tions on lumber and wool were accomplished by a union of Democrats 
and progressive Republicans in both House and Senate, against, what 
Ferris termed, a "united front of stand-pat Republicans." As he had 
in previous speeches, Ferris recounted how President Taft had vetoed 
many progressive measures, thereby "setting up his judgment against the 
63 
majority of the representatives of all the people." 
Ferris carried all twenty counties in the fifth district as he led 
his nearest competitor, Republican C. O. Clark of Lawton, by 17,587 
votes. The results were: 
62s.hawn:ee News-Herald, October 3, 1912. 
63 Renfrew's Record, October 18, 1912. 
Ferris (D) 
Clark (R) 
Stallard (S) 
29,574 
11, 987 
11,033 
56.2% 
22.7% 
21.1%64 
Even if the Republican and Socialist votes had been combined, Ferris 
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would have been re-elected by 6,554 votes, an overwhelming margin. This 
represented a 2,412 vote increase over his 1910 victory margin of 15,175, 
which indicates that Ferris' progressive record in the Sixty-second 
Congress had been approved by the voters of his district. 
With the addition of three new legislative seats, Oklahoma would 
send eight representatives to the House: six Democrats, Carter, 
Davenport, Ferris, Murray, Thompson, and Weaver; and two Republicans, 
McGuire and Morgan. The Democrats dominated the 1912 Congressional 
elections in Oklahoma. They won the three at-large seats by comfort-
able margins, demonstrating state wide strength which they had pre-
viously displayed in gubernatorial elections, and the one presidential 
race in 1908. Even in the traditionally Republican strongholds of the 
first and second districts, though McGuire and Morgan won, the Demo-
crats made their best showing over any previous year. And finally, 
Carter, Ferris, and Davenport were elected by landslide margins. 
Several reasons lie behind the Democratic ascendancy in 1912. 
First, the united Democratic Party behind Wilson was too much for the 
splintered Republican legions to overcome, even though there was a 
concerted effort on the par,t of Oklahoma Republicans to prevent differ-
ences. Second, the Democrats fielded a list of formidable candidates, 
with the popular Murray leading the at-large ballot. Davis and Carney 
in the first and second districts, respectively, presented strong 
64Kirkpatrick, et al., Oklahoma Voting Patterns: Congressional 
Elections, 38-39. 
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progressive platforms, and conducted energetic campaigns, even if in 
a losing cause. Carter, Ferris, and Davenport relied on their experi-
ence and progressive voting records to achieve re-election. Third, the 
increased strength of the Socialist Party, especially in the southeast 
and southwest sections of Oklahoma, stimulated the Demo'cratic organiza-
tion to campaign harder, and to encourage a larger voter turnout which 
apparently went in their favor. And finally, the voters of Oklahoma 
seemingly registered their protest against the "stand-pat" Republican 
administration and their desires to see more progressive legislation 
put into effect by the Sixty-third Congress. 
The Wilson administration first moved toward reforming the existing 
economic order; and its initial step was to consider a revision of the 
tariff, a logical move because the Payne-Aldrich schedules had made 
high protection appear a symbol of the predatory rich in the eyes of 
the reformers. A new tariff bill, drafted by Underwood, became the 
chief interest of the special session of the Sixty-third Congress which 
Wilson summoned to meet on April 8, 1913. The. bill (H. R. 3321) was 
designed to reduce the cost of living by placing wheat, corn, sugar, 
meat, eggs, and milk on the free list, along with flax and shoes. Duty 
free also were iron ore, pig iron, steel rails, paper and wood pulp. 
On luxuries, such as precious stones, furs, and perfumes, the old rates 
were left unchanged. Taken as a whole, the Underwood bill was by no 
means a radical abandonment of protection, but it did propose the first 
genuine downward tariff revision since the Civil War. 
One of the most important features of the bill was an income tax 
clause sponsored by Hull of Tennessee. His graduated income tax pro-
vision was made possible by the Sixteenth Amendment, which was ratified 
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on February 25, 1913. The rates adopted were moderate, with incomes 
of less than $3,000 for unmarried persons and of less than $4,000 for 
married ones exempt; a flat 1 per cent tax was applied on all incomes, 
individual and corporate, over $4,000. In addition, a surtax of 1 per 
cent on incomes from $20,000 to $50,000, 2 per cent on incomes from 
$50,000 to $100,000, and 3 per cent on incomes over $100,000 was 
added. 65 
The debate on H. R. 3321 was heated, and Oklahomans presented their 
views, both favorable and unfavorable. Morgan, a strong advocate of 
protection, was the first to speak, as he rose on the House floor on 
April 28. He denounced the new tariff bill by saying that it was not 
just a bill to reduce duties, but that it would revolutionize the whole 
tariff policy of the country. If it became law, according to Morgan, 
the natio.nal policy of protection would be abandoned, and the nation 
would be committed to a policy of a tariff for revenue only. He 
pointed out that since the enactment of the Payne-Aldrich bill, there 
were no factories closed, no bankruptcies declared, no investors fright-
ened, and no depreciation in the value of property. The protective 
tariff law has also provided the farmer with good prices for his 
products, added Morgan. There was no question, in Morgan's opiriion, 
that the increased importations under the proposed bill would be a great 
boon to the farmers and manufacturers of other countries, but would be 
a detriment to the farms and factories of America, as it would "cramp, 
cripple and dwarf our fundamental industries, curtail production on 
the farm, lessen the demand for labor, and lower wages, and tend to 
65Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917, 38. 
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stagnate business, demoralize enterprise, and impede progress." 
Morgan explained that the authors of the bill had proposed, 
through foreign competition, to destroy trusts and annihilate monopoly. 
''Competition from abroad is not a remedy for monopoly at home," de-
clared Morgan. It was his belief that to cure the trust evil, a remedy 
should be applied that would act on the trust alone; whereas the tariff 
reduction would act upon all industries alike. The trust can stand 
foreign competition, in contrast to the small industrial and business 
concerns that would be destroyed. Thus, according to Morgan, the tariff 
reduction bill would not solve the trust problem because the greater 
part of the monopoly of the country existed wholly independent of the 
tariff. Morgan felt that monopoly was the result of business methods 
and not the tariff. Therefore, he reiterated his proposal for some 
kind of national commission to prevent the formation of monopolies, 
and to place effective control over the large corporations<that already 
existed. It was Morgan's theory that ''we might have years of absolute 
free trade and the trust and gigantic corporation would abide with 
us still." He concluded his remarks on the Underwood bill by stating: 
It is the duty of those who constitute the minority in this 
House, before it is finally too late, to point out the de-
fects of the measure, to call attention to its probable 
effect upon the country, and warn the majority in this 
House of the imminent danger in abandoning the principle 
and policy of protection, under which our country has made 
its greatest strides of progress and attained its highest 
plane of prosperity, and in substituting for protection a 
tariff for revenue only, under which when last tried, during 
the Cleveland administration, our country suffered its 
greatest business depression, our industrial development met 
with its severest and most bitter reverses, and when our 
people felt most keenly the awful scourge of poverty and 
hard times.66 
66u. s., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, 
Part 7, 197-200. 
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Obviously, Morgan had not departed from his protectionist views that 
he had expressed so often since his entrance into the House in 1908. 
In contrast to Morgan, Congressman Murray on April 29 indicated 
that he shared Wilson's desire to lower the tariff. Giving his at ten-
tion to the arguments of Morgan and other protectionists that a lower 
tariff would force American wages to compete with cheap foreign labor, 
Murray contended that wages had little to do·with the tariff, but were 
based on "the cost of keep,'' or the cost of living. Wages were high 
in.this country because of the labor unions, he said, and that was as 
it should be. 67 Murray would speak later in the session in regard· to 
the income tax provision of the Underwood bill. 
Morgan again spoke against the bill almost immediately following 
Murray's short remarks on April 29. He directed his comments on pro-
tection toward the manner in which it aided the factories of Oklahoma. 
"The fact is that if our State could be kept under the protective-
tariff policy it would become one of the great manufacturing States of 
this country," emphasized Morgan. He voiced further opposition to the 
bill because of the reduction of wages that he felt would occur if 
protection was eliminated. Quoting statistics from the Bureau of the 
Census, Morgan informed his colleagues that over $4,000,000,000 of total 
wages were being paid to laborers in American manufacturing establish-
ments, and "no other country on earth pays out so large an amount of 
wages anywhere, and in no other country do we distribute such an amount 
of the total wealth in wages." Morgan ended his comments by criticizing 
Underwood for leading the House and the nation into a tariff policy, 
67 U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, 
Part 1, 795. 
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that "will reduce the total.amount of wages paid out," and "it means 
a loss to every one of the 7,000,000 men who are employed in the manu-
f . . d . d I . . 1168 acturing in ustries, an protest against it. 
In the course of Morgan's April 29 defense of protection for 
industries, he briefly mentioned the glass factories and lead mines of 
Oklahoma that longed for protection. On April 30, Davenport, a sup-
porter of a lowered tariff, replied to Morgan. Davenport revealed to 
his colleagues that the glass factories that Morgan had referred to had 
gone out of business in Oklahoma immediately after the adoption of the 
Payne-Aldrich bill. He explained that most of the lead mines in Okla-
homa were located in his district, and they "do not need protection 
greater now than they have had for years, and they are not clamoring 
in my district for that protection. 1169 
McGuire joined Morgan in opposing the tariff bill, when he spoke at 
length on May 1 against the principles of free trade and tariff for 
revenue only. He was particularly concerned about the lack of attention 
given to the interests of the American farmer, and recounted that most 
of the representatives defending the bill came from "sections and cities 
where the products of the farm are consumed and not where they are pro-
duced." Taking data from the 1910 census and Department of Agriculture 
reports, McGuire made a comparison of the value of four farm cornmodi-
ties under a Republican and Democratic administration. The Wilson bill, 
disclosed McGuire, which ruined the country during the Cleveland Demo-
cratic administration, provided for a duty of 20 per cent ad valorem on 
68u. s. ' Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, 
Part 1, 797. 
69 
u. s.' Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, 
Part 1, 854. 
cattle; whereas the Payne law provided for a duty of 27\ per cent ad 
valorem. The proposed Underwood bill only provides for 10 per cent 
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ad valorem on cattle, or only one-half as much as the Wilson bill, 
which, according to McGuire, had wrought destruction to the farmers 
due to the ruinous cattle prices under it. Using Oklahoma as an ex-
ample, McGuire pointed out that "the average worth of all cattle under 
a Republican administration and a Republican tariff has been and is 
$20 more per head than under a Democratic administration and a Demo-
cratic tariff." 
The value of horses and mules was only about $30 and $40 per head, 
respectively, under a Democratic tariff, stated McGuire. On the other 
hand, under a Republican tariff, by 1912, their value had increased to 
$110 and $120 per head, respectively. How can the Democratic Party, 
queried McGuire, who uses the mule as its party emblem, treat this 
animal so shamefully? It does not seem possible how, in the light of 
such a record, "an honest Democrat can look a mule in the face," added 
McGuire. 
In 1896 and 1897, under a Democratic tariff, the average value of 
wheat was 57 cents per bushel on the Chicago market, asserted McGuire, 
but in 1910, 1911, and 1912, the average had risen to almost $1 per 
bushel under the Republican tariff. Therefore, it should be remembered, 
declared McGuire, that the present Underwood tariff reduces the tariff 
still lower than the Cleveland administration, when the farmer's plight 
was appalling. Ending his defense of the American farmer, McGuire 
maintained that protection had always been "the watchword of the Repub-
lican Party, and as long as we adhere to it the Nation will succeed; 
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and when we abandon it, we will fail. 1170 
Taking up where McGuire finished, Morgan also spoke on behalf of 
the American fanner's position in regard to the tariff. In his opinion, 
the farmer was entitled to the same protection as the manufacturer. 
"Give our fanners a fair chance, give them prices that will make their 
labor remunerative, and they will furnish products in abundance for 
all," declared Morgan. He voiced opposition to the opening of our 
markets to the cheap farm products of Canada, Mexico, and South Ameri-
ca, where the price of labor was only about one-fiftliwhat it costs the 
American fanner. Fanning is the greatest industry of the nation, 
concluded Morgan, and "if our legislation makes the farmer prosperous, 
11 h 1 ·11 h . h · 1171 a ot er c asses wi s are int at prosperity. This tenninated 
the participation of Oklahomans in the debate on the tariff section 
of the Underwood bill, but just prior to the vote on May 8, one of the 
Oklahoma delegates, Murray, spoke on the income tax provision of the 
bill. 
"Alfalfa Bill" favored the income tax proposal, and during the 
final hours of debating, he expressed strong opposition to an amendment 
which would have lowered the base income from $4,000 to $1,000 per year. 
He demanded a tax on surplus wealth, which, he claimed, had gone un-
taxed for fifty years. Men who were making only a decent wage should 
not pay this tax, which was a means of redistributing surplus wealth. 
Displaying a great deal of perception, Murray predicted that the income 
70u. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, 
Part 1, 935-937. 
71 U. S., Congressio.nal Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, 
Part 1, 941. 
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tax method would, in a very few years, be the only means for supporting 
the government, and "the days for protective-tariff favoritism will be 
72 
over." 
On May 8, the day the. first vote was to be taken, a motion was 
presented by Mann of Illinois to recommit the Underwood bill to the 
Ways and Means Committee for further study. The motion, which was 
obviously a stalling tactic employed by opponents of the bill, failed, 
122 "yeas" to 295 "nays," with 14 "not voting." McGuire and Morgan, 
adhering to the posture they had displayed in the debate, voted for 
recommittal. Carter, Ferris, Davenport, Murray, Thompson, and Weaver 
voted against the Mann motion. The vote was then taken on the bill, 
with 281 voting for, 139 against, and 12 not voting. The Oklahoma 
delegation was aligned as follows: Carter, Ferris, Davenport, Murray, 
Thompson, and Weaver were among the 281 for; Morgan and McGuire were 
among the 139 against. 73 Under the skillful leadership of Underwood 
the bill had passed the .House. by a resounding majority. Now public 
attention was focused on the Senate, where the Democratic margin of 
control was small, and a hard fight developed. 
Throughout the summer, the lobbyists descended upon Washington in 
swarms to try to influence Senators. So active were the lobbyists that 
the President said that "a brick couldn't be thrown without hitting one 
of them." On May 26, Wilson issued a public statement denouncing the 
72u. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, 
Part 2, 1252. 
73u. s., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, 
Part 2, 1386-1387. 
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"industrious and insidious" lobby. Reaction to Wilson's sensational 
statement was favorable among the progressive members of the House apd 
Senate. Among those supporting the President's concern about the 
pressures being applied by interest groups were Oklahomans Murray, 
Morgan, and Ferris. 
On June 10, Murray introduced H. Res. 165, to amend the House 
rules to place limitations on lobbying. He then spoke briefly on be-
half of his proposal: 
I hope to see the day come when railroad lobbyists or paid 
lobbyists of any kind will cease and that the great interests 
will come before the committees and before Congress and in 
the open and to the,public say 'We want this, and we will show 
you why it is right;' and whatever _is right ••• should 
be enacted into law.7~ 
Although Murray's resolution was not accepted, he had shown early 
approval of Wilson's stand against lobbying. A resolution, similar 
to Murray's, that had been introduced by Congressman Robert L. Henry 
of Texas was approved on July 9, and drew attention from Ferris and 
Morgan. The measure (H. Res. 198) was favored by Ferris, but in a 
July 5 speech, he declared that it should be made into joint resolution 
form. He felt that if any member of the House was "venal or corrupt 
he ought to receive the condemnation of both ends of the Capitol." 
Another reason why Ferris thought it should be a joint resolution was 
that the charges reached both Senate and House members; and, he felt, 
if the two houses selected separate committees, it would involve "a 
duplication of time, a duplication of investigation, as well as a con-
74New York Times, May 27, 1913. 
75u. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, 
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flict of authority." Thus he was "heartily in favor of an investiga-
tion that will bring about good results and purify the membership of 
this House. 1176 Ferris' views were reinforced by fellow Oklahoman, 
Morgan, on the same day. 
The Henry resolution specifically mentioned the alleged lobbying 
activities of the National Association of Manufacturers, an interest 
group who opposed the tariff bill. Morgan believed that the House 
investigating committee, proposed by the resolution, should include a 
clause requiring the said committee to inquire whether money had been 
used, or improper influence exerted by the National Association of 
Manufacturers in securing or preventing the nomination or election of 
77 
any candidate for the House. Although neither Morgan's nor Ferris' 
suggestions were approved, their positions indicate that they advo-
cated limits on lobbying activities. The Henry resolution was adopted 
by the House on July 9, 1913, with no vote being recorded. 78 Thus, 
three of the eight Oklahoma representatives had signified their approval 
of political reform by expressing hope that the proposed special in-
vestigative committee would conduct a searching campaign to rid Congress 
of any improper dealings. 
After the smoke had cleared concerning the lobby investigation, 
the Senate passed the Underwood bill, with revisions, on September 9 by 
a vote of 44 to 37. Instead of wrecking tariff reform, the Senate had 
76u. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, 
Part 3, 2320-2321. 
77u. s., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, 
Part 3, 2324. 
78u. s., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, 
Part 3, 2353. 
actually effected a general reduction of 4 per cent in the Underwood 
rates, thus bringing the general level of rates down to 24-26 per 
79 
cent. The revised bill was sent back to the House, where it was 
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approved on September 30 by a vote of 255 for, 104 against, 3 present, 
and 67 not voting. On the day of passage, two members of the Oklahoma 
delegation, Morgan and Davenport, addressed themselves to the issue, 
with Morgan speaking against the Senate version, and Davenport for it. 
Morgan, in a last minute plea, reaffirmed his opposition to the bill 
because of the detrimental effects it would have on Oklahoma's chief 
industries, farming and manufacturing. He pointed out that the farmer 
without protection would be forced to share his markets with the 
farmers of all the world without compensation. By passing this tariff 
bill, Morgan contended that the American farmer would lose his most 
valuable asset, a market. "Destroy the farmers' market and you have 
ruined their business," added Morgan. Turning his attention to manu-
facturing, Morgan argued that even though Oklahoma possessed great 
natural advantages, the national government was about to embark upon 
a tariff policy that would "deter men from investing capital in mills 
80 
and factories in Oklahoma." For these reasons, Morgan remained 
steadfast in his opposition to tariff reduction. 
Davenport, on the other hand, called the Underwood bill "one of 
the best bills that has ever been written upon the tariff question." 
Concentrating most of his remarks to the farmer's position on the 
tariff, he stated that he felt fortunate to be able to cast his vote 
79Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917, 42. 
80u. s., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, 
Part 6, 5262-5265. 
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for putting lumber on the free list. Furthermore, the American 
farmer, according to Davenport, can now purchase all his machinery 
and implements without paying any tariff duty. Davenport proudly con-
eluded his speech by saying that he was glad to be a part of a bill 
which would be of such great "benefit to the toilers of the United 
81 States." 
The only other Oklahoma representative to comment on the Underwood 
bill was Ferris, but his remarks did not come until a later session of 
the Sixty-third Congress. On February 2, 1914, he addressed the House 
on the accomplishments of the Sixty-third Congress, and among the 
achievements was the Underwood Tariff. He described it as a piece of 
legislation that "from the first line to the last one was in the 
interest of the American people." Ferris noted that tariff reform had 
been demanded by the American people during the last administration, 
but that Taft had denied them, and thus had been driven from power. 82 
In the final roll call, Ferris, Davenport, Murray, Thompson, and 
Weaver were included in the 255 votes cast in the affirmative; Morgan 
in the 104 negative votes; with Carter and McGuire answering 
83 
"present." As signed by the President on October 3, 1913, the 
Underwood Tariff lowered the average ad valorem rates from the Payne-
Aldrich level of over 40 per cent to about 25 per cent, besides pro-
viding an extensive free list. 84 The passage of the bill was signifi-
81 U. s., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, 
Part 6, 359-360. 
82u. s., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1914, LI, 
Part 4, 3424. 
83 U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, 
Part 6, 5274. 
84Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917, 42-43. 
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cant in that Wilson's dominance in the Democratic Party was firmly 
established, and, in addition, he had won the admiration of many 
"insurgent" Republicans. The three incumbent Democrats, Carter, 
Ferris, and Davenport, who were already on record for tariff reform, 
lent considerable support for the Wilson tariff reform proposal. Al-
though Carter answered "present" on the final vote, he had voted for 
the bill when it originally passed the House in May. Davenport, in 
the midst of debate, and Ferris, later in the session, added their 
vocal support for the measure. The three new Congressmen-at-large, 
Murray, Thompson, and Weaver, all indicated.:approval of tariff reform 
as shown by their roll call votes, but Murray was the only one of the 
three who felt strongly enough about the bill to speak on its behalf. 
Murray not only commented on the benefits of tariff reform, but was 
the only Oklahoma delegate who cited the merits of the income tax pro-
vision of the bill. 
McGuire and Morgan did not break the tradition of their past 
records on tariff legislation that they had established in the Sixty-
first and Sixty-second Congresses, as they continued their forceful 
support for a protectionist policy in the Sixty-third. McGuire de-
livered his only significant speech in the Sixty-third Congress against 
the Underwood bill, focusing most of his criticism on the fact that the 
farmer would be left unprotected. Morgan was quite prolific in his 
speechmaking on the tariff, directing his remarks to the lack of pro-
tection that both agriculture and industry would be afforded by the new 
tariff. However, Morgan, a "standpatter" on the tariff issue, joined 
Murray and Ferris in condemning the lobbying activities that enveloped 
Washington during the summer of 1913. It seems rather inconsistent for 
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Morgan to display such an attitude since the chief lobbying agent for 
a higher tariff was the National Association of Manufacturers, which 
was cited by the House resolution for its improper dealings. This may 
reflect the fact that Morgan placed political reform on a higher 
priority basis than economic reform. Murray, by introducing a resolu-
tion for lobby limitations, and Ferris, who wanted a joint resolution 
on the subject, likewise recognized the need for reform in the politi-
cal realm. 
While the tariff debates were still in progress, Congress was 
given a new assigmnent--the complicated and difficult task of banking 
and currency reform, which was high on Wilson's list of legislative 
priorities. Serious faults in the banking structure of the country had 
been obvious for years. National banks still operated under antiquated 
legislation passed during the Civil War; state banks went their own 
way under a hodgepodge of conflicting statutes; and over the system as 
a whole there was no agency of control. Bank reserves were not 
mobilized in a manner to meet depositors' runs on fundamentally sound 
institutions. Small town banks followed the practice of depositing 
their reserve funds principally in the banks of larger cities, which 
in turn deposited in the bigger New York City banks. Since the funds 
of these banks were available for speculative loans, the banking 
structure of the entire country was likely to be jeopardized by trouble 
in the securities market. The system furthermore tended to drain funds 
from rural districts where credit was badly needed, and concentrate 
them in the cities where they encouraged speculation. Credit and 
currency were inelastic. In the first case, banks unable to borrow 
themselves were often compelled to refuse to make new loans to their 
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clients or to renew old ones, even when perfectly good collateral was 
offered. In the second case, instead of expanding and contracting 
as business interests increased or diminished, national bank notes were 
fixed in amount by the number of government bonds available for purchase 
by the banks. 85 
An inner circle of Democratic leaders began an intensive study of 
the banking problem soon after the 1912 election. Colonel Edward M. 
House, Wilson's top assistant and a former banker, conducted private 
discussions with leading financiers of the country, while the task of 
actually drafting a bill was placed in the hands of Representative 
Carter Glass of Virginia, Chairman of the House Banking and Currency 
Committee. The bill that Glass first drafted was so conservative that 
it aroused hostility among progressives because they felt it was still 
a sell-out to the ''money trust." A countermeasure representing the 
progressives' demand for strict government control was drawn up by 
Senator Robert L. Owen of Oklahoma, Chairman of the Senate Banking 
and Currency Committee. Wilson's first impulse was to side with the 
Glass version, but after lengthy consultation with Louis Brandeis, a 
progressive lawyer who was quickly becoming Wilson's chief advisor, 
he accepted the two important principles for which the progressives 
had been contending: that the central governing board of the new 
system should be made up exclusively of government appointees, and 
that the new currency should be an obligation of the United States 
86 government rather than of the banks. Out of all these preliminaries, 
85Ibid., 43-47. 
86Ibid., 48. 
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the Glass-Owen or Federal Reserve bill emerged, being introduced in 
April of 1913. In final form, the bill provided for twelve districts, 
each with a federal reserve bank to be owned by the national banks 
within each district; all national banks were required to join the 
system. These federal reserve banks were to do no direct banking with 
individuals or business houses, but were to act simply as agents of the 
member banks of the district; to purchase and sell bills of exchange; 
grant loans to member banks; issue federal reserve notes; and perform 
similar financial operations. The provisions of the bill were intended 
to alleviate the problems involved in the poor geographical distribu-
tion of money and credit, to reduce private control over banking, and 
to create a more elastic money and credit. 
The first Oklahoma representative to speak on the Federal Reserve 
bill (H. R. 7837) was Morgan, who offered an amendment to it on Sep-
tember 15, 1913. His proposition was to insert a paragraph that stated 
that any person residing within a given Federal Reserve district could 
subscribe to the capital stock of the Federal Reserve bank of that 
district at any time under such rules and regulations as was pre-
scribed by the Federal Reserve Board. Morgan declared that he had 
heard much about "equal opportunities to all and special privileges 
to none," and, therefore, asked: "Under the provisions of this bill, 
in allowing no one except banks to subscribe to this stock, are you 
not giving them a special privilege that is granted only to the 
bankers of the United States?" He asserted that two benefits would 
be derived from his amendment: 
First, it would strengthen the system by enlarging the 
capital; it would give these banks more financial strength, 
more capital. 
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Second, I think another benefit would be that it would 
popularize this system with the great masses of the people. 
I believe one of the defects in all our great corporations 
in this country, including the banks, is that there are so 
few people interested in them.87 
Morgan's amendment was rejected, and little can be gathered from these 
early remarks as to how he stood on the general provisions of the 
bill. He would offer additional amendments to the bill later in the 
debate. 
Also entering the debate on September 5 was Weaver, one of the new 
representatives. In his first speech on the House floor, Weaver empha-
sized the fact that he was a member of the Banking and Currency Commit-
tee, which had written the bill, and he felt that a summary of the 
"benefits of this great constructive measure" was necessary. He pro-
ceeded to itemize several benefits that would result in the passage 
of the bill including government control of the currency and banking 
system instead of private control; mobilization of cash reserves; more 
equitable distribution of surplus money, which would destroy the "Money. 
T t II d • f d • f • 1 • • 88 rus; · an more uni orm ere it aci ities. Concluding his remarks 
on behalf of the measure, Weaver expressed hope that it would be such 
.a nonpartisan issue that all independent Republicans and Democrats of 
89 
a progressive mind would vote for the bill. 
Oklahomans remained active in the debate as Morgan proposed two 
more amendments on September 15. The first dealt with using the earn-
87u. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, 
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ings from Federal Reserve banks to establish a public highway fund to 
improve road conditions in all the states. Morgan feared that the earn-
ings were going to be used to pay the national debt, and he felt that 
money to pay the national debt should come through regular channels of 
taxation. "If the Government proposes to appropriate any of the profits 
of the Federal Reserve banks, let the money be solemnly dedicated to 
some great national purpose that will contribute to the general welfare 
of the country,'' said Morgan in defense of his amendment. This amend- · 
ment was rejected, but Morgan immediately offered another. Included 
in this amendment was a recommendation that all earnings derived from 
Federal Reserve banks should be used to initiate a fund to protect the 
depositors from loss from the fai1ure of any member bank. Morgan, 
patterning his amendment on the bank deposit guaranty law in Oklahoma, 
avowed his firm convictions in regard to the protection of the 
90 15,000,000 depositors in the nation's banks. This amendment was 
also rejected, even though Morgan's dream would come true with the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation legislation of the New Deal. 
Both of Morgan's September 15 amendments appear to have merit and 
seem sound, but apparently since he was a Republican, the Democratic 
authors of the bill did not recognize the benefits that might accrue 
from such proposals. It would not be Morgan's last attempt to alter 
the bill. 
On September 16, new Congressman Thompson delivered his first 
major speech, which was a critique of the Glass-Owen bill. He first 
explained that he was going to vote for the bill as it was written 
90u. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, 
Part 5, 4995-4996. 
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because it was such an improvement over the existing banking and 
currency laws. However, he proclaimed that he felt it a duty to his 
conscience and to the people of the country to expound on some of his 
reservations concerning the bill. Thompson, referring to the Federal 
Reserve Board, cautioned his colleagues against such an advisory board, 
which, he believed would be tied too closely to the banking interests 
of the country. He asked: 
Why does not the bill carry a provision permitting the 
farmers of the country to have an advisory board? Why 
does it not carry a provision permitting the laborers of 
the country to have an advisory board? ••• I will answer 
by saying that none of the great classes of industry into 
which our country is divided should have an advantage over 
any other class.91 
Another provision of the bill which drew Thompson's criticism was 
section 14 which. dealt with maturity dates. He believed that the time 
provided in this section should be extended from 90 days.to 6 months 
for the maturity of commercial paper secured by staple farm products, 
so that farmers' and stockmen's paper would be the subject of redis-
count and placed on an equal footing with the paper of Wall Street 
speculators. Thompson contended that the recognition of staple farm 
products as a basis of security of notes and commercial paper was a 
great triumph for the producing class, but he suggested that the farmer 
could not afford to borrow for 60 days because from the time he plants 
until the time of maturity of his products, a much longer period was 
needed. If the time is not extended, affirmed Thompson, people in 
agricultural parts of the country, who usually borrow money about 
planting time and are unable to repay until the crops are harvested, 
91u. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, 
Part 5, 5009. 
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will be handicapped by the 90 day time limit ©f the notes. 
Thompson, speaking again for the agricultural sector, propounded 
a rural credit system. He compared the difference in interest rates 
of 8\ per cent paid by the American farmer to the 3\ to 4\ per cent 
paid by the farmers of Europe; where a farm credit system had been 
adopted. It was Thompson's opinion that by charging these excessive 
rates of interest, the producing masses of the country were being ig-
nored, and that any new banking and currency act should recognize "the 
interests of every class of citizenship--those engaged in the farming 
industry as well as in commercial and other industrial occupations." 
Although a rural credits system was not provided for in the Glass-Owen 
Act, Thompson established a precedent on this subject, which he would 
maintain until the realization of a rural credits system in the Federal 
Farm Loan Act of 1916. 
Still on the subject of agricultural welfare, Thompson continued 
his lengthy remarks by demanding a provision that no notes should be 
eligible to discount if they were to be used for the purpose of deal-
ing in futures or trading on margin in staple agricultural products. 
He pointed out that section 14 was one of the great provisions of the 
bill because it prohibited the rediscount of notes and bills issued or 
drawn for the purpose of trading in stocks, bonds, or other investment 
securities; and, Thompson reasoned that a similar provision should 
check the gambling in farm products. According to Thompson, the price 
of staple farm products had ceased to be controlled by the law of 
supply and demand, but "it has become the football to be either raised 
or lowered as the interests of the speculator ••• may be best 
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served." Thompson had again raised his voice on behalf of legisla-
tion that would not be included in the Federal Reserve Act, but would 
receive legislative approval in the Sixty-fourth Congress as the Grain 
Futures Act of 1916. 
Complementing Thompson's concern for the farmer was Murray. He 
felt that the bill needed amending, like Thompson, to protect the 
farmers and to give them the benefit of more currency and credit. 
Murray favored a plan based on agricultural banking developed in Scot-
land. The Scotch-bank system was a decentralized scheme which would 
issue currency based not on gold or silver but on the products of the 
soil, and it smacked of the earlier Populist subtr~asury plan of the 
1890 1 s. 93 On September 16, Murray told the House that he would vote 
for the bill, but only because he was bound by the Democratic caucus. 
The bill, he declared, was an improvement for agriculturists over the 
form in which it was first presented because of a number of amendments 
that Glass had been forced to accept; one of these was Murray's amend-
ment to have all twelve reserve districts represented on the Federal 
Reserve Board, with a limitation of only one member from each district. 
Another Murray criticism of the bill was that the President had been 
given absolute control of the banking system, and now, claimed Murray, 
banks would enter the realm of Presidential politics to influence 
appointments to the Federal Reserve Board. His principal objections 
to the bill were, likeThompsorls, the absence of a rural credits system, 
and guaranteed bank deposits along the lines that Morgan had advanced 
92Ibid., 5010-5012. 
93william H. Murray, Memoirs of Governor Murray and True History 
of Oklahoma (Boston: Meador Publishing Co., 1945), II, 186-200. 
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The day before the vote was to be taken, Morgan united his support 
with Thompson and Murray for a rural credits system. He put forth 
another amendment to the bill that would establish a system of national 
rural banks which would provide'the .farmers with better credit, cheaper 
interest, and larger capital. "In my judgment," argued Morgan, "there 
is more of an emergency for a better rural credit in this country than 
there is for a better system of banking or better system of currency." 
He reprimanded the bill's author, Glas~, for "letting the farmers go." 
Currency is provided for merchants, manufacturers, businessmen, bankers, 
speculators, and capitalists, but, proclaimed Morgan, nothing has been 
provided for the agricultural interests which "ought to be the very 
corner stone of our financial structure." For the fourth time, a 
Morgan attempt to alter the bill was defeated. 95 The debate, in which 
Oklahoma Congressmen had played a major role, was over as the bill came 
to a vote on September 17, 1913. 
The bill passed 287 for, 85 against, 2 present, and 55 not voting. 
Davenport and Ferris, who had remained silent in the debate, joined 
Murray and Weaver,.who had committed themselves vocally to the bill, 
in casting "ayes." Morgan, who had taken great interest in the 
measure, opposed the bill; McGuire answered "present;" and Thompson, 
who had commented at length on the bill, and Carter, who did not par-
94 U. s., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, 
Part 5, 5020-5023. 
95u. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, 
Part 5, 5099. 
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96 ticipate in the debate, did not vote. The alignment of the Oklahoma 
contingent was something of an enigma. Weaver, who was a freshman 
member of the Banking and Currency Committee, was the only Oklahoma 
delegate who supported the bill without reservations, which can per-
haps be attributed to the fact that he had helped Glass in its formu-
lation. Murray, although supporting the bill in the end, had raised 
several questions, particularly concerning agrarian interests. Ferris 
and Davenport voted for the bill, but had lent no vocal support for 
the resolution. On the other hand, Morgan, whose four amendments were 
defeated, probably opposed the bill because he believed that the bill 
was inadequate without his proposals. McGuire's answer of "present" 
to the roll call presents somewhat of a mystery since he did not speak 
in the preliminaries. Carter and Thompson did not vote, which is 
surprising, especially since Carter had been such a strong supporter 
of Wilson in the presidential election, and Thompson had entered into 
the debate with such vigor. Perhaps they felt their vote was not 
needed for passage; however, they, or at least Thompson, were dis-
pleased with some of the bill's provisions. 
The Senate proceeded in a leisurely fashion until the last of 
October, when Wilson stepped in and threatened to go to the people if 
the bill's opponents persisted in blocking legislation. The Senate 
leaders of the bill, such as Owen, were determined to pass the bill 
before Christmas. Finally, on December 19, it passed the upper house 
by a vote of 54 to 34. 97 During the course of Senate debate, Repre-
96u. s., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, 
Part 5, 5129. 
971ink, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917, 52. 
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sentative Weaver, on November 1, delivered a speech before the Okla-
homa City Chamber of Commerce on the subject of the Glass-Owen Currency 
bill. He introduced his address by describing the faults of the exist-
ing banking and currency system: "It is archaic because it was nur-
tured amid the horrors of a Civil War and evolved of military neces-
sity." In response to the criticism of the Presidentially appointed 
Federal Reserve Board, Weaver defended this provision by saying that 
if the President can be trusted with appointing the Supreme Court 
Judges, Interstate Commerce Commission, and all Executive officers of 
the government, then "why can he not be trusted to appoint the Federal 
Reserve Board?" With government control and supervision of the entire 
banking system, Weaver stated, the reserve funds will be mobilized 
and may be shifted and transferred from one depository to another 
wherever needed, to suit the exigencies of the hour. ·Weaver concluded 
by saying that the bill: 
Will be a God's blessing to the farmer and stockraisers of 
the South and West, a class that has long borne the burden 
of exorbitant interest, because of the scarcity of money 
in those sections, drained from them and concentrated in 
Wall Street's gambling hell.98 
Thus Weaver carried his convictions concerning the bill back to his 
Oklahoma constituents, emphasizing the beneficial aspects of the pend-
ing resolution, and presenting arguments to counteract the criticism 
that had been presented by fellow delegates with regard to the situa-
tion of the farmer. 
The Senate version of the bill contained several new amendments, 
on which Murray, Thompson, and Morgan commented before the final vote 
98 Speech of Claude Weaver, November 1, 1913, Claude Weaver Col-
lection, Division of Manuscripts, University of Oklahoma Library. 
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was taken on December 22. One of the Senate amendments provided for 
the extension of credit to farmers from three to six months, which all 
three heralded as an improvement over the original House bill. 99 In 
addition, Murray sought to win House approval for an amendment for-
bidding Congressmen, Senators, or federal bank directors from serving 
on the Federal Reserve Board, which failed. lOO Murray, along with 
Thompson, Weaver, Carter, Ferris, and Davenport, agreed to the confer-
ence report of the bill, which passed the House on December 22 by a 
count of 298 "yeas," 60 "nays," and 76 "not voting." Morgan and 
McGuire, who answered "present" to the roll call when the bill 
101 
originally passed the House, cast negative votes on final ·passage. 
The next day President Wilson signed the measure. According to Link, 
it was the greatest single piece of legislation enacted during the 
W· 1 d . . . 102 i son a ministration. The Glass-Owen Act, which began as a bill 
designed to serve only the business community and to reinforce private 
control over banking and currency, had undergone considerable change 
due to progressive pressure. Oklahoma Congressmen, especially Murray, 
Thompson, Weaver, and Morgan, could take partial credit for the re-
visions that the bill had experienced. Weaver was commended by Chair-
man Glass for his efforts as a member,of the House Banking and Currency 
Committee: "No member of the Committee has been more regular in 
99u. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1913, LI, 
Part 2, 49, 1303, 1458. 
100u. s., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1913, LI, 
Part 2, 1314. 
101u. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1913, LI, 
Part 2, 1464. 
102Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917, 52. 
attendance, more devoted to its work or more useful generally ••• 
and he enjoys the cordial respect and confidence of the administra-
tion.11103 In contrast to Weaver's unwavering support of the bill, 
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Murray and Thompson evidently joined the bloc of Western and Southern 
Democratic Congressmen who sought additional benefits for the farmer. 
No one can definitely measure the amount of influence these two Okla-
homa representatives had within this bloc; however, it is obvious that 
they were active participants in reshaping the bill to give more recog-
nition to the agriculturists' interests. 
The other Democrats, Carter, Ferris, and Davenport, were not en-
thusiastic for the bill, as was indicated by their lack of participa-
tion in the debate. However, Ferris at a later date manifested his 
support in an open letter to his constituents of the fifth district. 
He described the new currency law as a measure which would "prevent 
future money panics, more equitably distribute the money circulation 
of the country, enable the farmer to borrow money for lower rates of 
interest and for longer periods than ninety days, distribute the 
104 
money now retained by Wall Street Banks." It appears that Weaver, 
to some extent as expressed in his Oklahoma City speech, Murray, 
Thompson, and Ferris all shared a hatred for Wall Street which was 
reminiscent of the days of the Populist Party. Morgan, suffering from 
the disappointment of his failure to amend the bill, opposed as well as 
McGuire, who did not deviate from his "stand-pat" philosophy on eco-
103 
· Letter, Carter Glass to D. C. Pryor, July 9, 1914, Claude Weaver 
Collection, Division of Manuscripts, University of Oklahoma Library. 
104campaign Letter of Scott Ferris, January 13, 1914, Claude Weaver 
Collection, Division of Manuscripts, University of Oklahoma Library. 
nomic reform. On. the whole, the Oklahoma delegation had played a 
significant role in this phase of Wilson's legislative program. 
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The Underwood-Sinnnons Tariff and the Federal Reserve Act were 
considered by the President as two of the three integral parts of his 
program, which was known as the "New Freedom." The third area con-
cerned the problems of curbing or destroying industrial monopoly. And 
so on January 20, 1914, Wilson asked Congress for new anti-trust legis-
lation. During the 1912 campaign, Roosevelt and Wilson had taken 
positions that seemed sharply opposed on this perplexing question. 
The former's "New Nationalism" program assumed that big business was 
inevitable, and should be strongly regulated by the Federal government; 
the latter's "New Freedom" platform held out hope that competition 
could be restored through a strict anti-trust policy without expanding 
Federal power. With the responsibility of office, Wilson and his ad-
visors found this antithesis too simple. The legislative program that 
evolved was neither as broadly Hamiltonian as Roosevelt's proposals 
nor as Jeffersonian as Wilson's. Instead the resulting legislation 
struck a kind of middle. ground between the two. 
The original anti-trust bill was drafted by Representative Henry 
D. Clayton of Alabama, Chairman of the House Judiciary Connnittee. The 
bill (H. R. 15657) was designed to make the Sherman Act more specific 
by including a series of explicit prohibitions against interlocking 
directorates and other monopolistic practices. The resolution was 
criticized from various sources. Businessmen felt that the new pro-
hibitions were so sweeping that they would hamper natural corporate 
growth; union leaders protested that the proposed law would not give 
labor its promised exemption from anti-trust prosecution; and others 
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repeated their conviction that what was needed was not more anti-trust 
suits, but Federal regulation. 
In his confusion, Wilson once again turned to Brandeis for guid-
. ance. The Boston lawyer's thinking on the trust problem had been 
changing, and he had now come over to the strong Federal Conunission 
approach, similar to the Rooseveltian "New Nationalism" plan. Hence 
Brandeis drafted a new bill to which Wilson swung his powerful support. 
The resultant Federal Trade Conunission bill (H. R. 15613), introduced 
by Representative J. Harry Covington of Maryland, provided.for a bi-
partisan conunission of five members, which was empowered to investi-
gate corporate practices and, where these were found to be illegal, to 
issue orders to "cease and desist" from doing so. The orders of the 
conunission, however, were subject to review in Federal courts. 
As the trade conunission approach gained ascendancy, enthusiasm 
for the Clayton bill declined. Nevertheless, the bill was important 
because it prohibited discrimination in pricing where it would tend to 
foster monopoly, and carefully limited interlocking directorates. As 
a concession to the interests of organized labor, the act exempted from 
the anti-trust laws all farmer and labor groups conducted not for 
profit; it also restricted the use of injunctions in labor disputes 
and legalized practices such as strikes and picketing. Samuel Gompers, 
President of the A. F. of L., hailed these provisions as a "Magna 
Carta" for labor. 
Even before Wilson presented his January 20 anti-trust message, 
Congressman Morgan was receiving national attention on the issue. Mor-
gan, who on January 25, 1912, in the Sixty-second Congress had intro-
duced a bill to regulate the commerce of certain corporations, reintro-
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duced a bill on January 17, 1914, to create an interstate corporation 
commission. The Congressional Record indicates that Morgan was the 
first legislator to introduce a bill to create such a commission, and, 
in addition, was the first representative to deliver a speech advocating 
such a measure. Morgan, three days before the President appeared be-
fore Congress to present his anti-trust message, called for. the adminis-
tration to adopt his plan. He declared that a commission was necessary 
"to aid in the dissolution of unlawful corporations" because, in 
Morgan's opinion, "our courts are overcrowded," and lack "the executive 
machinery necessary to dismantle these vast industrial corporations." 
Declaring the Sherman Act ineffective, Morgan stated that if the execu-
tion of the 1890 law had been placed under an independent commission, 
with adequate authority, the txust question would have been largely 
settled years ago. He then enumerated some of the purposes for which 
a commission was needed: 
1. To control the practices and business methods of large 
industrial corporations. 
2. To reenforce, restore, and maintain competition as a 
factor in price regulation and, if necessary, exercise 
direct control over the prices of all monopolistic 
corporations. 
3. To maximize the power of our industrial corporations as 
agencies for the equitable distribution of wealth and 
to minimize their power as instruments for the concen-
tration of wealth. 
4. To respond to the imperative public sentiment of the 
country for antitrust legislation that will adequately 
protect the people from all monopolistic industrial 
concerns.105 
Morgan's House speech received,coverage in the January 18 edition 
of the New York Times. The article, entitled "Wilson Definite on Trust 
105u. s., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1914, LI, 
Part 2, 1866-1872. 
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Curbs," stated that the Oklahoma Congressman had strongly endorsed 
what he hoped would be the creation of an interstate trade commission 
by the administration. The article outlined many of the proposals 
that Morgan had presented in his House speech, and quoted Morgan as 
saying, "We need a commission to aid in the readjustment of business 
in harmony with the law. 11106 
Morgan created additional furor when he appeared before the House 
Interstate Commerce Committee on February 7 and criticized the Adminis-
tration bill. In yet another New York Times article headlined ''Wants 
Trade Board Only to Curb Trusts," Morgan was cited as saying that he 
felt the Administration bill would give "the commission jurisdiction 
over too many corporations and too little power over the big corpora-
tions." He urged consideration of his bill which, in Morgan's belief, 
contained important provisions which the Administration-backed bill 
did not contain. The government, contended Morgan, should limit the 
jurisdiction which it assumes over private enterprises to those 
corporations which have attained such size as to give them dangerous 
monopolistic power, commonly known as "trusts." Morgan's bill re-
stricted the proposed trade commission's jurisdiction to those corpora-
tions which had a gross annual output in excess of $5,000,000. While 
this would include only 300 to 500 corporations out of 268,000 in the 
country, Morgan argued that it would include corporations which employ 
one-third of the wage earners and produce nearly 50 per cent of the 
manufactured products of the country. Morgan maintained that the 
proper method of controlling the properties of corporations engaged in 
l06N y k T · J 1'8, 1914. ew or imes, anuary 
interstate commerce was "to /prohibit specific practices which are 
inimical to public good," which, he declared, his bill provided. He 
concluded his testimony by saying: 
Acquired monopoly is as dangerous to the public interest as 
is natural monopoly, and it is as much the duty of the 
National Government ••• to protect the people against the 
evils of acquired or artificial monopoly as it is to protect 
them against natural monopoly.107 
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Thus Morgan continued to wage a relentless campaign on behalf of 
his original. trade commission bill. Again. in April, before the debate 
on the Administration bill actually began in late May, Morgan drew the 
attention of the national press. "Favors Fixing of Prices" was the 
title of a New York Times article which stated that Morgan had called 
for the consideration of the "Oklahoma Idea" in connection with the 
creation of a Federal Trade Commission. According to Morgan, the 
Oklahoma Corporation Commission had the right to fix prices, which, 
he said, had worked successfully, and deserved examination by the 
Administration. Morgan was quoted as saying that he was "an ardent 
advocate of the proposition to create a Federal trade commission," 
and, it was "absolutely necessary to protect the people from large 
·. d . l ,,108 in ustria concerns. 
When House debate finally began on the Administration bill on 
May 19, Morgan was the first Congressman to speak. He reiterated 
many of the points that he had made in his January 17 speech, and 
related that it had been 24 years since the Sherman law had been 
enacted. He asked: ''What law since that time has been placed on the 
107 New York Times, February 8, 1914. 
108 New York Times, April 3, 1914. 
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statute books that gives to the Federal Government any additional 
power to control or regulate the practices of our great industrial 
corporations?" "Not one," said Morgan, answering his own question. 
"What has been done by Congress in those 24 years to curb the trusts," 
queried Morgan. "Nothing" was again his own answer. Morgan reasoned 
that it was time for Congress to "promulgate a rule of business 
morality, create a standard by which the methods and practices of 
industrial corporations shall be judged," rather than confining legis-
lation .to "statutory .provisions prohibiting industrial corporations 
from doing this or that tli(;i.ng. 11109 From the outset of the debate, 
Morgan made it clear that he favored some type of regulatory commis-
sion, whether it be the one provided for in his bill, or the Adminis-
tration proposal. 
But Morgan alone was not to have a corner on Oklahoma participa-
tion in the debate. Murray favored the trade commission bill, but 
wanted to give the commission greater powers. He offered an amendment 
to authorize the commission to send all information gathered on the 
railroads to the Interstate Commerce Commission and the state railroad 
commissions. The idea was to make the Federal Trade Commission a 
clearinghouse of factual data. The amendment was rejected. Another 
Murray amendment provided that all business reports to the commission 
must be made under oath, corporations must submit lists of the names 
and addresses of all stock or bond owners, and corporate books and 
records must be opened to the commission. Murray argued that this 
information must be made available to aid in the prosecution of trusts 
109u. s., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1914, LI, 
Part 9, 8854-8857. 
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and monopolies. 1 1 . d 110 This Murray proposa was a so reJecte. The dis-
cussion on the Federal Trade Commission bill ended on May 26, with two 
Oklahomans having vigorously participated in the debate. The House then 
moved to consider the Clayton bill, which also dealt with the anti-trust 
problem. More of the Oklahoma representatives took an active interest 
in this bill, particularly the section concerning the removal of labor 
and farm organizations from the anti-trust provision, which the Presi-
dent did not favor because it would have placed labor organizations be-
yond the pale of the anti-trust law entirely. 
Congressman Thompson was quick to jump into the debate as he de-
livered a speech the first day the bill was presented to the House. He 
was specifically concerned with the exemption of farm and labor organi-
zations from the anti-trust laws. Emphasizing the Democratic platform 
of 1912, he quoted from the plank, which stated that labor organizations 
should not be regarded as illegal combinations in restraint of trade. 
Thompson urged his colleagues to uphold the Baltimore platform, stating 
that farming and laboring organizations were not instituted for profit 
and, therefore, should not be penalized as the corporate monopolies. 
These organizations are designed for the purpose of "mutual help," and 
it would be a "monstrous proposition" to prosecute their members for 
doing the right thing, namely, to better their condition, proclaimed 
Thompson. He concluded his remarks by saying: 
I can not and will not support a bill which does not in 
the plainest language exempt thes~ organizations from the 
penalties of the antitrust act. I can not and will not 
vote for a provision that will subject our workingmen to 
prosecution if they organize to secure a better wage for 
110 U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1914, LI, 
Part 9, 8973-8994. 
their labor. I can not and will not vote for a provision 
that will subject our farmers to prosecution if they 
organize and agree to hold the product of their toil for 
better prices or if they agree not to plant as large an 
acreage of wheat, corn, or cotton as they formerly 
planted. lll 
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Thompson gained additional support for his arguments from within the 
Oklahoma delegation. 
Murray presented a series of amendments which he hoped would 
aid farmers and laborers. Like Thompson, Murray favored the exemption 
of labor unions from the anti-trust provision. He led the fight to 
exempt farm co-operatives as well. Hts amendment to exclude co-opera-
tives was defeated, as was his proposal to lower from $2,500,000 to 
$1,000,000 the amount of capital stock which placed a business under 
the interlocking directorate portion of the bill. 112 The same day 
that his amendments were rejected, Murray delivered a speech on the 
House floor that revealed the disagreement among Democrats over the 
Clayton bill. He said that in the coming Congressional election his 
opponents might charge him with walking out of the "President's patron-
age pantry," but, despite the President's opposition, he favored ex-
eluding labor unions and farm co-operatives from the bill. Parts of 
the measure were vicious, he claimed, such as the provision forbidding 
co-operatives from withholding products from market. Murray explained 
that in his experience as a farmer, he felt that a farmer ''must some 
times reduce the acreage of his crop and at all times limit the 
amount that goes upon the market, otherwise he would never receive a 
111u. s., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1914, LI, 
Part 9, 523. 
112u. s., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1914, LI, 
Part 10, 9481-9484. 
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fair price. 11113 
Morgan united his efforts with Thompson and Murray in attempting 
to exclude farm organizations from the anti-trust laws. He informed 
fellow House members that he believed the United States was doing more 
to help the farmer become better educated, but pointed out that Ameri-
can farmers were 25 years behind Europe in learning how to organize 
so as to improve their marketing and purchasing methods. Morgan urged 
Congress to include an amendment that would encourage the farmer to 
organize, "so that tilie .products of the farm can come more directly to 
114 
consumers with less cost and with a fewer number of middlemen." 
Through the efforts of Murray, Thompson, and Morgan, as well as other 
representatives, the House finally approved amendments to the Clayton 
bill which removed labor unions and farm co-operatives from its anti-
trust sections. Standing by their convictions, the three Oklahoma 
Congressmen had parted company with the Administration on this issue, 
which could have been particularly damaging to Democrats Murray and 
Thompson. Nevertheless, it.was an issue that progressives had long 
demanded. 
Departing from the farm and labor interests in the bill, three 
other Oklahoma Congressmen addressed themselves to the Clayton 
measure, especially on the subject of interlocking directorates. 
Ferris, Carter, and Davenport all spoke in favor of an amendment that 
Ferris had introduced, which provided that the transportation of oil 
113u. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1914, LI, 
Part 17, 543-545. 
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and water power be included under the common carrier section of the 
bill. It was their belief that pipe lines carrying oil and wires 
transporting hydroelectric power should be subjected to regulation 
under the interstate commerce clause of the bill. Ferris, speaking 
on behalf of his amendment, declared that in dealing with anti-trust 
legislation, Congress could not afford to disregard the pipe line 
monopoly held by the Standard Oil Company, and the monopolization of 
transporting facilities by the water power trust. He emphatically 
stated: ''What are the pipe lines? The worst monopoly in the country. 
What is the Standard Oil Company? The worst monopoly in the country. 
What is the Water Power Trust? One of- the worst monopolies in the 
country." Therefore, Ferris contended that in considering the problem 
of interlocking directorates, the Clayton bill must recognize the 
question of transportation monopoly, which, he said, "is the vital cord 
115 in the whole trust question." 
Carter and Davenport agreed with Ferris, confining their remarks 
to the pipe line monopoly pm,~sessed by Standard Oil. Both felt that 
Standard Oil, by having a monopoly of transportation facilities, fixed 
the price of oil that best suited their convenience. Hence, the oil 
of independent producers, according to Carter and Davenport, was 
flatly refused at any price until Standard Oil was taken care of. 
They both demanded amendments that would disallow pipe line companies 
from producing oil so as to break up "the worst monopoly on the face 
115u. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1914, LI, 
Part 10, 9586-9587. 
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of the earth." Thus it appears that Ferris, Carter, and Davenport 
were vitally concerned with trust-busting, but seemed more interested 
in the provisions of the Clayton bill than with the Federal Trade 
Commission bill, on which they remained silent. Six of the eight 
Oklahoma Congressmen had engaged in the debates on the two bills of 
Wilson's anti-trust program, as only McGuire and Weaver refrained from 
commenting. 
The Federal Trade Commission bill passed the House first, with no 
vote being recorded as indicated by the Congressional Record for June 
5, 1914. The Clayton bill was then presented for a vote the same day, 
receiving approval by a count of 277 for, 54 against, and 99 not voting. 
Davenport, Ferris, Murray, Morgan, Thompson, and Weaver supported the 
measure, with Carter absent, and McGuire casting the only negative 
117 
vote. The conference committee report on the Federal Trade Commis-
sion bill was agreed to in the House on September 10, 1914 with no roll 
call. A motion was made for a division of the House on the bill, but 
d . db h ff• · b d. h · 118 1e ecause t ere was not a su 1c1ent num er secon 1ng t emotion. 
The Clayton bill conference committee report was approved on October 
8, 1914 by a vote 245 "yeas," 52 "nays," and 126 "not voting." Seven 
of the eight Oklahoma delegates cast affirmative votes; McGuire was 
the only exception, as he failed to answer the roll call. 119 
116u. s., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1914, LI, 
Part 10, 9475-9477. 
111u. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1914, LI, 
Part 10, 9910-9911. 
118u. s., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1914, LI, 
Part 15, 14943. 
119u. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1914, LI, 
Part 16, 16344. 
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The near unanimity within the Oklahoma group, not only by vote 
but by favorable commentary for the most part, indicates that they 
desired some type of legislation to deal with the trust problem, an 
issue that had long concerned progressives. Morgan stands out among 
the Oklahomans for his innovative ideas in regard to the Federal Trade 
Commission plan. It appears that his plan was well formulated long 
before Brandeis persuaded the President that this was the proper method 
in coping with the trust problem. National attention was directed 
toward Morgan's plan, even before the President's recommendation, as 
he received coverage in the nation's largest newspaper, the New York 
Times, on three different occasions. And although his original pro-
posal was not accepted, Morgan supported the Brandeis written resolu-
tion, without resentment, because of his intense desire to see legis-
lation of this type enacted. Another significant aspect of the anti-
trust debates would be the influential role that Murray, Thompson, 
and Morgan played in reshaping the Clayton bill so as to exempt farm 
and labor groups from prosecution. In defiance of the Administration, 
these three Congressmen helped determine the fate of an issue which 
had troubled reformers since the Sherman law was put into effect. On 
the whole, the Oklahoma delegation, with the exception of McGuire, had 
in some manner helped in the fulfillment of Wilson's third and last 
recommendation that he had presented to the Sixty-third Congress, the 
strengthening of anti-trust laws. 
One outstanding achievement of the Sixty-third Congress was not a 
part of the President's legislative program, though there is no evi-
dence that Wilson opposed it. As the end result of a number of years 
of effort on the part of both public and private groups to improve the 
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conditions of life on American farms, a bill (H. R. 7951) introduced 
by Representative Asbury Lever of South Carolina and Senator Hoke Smith 
of Georgia established a system of cooperative extension work to be 
carried on by the land grant colleges and the Department of Agriculture. 
The basic idea of demonstration as a technique in agriculture and 
home economics had been developed by Dr. Seaman Knapp, financed by a 
combination of public and private funds. In many cases Dr. Knapp's 
demonstrations had been spectacularly successful in increasing produc-
tion and improving the farmers' standard of living. The bill authorized 
the use of federal funds, which had to be matched by state funds, to 
finance demonstration work in agriculture and home economics in every 
rural county. The bill passed the House on January 19, 1914, with no 
roll call being demanded. 120 
Although Morgan had introduced legislation and presented support-
ing statements for agricultural extension education in the Sixty-
second Congress, the only Oklahoma representative to enter the Smith-
Lever debate in the Sixty-third was Murray. The Tishomingo Democrat 
had a long interest in agricultural education, and in his December 11, 
1913, speech, he called for an expansion of both agricultural and 
mechanical education •. Using Biblical stories and analogies, he stated 
that the white race knew less about agriculture than any other race. 
There were two basic kinds of education, Murray contended, classical 
and industrial, and it was the latter that needed federal aid. He 
edified the members of the House by relating his efforts for agri-
cultural education at the Sequoyah and Oklahoma Constitutional Con-
120u. s., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1914, LI, 
Part 2, 1947. 
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ventions. Vocational agriculture was a means to increase production, 
lower the cost of living, create better farmers, and improve marketing 
methods, he said, but too often the farmers themselves had opposed 
agricultural education. He planned to vote for the Smith-Lever bill, 
but wanted to add an amendment to provide for district junior agri-
cultural schools such as the one he had established at Tishomingo. 
Using the University of Oklahoma as an example, he said that state 
universities opposed agriculture and that graduates of agricultural 
and mechanical colleges, such as Oklahoma A. and M., often refused to 
return to the farm because of better employment opportunities else-
where. Therefore, he believed that the only answer was a federal 
system of two-year vocational colleges. He concluded, "I have learned 
that men will take a cold, a cussing, or a rail off your fence; indeed, 
anything, except your good advice." The American farmer, complained 
Murray, knew more about every other man's business than he did his 
own. The entire speech extolled the virtues of agriculture, but one 
phrase, repeated throughout his life, gives the key to his thinking: 
"Civilization begins and ends with the plow." Although his speech 
received praise from men in and out of Congress, his amendment was 
121 
not accepted. Neither his animosity toward the University of 
Oklahoma nor his desire for agricultural education would diminish 
in the future. It is surprising to find so little support,among the 
Oklahoma delegates for a bill that affected such a large portion of 
their constituents. The overwhelming support of the bill, as indi-
cated by the lack of a roll call, may have caused the remaining 
121u. s., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1913, LI, 
Part 1, 713-729. 
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Oklahoma delegates to reason that vocal support was not necessary for 
final passage. 
The resolution for a women's suffrage amendment to the Constitution 
was definitely not on the Administration's legislative program, since 
the time when Wilson could bring himself to support it was yet in the 
future. This issue, concerned with reform in the political procedure 
of the country, had been an objective of many progressives. By 1914 
the male monopoly of the voting booth had been broken in eleven states, 
11 f h M. . . . 122 a west o t e ~ssissippi. Frank Mondell, representing Wyoming, 
which was the first state to adopt women's suffrage, introduced H. J. 
Res. 1, which provided for a Constitutional amendment that would not 
deny the vote on account of sex. 
Only Carter from the Oklahoma delegation participated in the 
women's suffrage debate. Praising the virtues of the American woman, 
Carter declared that he welcomed the idea of feminine participation 
in public meetings and public affairs. He said: 
I am really such a believer in woman as a class that sometimes 
I am almost convinced against my better judgment that she 
should indulge in the pastime of voting. Were it not for 
shattering an ideal, were it not for dethroning her from 
that high pedestal upon which we are accustomed to place 
her, and dragging her down to the level of us beastly men, 
I believe I might even to-day be willing to vote for 
universal woman suffrage.123 
However, Carter, in conclusion, rejected the principles of the reso-
lution because, in his opinion, the Federal government should not 
prescribe qualifications for the rights of suffrage in any of the 
122 Harold U. Faulkner, The Quest for Social Justice, 1898-1914 (New 
York: Macmillan, 1931), 174. 
123u. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 3rd Sess., 1915, LI!, 
Part 2, 1459. 
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separate states, but rather leave this to the discretion of the states 
124 themselves. As indicated by the tone of his final remarks, Carter, 
as well as Murray and Weaver, were among the 204 representatives who 
voted down the resolution. On the other hand, Davenport, Ferris, 
·Morgan, McGuire, and Thompson were recorded as voting with 169 other 
representatives for the resolution. 125 Thus, five of the eight 
Oklahomans favored this political revision that had been advocated by 
reformers since the days of the Populist Party's recognition of women's 
rights. Only Carter gave his reasons for opposing the measure, which 
mainly were based on his belief that the states were given the Consti-
tutional right to establish voting regulations. Murray and Weaver, 
great admirers of Wilson, may have failed to support the resolution 
because of Wilson's negative position. However, three of the Demo-
crats, Ferris, Davenport, and Thompson, defied the Administration by 
supporting the bill. Ferris and Davenport had supported previous 
political reform bills, and, therefore, adhered to their progressive 
tradition. Thompson, a Bryan type Democrat, may have been led by his 
strong Populist background. Morgan and McGuire, the two Republicans, 
were also positive on this aspect of progressivism, which continued 
their support of reform along political lines, with the exception of 
McGuire's disapproval of judicial recall. 
The third session of the Sixty-third Congress enacted only one 
major piece of progressive legislation, the LaFollette Seamen's Act. 
This bill, for which LaFollette had been working since 1909, was an 
1241bid. 
125u. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 3rd Sess., 1915, 111, 
Part 2, 1483-1484. 
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effort to improve the conditions of labor for seamen on American 
vessels. In many ways, sailors were still bondsmen in almost the 
medieval sense, and maritime safety requirements were often inadequate. 
The bill had passed Congress in the latter part of the Sixty-second 
Congress, only to receive a pocket veto from President Taft in the 
1 · d f h. am· · · 126 cosing ays o is a inistration. But Senate bill 136 passed 
the House on February 25, 1915 with no roll call vote being recorded, 
h h h . d . . d 127 t oug a two-t ir s maJority was counte. The Senate had already 
128 given its approval, and Wilson signed it into law on March 4, 1915. 
Only Ferris of the Oklahoma delegation commented on the LaFollette 
bill. Reviewing the achievements of the Sixty-third Congress on July 
21, 1916, Ferris declared that labor had long requested and petitioned 
for such legislation. He pointed out that the Democratic House of the 
Sixty-second Congress had presented President Taft with a seamen's 
bill, but he had refused it. Ferris concluded his remarks by saying 
that the Democrats and progressive Republicans had given labor what it 
deserved to have, in enacting the LaFollette bill. 129 
With the conclusion of the Sixty-third Congress, President Wilson 
had to be satisfied with the results. His three major recommendations 
dealing with revision of the tariff, reorganization of the banking and 
currency system, and strengthening of the anti-trust laws had been 
enacted in the form of the Underwood-Simmons Tariff, the Federal Re~ 
1261. k in, Woodrow Wilson and the 
----
Progressive Era, 1910-1917, 62. 
121u. s. ' Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 3rd Sess., 1915, LI!, 
Part 5, 4654. 
1281. k in, Woodrow Wilson and the 
----
Progressive Era, 1910-1917, 63. 
129u. s.' Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, 
Part 11, 11410. 
serve Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Clayton Anti-
Trust Act. In addition to these three major areas of national 
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policy, three other bills were important in indicating the progressive 
attitudes of Congressmen: the Smith-Lever bill, the LaFollette Sea-
men's bill, and the Women's Suffrage Amendment resolution; the first 
two were enacted. In all of these resolutions, Oklahomans played a 
significant role in the debates and roll call votes. 
In final analysis, the tariff and taxation reforms included in 
the Underwood bill were supported by Carter, Ferris, Davenport, Murray, 
Thompson, and Weaver. Of the six, Davenport, Ferris, and Murray spoke 
on behalf of tariff reduction, and only Murray presented favorable 
arguments for the income tax provisions of the bill. Ferris and 
Davenport had consistently spoken and voted for tariff reduction as 
indicated by their previous records. On the other hand, Carter in 
his three terms of service had always voted for lowered tariffs, but 
had little to say on the subject. Known for his verbosity, Murray was 
the only one of the new at-large representatives to comment on the 
bill. McGuire and Morgan, remaining devoted to the Republican Party 
protectionist policy, opposed the Underwood bill as both spoke and 
voted negatively. However, neither of the two apparently opposed the 
income tax clause, as their remarks were concentrated on the lowered 
tariff provisions. It was not unusual for Morgan and McGuire to 
oppose such legislation for they had been strong supporters of the 
Payne-Aldrich bill in the Sixty-first Congress and had resisted the 
tariff reduction attempts by the Sixty-second Congress. Thus the 
alignment of the Oklahoma delegation remained the same as it had on 
previous tariff propositions. 
On the issue of banking and currency reform, Carter, Davenport, 
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Ferris, Murray, Thompson, and Weaver supported the leadership of 
Wilson. The three at-large Congressmen, Murray, Thompson, and 
Weaver, took the most active part in the preliminary debate on the 
Federal Reserve bill. Weaver appeared to be the Oklahoman most 
connnitted in favor of the bill, undoubtedly because he was a member 
of the House Banking and Currency Connnittee, which had drafted the 
legislation. Both Thompson and Murray stated their support for such 
reform, but addressed themselves to the bill's lack of provisions for 
the agricultural sector of the economy, namely, the scant attention 
devoted to lowered interest rates and a longer credit system for the 
farmer. Only Morgan connnented in a negative fashion to the bill, 
primarily because he, like Thompson and Murray, favored more adequate 
credit facilities for the farmer; but he also wanted a bank guaranty 
provision added to the bill. Carter, Ferris, and Davenport voted for 
the bill, but did not feel strongly enough about it to vocalize their 
support. McGuire, who remained silent on all legislation following 
the Underwood Tariff, cast a "no" on the Federal Reserve bill. 
The last of Wilson's three-part program dealt with the anti-trust 
question. Of all the."New Freedom" legislation, this one was the most 
favorably accepted by the Oklahoma delegation. Whether the trust 
question was to be settled by a national trade connnission, or by 
strengthening the Sherman Act, seven of the eight Oklahomans supported 
anti-trust legislation. The Clayton bill, which was the original 
White House proposal in handling the trust problem, received both 
vocal and roll call support from six of the Oklahoma representatives. 
Thompson, Murray, and Morgan showed particular interest in the clause 
exempting farmer and labor groups from anti-trust suits, which re .. 
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fleeted their concern for the agricultural and laboring constituency 
of Oklahoma and the nation. In contrast, Davenport, Carter, and 
Ferris directed their remarks to the problem of monopoly, especially 
the Standard Oil Company, which affected the independent oil producers 
in Oklahoma. Thus, for various reasons the Oklahoma delegation was 
virtually united in its support of the Clayton bill. 
The Federal Trade Commission bill, which replaced the Clayton 
bill as the Administration's chief method of coping with the trust 
problem, likewise received approval of most of the Oklahoma delegation. 
Republican Morgan and Democrat Murray were the most outspoken for this 
plan. Morgan achieved national prominence on this issue as he had been 
the first Congressmen to propose such legislation, doing so in the 
Sixty-second Congress, which was prior to Roosevelt's proposal in the 
1912 presidential race. Therefore, Morgan was the forerunner of the 
"New Nationalism" plank advocating a national trade commission, which 
the "New Freedom" program of Wilson eventually adopted. Morgan was 
given a great deal of credit by the national press, and based on the 
evidence he deserves the title of "Father of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion." Murray, whose ideas were not as innovative as Morgan's, never-
theless proposed several amendments which would have given the commis-
sion greater.powers. Hence, the existence of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act owes much to the Oklahoma delegation, especially Morgan. 
The remaining progressive legislation presented to the Sixty-third 
Congress was not on the Administration's agenda. Of the four proposals, 
they were divided between political and social reforms. In regard to 
the former, limitations on lobbying and women's suffrage were the 
specific issues. The problem of excessive lobbying became an issue 
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during the tariff debate, and Murray, Morgan, and Ferris were among 
those who answered Wilson's call to put a halt to the pressure group 
activity. Although no vote was recorded, the evidence indicates that 
at least three Oklahomans supported this political reform. Of long 
interest to progressives, the resolution to add a Constitutional 
amendment providing for women's suffrage was first presented to the 
Sixty-third Congress. Only Carter from the Oklahoma unit spoke on the 
resolution, and his remarks were negative in nature. However, his 
speech did not reflect the feelings of the entire delegation, as the 
roll call vote shows that five of the eight supported the resolution, 
even though it was defeated. Murray and Weaver joined Carter in 
opposing the resolution, but Davenport, Ferris, Thompson, Morgan, 
and McGuire voted for this political reform. 
The social reform bills, both of which were enacted, were the 
Smith-Lever Act and the LaFollette Seamen's Act, both advocated by 
farmer and labor groups, respectively. No roll call votes were re-
corded for either bill, but two Oklahomans lent strong vocal support 
for the proposals, Murray for the Smith-Lever Act, and Ferris for the 
Seamen's Act. 
The preceding evidence indicates that the voters of Oklahoma had 
been well represented on the leading progressive iss.ues in the Sixty-
third Congress. With Wilson facing re-election and war on the horizon, 
the next chapter will examine the growing progressivism of the Oklahoma 
delegation in the Sixty-fourth Congress. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE ELECTION OF 1914 AND THE SIXTY-FOURTH CONGRESS 
With the outbreak of war in Europe in August, 1914, the attention 
of the people of the United States was diverted to matters other than 
political. As it turned out, the developments abroad were, significant 
to the Democrats during the ensuing Congressional campaign. The Repub-
licans did not wage a vigorous fight, and there seemed to be a general 
disposition to stand by the President during a time of peril. The most 
important Democratic asset, however, was the continued disruption of 
the Republican Party, with Roosevelt and the Progressives making one 
last and futile effort to establish themselves as a major party. 1 In 
spite of all these advantages, the Democrats made a poor showing 
nationally in the state and Congressional elections on November 3, 
1914. (!he Democratic majority in the House was reduced from seventy-
three to twenty-five. 2 However, the national trend did not hold true 
for Oklahoma, as the Democrats picked up seven of the eight Congres-
sional seats:) 
Congressional redistricting in Oklahoma, after a long delay, was 
finally accomplished in 1913. Dozens of bills had been offered in the 
~ 
1 George E. Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1946), 300-303. 
2Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1954), 78-.~ ~-
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legislature since the 1910 census, but the eight district plan, which 
favored the Democrats, was the one which was approved in the end, The 
district boundaries were regular and app,eared sensible, except for the 
saddle-shaped fifth (see Figure 4), Moreover, they were fairly equal 
with respect to population (see Table II), Leaving only two districts 
touching the Kansas border, the Democratic legislature hoped to re-
verse the Congressional dictate of 1906 so as to assure at least six 
of the eight seats to Democratic nominees as long as the traditional 
voting patterns continued. The elections of 1914 exceeded the Demo~ 
cratic expectations, as they were victorious in all but one of the newly 
created districts, 
Due to the fact that the third session of the Sixty-third Congress 
did not adjourn until late October, the various Congressional campaigns 
in Oklahoma attracted little attention. Furthermore, the Oklahoma Re-
publican Party, like the parent national party, conducted something 
less than an energetic campaign, The political climate of the pre-
election days was best evaluated by an editorial in one of Oklahoma 
City's newspapers. The October 10 article, entitled "The Political 
Calm," stated that with only about three weeks to go, there seemed 
to be little excitement or interest in the elections except that dis-
played by the candidates. The editorial attributed the situation to a 
well satisfied electorate which apparently was pleased with the manner 
of representation in the past and the prospect for the future. 3 The 
political calm that rested over the state set the temper for the 
state's 1914 Congressional elections, 
3oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, October 10, 1914. 
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The new first district included the ten counties of northeastern 
Oklahoma, and the 1914 race pitted Davenport, the Democratic incumbent 
from the old third district, against Joseph A. Gill, a Vinita Republi-
can. In appealing to the voters of the new district, Davenport empha-
sized his six years of Congressional service which, he believed, had 
given him the necessary experience to become a competent legislator. 
The Tulsa Democrat endorsed Davenport's candidacy by publishing two 
October editorials on his behalf. The first was headlined "What 
Davenport Does," which dealt with Davenport's committee assignments 
and the varioUS',appropriations he had procured for Tulsa County. It 
also stressed the fact that Davenport had always labored for the inde-
pendent oil producers of his district, and although he represented the 
largest oil district in the world, according to the Tulsa paper, he 
had never been accused of "having the smell of Standard Oil on his 
4 
clothes." The second editorial, ''Why Honorable James S. Davenport 
Should Be Returned to Congress," was a glowing tribute to Davenport's 
record as third district representative. It castigated his opponent, 
Gill, as being a "standpat Republican" and a "carpetbagger." The 
article concluded by asl<ing, ''Will the good people of the First Oklahoma 
district endeavor to deter the progress of our nation and the policies 
of that;great executive, Woodrow Wilson, by voting for a Republican? 115 
Davenport's campaign rested on his prior service and experience, as 
well as the role he had played in the first Wilson Congress. 
Gill, on the other hand, centered his campaign on the tariff 
4 Tulsa Democrat, October 4, 1914. 
5 Tulsa Democrat, October 28, 1914. 
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issue, especially the lack of import duties on oil, lead, and zinc, 
three minerals of interest to the first district voters. His plat-
form, revealed in a front page article in the Bartlesville Daily Enter-
prise, called attention to the fact that "no effort was made to protect 
the American market for American oil. 11 He called for import duties on 
oil, lead, and zinc so as to equalize the cost of these imported 
minerals with the cost of producing them in Oklahoma. 6 Gill's cam-
paign promised a return to the protectionist spirit of the Payne-
Aldrich Tariff. 
Though Gill won Tulsa and Washington Counties by narrow margins, 
Davenport was the victor in the 1914 race by 1,238 votes. The results 
were as follows: 
Davenport 
Gill 
Others 
15,489 
14,251 
3,665 
46.4% 
42.0% 
11. 6%7 
Davenport's greatest strength was in Rogers, Pawnee, Osage, Mayes, and 
Delaware Counties, where he rolled up more than enough votes to offset 
Gill's slim margins in Tulsa and Washington Counties. It is difficult 
to compare Davenport's victory with his previous elections because he 
now represented a much smaller district, both in area and population. 
But apparently the voters of the new district were aware of his experi-
ence and his devotion to the Wilson administration. 
In the second district, which was the remainder of the old third 
district, two new candidates took to the stump. William W. Hastings, 
a Tahlequah Democrat, vied for the post against Charles A. Cook, a 
6Bartlesville Daily Enterprise, October 28, 1914. 
7samuel A. Kirkpatrick, et al., Oklahoma Voting Patterns: Congres-
sional Elections (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970), 42. 
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Muskogee Republican. Hastings won a convincing victory over Cook 
as he carried all eight counties of the district. He was given strong 
support by the Democratic press of the district, particularly the 
Okmulgee Daily Democrat and the Muskogee Times-Democrat. On the other 
hand, Cook could not muster the support of the leading Republican news-
paper of the district, the Muskogee Phoenix, which was also his home-
town paper. 
The pro-Hastings papers pointed out that President Wilson wanted 
Congressmen who were in "sympathy and harmony with his plans for 
progressive national legislation." The Democratic press stated that 
Hastings would be such a legislator. 8 In an editorial entitled "A Full 
Grown Congressman," which was printed in both the Okmulgee Daily Demo.; 
crat and the Muskogee Times-Democrat, Hastings was pictured as a candi-
date so fully equipped with the legislative tools that he would not 
have to serve the long apprenticeship accorded to most new Congressmen. 
It was emphasized that Hastings was well acquainted with the President's 
cabinet and department heads, a matter which, according to the news-
papers, made him a stronger candidate to represent the new second 
d . . 9 1.str1.ct. The election results show that Hastings won by a 4,150 vote 
margin. 
Hastings 
Cook 
Others 
12, 719 
8,569 
4,618 
49.0% 
33.0% 
18.0%10 
It seems that the popularity of Hastings and the strong endorsements he 
8 Okmulgee Daily Democrat, October 15, 1914. 
9 Okmulgee Daily Democrat, September 24, 1914. 
lOK. k 'k 1 Okl h V . P 1.r patr1.c, et a., a oma ot1.ng atterns: Congressional 
Elections, 42. 
274 
received from the press were sufficient to solidly defeat the remaining 
candidates in the field. Although he did not quite poll a majority, 
Hastings' margin was considerable. 
The race in district three, which included the eleven counties of 
southeastern Oklahoma, was a three-cornered affair with Charles Carter, 
the Democratic incumbent from old district four; C.H. Elting, a Re-
publican from Durant; and R. L. Norman, a McAlester Socialist, being 
the principal participants. Carter's support of the Wilson administra-
tion was underscored by the pro-Carter newspapers such as The Daily 
Ardmoreite and the McAlester News-Capital. They pointed out that he 
had voted for the new tariff law, the new banking law, the income tax, 
and the trade commission bill. Basing his speeches on the Wilsonian 
reforms, Carter emphasized the fact that the Democratic Party was "the 
party of the people always found on the side of the masses struggling 
for their rights."ll The traditional campaign oratory was seemingly 
absent as Carter carried all eleven counties which allowed him to win 
his fifth consecutive term to Congress. The Socialist candidate, 
Norman, ran second to Carter in nine of the eleven counties, and polled 
4,109 votes more than the Republican, Elting, to become the principal 
opposition for the Democrats in the new third district. 
Carter (D) 
Norman (S) 
Elting (R) 
Others 
17,474 
10,588 
6,479 
191 
50.3% 
30.4% 
18.6% 
.7%12 
Although Carter rolled up an impressive majority, the size of the 
Socialist vote undoubtedly disturbed both major parties as it appeared 
. ' . ·' 11 · ... ",. •' ' ' ·- . ' -' . 
. l'he Ha:i,ly A~dmo;re:i,t.~, Noyeni,b~r. 1, 1914; McAlester News-Ca,pital, 
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12
~irk;atri~~, et al., Oklahoma Voting Patterns: Congressional 
Elections, 42-43. 
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to be gaining strength by 1914, especially in the third, fourth, and 
seventh districts of the southern half of Oklahoma. 
William H. Murray, who was one of the three Congressmen who had 
been elected at-large in 1912, did not have the same advantage in 1914. 
His home county, Johnston, had been put together with eight other 
counties to form the new fourth district. Murray's chief opponents 
were James Dennis Flynn, a Sapulpa Republican, and Marion Hughes, a 
Socialist from Shawnee. Robert L. Williams, the Democratic candidate 
for governor in the November elections, wrote Murray asking him to get 
a leave from Speaker Clark and return to Oklahoma to help in the up-
coming campaigns. Murray told Williams to support the President by 
name, to praise the tariff and the Federal Reserve, and to call for 
1 d . 1 . 1 . 13 rura ere its egis ation. After Congress adjourned in late October, 
Murray stayed in Washington for a while and then, at the request of the 
White House, went to New Jersey to campaign for the Congressman of 
W• 1 I h d• • 14 i sons ome istrict. The election returns in the fourth district 
indicate that Murray had been almost too complacent about his own race. 
Murray (D) 
Flynn (R) 
Hughes (S) 
Others 
13,758 
9,395 
9,198 
251 
42.2% 
28.8% 
28. 2% 
.8i)5 
The election statistics show that Murray carried all counties except 
Lincoln; however, the combined Republican-Socialist vote appears to 
13 Robert L. Williams to William H. Murray, August 24, 1914; Murray 
to Williams, A\lgust 26, 1914, William H. Murray Collection, Division of 
Manuscripts, University of Oklahoma Library. 
14 Shawnee News-Herald, October 27, 1914. 
15K· k . k 1 Okl h . P ir patric, et a., a oma Voting atterns: Congressional 
Elections, 43. 
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indicate that Murray's popularity may have declined and that in future 
campaigns he could not rest on his laurels. 
In the new fifth district, At-Large Congressman Joseph Thompson 
was challenged by D. K. Pope, a Republican attorney from Oklahoma City. 
Very little coverage was given to Thompson in the Democratic press 
because they apparently felt that his record and experience would 
assure his re-election. On the other hand, Pope received a strong 
endorsement from the Oklahoma City Times, the leading Republican pub-
lication of the district. The Times praised Pope's innovative plans 
concerning the establishment of cotton mills in Oklahoma, especially 
since the state had become a major producer of cotton. Industries 
such as textiles have not been started in Oklahoma, Pope declared, be-
cause of the lack of protection afforded by the govermnent while they 
are attempting to gain a foothold. Pope demanded protection so that 
the infant industries of Oklahoma would not have "to compete with 
Ui foreign pauper labor." Despite the lack of campaigning by Thompson, 
the activity of Pope, and the strong editorial support given to Pope 
by a leading Republican newspaper, Thompson won an easy victory with a 
4,754 vote margin. He carried six of the seven counties of the new 
district, Logan being the only exception. 
As 
Thompson 14,040 
Pope 9, 286 
Others 6,198 
in the fourth district, it appeared that the 
16oklahoma City Times, October 31, 1914. 
17Kirkpatrick, et al., 43. 
47.5% 
31.3% 
21.2%17 
lackadaisical attitude 
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expressed by Thompson would not hold up in future campaigns. 
The ever popular Scott Ferris was the Democratic candidate in the 
new sixth district, which embraced nine counties in south central 
Oklahoma. Ferris' chief opponent was Republican Alvin Campbell of 
Lawton, but the Socialists entered a strong candidate in the person 
of J. T. Cumbie of Lawton, who had been a candidate for the at-large 
seat in 1912. Most of the Democratic press in the district and around 
the state was lauding Ferris' record; and there was considerable dis-
cussion, at least among Oklahomans, that Ferris might succeed Oscar 
Underwood as the House majority leader. This idea was being promoted 
by editorials in The Daily Ardmoreite, and it appeared as a front page 
18 
story in the Tulsa Democrat. Despite all the favorable publicity on 
his behalf, Ferris conducted a vigorous campaign in the time allowed due 
to the late adjournment. Most of his speeches praised the achieve-
ments of the Democratic Congress, and he reasoned that his party had 
done more for the relief of the ~ommon people in eighteen months than 
the Republicans had done in the twelve years prior to 1912. 19 Ferris 
won re-election to a fifth consecutive term by 6,287 votes as he 
carried all but Kingfisher County. 
Ferris (D) 
Campbell (R) 
Cumbie (S) 
Others 
14,578 
8,291 
6,671 
745 
48.2% 
27.4% 
22.0% 
2.4%20 
This marked the first time that Ferris had won by less than a majority. 
--
16rhe Daily Ardmoreite, October 16, 1914; Tulsa Democrat, October 
20, 1914. 
19K· f' h T' 0 b 22 1914 ing is er imes, cto er , • 
20K. k 'k 1 44 ir patric, et a., • 
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And though he won quite handily, the combined Republican-Socialist 
vote against Ferris was 14,962, or 49.4%. 
The new district seven emerged from the eleven southwestern coun-
ties of Oklahoma where the 1914 race brought forth all new candidates: 
J. v. McClintic, Democrat from Snyder, W. S. Mills, Republican from 
Clinton, and H. H. Stallard, Socialist from Snyder. The Democratic 
newspapers of the district, especially the Mangum Star and the Cordell 
Beacon, strongly supported McClintic's candidacy. With McClintic 
tying his campaign closely to the efforts of the Wilson administration, 
both the Star and the Beacon encouraged the voters to elect a man who 
would be in sympathy with the Wilson policies. 21 In an October 29 
editorial, the Mangum publication proclaimed that McClintic would 
"cooperate and assist Wilson in pushing through the national congress 
the great measures in the interest of the producing masses of America." 
The editorial concluded that a vote for Mcclintic was a vote to "keep 
Okl h . ..22 a oma progressive. Stallard, the Socialist, accused Mcclintic 
of not supporting the eight-hour law for women and campaigned on the 
platform that he, rather than McClintic, represented the wishes of the 
farmer. This controversy was discussed in an open letter to the Beacon 
from C. M. Portwood, McClintic's campaign manager, on October 15. 
Portwood refuted the Stallard accusation by stating that McClintic 
had supported the eight-hour law for women while he was a member of 
the state legislature. As for the charge that Mcclintic did not 
represent the farmer, Portwood declared that he did "not know of any 
21 Mangum Star, October 22, 1914; Cordell Beacon, October 29, 1914. 
22 Mangum Star, October 29, 1914. 
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Democrat farmers in this section but what will support Jim McClintic. ,p 
Apparently McClintic was successful in thwarting his opponent's charges, 
as he won by 2,840 votes over Stallard, his closest competitor. Re-
publican Mills carried only Ellis County and ran behind Stallard in 
the other ten counties. Stallard outpolled McClintic in Beckham, Dewey, 
and Kiowa Counties, but Mcclintic I s strength in Washita, Tillman, 
Greer, and Custer was enough to overcome the Socialist challenge. 
Mcclintic (D) 
Stallard (S) 
Mills (R) 
Others 
11, 861 
9,021 
6,179 
337 
43. 3% . 
32.9% 
22.6% 
.2%24 
The election results in the seventh district indicated that the Social-
ist Party had displaced the Republican Party as the major opposition 
to the Democrats in the heavily rural southwestern part. of Oklahoma. 
Once again it was fortun~te for the Democrats that the combined vote 
of the Republicans and Socialists was split since that total would have 
been 15,200, or 3,339 more than McClintic received. 
The new eighth district was one that the Democrats had conceded 
to the Republicans, primarily because such a large portion of it 
bordered on Republican Kansas, and it had gone Republican in the four 
previous elections. Dick Morgan, the incumbent Republican:from the old 
second district, was opposed by Henry S. Johnston from Perry, who had 
been the unsuccessful Democratic candidate in district one in 1908. 
Johnston had been a member of the state constitutional convention and 
the state senate, where he had supported such progressive policies 
as primary elections, a corporation commission, mine and factory in-
23 Cordell Beacon, October 15, 1914. 
24K· k . k 1 44 ir patric, et a., • 
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spection of child labor, establishment of a state pure food and drug 
department, and a graduated inheritance and income tax. 25 In an October 
20 editorial, the Enid Morning News, a Democratic publication, con-
tended that the people of the eighth district should show their ap-
proval of the Wilson administration by voting for Johnston. The 
editorial argued that the re-election of Morgan would mean a vote in 
Congress against the President, and "it would mean disapproval by the 
people of this district of the wise and progressive policies of the 
President. 1126 
Morgan counteracted Johnston's attempt to relate to the Wilson 
administration by emphasizing his faithful service to his constituents 
and his six years of experience in the House. In an Enid speech just 
prior to the election, Morgan reaffirmed his ideas on the regulation 
of corporations by a federal trade connnission, and the protective 
tariff. He believed that the free trade provision of the Underwood 
Tariff had placed the American farmers in competition with the farmers 
of every country of the world, where they had cheap land and labor. 
Consequently, said Morgan, the market for American farm products has 
been "contracted, diminished, restricted, limited, and lessened. 1127 
In the hotly contested race, Morgan won by a mere 765 votes as he 
polled large margins in the traditional Republican counties of Gar-
field and Woods. Johnston showed his greatest strength in the eastern 
counties of the district, Noble and Kay. The results were as follows: 
25 Noble County Sentinel, July 23, 1914. 
26Enid Morning News, October 20, 1914. 
27Enid Events, October 29, 1914; Alva Review Courier, October 29, 
1914. 
Morgan 
Johnston 
Others 
13,294 
12,529 
6,092 
41.7% 
39.3% 
19.0%28 
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The fact that Morgan had received considerable national publicity did 
not keep him from being engaged in another close contest. The late 
adjournment hindered Morgan's campaigning, which probably reduced his 
vote total as he was not able to explain his position on his votes 
in the Sixty-third Congress. On the other hand, Johnston was a 
formidable candidate who was well known in the area and seemingly 
espoused a progressive platform. Overall, it was the traditional Re-
publicanism of the counties comprising most of the new eighth district 
that enabled Morgan to win a fourth term. 
The new alignment from Oklahoma to the Sixty-fourth Congress would 
be seven Democrats and one Republican. Most political analysts predict 
that the party in power suffers more setbacks in off-year elections, 
but this was not evident in Oklahoma in 1914. There are several 
reasons why the Republicans fared so poorly as compared with elsewhere. 
First, it appears that the Republican state organization was still 
feeling the pains of the 1912 rupture and, in addition, waged a weak 
campaign. Second, the Democratic Party was in an advantageous position 
in Oklahoma because of the strength exhibited by the Socialist Party. 
If there was an anti-administration feeling among Oklahoma voters in 
1914, it was apparently divided between Republicans and Socialists. 
It should be noted that in six of the seven districts where Democrats 
were victorious, the combined Republican-Socialist vote was greater, 
the lone exception being the third. In districts three, four, and 
28K· k . k 1 44 ir patric, et a., • 
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seven, the Socialist Party provided the chief opposition for Democrats 
as 1914 proved to be the peak of Socialist sentiment in the state. 
~he record of the Sixty-fourth Congress was remarkable, primarily 
because it included an election year when Congressmen are generally 
more interested in oratory than in action. Between January, 1916, and 
March, 1917, the Congress initiated legislation concerning federal 
regulation of child labor; adopted a model workmen's compensation law 
for federal employees; established a system of agricultural credit; 
decreed an eight-hour day for certain classes of railroad employees; 
and set up federal programs for the improvement of rural roads and 
vocational education. All this was accomplished in the midst of con-
cern about the possible development of hostilities between the United 
States and one or more belligerents in the European War.l 
One of the most startling achievements of the Sixty-fourth Cong-
ress was the passage of the Keating-Owen bill which forbade the ship-
ment in interstate commerce of goods manufactured in whole or in part 
by children under fourteen, of products of mines and quarries involving 
the labor of children under sixteen, and of any products manufactured 
by children under sixteen employed more than eight hours a day. Long 
advocated by the proponents of humanitarian legislation and sponsored 
by the National Child Labor Committee, such a bill had until now made 
slow progress in Congress. But after the Democratic victory in 1912, 
the progressives became more and more insistent, and on this issue as 
on others, President Wilson changed his mind. At the outset he believed 
that such a law would be an unconstitutienal invasion of states rights, 
but his commitment to progress!ve principles led him to overlook his 
earlier scruples. The bill (H. R. 8234), introduced by Representative 
Edward Keating of Colorado, passed the House on February 2, 1916, by a 
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vote of 337 to 46. 29 Then the bill languished in the Senate, where it 
would probably have died had it not been for Wilson's personal inter-
vention. On July 18, the President went to .the Capitol and pleaded 
with Senate leaders to allow the measure to come to a vote. With the 
aid of Senator Robert L. Owen,·the. sponsor of the bill in the upper 
house, the measure was adopted by the Senate on' August 8" and i;;igned 
by the President on September 1. ~O 
None of the members of the Oklahoma House delegation entered the 
child labor bill debate. However, the roll call indicates that there 
was unanimous support for'the resolution among the Oklahoma members as 
31 
all eight voted for the bill when it passed the House on February 2. 
After Senate passage on August 8, the bill went to conference commit-
tee, and the report coming out of that committee was agreed to in.the 
House on August 18 with n,o roll call vote recorded. 32 
Although not p~rticipating in the discussion over child labor, the 
Oklahoma delegation appeared to be ahead of the President on this so-
cial reform which had been advc:,ca.ted by progressives since the adminis-
tration of Roosevelt. It was·not until July, 1916, that Wilson made 
his move for the child labor cause, and as Link points out, he might 
have never intervened had he not been warned that the Democrats might 
29u. S., Congressional R~cord, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, 
Part 2, 2035. 
301ink, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917, 226-227. 
31 U. S., Congressional Record;, 64th pong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, 
Part 2, 2035. 
32u. s., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, 
Part 13, 12845. · 
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stand or fall on this issue in 1916. 33 
Even though President Wilson had devoted a good deal of attention 
to the question of rural credits in his first annual message to Cong-
ress, and again when the Federal Reserve bill was under consideration 
in the House, until 1916 he maintained that the government itself should 
not become involved in lending money to farmers. Oklahoma spokesmen 
such as Murray, Thompson, Ferris, and Morgan felt otherwise, and had 
lobbied for such legislation throughout 1914 and 1915. The President 
and his Secretary of Agriculture, David Houston, changed their stand 
on the issue in January, 1916, maintaining that the pressure of war 
time conditions had altered their stance. The anticipation of the 
upcoming presidential election may have also played a part as it gave 
Wilson ample time to appear as friend of the farmer in the campaign. 
Again the Oklahoma delegation, especially Democrats Murray, Thompson, 
and Ferris, as well as Republican Morgan, appear to have been ahead 
of the President's progressive spirit, because they had advocated 
rural credits of some type since the early meetings of the Sixty-third 
Congress. These four were joined in the floor discussion of the bill 
by Democrats Davenport, Hastings, and McClintic, with only Carter re-
maining vocally inactive. 
The first to speak on the much controverted issue was Morgan, who 
had already introduced rural credits legislation (H. R. 10310) in the 
first session of the Sixty-fourth Congress. On March 29, 1916, he 
arose and first demanded that the Banking and Currency Committee 
report a rural credits bill to the House: "In the name of 6,500,000 
331. k in, 227. 
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farmers of the United States, I protest against any further delay in 
rural-credit legislation." Morgan then outlined the provisions of his 
resolution which included a plan for twelve Federal land bank districts 
that, according to Morgan, would insure equal credit facilities and 
uniform interest rates to farmers in all sections of the country. In 
addition, Morgan I s bill set a maximum 'interest rate of 5 per cent per 
annum; required that each Federal land bank have an operating capit~l 
of $1,000,000, one-half of which was to be contributed by the United 
States government; and stated that the United States government would 
34 
contribute $500,000 to the guaranty fund of each Federal land bank. 
On May 6, Morgan again entered into the discussion over rural 
credits. On this occasion, he addressed himself to the bill under 
consideration (S. 2986) which had been introduced by Senator Henry 
Hollis of New. Hampshire. The Hollis bill was the one eventually 
adopted; and it provided for 12 Federal farm loan districts under the 
general administration of a Federal Farm Loan Board consisting of the 
Secretary of the Treasury and four other members. In addition, each 
district would have a Farm Loan Bank, capitalized at $750,000, in 
which cooperative farm loan associations held membership. Farmers 
belonging to these associations could secure long-term loans up to 40 
years on farm-mortgage security at interest rates lower than those 
prevailing in commercial banks. 
Morgan, on the whole, supported the Hollis bill, but conunented 
on two sections that he felt should be eliminated to improve it for 
the sake of the farmer: one, a section which authorized the creation 
34u. S.,:Congressional Record~ 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LUI, 
Part 5, 512S~5127. 
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of joint-stock banks; and two, the section which placed restrictions 
upon the loans. It was Morgan's belief that joint-stock banks should 
not be established under government auspices because they would be 
conducted for a profit, and, acting as middlemen between farmers and 
investors, they would be "clothed with power to levy unjust tribute 
on both borrowers and lenders.'' He declared, "They will be organized 
as money-making institutions." The argument was then presented that 
Germany had joint-stock banks, to which Morgan replied: "It is true 
that Germany has joint-stock banks •••• But the joint-stock banks 
were not intended primarily as farm-mortgage banks •••• Only 6 per 
cent of the business on these banks consists of loans on farm lands." 
Morgan concluded his argument against the joint-stock bank section 
by saying that "in organizing our system of land credits for the 
farmers of this Nation we should not create private, profit-sharing, 
surplus-creating, dividend paying, land-credit banks." As for the 
restrictions to be placed upon loans, Morgan asserted that the bill 
should not make loans restricted only for certain purposes. According 
to Morgan, there "are many legitimate purposes for which farmers will 
want to borrow money." He maintained that every land-credit system in 
Europe made loans without restrictions, and he said, "I am in favor of 
striking out all restrictions." Concluding his remarks, Morgan pro-
claimed that "the average American farmer will not borrow money unless 
it is for good purposes, and I am opposed to making a ward out of 
h . ,,35 i.m. Although Morgan's suggestions were not accepted, he had re-
affirmed his strong convictions concerning rural credits. 
35 U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, 
Part 8, 7544-7547. 
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On May 9, Representative Carter Glass, one of the chief sponsors 
in the House of the Hollis bill, yielded to freshman Congressman 
Hastings to speak in its behalf. For the most part, Hastings heralded 
the bill as one that "will have more far reaching and beneficial 
effect" than any other to be considered by the Sixty-fourth Congress. 
He expressed the need for such legislation by pointing out that the 
Federal Reserve Act had provided only for the short time six months' 
loan, and these loans were on first farm mortgage security for a period 
not to exceed five years. In Hastings' opinion, "the time is too 
short, renewals are too. frequent, and the interest rate of coilll!lercial 
banks are too high." Furthermore, Hastings asserted that the threat 
of foreclosure was always hanging over the farmer because of the risk 
of .the farming seasons. He reasoned:. 
It is only in exceptional cases where a farmer can borrow 
money at coilllllercial rates, buy a farm, and pay his note 
within the time usually granted by coilll!lercial banks. If 
crops fail and he is unable to meet the interest and the 
installment when due, the mortgage is foreclosed and he 
loses his initial payment, together with the time and work 
he has expended on it.36 
Hastings concluded his favorable. coilll!lents by saying that "the im-
portance of this bill cannot be overestimated" because it advances 
a means whereby the farmer may secu.re loans upon long terms at the 
lowest possible rate of interest and payable in small amortization 
37 payments. 
On the same day, Glass likewise yielded to Congressman Ferris to 
speak for the rural credits bill. Using a statistical approach to his 
36 U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIU, 
Part 8, 7702. 
37rbid. 
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argument, Ferris informed his colleagues that tenantry in the United 
States had increased 16.3 per cent from 1890 to 1910 whereas home 
ownership had increased only eight-tenths of 1 per cent. Ferris 
further revealed that in 1890, only 28.2 per cent of American farms 
carried mortgages, while by 1900, 31.6 per cent carried mortgages, and 
in 1910, 33.6 per cent of the farms carried mortgages. Ferris de-
clared that there were notable exceptions where farms were mortgaged 
due to lack of thrift and to mismanagement, but it was his contention 
that the Sixty-fourthCongress had the "solemn duty resting upon it 
to help reduce the interest the farmer must pay and liberalize the 
loans he must execute, to the end that he may retain his homestead, 
educate his children, and properly care for himself and his family 
in the station in which the American farmer deserves to live." Ferris 
disclosed that the total farm mortgages on American farms amounted to 
almost $4,000,000. The interest on this figure at 8 per cent, reasoned 
Ferris, would be $320,000,000. If by the legislation under considera-
tion, avowed Ferris, we can reduce the interest rate to 5 per cent, 
the drain in interest upon American farmers would be only $200,000,000, 
a saving to them of $120,000,000 annually. Ferris concluded by asking: 
Who is there present who would not be willing to say that the 
lifting of this partial load from the back of the farmer would 
be an inducement to the boy who has left the farm to return to 
it and try again?38 
Thus, Ferris, a veteran member of the Oklahoma delegation, added a 
strong voice in the affirmative. 
Another Oklahoma House member, Davenport, offered an amendment to 
38u. s., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, 
Part 8, 7724-7726. 
289 
the Hollis bill on May 12. The debated bill provided that the United 
States government would supply $750,000 capital to each of the 12 
Federal land banks for a beginning. Davenport's amendment, like.that 
provided in Morgan's bill, would have increased the initial sum from 
$750,000 to $1,000,000. Speaking at great length in defense of his 
amendment, Davenport explained that for years we have<been providing for 
all classes of business and all classes of enterprises in Congress, 
and everyone said it was for the good of the farmer. Now, said Daven-
port, we come to a proposition where we can really do some good for 
the farmer if we are willing. "I say to you that $1,000,000 is a 
small amount to start these banks with," exclaimed Davenport. He be-
lieved that America must realize that proper development of agriculture 
required capital. The mainstay of our government, claimed Davenport, 
is made up of the people who feed and produce the raw materials for 
our food and clothing, and yet they have not had any d.irect legisla-
tion in their behalf. Davenport concluded his speech by saying that 
the farmer and rural dwellers had not been provided for in the same 
manner as those who live in cities and those interested in corpora-
tions; therefore, according to Davenport, the passage of the bill was 
mandatory to give the farmers that to which they were entitled and for 
which they had so long contended. 39 Davenport's amendment was re-
jected, but he had presented an eloquent defense for rural credits. 
Davenport's remarks were complemented the same day by fellow 
delegate Murray. He saw the rural credits legislation as justifiable 
because it would prevent home-owning farmers from becoming tenants and 
39u. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIU, 
Part 14, 1058-1061. 
290 
aid tenant farmers in becoming home owners. However, Mur r ay, like 
Ferris, felt that the bill did not go far enough in regard to the 
tenant. He saw it as discrimination against the homeless who did not 
have the 45 per cent' of the cost of a farm required when seeking a 
loan. Murray believed that the prerequisite figure should be reduced 
to 10 per cent of the cost of the fann, and he offered an amendment to 
that effect. There were arguments, according to Murray, t hat this 
legislation was "special" legislation, but he answered these objections 
by contending that "special" laws had been passed for all classes of 
people from the railroad interests to the laboring man. Concluding his 
remarks, Murray declared that this was a "special" act enabling the 
tenant to become interested in his occupation and increase production, 
which would aid the whole society by lowering the cost of living. 40 
Murray's amendment failed, but his interest in the tenant farming class 
reflects the growing problem of agricultural unrest in his part of 
Oklahoma. 
On May 13, Morgan, displaying an intense interest i n the bill, 
offered three amendments. His first proposal was to lessen the l 
per cent per annum charge due on the loan for administration expenses 
to one-half of l per cent. Morgan reconunended this alteration because 
he felt that it would still be sufficient and, in addition, might de-
crease the "extravagance in the management of public affairs." His 
second proposition dealt with an extension of the time period of 
Federal land bank loans from 36 to 60-years. Morgan advocated this 
extension for two reasons : one, he k~ew that most European institu-
40 U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., lst Sess., 1916, LIII, 
Pare 8, 7884-7887. 
tions that loaned money had no date of payment; and two, he believed 
that it was the only way that the credit could reach a poor man. To 
give the poor man a loan for 60 years, argued Morgan, is to give him 
an opportunity to pay off the principal at a half of 1 per cent per 
I 
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annum. In his opinion, the limitation of loans to 36 years was a "dis-
crimination against the farmers of limited means." A third amendment 
sponsored by Morgan was to permit borrowers to pay off the principal 
or any part of it at any time in two years after the date of the 
mortgage. The Hollis bill would not allow the borrower to pay any 
part of the principal for five years. Morgan believed that the borrow-
er should be given every encouragement to pay his loan at the earliest 
d .bl 41 ate possi. e. Although all three of Morgan's amendments were re-
jected, they do indicate a strong interest on his part in making the 
credit facilities more acceptable to all classes of farmers. 
Also on May 13, Representative Thompson made his first speech of 
the Sixty-fourth Congress, and it dealt with rural credits, a topic 
which he had spoken for in the Sixty-third session. He began his re-
marks by describing the Hollis bill as the most important resolution 
that would come before the House because it involved "a subject that 
vitally affects 40,000,000 of our people, and on its proper solution 
depends on the happiness and prosperity of the whole country." Thomp-
son alleged that the farming class had been "discriminated against in 
the rate of interest they have been compelled to pay, from the period 
when our Government was established down to this time." He argued 
that while the United States government had been able to borrow at from 
41u. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, 
Part 8, 7918-7920. 
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2\ to 4 per cent, cities and school districts at 3 to 5 per cent, 
and railroads and other industrial corporations from 4~ to 6 per cent, 
the farmers had been "required to pay two, three, four, five, and often 
ten and twenty times that rate of interest." Thompson explained that 
farmers had finally learned that credit systems had been established 
that enabled practically every other character of business to secure 
money at greatly reduced rates, and they are demanding the same con-
sideration. "The farmer has the best security in the world--the land," 
proclaimed Thompson; "what he needs is some system that will connect 
him with the man who has money and wants to loan it on good security." 
Concluding his speech, Thompson maintained that the farmers of the 
United States are among its best credit risks: "They do not seek 
special favors; all they ask is fair terms. 1142 Thus Thompson added his 
support to the growing list of Oklahoma House members in favor of rural 
credits. 
On May 15, the day the bill passed the House for the first time, 
several Oklahoma delegates became involved in the debate over an amend-
ment proposed by a fellow representative, Hastings. As a member of 
the House Banking and Currency Connnittee, Hastings was deeply concerned 
over the outcome of the Hollis bill. He believed that section 15 was 
a nonworkable proposition, and therefore suggested an alternative. 
Hastings explained his fear that under the existing terms of section 
15, there would be too many delays in securing the loans. The method 
proposed by section 15 to obtain a loan was through a farm-loan associa-
tion of at least 10 persons, and the minimum amount borrowed must be 
42u. s., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, 
Part 8, 7941-7947. 
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$20,000. He felt that this provision was unworkable because the 
average loan would be, according to Hastings, about $500; and, in 
addition, there would be too much time consumed in establishing a 
loan association, if there were sufficient numbers applying for member-
ship, and finally being admitted. Hastings' amendment made provision 
that if no local association was formed within 90 days after the es-
tablishment of the Federal land bank in the district, then a farmer 
could apply directly for loans through local agents of the Federal 
land bank. According to Hastings, the amendment would cut about 30 
days' delay in the loaning process. 
Taking up the Hastings substitute were fellow Oklahomans, Morgan, 
Ferris, Thompson, and Davenport, who vigorously supported it. Their 
conunents were directed to section 15, which they described as cumber-
some and unworkable, whereas they viewed the Hastings alternative as 
practical, giving the land bank board more latitude and flexibility 
than that provided in Section 15. Ferris summarized their sentiments 
by saying, "Hastings has offered you a razor that will shave. 1143 The 
Hastings amendment was voted down, but not before a majority of the 
Oklahoma House members had made their feelings known concerning 
section 15, which they considered impractical. 
Before the roll call vote was taken, McClintic became the seventh 
of the Oklahoma delegates to speak for the rural credits bill. He 
praised the rural credits system, saying that where it had been in 
effect, it had caused "the people to be more energetic, thrifty, and 
more saving," which had the result of creating larger deposits and 
43u. s., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, 
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surpluses. McClintic believed that this would result in the creation 
of more capital in local communities to be used for the construction 
of different kinds of public works. Describing the legislation as 
"the best and foremost step ever taken by this Nation," McClintic 
related that it would allow the farmers to become better businessmen 
and enable them to solve their economic problems. He ended his speech 
by declaring that: 
The cost of production will be reduced and consumers as a 
result will be greatly benefited and lenders of money will 
find a better and safer market, as practically all the 
risks will be eliminated.44 
Thus, as the debate ended, only Carter of the Oklahoma group had failed 
to comment on the rural credits issue. 
The vote on the Hollis bill was 295 for, 10 against, and 125 not 
voting. Even though Carter abstained from the discussion, he joined 
the other seven Oklahoma representatives in voting for the bill. 45 The 
conference committee report was also accepted in the House on June 27, 
1916, by a vote of 311 to 12 with 108 not voting. The positive position 
of the Oklahoma delegation remained intact as all eight cast "yeas" to 
46 the roll call. From the debate there was little doubt remaining as 
to the posture of the Oklahoma contingent on the issue of rural credits. 
For Murray, Morgan, Ferris, and Thompson, it was an act that they had 
desired since the passage of the Federal Reserve Act. The four 
veterans received considerable help from two newcomers, McClintic and 
44u. s., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, 
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Hastings. Apparently the rural orientation of most of the Oklahoma 
Congressional districts affected the stand taken by Oklahoma's House 
members. Furthermore, the fact that several of the group, such as 
Murray and Ferris, had spent their early years on farms, gave them 
additional insight. Another factor which may have accounted for the 
increased participation for rural credits was the large 1914 vote of 
the Socialist Party, which had made its largest appeal to the farming 
and laboring classes. Of all the legislation enacted during the scope 
of this study, rural credits received the most discussion, most roll 
call attention, and unanimous support from the Oklahoma delegation. 
Another notable domestic reform that came about during the Wilson 
administration was the ''dollar matching" policy. Grants from the 
federal government to aid the states in education and internal im-
provements were almost as old as the Constitution, but throughout the 
nineteenth century, these grants had been made primarily in the form 
of land or the receipts from land sales. When Wilson became President, 
this source of supply had so nearly approached exhaustion that some 
new form of aid had to be found. It was discovered in the form of 
income tax revenue which was used to appropriate money by the federal 
government to the states provided that the federal appropriations be 
matched by money from the states. An urgent demand of the farmers 
was the improvement of roads in rural areas. The Federal Highway Act 
of 1916 met this demand as it applied the "dollar matching" principle 
to road building. The bill (H. R. 7617) was introduced by Congress-
man Dorsey Shackleford of Missouri, and provided an appropriation of 
$5,000,000 for the first year of distribution. Size, population, and 
existing mail routes were all factors in determining the amounts to be 
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allotted to each state. Four of the eight Oklahoma House members 
entered the debate in January, 1916, concerning the good roads pro-
posal. The first to speak was Hastings, who, on January 22, was 
yielded ten minutes by the bill's sponsor, Shackleford. Viewing the 
legislation as affecting every citizen of the United States, Hastings 
asserted that good roads meant better schoolhouses, increased attend-
ance at school, and therefore less illiteracy. Good roads would 
make it possible, he declared, to extend the rural mail service to 
every farmer's door and thus would allow him to enjoy the same mail 
privileges afforded by those living in cities. Hastings, who had 
introduced similar legislation on January 12, 1916 (H. R. 8819), con-
eluded by referring to the Shackleford resolutions: 
Over and above it will restore confidence to the farmers of 
this country and bring them to realize that their Representa-
tives in Congress have their welfare at heart, and that while 
the farmers of the country bear so much of the burdens of this 
Goverrunent in the way of taxation, Congress is ready and 
willing to give them recognition and to give them some of the 
benefits of this Goverrunent.47 
Hastings thus became an early and active participant in the campaign 
for better rural roads. 
Later on January 22, Shackleford yielded to Thompson from 
Oklahoma. It was Thompson's opinion that the debate over the good 
roads bill had demonstrated that those states which had been the 
greatest beneficiaries of tariff legislation were those that were 
unalterably opposed to any bill that appropriates money which might 
in any way benefit the farming and producing masses of the country. 
To those who oppose the bill by saying that it would aid in the "con-
47 U. s., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, 
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struction of cow trails," Thompson affirmed that the money was intended 
to aid in the "construction of roads from the farm, where the products 
that go to feed the multiplied millions of this earth are produced." 
Thompson ended his speech by warning the Congress that if it continued 
to neglect the laboring and producing masses of the country: 
We will soon be face to face with the condition which the 
British Parliament had to solve in Ireland less than half 
a century ago and which has called for an appropriation of 
two and one-half billion dollars out of the British Treasury 
to encourage a movement back to the farm in order that the 
British Nation might produce enough within its own borders 
to supply the necessities of its people.48 
Thus Thompson had added a strong voice for the good roads measure. 
On January 24, Congressman Davenport rose to speak for the good 
roads bill. He believed that the resolution was not political in 
nature, and he asked those who opposed it "not to vote against this 
measure from a selfish motive or because he feels his section of the 
country will not profit thereby." According to Davenport, "all of the 
people of the United States will be benefited if this measure becomes 
law." Davenport, a member of the House Conunittee on Roads from which 
the bill originated, stated that the United States was the only pro-
gressive nation of the world which had not given consideration to the 
construction of its highways. "All of the progressive nations of 
Europe," argued Davenport, "are giving national aid to their highways, 
while this Government has neglected to extend aid and has thereby 
imposed a burden of millions of dollars annually on our producers." 
Another argument for good roads presented by Davenport was that all 
people depended upon the products of the farm, and, as Davenport 
48u. s., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, 
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stressed, the cheaper you can bring those products to the door of the 
consumer the better off everyone would be. Davenport said that he 
• 
wanted to see the day when every farmer could haul his product to 
market over good roads "without being forced to drive in m\'.id up to the 
hub of his wagon." Calling for passage of the bill, Davenport expressed 
hope that in the future, the appropriations for road improvement would 
be greatly increased so that there would be "better opportunities for 
school and church attendance" which, in Davenport's opinion, "will in 
every way tend to upbuild the intellectual and moral standards of every 
community in the United States. 1149 It appears that Davenport was 
anxious for some type of legislation concerning rural road improvement. 
On the day of passage, January 25, McClintic commented on the 
Shackleford bill, but also pointed out the features of the good roads 
bill that he had introduced on December 6; 1915 (H. R. 620). 
McClintic contended that the gove:i;nment should assist in the building 
of roads, and as he viewed it, more i::o!a:.i\l..s: were necessary if the country 
wanted to "successfully develop the West." Roads were mandatory, 
according to McClintic, if the natural resources of the western country 
were to be transported to the thickly populated sections of the coun-
try. He declared that "the progress of every nation goes hand in hand 
with the development of its roads." McClintic then elaborated upon 
the provisions 0£. h1:,s ·'b-ill~ which differed little from the Shackleford 
proposition. In conclusion, he maintained that in the past the 
government had spent enormous amounts for rivers, harbors, and public 
buildings, and therefore, it was time that funds be appropriated for 
49u. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, 
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"those people who live in the rural districts, the tillers of the soil, 
50 the producers." As representative from the heavily rural southwestern 
section of Oklahoma, McClintic had a vested interest in the passage of 
this bill. Although Ferris did not participate in the good roads de-
bate, he did introduce H. R. 405 on December 6, 1915, which was a bill 
designed to aid states in the construction and maintenance of rural post 
roads. However, the bill was never reported out of conunittee. 51 Thus 
five of the eight Oklahoma representatives had taken an active part in 
the pre-roll call process, all expressing favorable connnents on the 
good roads resolution. 
The Shackleford bill passed the House on January 25, 1916, by a 
vote of 283 "yeas," 81 "nays," and 67 "not voting." Seven of the eight 
Oklahomans voted in the affirmative, with Ferris not voting. 52 The 
roll call absence of Ferris, however, indicated neither lack of 
interest nor opposition. The conference connnittee report was agreed 
to on June 28, 1916, with no roll call vote recorded. 53 The Oklahoma 
House delegation had openly displayed unanimity on the issue of good 
roads. Not only was this an expression of a desire to aid rural areas, 
but it also indicated that the Oklahoma contingent approved of the 
"dollar matching" principle which many opponents had declared unconsti-
50u. s., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LUI, 
Part 13, 172-174. 
51u. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, 
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52u. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, 
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tutional because they felt it infringed upon states' rights. The 
passage of the law thus marked an additional extension of federal 
power to be used in attaining domestic reform goals. 
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"Dollar matching" in education became an issue in the second 
session of the Sixty-fourth Congress as the Smith-Hughes bill was pro-
posed. This legislation was designed to allow Congress to appropriate 
funds, to be matched by the states, for education in commercial, in-
dustrial, and domestic science subjects in schools of less than college 
level. A board of vocational education, recommended by the bill, would 
be given the right to pass on the merits of the projects for which the 
various states proposed to use their allotments. 
The only two Oklahoma House members to expound on the vocational 
education issue were Hastings and Morgan. In the course of debate, 
Hastings became disturbed with the section of the Smith-Hughes bill 
(S. 703) which dealt with the distribution of the appropriation within 
the state. He asked the House sponsors of the bill how they planned 
to distribute the funds throughout each state "so as to reach the poor 
boy and the poor girl on the farm who is unable to pay board or go away 
from home to some city." The great concern of Hastings appeared to be 
the possible concentration of funds in a few schools, but he declared 
that he was "heartily in favor of the principles of the bill." It 
seems that Hastings wanted the control of funds to be placed in a 
Federal board instead of a state board; however, his wishes were not 
fulfilled as the act provided for control of the appropriations by the 
state board of education. Nevertheless, Hastings had shown by his 
participation in the debate his interest for vocational education which 
meant much to agricultural states like Oklahoma. In conclusion, 
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Hastings contended that "there is no more important bill pending before 
54 Congress." 
Prior to passage, Morgan expressed his continuing interest in 
vocational education by offering an amendment to S. 703. He wanted 
to make the teaching of "agricultural subjects" more specific by in-
eluding the study of "rural credits" and "cooperation in business 
among farmers" as part of the curriculum. Morgan believed that much 
was being accomplished in teaching better farming methods, but his 
concern was that "farmers are losing many millions of dollars every 
year because they have not been taught and trained to apply better 
business methods." Morgan reasoned that all of the business interests 
of the country were united, except the farmers who do not cooperate 
in business. The farmer must be informed on how to secure his proper 
share of the wealth he produces, asserted Morgan, and the way to do that 
is to adopt this amendment whereby he will learn how to cooperate in 
his business efforts. In the complex system of sale and distribution, 
Morgan emphasized that the middleman was taking "one-half of the value 
of the farm product," and he felt his amendment would help the farmer 
learn that he "can sell direct to the customer and thus cut out the 
cost of distribution. 1155 Morgan's amendment was rejected, but it did 
not thwart his continuing interest in the field of vocational educa-
tion. He had proposed vocational education legislation in the Sixty-
third Congress, and had spoken on behalf of the Smith-Lever Act of 
1914. No other House member from Oklahoma had spoken out and labored 
54 U. S., C
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as long on this issue as had Congressman Morgan. 
There was no roll call vote demanded either time the Smith-Hughes 
bill passed the House. It was first approved on January 9, 1917, 56 
and the conference report passed on February 16, 1917. 57 Therefore, 
the participation by Hastings and Morgan serve as the only indicators 
as to how the Oklahoma delegation responded to the issue of "dollar 
matching" in vocational education. It is notable that only two repre-
sentatives, Hastings, a newcomer, and Morgan, a veteran, lent vocal 
support to a bill that so vitally affected all districts in Oklahoma. 
Another accomplishment of the Sixty-fourth Congress that falls 
within the realm of progressive legislation was the Kern-McGillicuddy 
Workmen's Compensation Act of 1916 (H. R. 15316). Introduced by Repre-
sentative Daniel McGillicuddy of Maine, the act established a system 
of workmen's compensation for federal employees. The bill was drawn 
up with the aid of the American Association for Labor Legislation, 
and was described by a contemporary periodical as "the most scientific 
58 
and the most liberal compensation act in any country." It is still 
recognized by one of the foremost studies on the subject as "one of the 
59 
most advanced 'tll'Orkman' s compensatio.n laws in the world." 
None of the Oklahoma House members entered the July, 1916 debate 
56 U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1917, LIV, 
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concerning the workmen's compensation issue; however, a roll call vote 
was taken when it passed the House on July 12. Davenport, Ferris, 
Hastings, McClintic, Morgan, and Thompson were among the 287 votes 
for the bill. None of the Oklahoma delegates were to be found in the 
list of three dissenting votes; however, Murray and Carter were counted 
60 
with the 140 members who did not answer the roll call. The confer-
ence cormnittee report was accepted with no roll call on September 4, 
1916. 61 Therefore it appears that the Oklahoma delegation unanimously 
approved of this social reform. The fact that it received only three 
negative votes in the House could account for the lack of debate activi-
ty on the part of the Oklahoma members. On the other hand, the eight 
members had been quite vocal in the discussion of other issues, some of 
which had passed with scant opposition. 
In late surmner of 1916, a protracted dispute between the four 
railway brotherhoods representing the trairunen. and the management 
of the railroads threatened the country with a nationwide rail strike. 
When President Wilson personally intervened to effect a compromise, 
he secured the agreement of the brotherhoods to his proposal but failed 
to move the management. Wilson then went to Congress and asked for a 
law providing that the trairunen be paid on the basis of an eight-hour 
day. The President also recormnended that a cormnission be established 
62 to observe the effects of the eight-hour day. On September 1, 1916, 
60u. s., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, 
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the House passed the Adamson Act (H. R. 17700) introduced by William 
c. Adamson, Congressman from Georgia. The bill, which provided for 
the eight-hour day and the comrldasion to investigate its effects, 
passed the House by a vote of 239 to 56, with 132 not voting. 63 The 
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resolution was unanimously accepted in the Senate on September 2, and 
the President signed it on September 3, and the railroad strike was 
64 prevented. As on workmen's compensation, the Oklahoma House members 
chose to remain silent on this issue. However, Davenport, Hastings, 
McClintic, Morgan, Murray, and Thompson answered "yea" to the roll 
call. Carter and Ferris were recorded as "not voting. 1165 The Adamson 
Act was another step in the direction of general recognition of the 
eight-hour day as a reasonable basis not only of wages but of work. 
The lack of debate on the part of Oklahoma House members may be attrib-
uted to the short amount of time devoted by Congress to the railroad 
legislation due to the possibility of a strike. Another factor which 
accounted for the inactivity in the debate may have been the strong 
White House pressure that was being exerted for passage. The Oklahoma 
delegation positively responded by supporting the eight-hour legisla-
tion. 
What conclusions is it possible to draw about the attitude of 
Oklahoma Congressmen during the Sixty-fourth Congress? The six pieces 
of legislation that are considered progressive can be broadly defined 
63u. s., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, 
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into two categories: those dealing with labor reform, Le., Keating-
Owen, Kern-McGillicuddy, and Adamson; and those dealing with agri-
cultural reform, i.e., rural credits, good roads, and vocational educa-
tion. None of the labor reform bills received vocal support f rom any 
of the Oklahoma House members. On the othe~ hand, the roll ca ll votes 
show that all eight voted for the Keating-Owen Act, while six of the 
eight voted for the Kern-McGillicuddy and Adamson Acts. On t hese two 
occasions, Carter and Murrav. and Carter and Ferris were absent , re-
spectively. Therefore, there appears to be strong sentiment within the 
delegation for these social justice causes. 
In contrast, all of the legislat i on that was concerned with reform 
for the agricultural sector received both vocal and roll call attention 
from the Oklahoma House members. The rural credits bill provoked more 
discussion on the House floor among the Oklahoma delegation than any 
other single issue included in the scope of this study. I n addition, 
no other issue of this study generated more favorable support. Seven 
of the eight Oklahomans conmented on the bill at least once during the 
first session of the Sixty-fourth Congress. Only Carter remained silent 
on the issue, but he joined the remaining seven in throwing roll call 
support behind rural credits. The good roads legislation also stimu-
lated a great deal of interest within the Oklahoma group. Davenport, 
Hastings, McClintic, and Thompson participated in the debate, all from 
a positive stance. Furthermore, Ferris introduced good roads legisla-
tion, although he was the lone Oklahoma delegate co be absent for the 
roll call which indicated tnat the other seven vot.~d for the good roads 
bill. The thirG agricultural reform bill dealt with vocational educa-
tion. It drew praise from Morgan, an ardent worker on behalf of voca-
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tional education in earlier sessions, and Hastings, a first term 
representative. No roll call votes were taken on the Smith-Hughes 
Act, so little analysis can be made along those lines. Overall, the 
six pieces of progressive legislation passed by the Sixty-fourth 
Congress achieved virtual unanimity within the Oklahoma delegation as 
little dissension could be found. 
The near total agreement of the Oklahoma House members indicates 
several points. First, the record shows that there was a fundamental 
change of outlook on the part of most House members which undoubtedly 
influenced the Oklahoma members. The eight-member Oklahoma contingent 
moved with the progressive leadership in Congress and the White House, 
and on agricultural reform, particularly rural credits, led the way 
for change. In addition, the first term Congressmen, Hastings and 
McClintic, who were quite active, may have encouraged the veteran 
members to speak out more often. 
A second reason for the general consent among Oklahoma House mem-
bers was the desire to win re-election in 1916. The reform proposals 
of the Sixty-fourth Congress were designed to attract as many as pos-
sible of the voters who had supported the Bull Moose Party in 1912. 
Wilson himself boasted in his acceptance speech in 1916 that the Demo-
cratic Party had not only carried out its own platform pledges, but 
t f th f h P i P ~ wel1. 66 Th h mos o ose o t e rogress ve ar.y as et ree repre-
sentat1ves from districts three, four, and seven, concentrated in the 
southern half of Oklahoma, also had to nullify the rising tide of 
Socialism, and the party in power had to appeal to the disgruntled 
66Ray Stannard Baker aud William E. Dodd, eds., The Public Papers 
££. Woodrow Wilson (New York: Harper and Bros., 1925-1927), V, 200. 
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fanners and laborers in these areas. This may have accounted for the 
vigorous support for the agricultural and labor refonns. So there was 
obviously a contest for Progressive and Socialist Party support, and 
evidently the seven Democrats and one Republican felt that it was up to 
them to prove that as elected representatives they were the proper 
channel for domestic refonn. 
With the end of the Sixty-fourth Congress, progressivism in the 
United States was destined to pass, at least temporarily, into the 
limbo of forgotten things. So completely was the public mind taken up, 
first with the war itself, and then with the battle over the Versailles 
Treaty, that domestic policy faded in importance or interest. This is 
not the end, however, but only a stopping place. The thread of pro-
gressivism which has been developed in this study would reappear in 
the 1920's and would become extremely important in the early days of 
the New Deal. But how the Oklahoma House delegation would react at 
a later date is another story. 
CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The record of the thirteen men Oklahoma sent to the United States 
House of Representatives during the progressive era is a significant 
one. During the sixteen year scope of this study, Bird S. McGuire 
served twelve years; Scott Ferris and Charles Carter, ten; Dick T. 
Morgan and James S. Davenport, eight; William H. Murray and Joseph B. 
Thompson, four; Dennis T. F1lynn, Elmer Fulton, Charles Creager, Claude 
Weaver, William H. Hastings, and James v. McClintic, two each. Forty-
four issues were selected for this investigation, with -'twenty-one con-
cerning economic reform; seventeen, social reform; and six, political 
reform (see Appendix B). As indicated in Chapter III, the selection 
of these issues was based on the citation of these measures or actions 
by eight historians whose writings.concentrate on the progressive 
period (Benjamin P. DeWitt, Harold U. Faulkner, Henry F. Pringle, 
George E. Mowry, Russel B. Nye, Eric F. Goldman, Arthur S. Link, and 
Richard Hofstadter). 
McGuire's twelve years of service advance him as the record 
holder for length of term among the thirteen Oklahoma representatives. 
' His tenure lasted from ~he Fifty-eighth through the Sixty-third 
Congresses, with thirty-four of the forty:,-four issues falling in this 
time period. All six of the political reforrn issues were included in 
his legislative career, with McGuire voting for two of them: the 
'lfHl 
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campaign expenditures act of the Sixty-second Congress, for which he 
spoke, and the resolution for a Constitutional amendment for women's 
suffrage in the Sixty-third. On the other hand, he opposed the House 
rules change, or revolt against "Cannonism," and the Arizona statehood 
issue which concentrated on the initiative, referendum, and recall 
principles, especially the latter. In addition, he displayed a lack 
of interest in the Gonstitutional amendment for direct election of 
United States Senators, as he failed to vote or even to pair on it in 
the Sixty-second Congress, and he took no stand regarding the lobby 
investigation that took place in the Sixty-third Congress. 
Eleven of the seventeen social reform issues were presented during 
McGuire's service. He took no position on the three 1906 measures 
enacted while he was territorial delegate: Pure Food and Drug Act, 
Meat Inspection Act, and Employer's Liability Act. Even though McGuire 
had no vote he might have been interested enough to give his views. 
He supported the Second Employer's Liability Act of the Sixtieth Cong-
ress, and the Anti-Injunction Bill and the Workmen's Compensation for 
Railway Employees Act of the Sixty-second. Five social issues were 
introduced on which McGuire made no stand, including the Bureau of 
Mines Bill in the Sixtieth, the Children's Bureau and Eight-Hour Day 
for Government Contracts legislation in the Sixty-second, and the 
Smith-Lever and LaFollette Seamen's Acts of the Sixty-third. Apparent-
ly McGuire favored some social reforms, especially regarding labor, but 
his no-position stance ~n eight of the eleven issues indicates a dis-
interested attitude. 
McGuire had the opportunity to pass judgment on sixteen of the 
twenty-one issues dealing with economic reform. He remained silent on 
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the Hepburn Act of 1906, the one economic reform that was brought 
forth during his territorial delegate career. McGuire's protectionist 
philosophy was indicated by his support of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 
the Sixty-first Congress, and by the fact that he voted against four 
measures that dealt with lowering tariffs: Canadian Reciprocity, 
Farmer's Free List, wool and cotton duty reductions, and the Underwood-
Simmons Tariff. He voted for the Aldrich-Vreeland Act of the Sixtieth 
Congress, which many progressives opposed because they felt it would 
extend Wall Street's control over the money supply, and he opposed the 
Clayton Act of the Sixty-third Congress, which dealt with trust 
regulation. McGuire did vote for the Mann-Elkins Act and Postal Savings 
Act of the Sixty-first Congress, but took no position on either the 
income tax Constitutional amendment resolution of the Sixty-first, or 
the Federal Reserve Act and Federal Trade Commission Act of the Sixty-
third Congress. 
McGuire vocally addressed himself to only three of the thirty-four 
progressive issues that confronted him. On two occasions he spoke for 
higher tariffs, in the Payne-Aldrich and Underwood-Simmons debates, and 
the third concerned the noncontroversial campaign expenditures act, 
which passed the House by a vote of 307 to O. Furthermore, he offered 
no resolutions in his twelve years that could be considered progres-
sive in nature. Nor did he attempt to amend any proposals that would 
have given them a more progressive tone. 
Overall, McGuire cast himself in the non-progressive mold although 
he took a positive stand for eight of the thirty-four progressive 
issues. The remaining twenty-six he either opposed or took no stance 
thereon. His opposition to the House rules change and the recall pro-
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vision of the Arizona constitution, and his lack of enthusiasm for the 
direct election of United States Senators leaves him out of the ranks 
of those who shared the progressive hope for perfecting the democratic 
process. Although he did not directly oppose any of the social reforms, 
he displayed a significant lack of interest in such progressive matters 
as the abolition of child labor and the eight-hour day. Perhaps Mc-
Guire's non-progressive qualities are best revaled by his record on 
economic reform. He consistently supported higher tariffs, and his 
non-progressive stand on the tariff question was complemented by his 
negative attitude toward any form of trust regulation; he was the only 
Oklahoma delegate to oppose the Clayton Act. Further argument for his 
non-progressive tendencies would be the fact that he was the only 
Oklahoma delegate who did not support the income tax principle or the 
banking and currency reform provided by the Federal Reserve Act. 
McGuire's record falls far short of the progressive mark. 
Scott Ferris was elected to the Sixtieth Congress and remained 
there through the ten years which constitute this study. Thirty-two 
of the forty-four issues received his attention. On the political 
reform questions, Ferris maintained a perfect progressive record as he 
voted for all six, and spoke in support of four including the Consti-
tutional amendment for direct election of United States Senators, 
the initiative, referendum, and recall provisions of the Arizona con-
stitution, campaign expenditures, and lobby investigation. In addi-
tion, he offered resolutions providing for a Constitutional amendment 
for the direct election of United States Senators in the Sixtieth, 
Sixty-first, and Sixty-second Congresses. 
Thirteen of the seventeen social reforms were put forth during the 
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tenure of Ferris. He voted for nine and spoke in behalf of five. 
On the remaining four issues Ferris took no position. His connnitment 
to social reform was shown by his roll call support of the Second 
Employer's Liability Act, Bureau of Mines Bill, Keating-Owen Act, Kern-
McGillicuddy Workmen's Compensation Act, Children's Bureau, Eight-Hour 
Day on Government Contracts, Anti-Injunction Bill, and LaFollette 
Seamen's Act. 
Ferris took a progressive posture on fourteenofthe sixteen 
economic reforms that were proposed during his service. He was a 
strong advocate of tariff reform, as indicated by his speaking and 
voting against the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, and for Canadian Reciprocity, 
Farmer's Free List, and the Underwood-Sinnnons measures. Although he 
was silent on the Federal Reserve Act, he did lend roll call support. 
On the issue of trust regulation, he spoke and voted for the Clayton 
Act and, in addition, introduced two resolutions in the Sixtieth 
Congress concerning railroad regulation. Ferris was interested in tax 
and conservation reform as he cast a positive vote for the Constitu-
tional amendment providing for a graduated income tax, and he was the 
only Oklahoma representative in the Sixty-first Congress to denounce 
Secretary of the Interior Ballinger's conservation policies. Finally, 
he spoke for the improvement of the farmers' conditions by supporting 
the Federal Highway Act and the Federal Farm Loan Act. 
Ferris supported thirty-one of the thirty-five progressive 
matters in the ten years he served, speaking in behalf of fifteen. 
From the preceding evidence, Ferris falls within the mainstream of 
progressivism perhaps better than any of the other twelve representa-
tives. He voiced strong sentiments for tariff, tax, banking and mone-
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tary reforms; supported regulation of trusts by introducing two reso-
lutions on the subject and attempting to amend the Clayton Act to make 
the interlocking directorate clause more stringent; favored improve-
ment of the laborer by upholding legislation for the Abolition of Child 
Labor, the Eight-Hour day, Workmen's Compensation, Seamen's Welfare, 
and the Anti-Injunction bill; and backed improvement of the farmers' 
plight by supporting the parcels post, good roads, and rural credits. 
For these reasons, Ferris must be classified as one of the leading, 
if not the leading, spokesman for progressivism among the representa-
tives who served Oklahoma during the progressive period. 
Like Ferris, Charles Carter served ten of the sixteen years 
covered by this research, the Sixtieth through Sixty-fourth Congresses. 
He therefore encountered thirty-five of the forty-four issues selected 
for this study. In regard to political reform, Carter gave affirmative 
roll call support to the House rules change, Constitutional amendment 
for direct election of United States Senators, campaign expenditures 
regulation, and the initiative, referendum, and recall principles of 
the Arizona state constitution. On the other hand, he not only voted 
but spoke against the Constitutional amendment for women's suffrage. 
Apparently his attitude on that political reform, like President 
Wilson's, had not become sufficiently advanced. On the thirteen social 
reform issues, Carter voted for seven and took no position on six. 
He favored legislation pertaining to vJOrkmen's compensation, anti-
injunction, and abolition of child labor. However, his no-position 
stance on such reforms as the eight-hour day displays a certain lack 
of enthusiasm for social reform. The fact that he did not once speak 
for any of the social reforms also lends credence to the above argument. 
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Carter advanced~ progressive attitude on twelve of the sixteen 
economic reform issues. He spoke and voted consistently for tariff 
reform including a "nay" vote on Payne-Aldrich and "yea" votes for 
Canadian Reciprocity, Farmer's Free List, wool and cotton duty reduc-
tions, and the Underwood-Simmons Tariff. In legislation affecting 
trust regulation, Carter voted and spoke for the Clayton Act, but re-
mained silent on the Federal Trade Commission proposal. His support 
of the Constitutional amendment for an income tax and the Federal Farm 
Loan Act give additional proof of his desire to achieve economic reform. 
The one area of economic reform on which Carter appears weak is that of 
banking and currency, as he failed to vote for the Federal Reserve Act. 
Carter's favorable attitude toward twenty-three progressive issues 
and the fact that he opposed only one, women's suffrage, places him in 
the role of a progressive. Carter was a silent progressive as he 
addressed himself to only three of the twenty-three measures he sup-
ported. It should also be noted that he offered no resolutions of a 
progressive nature. Nevertheless, his strong voting record for 
meaningful progressive issues indicate Carter's convictions for pro-
gressivism. 
Dick T. Morgan was elected to four terms, serving from 1909 to 
1917. He had to answer to thirty-three of the issues embraced by this 
study. ~organ was one of the most active Oklahoma representatives, as 
he spoke on seventeen of the thirty-two propositions; introduced 
numerous resolutions dealing with vocational education, rural credits, 
and a federal trade commission; and offered amendments in an attempt 
to improve the Federal Reserve Act, the Smith-Hughes Act, and the 
Federal Farm Loan Act. Opposing only the House rules change in 1910, 
315 
Morgan was a strong advocate of political improvements as he spoke in 
direct support of the Constitutional amendment providing for direct 
election of United States Senators, the initiative, referendum, and 
recall provisions of the Arizona statehood issue, campaign expenditures, 
and the lobby investigation that President Wilson demanded. Although 
he did not speak, his vote was cast in the affirmative for the Consti-
tutional amendment for women's suffrage. 
Appearing as a friend of social reform, Morgan favored ten of the 
eleven issues related to this aspect of progressivism. His deliberate 
speeches and numerous resolutions concerning vocational education 
classify him as the most outspoken Oklahoma representative for this 
cause. In addition, he backed legislation for Workmen's Compensation, 
the Eight-Hour day, Abolition of Child Labor, and Anti-Injunction bill. 
Morgan's position on economic reform was mixed. For the most 
part, he adhered to the traditional Republican high protective tariff 
policy. In limited cases, however, he supported a revision of certain 
schedules downward. On the whole, he was a proponent of the Payne-
Aldrich Tariff, but did vote for the free lumber schedule and the pro-
posal to strike the countervailing duty on oil. Morgan opposed other 
tariff reform issues including Canadian Reciprocity, wool and cotton 
duty reductions, and the Underwood-Simmons Tariff. He did make 
additional overtures toward tariff reform by approving the Farmer's 
Free List, and he admitted in the wool tariff debate that a revision 
of duties on wool manufactures was in order. On trust regulation 
there was no doubt as to Morgan's opinion. According to the record, 
he was the first to propose a federal commission to regulate the large 
corporations, introducing and speaking for such legislation in both the 
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Sixty-third and Sixty-fourth Congresses. Morgan was nationally recog-
nized for his e.fforts to deal with the trust problem. Having failed to 
amend the Federal Reserve Act to provide for a bank guaranty clause 
and a rural credits system, Morgan opposed it. His impact was later 
felt on the Federal Farm Loan Act as he not only supported but offered 
three amendments which sought to improve the farmers' economic plight. 
Morgan's support of the ConstiUUtional amendment for an income tax and 
the parcels post legislation present further proof that his progressive 
spirit developed throughout his eight years of service. 
Although not aligning himself with the progressive Republicans on 
the House rules change, Morgan must be described as a progressive. He 
supported twenty-three of the thirty-three issues on which he was held 
accountable. His vocal and roll call support for the techniques to 
improve the mechanics of voting indicate that he desired political re-
form. He favored tax, banking, and currency reform as evidenced by the 
type of amendments that he pr~posed to alter the Federal Reserve Act. 
He stands out among the Oklahoma delegation as well as in the nation 
as a vigorous supporter of trust regulation. Apparently he held mixed 
emotions in regard to tariff reform, but it seems that he shifted with 
the progressive tide. Perhaps the strongest point to make in behalf 
of Morgan's progressivism was his intense interest in improving the 
conditions of the farmer and laborer. He campaigned for rural credits 
and vocational education throughout the Sixty-third and Sixty-fourth 
Congresses. 
James S. Davenport also served eight years covered by this sixteen 
year study, including the Sixtieth and Sixty-second through Sixty-fourth· 
Congresses. Twenty-eight of the forty-four issues were brought to his 
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attention, with eighteen receiving his support and ten on which he took 
no position. The evidence on Davenport indicates that his attendance 
record was poor during the Sixtieth and Sixty-second Congresses, which 
accounts for the fact that no position could be found for him on such a 
large number of issues. His roll call inactivity was complemented by 
his silence, as he spoke on only four measures. Five of the six 
political reform issues came across Davenport's desk, missing only the 
House rules change of the Sixty-first. One of the speeches he 
delivered was a strong supporting statement for the initiative, refer-
endum, and recall principles provided in the Arizona state constitution. 
He supported the Constitutional amendment providing for women's suffrage, 
but failed to vote on a similar amendment for direct election of United 
States Senators, the campaign expenditures act, and he remained unin-
volved in the lobby investigation issue. Davenport's roll call votes 
for Abolition of Child Labor, the Eight-Hour day, and Workmen's Compen-
sation manifest a willingness for social change. However, he failed to 
answer the roll call on several social reforms such as the Bureau of 
Mines Bill, Second Employer's Liability Act, and the Anti-Injunction 
Bill. Davenport's most consistent record for change comes within the 
realm of economic reform. He did not miss a single vote on the five 
tariff reform questions presented and indicated his tariff ph;f.l.o.~phy 
by speaking for the Underwood-Simmons downward revisions. In addition 
he voted for the Federal Reserve Act and Federal Farm Loan Act, which 
displayed a desire for banking and currency reform. His support for 
trust regulation was demonstrated by a speech and a roll call vote for 
the Clayton Act. Although Davenport at times missed roll calls and 
debated infrequently, his support of eighteen of the twenty-eight issues 
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cl,&s.s,t;p~eS:''~~,$,. a P1iO-g:Jt:e,s:$:ive. This description can also be main-
tained because he opposed none of the remaining ten issues. Despite 
his spotty voting record, enough evidence can be garnered to show that 
he advocated tariff, banking and currency reform; trust regulation; 
increased public participation in political decision making; and ad-
vancements for the farmer and laborer. 
William H. Murray served in the Sixty-third and Sixty-fourth Cong-
resses. Fourteen of the forty-four issues were brought forth during 
this time span, including two political, seven social, and five eco- _ 
nomic. Most of the important political reform issues occurred before 
Murray's time, but he did introduce a resolution which would have pro-
vided for an investigation into the lobbying activities during the 
Sixty-third Congress. Moreover, he delivered a strong speech against 
the alleged lobby. Murray saw fit to oppose the other political reform, 
women's suffrage. Among the social reform issues, Murray voted for 
Abolition of Child Labor, the Eight-Hour day, and Vocational Education, 
being recognized as one of the leading spokesman for the latter. But it 
was on economic reform that Murray made his greatest contributions to 
progressivism. He both spoke and voted for the four planks of Wilson's 
"New Freedom" platform: the Underwood-Simmons Tariff, the Federal 
Reserve Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act. 
He proposed a series of amendments to the Federal Reserve Act, the 
Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act. He succeeded in 
altering the Federal Reserve Act so that each of the twelve districts 
was represented on the Federal Reserve Board, but his attempts to 
strengthen the power of the Federal Trade Commission were rejected; 
nevertheless, it displayed his sentiments concerning trust regulation. 
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Proposals offered by Murray to liberalize the rural credits section 
of the Federal Reserve Act were eventually adopted in the Federal Farm 
Loan Act. He and others campaigned for and eventually won exemption 
for farmer and laborer groups in the anti-tr4st section of the Clayton 
Act. Murray had the distinction of being the only Oklahoma repre-
sentative who spoke for the Hull income tax clause of the Underwood-
Simmons measure. Thus on the five economic reform issues, Murray lent 
both roll call and vocal support to the progressive cause. 
Murray therefore favored eleven of the fourteen progressive 
measures and must be considered as playing a strong role for reform 
despite his serving only four years. His presence was keenly felt on 
tariff, banking, and currency reform; trust regulation; improvements 
for the laborer in the form of Keating-Owen Child Labor and Adamson 
Eight-Hour Acts; and improvements for the farmer through vocational 
education, good roads, and rural credits. 
Joseph B. Thompson also served four years, from 1913 to 1917. On 
the two political reforms, he favored the women's suffrage Constitu-
tional amendment resolution, but took no position with regard to the 
lobby investigation. Social reforms that met Thompson's approval were 
Abolition of Child Labor, the Eight-Hour day, and Federal Workmen's 
Compensation. He took no position on the Smith-Lever and Smith-Hughes 
vocational education acts. On economic reform, Thompson adhered to 
tariff revision downward, rural credits, and trust regulation. He made 
a lengthy speech pertaining to the rural credits section of the Federal 
Reserve Act, but did not vote either positively or negatively on the 
bill, apparently because of the weak rural credits provisions. His 
energetic campaign for rural credits was finally realized in the Federal 
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Farm Loan Act, on which he delivered positive remarks. Thompson's 
concern for the farmer and laborer was elaborated when he spoke in favor 
of exempting such groups from the anti-trust provisions of the Clayton 
Act. 
Thus Thompson favored eight of the fourteen issues that arose in 
the Sixty-third and Sixty-fourth Congresses, speaking on four. He must 
be considered a progressive because of his reform attitudes toward the 
tariff, child labor, workmen's compensation, the eight-hour day, women's 
suffrage, good roads, rural credits, and trust regulation. 
The remaining six representatives, Flynn, Fulton, Creager, Weaver, 
Hastings, and McClintic, served only two years each, producing less 
evidence on which to base conclusions. Dennis T. Flynn served as 
territorial delegate in the Fifty-seventh Congress, the first session 
analyzed by this research. There were only four major progressive 
issues to which Flynn might have addressed himself. All four were 
primarily economic in nature; three dealt mainly with Roosevelt's 
early attempts at trust regulation, the fourth being concerned with 
conservation. Flynn offered no response to any of these four national 
issues either from a negative or positive view. It appears that Flynn, 
having previously served as territorial delegate for three terms, 
did not intend to become involved in national legislation as he 
approached retirement, especially since he could retire on his fame 
connected with the "free homes" legislation. Because of the opportunity 
that delegates possessed to spe~k on the House floor and because of the 
numerous newspaper outlets in the territory, Flynn could have taken a 
position if he had so desired. Therefore, Flynn does not meet the 
qualifications of a progressive. 
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Elmer L. Fulton served only in the Sixtieth Congress, an inactive 
one since only three.of the forty-four issues were brought forth during 
its tenure. None were related to political reform, two pertained to 
social change, and one on economic reform. According to the record, 
Fulton voted progressive on all three issues, for the Bureau of Mines 
and Second Employer's Liability, and against the Aldr_ich-Vreeland Ac.t. 
The seven resolutions that Fulton introduced are the best indication 
of his relation to progressivism. The seven included Constitutional 
amendments that would have provided for the recall of Representatives, 
the initiative, referendum, and recall, the direct election of United 
States Senators, and an income tax. In addition, he sought legislation 
that would prohibit campaign contributions by corporations, repeal 
duties on agricultural implements, and amend the Sherman Act to make 
restraint of trade a felony instead of a misdemeanor. Based on the 
character of these resolutions, Fulton was a progressive because he 
desired political innovations, tax and tariff reform, and the regula-
tion of trusts. His votes for employer's liability and a Bureau of 
Mines indicate that his progresa,tvism was not limited to political 
and economic reforms. 
Charles Creager was elected to the Sixty-first Congress. Only six 
of the forty-four issues emerged during those two years, one dealing 
with political reform and the other five, economic reform. However; 
two of these issues, the House rules change and the Payne-Aldrich 
Tariff, were significant measures of a representative's progressivism. 
On both, Creager voted non-progressive, casting a "nay" vote on the 
Norris proposition to change House rules and both speaking and voting 
for the protectionist Payne-Aldrich Tariff. On the other hand, Creager 
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•oted for the income tax Constitutional amendment and postal savi ngs, 
1ut took no stand on Mann-Elkins or the Ballinger-Pinchot conservation 
ontroversy. Even though Creager's response to tax reform may have 
eemed progressive, his negative position on tariff and politica l reform 
ymbolizes a non-progressive attitude. 
The Sixty-third Congress was Claude Weaver's only tenn as Ok lahoma 
epresentative. Eight of the progressive issues fell within tha t time 
pan. On political reform, Weaver voted against women's suffrage and 
emained silent on the lobby investigation. The Sixty-third Congress 
assed two social reform issues, the Smith-Lever and LaFollette Seamen's 
cts, with Weaver taking no position. In contrast, Weaver strongly 
3vored the economic reforms enacted by the Sixty-third session i n-
luding the Underwood-Simmons Tariff, the Federal Reserve Act, t he 
layton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act. He delivered 
Jsitive speeches both in the House and in Oklahoma on the benef i ts of 
~e Federal Reserve Act. Weaver, as a member of the House Banking and 
~rrency Committee, helped draft the Federal Reserve legislation, and 
35 commended by Chairman Career Giass for his work. Based on h i s 
entiments concerning tariff, banking, and currency reform, plus his 
~dorsement of trust regulation, Weaver was a progressive. 
William W. Hastings represented Oklahoma's second district i n the 
Lxty-fourth Congress. Six reforms were presented, five social and 
1e economic. Hastings voted with the progressives on all six issues, 
1cluding che Keating-Owen Child Labor Act, che Kern-McGillicuddy 
,rkmen's Compensation Act, the Federal Highway Act, the Adamson Eight-
1ur Day Act, the Smith-Hughes Act, and the federal Fann Loan Act. He 
1ve emphatic speeches in support of the federal Highway Act, Smith-
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Hughes Act, and Federal Farm Loan Act. Furthermore, he offered a reso-
lution for the improvement of rural roads, and attempted, by proposing 
an amendment, to liberalize the Federal Farm Loan Act by making loans 
more accessible to all classes of farmers. Although having no oppor-
tunity to express his convictions on political reform, Hastings, on 
the social and economic reforms, stood for progressivism. 
James v. McClintic was also a member of the Sixty-fourth Congress. 
He supported five progressive issues and took no position on the sixth, 
the Smith-Hughes Act. Good roads were important to McClintic, as he 
spoke; voted, and introduced legislation in support of that cause. 
His advocacy of the Abolition.of Child Labor, Workmen's Compensation, 
the Eight-Hour day, Good Roads, and Rural Credits indicate progressive 
behavior on the part of Mcclintic. 
Thus from 1901 to 1917 Oklahoma sent to the United States House of 
Representatives ten progressives and three non-progressives. The ten 
progressives actively sought political reform, dissenting only on the 
question of women's suffrage. Their support of social reform was less 
vocal, but not once did the Oklahoma House progressives vote against 
any of the seventeen social issues. Perhaps their greatest impact 
was felt in the area of economic reform, with Morgan, Murray, and 
Ferris leading the way, espec.ially on such vital progressive issues as 
the Underwood-Simmons Tariff, Constitutional amendment for an income 
tax, Federal Reserve Act, Clayton Act, Federal Trade Commission Act, 
and Federal Fann Loan .Act. ·l.n regard to speeches and legislation pro-
posed, Ferris and Morganemerge as the most active progressives among 
those who served long~r periods, whereas Murray and Hastings appear 
as the most active among the representatives who were elected for two 
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terms or less. Ferris' record shows that he supported all types of 
progressive legislation and is perhaps the most well-balanced pro-
gressive of the ten. Morgan's progressive spirit grew throughout the 
period, and he seems to be the Oklahoma House progressive most inter .. 
ested in economic reform. 
The remaining question to be answered by this study is to what 
degree, if any, do the ten Oklahoma House progressives fit the "progres..: 
sive profile" of the Mowry-Chandler-Hofstadter thesis, which has 
traditionally been the principal model for determining a progressive. 
Mowry examined the personal histories of forty-seven California pro-
gressives in order to form a composite portrait of the "typical" 
progressive. This person, according to Mowry, was a middle-class 
Protestant with a west-European background and/or a north-European 
name; he was quite often a Mason; young, under forty years of age; and 
1 
well-educated. Three years later, Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. made a 
study of 260 national progressive leaders and reached similar con-
clusions. Chandler's "typical" progressive was likely to be urban 
and middle-class, a native Protestant American, a professional man and 
college graduate, and one who had had little experience in politics 
2 
except on the local level. Hofstadter accepted the Mowry-Chandler 
studies, combining the results with the results of his own research 
to develop seemingly impressive ideas about progressivism. According 
1George E. Mowry, The California Progressives (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1951), 86-88. 
2Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., "The Origins of Progressive Leadership," 
in Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard Uni;;;;sity Press; 1954), VIII, Appendix III, 
1462-1465. 
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to Hofstadter, the ferment of the progressive era was an urban, 
middle-class response to changing patterns in American society, a status 
revolution of the middle-class against the "newly rich, the grandiosely 
1 . h h f . 113 or corrupt y ric, t e masters o great corporations. 
In my Oklahoma study, I have used the same biographical criteria 
as the Mowry-Chandler-Hofstadter thesis to show the similarities and 
dissimilarities of the ten Oklahoma progressives as compared with the 
"typical" progressive described by the above thesis. In addition, my 
conclusions will analyze the biographical relationships of the three 
non-progressives from Oklahoma to the "typical" progressive proposed by 
the standard thesis. The seven most important biographical aspects 
examined follow. 
1. Age. Compositely, the California progressive was a young man, 
4 
often under forty years of age. In Oklahoma, the average age of the 
ten progressives upon taking the oath of office was slightly olde~ at 
42.5 years. On the other hand, the three non-progressives averaged 
36 years of age, 6.5 years less than the progressives. One of the 
most active House progressives from Oklahoma, Ferris, took the oath 
of office at the age of 30 in 1907, and remained in the House through-
out the duration of this study, making him only 40 by 1917. Other 
Oklahoma House progressives who fall into the Mowry-Chandler-Hofstadter 
3Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1955), 131-137. In analyzing the progres-
sives in Wisconsin Robert Maxwell, LaFollette and the Rise of the 
Progressives in Wisconsin (Madison: State Historical Society of Wiscon-
sin, 1956), 4-5, and Russel B. Nye, Midwestern Progressive Politics: 
~ Historical Study of~ Origins and Development, 1870-1958 (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1959~ 183-185, drew much the same conclusions. 
4 Mowry, The California Progressives, 86. 
326 
age category were Carter and McClintic, who were sworn in at the ages 
of 38 and 36, respectively. Five other Oklahoma progressives were less 
than 45 years old at the time of their election: Thompson; 41; Murray, 
43; Davenport, 43; Fulton, 44; and Weaver, 45. However, Morgan, an 
ardent progressive on all issues except tariff reform, was elected at 
the age of 55 and by 1917 was 63, and Hasting~ an outspoken progressive 
of the Sixty-fourth Congress, was 50 when he was sworn in. The three 
non-progressives, Flynn, Creager, and McGuire, were all quite young when 
assuming the duties of a representative. Flynn was 31, Creager 35, 
and McGuire 43 when elected. 
2. Origins. In deal.ing with their nativity, Chandler remarked that 
his 260 progressives "were native born" with "only nine being born out-
side the United States. 115 Mowry commented that the California progres-
sives "had probably been born in the Middle West ••• and ••• carried 
6 
a north-European name." The ten Oklahoma House progressives were all 
nativ~-American, but so were the three non-progressives. Only three 
of the ten progressives came from the Middle West: Ferris from 
Missouri, Fulton from Iowa, and Morgan from Indiana. On the other hand, 
two of the three non-progressives originated in the Middle West, 
Creager from Ohio and McGuire from Illinois. Flynn, the third non-
progressive, was born in Pennsylvania. Of the remaining seven pro-
gressives, Carter was born in Indian Territory, and the other six were 
5 . 
Chandler, "The Origins of Progressive Leadership,'' 1462. 
6 Mowry, The California Progressives, 57. In dealing with pro-
gressives in general, and not just those of California, Mowry adds that 
"an overwhelming proportion ••• came from old American stock with 
British origins consistently indicated." See George E. Mowry, The Era 
of Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of Modern America, 1900-191_2_ --
(New York: Harper and Row-;--T958), 86°:" 
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native to the South; four came from Texas.i Murray, Thompson, Weaver, 
and McClintic; one from Arkansas, Hastings; and one from Alabama, Daven-
port. The ten progressives as well as the three non-progressives 
carried north-European names. It appears that Mowry's thesis on origin 
in the Middle West holds true for two of the more active progressives, 
Ferris and Morgan, but the other eight were Southern in origin. 
3. Geographical Distribution. Chandler writes that progressive leaders 
were city men, and Hofstadter states that the ferment of the progressive 
7 
era was urban. Only two of the ten progressives, Murray and Mcclintic, 
came from municipalities of less than 2,500, the population figure used 
in 1910 by the Bureau of the Census in dividing rural from urban. How-
ever, three other progressives, Morgan, Thompson, and Hastings, were 
drawn from locations with fewer than 3,000 inhabitants, and a fourth, 
Davenport, was a resident of a town of slightly over 4,000. According 
to the 1910 census data, there were eight cities in Oklahoma with 
a population over 10,000, and four Oklahoma representatives lived in 
three of these. Two progressives, Weaver and Fulton, resided in Okla-
homa City, which had a 1910 population of 64,205; and two non-progres-
sives, Creager and Flynn, came from Muskogee and Guthrie, which had 
populations of 25,278 and 11,654, respectively. The third non-progres-
sive, McGuire, came from a rural village of 2,161. Carter and Ferris, 
the other two progressives, dwelled in cities that fell between the 
4,000 to 10,000 range, Ardmore and Lawton, which had populations of 
8,618 and 7,788, respectively. 
7chandler, "The Origins of Progressive Leadership," 1462; Hof-
stadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R., 131. 
RURAL 
(2,500 or less) 
CITIES 
(2,500 to 10,000) 
CITIES 
(Over 10,000) 
Progressives 
McClintic (1,122) 
Murray (1,408) 
Thompson (2,689) 
Morgan (2,696) 
Hastings (2,891) 
Davenport (4,082) 
Ferris (7, 788) 
Carter (8,618) 
Weaver (64,205) 
Fulton (64,205) 
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Non-Progressives 
McGuire (2,161) 
Flynn (11, 654) 
Creager (25,278) 
Although the nomenclature used by Chandler and Hofstadter is confusing, 
it would appear that eight of the ten Oklahoma House progressives could 
hardly be described as coming from highly urban areas. 
4. Occupation. Chandler found that the occupations of his progressive 
leaders clearly linked them with the urban middle class, with over sixty 
per cent being professional men. He discovered that among the 260 
8 progressives there were no.:farmers or laboring men. Mowry' s summary 
notes that the California progressives were "a group of highly literate, 
independent free enterprisers, and professional men. 119 Both progres-
sives and non-progressives from Oklahoma's House delegation were pre-
dominantly middle-class professionals and businessmen. Eight of the 
ten progressives and two of the three non-progressives were lawyers, 
the exceptions being Creager, a non-progressive, who was a newspaper-
man; McClintic, a progressive, who was a small businessman-merchant; 
and Carter, a progressive, who was a farmer-rancher. However, in 
8 Chandler, "The Origins of Progressive Leadership," 1462-1463. 
9Mowry, The California Progressives, 88. 
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addition to Carter, seven of the progressives, Ferris, Morgan, Daven-
port, Murray, Thompson, Hastings., and McClintic, were either born or 
reared on a farm. Ferris and Murray owned farms during their legisla-
tive tenure, and Morgan and Murray had taught in the rural schools. 
Thus the evidence shows that eight of the ten progressives as well as 
two of the three non-progressives were professionals. But it appears 
that a large percentage of the progressives were sons of farmers, 
whereas none of the non-progressives were. 
5. Education. Seventy-five per cent of the California progressives, 
. 10 Mowry found, had received a college education. Chandler remarks that 
"at a time • when college graduates were much fewer, over sixty 
per cent ••• were professional men, a large number of whom attended 
11 graduate schools." Six of the ten Oklahoma House progressives were 
college graduates, including Ferris, Weaver, and Hastings, who were 
trained in law schools, and Morgan, Murray, and Thompson, who graduated 
from small four-year institutions. Of the remaining four progressives, 
Fulton and Mcclintic had attended college but apparently never graduat-
ed, whereas neither Davenport nor Carter had received any higher educa-
tion. McGuire, Creager, and Flynn, the three non-progressives, had 
attended college but never graduated. Oklahoma's House progressives 
thus fell below the seventy-five per cent of Mowry's study but within 
the sixty per cent of Chandler's survey. 
10 Mowry, The California Progressives, 87. Writing of the national 
"reformers," he adds that "most ••• had had a college education in a 
day when a degree stamped a person as coming from a special economic 
group." See Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of 
Modern America, 1900:f91z-;-a6°:-
ll Chandler, "The Origins of Progressive Leadership," 1462. 
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6. Previous Political Experience. Chandler states that the national 
progressives had had little experience outside of local politics. 12 
Four of the ten Oklahoma House progressives, Fulton, Weaver, Carter, 
and Hastings, had held no elective office prior to their service in 
Congress. On the other hand, Ferris, McClintic, Thompson, and Murray 
had all served two or more terms in the Oklahoma legislature, with 
Murray acting as the first Speaker of the Oklahoma State House of 
Representatives. Morgan was elected to two terms in the Indiana 
legislature before coming to the Sooner State. Davenport's elective 
office was least significant, as he had been mayor of Vinita for two 
terms. Both Thompson and Murray had been active in state Democratic 
circles, with the former representing Oklahoma as a delegate to the 
Democratic national conventions of 1900, 1904, and 1908, and the 
latter attending the 1908 and 1912 conventions in the same capacity. 
Thompson, in addition, was chairman of the Democratic state committee 
in 1906 and 1908, helping in the Bryan victory in Oklahoma in the latter 
year. The three non-progressives, Flynn, McGuire, and Creager, had 
never held an elective office previous to their election to the United 
States House. Thus it appears that Oklahoma's non-progressives fit 
Chandler's observations better than the progressives, five of whom 
were significantly active outside of local affairs. 
7. Religious and Fraternal Associations. In dealing with the religion 
of the progressive leaders, Chandler states only that they were Pro-
13 
testant. Mowry goes into more detail: "The long religious hand of 
12Ibid., 1464. 
13Ibid., 1462. 
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New England rested heavily upon California progressivism •••• Of the 
twenty-two progressives whose biographies indicate a religious affilia-
tion, seven were Congregationalists, two were Unitarians, and four 
Ch . . s . . ,,14 were ristian cientists. Eight of the ten Oklahoma House progres-
sives expressed a religious preference in their biographies, all of 
them Protestant. The Methodist, Presbyterian, and Christian denomina-
tions were represented among the eight. This seems to resemble some-
thing other than the New England influence discussed by Mowry. All 
three of the non-progressives declared a religious affiliation, with 
McGuire and Creager, Protestant, and Flynn, Catholic. Mowry's Cali-
15 fornia progressive "was more often than not a Mason.'-' According to 
their biographies, six of the thirteen Oklahoma House members were 
affiliated with the Masonic order, four progressives, Ferris, Hastings, 
Mcclintic, and Carter, and two non-progressives, Creager and McGuire. 
It appears that the six could well be described as multiple joiners, 
since they also listed membership in other fraternal groups such as 
Odd Fellows, Elks, and Shriners. 
It has now been illustrated that the ten Oklahoma House progres-
sives were in many ways dissimilar to the "progressive profile" 
theorized by the Mowry-Chandler-Hofstadter thesis. The two greatest 
disparities occur with regard to political experience and geographical 
distribution, with the Oklahoma House progressive having achieved a 
more solid political background, and originating from a more rural 
or small town environment. FU:rthermore, the Oklahoma House progres-
14 Mowry, The California Progressives, 88. 
15Ibid. 
sive differed in that he tended to be slightly older, and somewhere 
in his occupational background he had been associated with farming. 
More than likely he came from the South rather than the Middle West. 
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And yet there are common denominators when one compares the Okla-
homa House progressive to the "progressive profile." All ten of the 
progressives were born in the United States of north-European ancestry. 
Of the eight declaring a religious preference, all were Protestant, 
and of those affiliated with a fraternal association, all were Masons. 
The percentage of the ten progressives receiving a college degree was 
slightly less than Mowry's study, but the same as Chandler's. 
On the other hand, the three non-progressive Oklahoma House 
members likewise fit many of the criteria laid down by the Mowry-
Chandler-Hofstadter thesis. On age and degree of political experience, 
they more nearly resemble the "progressive profile" than the progres-
sives, as they averaged 36 years, and none of them had ever held an 
elective office prior to serving in Congress. The greatest difference 
between the three non-progressives and the "progressive profile" was in 
education, as none were college graduates. But on origins, occupa-
tion, geographical distribution, religious and fraternal associations, 
the three non-progressives conformed to the Mowry-Chandler-Hofstadter 
thesis. 
It therefore appears that though.the Oklahoma House progressive 
was very much like Chandler's national progressive leader and Mowry's 
Californian, he was also very much like the three non-progressives. 
That the Oklahoma House progressive was not unique in some of the 
features mentioned by Mowry and Chandler, belies their "progressive 
profile," and disrupts their resulting theories, seized on by Hof-
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stadter and others to explain partially, if not completely, the de-
velopment of progressivism. 
The ten Oklahoma House progressives may be more appropriately 
described by the hypotheses presented in the interpretative essays by 
Arthur S. Link16 and Anne F. Scott. 17 Both of these historians recog-
nize the presence of the Populist element, or at least agrarian 
interests, in the growth of progressivism. It appears that Oklahoma's 
House progressives, many of them sons of farmers, were influenced 
chiefly by the Populist traditions. They inherited the philosophy 
underlying the agrarian crusade, i.e., it was the government's duty to 
intervene directly in economic affairs in order to benefit submerged 
or politically impotent interests. Hence, planks from the Populist 
Party platformwere still an important part in the thinking of the 
Oklahoma House progressives. Direct election of United States Sena-
tors, a graduated income tax, rural credits, parcels post, corporation 
regulation and Wall Street control, which had been Populist causes, 
were also the causes of Oklahoma Congressmen. 
Examples of their strong rural sentiment abound in their speeches, 
as even the members who represented the more urban districts often 
spoke eloquently of the simplicity and the inherent goodness of life 
on the farm. Poetry was, read, t:he Deity was petitioned, and stories 
16Arthur S. Link, "The Progressive Movement in the South, 1870-
1914," North Carolina Historical Review, XXIII (April, 1946), 172-195; 
Link, "The South and the 'New Freedom': An Interpretation," American 
Scholar, XX (Summer, 1951), 314-324. 
17Anne F. Scott, "A Progressive Wind from the South, 1906-1913," 
Journal of Southern History, XXIX (February, 1963), 53-71. 
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were told to emphasize their concern for the farmer, whom they con-
sidered the backbone of their country. As a majority of the Oklahoma 
House progressives were reared on the farm, they usually mentioned 
their rural background and the hard toils of their youth in the country. 
In addition to the agrarian or Populist influence on the Oklahoma 
House progressives, there was increasingly a humanitarian and a pro-
labor strain and a general philosophical willingness to extend the 
direct intervention of the federal government in economic, social, and 
political life. As the climate of opinion in Oklahoma as well as the 
nation became more receptive to progressive principles of this broader 
scope, these too were reflected in the votes and speeches of Oklahoma's 
representatives, although not to the extent of agricultural reform 
issues. 
Although neither Link nor Scott draw a "progressive profile" such 
as the one proposed by the Mowry-Chandler-Hofstadter thesis, I believe 
that the ten Oklahoma House progressives could be a starting point for 
a parallel "progressive profile" thesis. The preceding evidence clearly 
indicates that the Oklahoma progressive possessed certain character-
istics. differing from that of the "typical" progressive described by 
Mowry and Chandler; he was usually over 40 years of age rather than 
under, was native to the South rather than the Middle West, had a 
strong rural background rather than urban, and had a considerable 
amount of prior political experience rather than being a political 
novice. Therefore, it behooves historians of the progressive era to 
investigate progressivism.more thoroughly by researching United States 
House delegat.ions or similar state studies before they rely so heavily 
on the national study done by Chandler and the one state study 
investigated by Mowry. Perhaps if additional "progressive profiles" 
were drawn at the state level, a more accurate and representative 
national profile could be presented. 
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It must be concluded that the contributions of the ten Oklahoma 
House progressives were in many ways significant to the progressive era. 
The leadership of Ferris on a broad range of progressive issues, the 
influence of Morgan on the Federal Trade Commission and Federal Farm 
Loan Acts, the impact of Murray on the Federal Reserve and vocational 
education acts, the role of Weaver in the formulation of the Federal 
Reserve, and the strong roll call support of all ten Oklahoma House 
progressives prove that Oklahoma's role in shaping progressive legis-
lation was no less important than any other state delegations during 
the progressive era. Their accomplishments laid the groundwork for 
other reforms yet in the future, reforms in which some of them or 
their children would play a vital part. 
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APPENDIX A 
Fifty-Seventh Congress 
1. Newlands Reclamation Act of 1902 
2. Elkins Act of 1903 
3. Bureau of Corporations in newly created 
Department of Connnerce and Labor of 1903 
4. Northern Securities Case of 1902 
Fifty-ninth Congress 
1. Hepburn Act of 1906 
2. Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 
3. Meat Inspection Act of 1906 
4. Employer's Liability Act of 1906 
Sixtieth Congress 
1. Abolition of Child Labor in District of 
Columbia of 1908 
2. Second Employer's Liability Act of 1908 
3. Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1908 
4. Bureau of Mines Bill of 1908 
Sixty-first Congress 
1. Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1909 
2. Revolt Against "Cannonism" of 1910 
3. Resolution for Income Tax Amendment to 
Constitution of 1910 
4. Mann-Elkins Act of 1910 
5. Postal Savings Banks of 1910 
6. Ballinger-Pinchot Controversy of 1910 
Sixty-second Congress 
1. Resolution for Constitutional Amendment for 
Direct Election of United States Senators of 1911 
2. Publicity of Campaign Expenditures of 1911 
3. Arizona and New Mexico Statehood of 1911 
4. Canadian Reciprocity of 1911 
5. Farmer's Free List of 1911 
6. Wool Tariff Reduction of 1911 
7. Cotton Tariff Reduction of 1911 
8. Children's Bureau of 1912 
9. Parcels Post of 1912 
10. Eight-Hour Day on Government Contracts of 1912 
11. Anti-Injunction Bill of 1912 
12. Workmen's Compensation for Railroad Employees 
of 1913 
Sixty-third Congress 
1. Underwood-Simmons Tariff of 1913 
2. Lobby Investigation of 1913 
3. Federal Reserve Act of 1913 
4. Clayton Anti-Trust Act of 1914 
5. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 
6. Smith-Lever Act of 1914 
7. Resolution for Women Suffrage Amendment to 
Constitution of 1915 
8. LaFollette's Seamen's Act of 1915 
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Sixty-fourth Congress 
1. Keating-Owen Child Labor Act of 1916 
2. Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916 
3. Kern-McGillicuddy Federal Workmen's 
Compensation Act of 1916 
4. Adamson Eight-Hour Act of 1916 
S. Federal Highway Act of 1916 
6. Smith-Hughes Act of 1917 
354 
APPENDIX B 
Note: The reform issues have been broken into three groups based on 
my judgement. The number in parentheses indicates the Congress in 
which the issue appeared. 
Political Reforms 
1. House Rules Change (61) 
2. Constitutional Amendment for Direct Election 
of United States Senators (62) 
3. Campaign Expenditures Act (62) 
4. Arizona and New Mexico Statehood (Initiative, 
Referendum, and Recall) (62) 
5. Lobby Investigation (63) 
6. Constitutional Amendment for Women's Suffrage (63) 
Social Reforms 
1. Pure Food and Drug Act (59) 
2. Meat Inspection Act (59) 
3. Employer's Liability Act (59) 
4. Child Labor for District of Columbia (60) 
5. Second Employer's Liability Act (60) 
6. Bureau of Mines Bill (60) 
7. Children's Bureau (62) 
8. Eight-Hour Day on Government Contracts (62) 
9. Anti-Injunction Bill (62) 
10. Workmen's Compensation for Railway Employees (62) 
11. Smith-Lever Act (63) 
12. LaFollette Seamen's Act (63) 
13. Keating-Owen Act (64) 
14. Kern-McGillicuddy Workmen's Compensation 
Act (64) 
15. Adamson Eight-Hour Day Act (64) 
16~ Federal Highway Act (64) 
17. Smith-Hughes Act (64) 
Economic Reforms 
1. Elkins Act (57) 
2. Bureau of Corporations in newly created 
Department of Conunerce and Labor (57) 
3. Newlands Reclamation Act (57) 
4. Northern Securities Case (57) 
5. Hepburn Act (59) 
6. Aldrich-Vreeland Act (60) 
7. Payne-Aldrich Tariff (61) 
8. Constitutional Amendment for Income Tax (61) 
9. Mann-Elkins Act (61) 
10. Postal Savings Act (61) 
11. Ballinger-Pinchot Affair (61) 
12. Canadian Reciprocity (62) 
13. Farmer'p Free List (62) 
14. Wool Tariff Reductions (62) 
15. Cotton Tariff Reductions (62) 
16. Parcels Post (62) 
17. Underwood-Simmons Tariff (63) 
18. Federal Reserve Act (63) 
19. Clayton Act (63) 
356 
357 
20. Federal Trade Commission Act (63) 
21. Federal Farm Loan Act (64) 
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